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M Á T Y Á S B Ó D I G 
Hart's Jurisprudence: Its Relation to Philosophy 
Abstract. The essay concerns the way jurisprudence adapts to the challenges set by contempo-
rary philosophy concentrating upon the case of Hart 's legal theory. Hart produced one paradigm 
of linking philosophical considerations to jur isprudent ial analyses. He seemed to believe that 
the investigation of legal phenomena must itself raise and answer the underlying philosophical 
questions (only occasionally relying on philosophical sources). Although Hart was well aware of 
the rising new philosophy of his time, he sought to elaborate an autonomous conceptual framework 
for philosophical jurisprudence. The essay often takes Wittgenstein as an example for elucidating 
Hart's relation to philosophy (although criticizing those who believe that Hart is a key figure in the 
jurisprudential reception of Wittgenstein's later philosophy). The essay justifies Hart's claim to gain 
theoretical autonomy but points to three mistakes in that respect. (1) He sometimes misconceived 
his philosophical sources owing to the fact that he refrained from analyzing them. (2) Hart justified 
some of his crucial claims by a combination of arguments that is not entirely consistent. (3) His 
standpoint often raised philosophical issues but he sometimes failed to make an identifiable point 
upon them. The essay concludes that Hart was right in thinking that the time had come to reconsider 
the conditions of making theories about law but he could not justify his assumption that the 
reconsideration would lead to a certain kind of comprehensive theory of law. 
Keywords: jurisprudence, philosophy, Hart, Wittgenstein, the „open texture" of law, rule-
following 
What I try to take into account in the present paper is the attitude of juris-
prudence or, rather, of one particular conception of jurisprudence to philoso-
phical questions that arise in the course of jurisprudential reflection. It concerns 
the way jurisprudence adapts to the environment of contemporary philosophy 
and the challenges set by that environment. However, it does not amount to 
raising the issue of that adaptation. I concentrate upon the experiences of Hart's 
jurisprudence with respect to philosophy. Some of my questions could be raised 
in the context of a basically sociological investigation that concerns the actual 
circumstances of the birth of Hart's The Concept of Law and its characteristic 
formation of discourse. Although I admit the possibility and the significance of 
Mátyás Bódig, Lecturer, Institute for Legal Theory and Legal History, University of 
Miskolc, H-3515 Miskolc, Hungary. 
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that investigation, I pursue different ends. I am interested in the philosophical, 
conceptual perspectives of a certain approach to theoretical questions. 
I firmly believe that one of Hart's most important contributions to the theory 
of law is that he provided one paradigm of linking philosophical considerations 
to jurisprudential analyses. He made jurisprudence philosophical in a quite 
characteristic way. Before Hart, the theorists of jurisprudence were normally 
engaged in "applying" certain philosophical conceptions. It is not because Austin 
was simply a utilitarian, Kelsen was simply a neo-Kantian, Pound was simply a 
pragmatist. However, they relied on philosophers' works and ideas in very ex-
plicit ways without claiming that their theoretical efforts are "autonomous" as 
to their philosophical implications. In this respect, Hart kept some distance from 
any philosophical school implicitly claiming the theoretical autonomy not 
characteristic to his predecessors. That is why it is so problematic to establish 
clear connections between him and certain philosophers (like Wittgenstein and J. L. 
Austin). 
Hart's theoretical autonomy did not mean that he was not content with the 
available philosophical conceptions or did not know them. On the contrary, as a 
scholar of jurisprudence in Oxford, he lived in the centre of the rising new 
philosophy that has proven to be so significant in the recent decades. He held 
courses in common with J. L. Austin.' He was well aware of Ryle's, Witt-
genstein's, and Winch's philosophical ideas. Hart acknowledged the importance 
of the new philosophy taking shape (especially) in Oxford and Cambridge. The 
reader of The Concept of Law can feel the atmosphere of new theoretical 
(philosophical) perspectives. Hart was confident in his ambitions to provide a 
"fresh start"2 for discussing issues of legal theory and accounting for law as such. 
However, he did not commit himself to any of those contemporary philosophers 
in an explicit way: he did not attempt to extend any particular conception towards 
jurisprudence. Hart seemed to believe that the investigation of legal phenomena 
must itself raise the underlying philosophical questions and that we must find 
their answers in the context of the investigation. "[I]t seems to me that the 
common mode of definition is ill adapted to the law (...) and has helped to create 
the impression that the lawyer cannot hope to elucidate without entering a 
forbidding jungle of philosophical argument. I wish to suggest that this is not so; 
that legal notions however fundamental can be elucidated by methods properly 
1
 See Bankowski , Z. and MacCormick, N.: Speech Acts, Legal Institutions and Real 
Laws. In: The Legal Mind (ed. Neil MacCormick and Peter Birks), Oxford, Clarendon, 1986, 
122. 
2
 See Hart, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law. Oxford, Clarendon, 1961, 77-79. 
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adapted to their special character."3 (It reflects the way the above-mentioned 
philosophers themselves discussed issues without arguing for or against particular 
philosophical conceptions.) There was a philosophical background but the concepts 
and arguments deriving from the philosophical background could be moulded 
according to the needs of the investigation. 
There are several obvious examples of that attitude in Hart's theory. One of 
them could be the issue of the nature of "social rule". Hart 's theory presupposes a 
philosophical explanation of social rules as he explains law as a system of specific 
social rules. However, he did not adopt the necessary explanation from a particular 
book or article (in the strict sense of the word) he elaborated it himself, although 
it seems obvious that a theoretical account of social rules does not belong to the 
domain of legal philosophy. Another remarkable example is provided by his essay, 
"Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (which already contains many 
basic ideas of The Concept of Law), in which he made a crucial distinction between 
the "core of meaning" and the "penumbra of meaning" in language as such without 
referring to any philosophical source.4 
Hart can rarely be accused of misunderstanding certain arguments in some 
philosopher's work because he claims his concepts and arguments as warranted 
by the needs of his own investigation. The works of philosophers that are 
mentioned may form the background f rom which certain ideas derive but Hart 
did not think that they can provide ready-made concepts for his inquiry. It 
becomes even more obvious when he seems to adopt concepts. For example, the 
notion of "open texture", the crucial element of his account of interpreting and 
applying legal rules, derives from one of Friedrich Waismann's articles, "Verifia-
bility".5 Nevertheless, Hart uses the term in a way that is significantly different 
from Waismann. In Waismann's essay it was applied to descriptive empirical 
concepts while in Hart's text rules have "open texture". One would expect that 
the possibility of that alteration is drawn as a conclusion from the analysis of 
Waismann's text. Hart, however, delivers no such analysis and restricts himself 
to briefly mentioning Waismann's article.6 Hart's attitude towards Peter Winch's 
ideas seem to reinforce my remark. With respect to the explanation of normati-
3
 Hart, H. L. A.: Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence. In: Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon, 1983, 21. 
4
 Hart, H. L. A.: Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. 71 (1958) Harvard Law 
Review, 593; see 606-607. 
5
 See Waismann, F.: Verifiability. In: Logic and Language (ed. Antony Flew), Oxford, 
В lack well, 1951. 
6
 See Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 249. 
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vity, Hart's crucial claim is the distinction between the internal and the external 
aspects (of rules). That seems to be parallel to something that is central to 
Winch's account in his The Idea of a Social Science: the "internality of social 
relations".7 Hart's conception significantly differs from that of Winch but once 
again the differences are not brought out by means of an analysis: Winch is 
mentioned as having a "similar" conception.8 
I do not think those are mistakes to condemn. Hart's way of handling his 
philosophical sources belongs to his attitude towards philosophy and to his claim 
to elaborate an autonomous conceptual framework for philosophical jurispru-
dence. In a sense, he might have thought rightly that extensive analyses of his 
philosophical sources would have concealed the originality of his basic ideas. 
However, if we encounter ambiguities in Hart's theory of law, we cannot return 
to the sources that may clarify the issue in details. That may summarize the risk 
that Hart ran in opting for a specific formation of discourse. The theory had to 
stand for itself against every challenge. (Hart seemed to recognize that: in the 
"Postscript" attached to the second edition of The Concept of Law, he chose to 
defend his theory without returning to his philosophical background for some 
"extra help".9) The theory itself must contain the answer for the questions 
concerning the philosophical possibility or plausibility of its conceptual frame-
work. 
It would be too easy to draw the conclusion at this stage that Hart is far from 
successful in establishing his theory within a tenable conceptual framework. 
Since its first publication, Hart 's theory of law (as explicated in The Concept of 
Law) has been subject to criticism and hardly anyone takes it as entirely tenable. 
I shall pay some attention to the basic shortcomings of Hart's theory but that is 
not to be taken as the main intent of my text. The main issue is the possibility of 
and the need for theoretical "depth" in the philosophy of law, the interplay 
between jurisprudence and philosophy because Hart's influence on this level 
seems to be more important than on the level of his actual arguments. I try to 
differentiate between two kinds of issues: the issues of the plausibility of a 
particular theoretical device and the issue of the formation of discourse. As to the 
first, I think, the shortcomings of Hart's theory can be pointed out without too 
many complications. The theory has certain philosophical implications that are 
7
 See Winch, P.: The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy. London, 
Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1958, 123. 
8
 See Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 242. 
9
 See Hart, H. L. A.: Postscript. In: The Concept of Law. 2nd edition, Oxford, Clarendon, 
1994. 
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open to a critical survey. The criticism may lead us to calling into question the 
underlying methodology of Hart's theory and not to the final judgment on Hart's 
jurisprudence. I shall try to follow the line of the former reasoning. 
The relation of jurisprudence to philosophy is at the heart of Hart's legal 
theory. Let me sum up what I find particularly significant in that relation. The 
discourse in which the theory is formulated establishes a paradigm of facing or 
handling the challenge of philosophical problems in jurisprudence. This challenge 
is twofold. The theoretical discourse of law itself raises philosophical problems and 
the philosophical discourse can change the conditions of "making" theories on law. 
Hart seemed to use the philosophical discourse as a background that enabled him 
to handle the philosophical problems inherent in jurisprudence without explicit 
recourse to any particular philosophical conception-without speaking the 
language of any particular philosopher. In that respect, Hart's philosophy of law 
runs contrary to an attempt of placing one philosopher (say, Wittgenstein) into the 
centre of discourse (as limit and as criterion). 
For several reasons, I shall often take Wittgenstein as an example when I try to 
elucidate Hart's relation to philosophy. I hope that my paper will reveal most of 
those reasons. The principal reason is that Hart's relation to Wittgenstein is 
characterized by reception and detachment at the same time. It seems obvious 
that Hart's legal theory has something to do with Wittgenstein. There are traces 
of direct and indirect Wittgensteinian influence in his works. However, Witt-
genstein's late philosophy is far from central to Hart's theory. In The Concept 
of Law he did not quote and did not analyze a single sentence from Wittgenstein. 
He mentioned Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations as a book that contains 
"many important observations" concerning one particular issue that is of central 
significance for Hart's work: rule-following.10 Of course, it is not enough to 
establish strong connections between Hart and Wittgenstein. It is highly unlikely 
that Hart intended to produce a "truly" Wittgensteinian philosophy of law. 
My introductory remarks throw some light upon the mistake of those who 
believe that Hart is a key figure in the jurisprudential reception of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy.11 In the strict sense of the word, Hart did not promote the juris-
10
 See ibid. 249. 
11
 See Langille, В.: Revolution without Foundation: The Grammar of Scepticism and Law. 
33 McGill Law Journal ( 1983), 451,498. 
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prudential reception of Wittgenstein's later thinking. His theoretical efforts are 
detached from that reception in many respects. 
As to the metatheoretical convictions, there are sharp differences between 
Hart and Wittgenstein. For example, Hart was concerned with giving a theoretical 
account of the specific conditions of rule-following in an area of life and 
communication (legal practices). Although Wittgenstein produced a whole series 
of remarks on rule-following, he did not intend to provide or even encourage such 
an account. One cannot even extend Witgenstein's remarks towards the problems 
raised by Hart.12 As I shall show it below, Hart sometimes referred to certain 
semantic features of linguistic utterances to support his claims. In that respect, 
he seemed to be involved in the "linguistic turn" of philosophy. The turn that is 
often associated with Wittgenstein. However, Wittgenstein was not concerned 
about listing general features of language.13 In his later works, he did not seek 
a single abstract point of view (which was pretty much the fatal mistake of his 
TractatusH). Wittgenstein consistently refrained from using even the word 
language as an operative term that would embrace the entire scope of the analysis. 
He preferred to talk about language-games15 in order to put the emphasis upon 
the multiplicity of conditions of communication and understanding that surpass 
the horizon of comprehensive analytic concepts. (And there are further 
implications of the use of the term. Language-games are not simply tools of 
describing types of communicative situations but the common name for many 
invented, imaginary forms of communication that serve to provide illuminating 
comparisons of sharply differing uses of words or possibilities of understanding. 
"It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in 
battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering 
yes or no. And innumerable others.—And to imagine a language means to imagine 
a form of life.'"6) 
The considerations that lead to those metatheoretical convictions are comp-
letely alien to Hart. He was right in detaching himself from Wittgenstein—in never 
identifying himself as a Wittgensteinian. In that respect, he took advantage of his 
12
 As John McDowell seems to suggest in his "Non-cognitivism and Rule Following"; in: 
Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed. by S. H. Holtzman and C. M. Leich, London, Routlege and 
KeganPaul, 1981, see 160. 
13
 Nevertheless, one may point to remarks which refer to general features, i.e. Wittgenstein, 
L.: Philosophical Investigations. Oxford, Basil Blackwell; 1958, s. 43. I do not attempt to 
elucidate here how they fit into Wittgenstein's investigations. 
14
 See Pears, D.: The False Prison, vol. 2; Oxford, Clarendon, 1988; 424. 
15
 See Wittgenstein; Philosophical Investigations, op. cit. 7. 
16
 Ibid. 19. 
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theoretical autonomy. (And in other respects, he took advantage of keeping some 
distance from many other philosophers whose works also seem relevant to his 
efforts.) 
Wittgenstein did not seem to answer the "basic" methodological questions in 
a way that would be appropriate for supporting or establishing the Haitian 
enterprise even at the expense of some rectification. He might have opposed the 
use of operative terms and comprehensive analytic tools. He posed the question 
of the analytic study in a much more radical sense than we did in our original 
question. In many respects, Wittgenstein's conception seems to be a challenge to 
the Hartian theory, rather than a source of ideas. What we have found out during 
the analysis will be relevant to this challenge and will help to provide a partial 
characterization of the practice of the Hartian analysis. 
As I indicated above, I do not claim that there is no "interference" between Hart 
and contemporary philosophy. Actually, there are two elements in his theory that 
could be connected to the philosophy of the "linguistic turn". (1) Hart put an 
emphasis on analyzing the meaning of some characteristic legal terms. But he did 
not strive to formulate a theory of the language of law or to find the adequate 
philosophical account of language that could help us in that analysis. (2) Hart was 
convinced that any theoretical account of law should be anchored in the existing 
practices. We are not to present a "heaven of concepts" in which every conceptual 
element has a clear and consistent meaning. We have got to give an account of 
what the lawyers do, the way they actually use the terminology of law even if it 
is sometimes ambiguous and uncertain. Although it is not justified by textual 
evidence, he might have thought (pretty much like Wittgenstein) that the only 
ground for conceptual certainty is the existing practice.17 Concepts live their 
authentic lives in practices. 
The (partly legitimate) impression that he was somehow involved in the 
philosophy of language has lead some authors to think that the underlying 
philosophy of Hart's theory must be a theory of language. Some hoped that a 
good grasp of the conceptual conditions of his theory can be found in his partly 
explicit, partly implicit commitment to a view of language. However, that turned 
out to be a failure: there is no consistent view of language behind Hart's 
17
 See ibid. 109. and Wittgenstein, L.: On Certainty. Oxford , Basil Blackwell , 1979, 
102. 
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arguments—only a number of diverging ideas. The failure was based upon the 
misconception of Hart's relation to his philosophical sources. 
Let me elucidate what I mean. Sometimes it seems that Hart's analytic vision 
is based upon some theory of language or a general semantic theory.18 Hart 
emphasized the central significance of the analysis of legal concepts. He 
regarded it as the core of his positivist commitment.19 Some critics, like Lon 
L. Fuller,20 tried to point to that theory to reach to the heart of his ideas—but 
there is no such theory at the basis. Although Hart understood his own commit-
ment to analytic jurisprudence as a task of clarifying the meaning of the 
characteristic terms of legal communication, that was not meant to be a linguis-
tic analysis. It was (as Hart himself emphasized21) more like a sociological 
inquiry that elucidates social practices by way of throwing light upon the terms 
used in communicating the practices in question. Of course, it has something 
to do with some issues of the philosophy of language: it presupposes that at 
least some words are to be clarified in relation to their use in social practices. 
However, it is far from attributing central significance to the philosophy of 
language. Joseph Raz is right in thinking that Hart considered law as a complex 
political institution that could be explained with reference to some social 
needs.22 Hart's approach was basically an institutional one. (In that respect, his 
Essays on Bentham23 is much less misleading than The Concept of Law.) The 
elucidation of the specific vocabulary of law was a result of taking that 
conviction as the principal guideline in jurisprudence. And, at the same time, 
it was an issue that helped to point to the shortcomings of other theoretical 
approaches which fail to give a tenable account of the specific character of the 
terminology of law.24 
18
 See Hart: Positivism... op. cit. 607. 
19
 See ibid. 601. 
20
 See Fuller, L. L.: Positivism and the Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart. 71 
(1958) Harvard Law Review, 630, 668-669. 
21
 See Hart: The Concept of Law. p. v. 
22
 See Raz, J.: Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford, Clarendon, 1994, 204. 
23
 See Hart, H. L. A.: Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory. Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1982. 
24
 The use of a conceptual analysis as a starting point for a critique of rival theoretical 
conceptions could be exemplified by Har t ' s "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence". 
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Nevertheless, Hart's decision to claim theoretical autonomy sometimes has its 
price. As he chose not to establish carefully the philosophical issues concerning 
his theory, he committed some mistakes. I think there are three serious problems 
with his standpoint in this respect. 
(1) Hart sometimes misconceived his philosophical sources owing to the fact that 
he refrained from analyzing them. I shall support that claim by considering 
Hart's reference to Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following in the context of 
his theory of rules. 
Hart had to formulate a theory of rules and (in some respects) of rule-
following, and thought it had something to do with Wittgenstein. For that reason, 
he referred to Wittgenstein's analysis of the issue of rule-following, making the 
impression that Wittgenstein provided some basis for his theoretical device. 
However, Wittgenstein did not have a theory of rule-following, and we have 
good reasons to believe that he was not inclined to support such an enterprise. 
I tried to argue that there are some features of Hart's theory of legal inter-
pretation that establishes a conceptual link between him and Wittgenstein. Later, 
I tried to argue that the importance of those links does not lie in the fact that 
Wittgenstein provided excellent analytical tools to Hart in any sense. Actually, 
Wittgenstein did not provide anything like that and sought the answers to 
significantly different questions than those of Hart's. (When does and does not 
a certain form of doubt make sense?25) 
It has two crucial consequences for our inquiry. Wittgenstein did not 
elaborate a comprehensive theory of rules that could be in contrast or in 
accordance with Hart 's theory of legal interpretation. If there are conceptual 
links between Hart and Wittgenstein, if Hart made use of ideas that he 
considered as Wittgensteinian, he must have misunderstood systematically the 
purpose and the significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Something must 
have been between him and Wittgenstein that hindered him from realizing the 
problematic character of his (scarce) references to Wittgenstein—a distortion that 
was necessary to allow him to think that certain Wittgensteinian ideas might 
support his arguments. What was it? Part of the answer is the peculiar character 
of the formation of discourse that underlies the Hartian theory-making. 1 tried 
to grasp some of its salient features above and I would like to consider them 
again later. Hart was not engaged in clarifying the conditions of his references 
25
 See Pears: The False Prison, op. cit., vol. 2, 442. 
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in a careful analysis. Some of the tensions might have remained hidden. 
Moreover, Hart did not try to face and clarify the major ambiguities of his 
position. 
(2) Hart justifies some of his crucial claims by a combination of arguments that 
are not entirely consistent. Occasionally, he applies arguments without a 
determinate common character or direction and it allows for providing answers 
for many distinct problems at the expense of blurring the philosophical conditions 
of the consistency of his arguments. For example, he provided two ways of 
clarifying why legal rules are to be taken as "open-textured". He presented his 
conclusions partly as a consequence of the character of some elements of 
language, and partly as a result of pragmatic considerations concerning statutory 
interpretation. "Hart's discussion of 'open texture' in The Concept of Law seemed 
to rest half-way between emphasizing speaker's meaning and emphasizing word's 
meaning, and half-way between a theory of meaning and a theory of statutory 
interpretation."26 
It seems very compelling to conclude that we cannot take the distinction of 
the "core" and the "penumbra of meaning" and the "open texture" originating 
exclusively from an underlying philosophy of language. That is exactly what 
Brian Bix reached as a conclusion about Hart's "open texture": "I do not think 
that Hart's conclusion of partial indeterminacy in my view, summarized by 
more than based upon the idea of 'open texture' derived from a view of 
language so much as from a view of how people create and think about rules. 
Hart was not concerned about creating, elaborating, or defending a particular 
general philosophy of language. His concern was with the way that legal rules 
are (and should be) applied. Hart had not proven from the nature of language that 
judges must have discretion; rather, he gave reasons why legal texts should be 
interpreted in a way that leaves judges discretion in applying the law."27 Hart 
did not insist that the open texture of law and the indispensability of judicial 
discretion are necessary features of law, and their review in the course of the 
reflection on law is out of the question. It might be a symptom of an inherent 
ambiguity in Hart's position. "While Hart at times seemed to argue that 
something about language makes it inevitable that judges will have discretion, 
he seemed at other times to concede that judges could interpret rules in such a 
way that they would rarely need to exercise discretion. For example, he 
considered and rejected a way of clarifying the meaning of terms within rules 
26
 Bix, В.: Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy. Oxford, Clarendon, 1993, 22. 
27
 Ibid. 18. 
HART'S JURISPRUDENCE: ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 11 
based simply on language.28 (...) Hart's argument was couched as often in terms 
of policy as it was in terms of a meaning theory: he argued that any attempt to 
reduce judicial discretion significantly would have negative consequences (in 
particular, an inflexibility an inability to recharacterize rules to meet changing 
circumstances)."29 
It seems as if Hart had been reluctant to treat the "open texture" of law as a 
presupposition underlying his views on judicial interpretation and kept on 
seeking further arguments to prove its existence and the necessity of judicial 
discretion (e.g. the disadvantages of a rigid legal system). We may add another 
example that suggests that Hart could sometimes argue for the existence of the 
"open texture" of law without referring to the linguistic conditions of it. In the 
"Postscript" attached to the second edition of The Concept of Law he found it 
better to allude to some dignified figures of the judiciary who believed in the 
existence of the indeterminacy in law. "There is no doubt that the familiar 
rhetoric of the judicial process encourages the idea that there are in a developed 
legal system no legally unregulated cases (...) But it is important to distinguish 
the ritual language used by judges and lawyers in deciding cases in their courts 
from their more reflective general statements about the judicial process. Judges 
of the stature of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Cardozo in the United States, or 
Lord Macmillan or Lord Radcliffe or Lord Reid in England, and a host of other 
lawyers, both academic and practising, have insisted that there are cases left 
incompletely regulated by the law where the judge has an inescapable though 
'interstitial' law-making task, and that so far as the law is concerned many cases 
could be decided either way."30 
Hart 's standpoint is very confusing. If the "open texture" of rules is 
justifiable with reference to a theory of meaning, his arguments from policy are 
utterly irrelevant and misleading. If it makes sense to use arguments from policy 
it means that the consequences of the "open-texture" raise questions of practical 
philosophy. They concern our perspective of practical reasonableness. They 
concern what kind of law we would like to have. I cannot imagine a context in 
which Hart's two ways of arguing for the "open texture" could be linked 
together. 
(3) Hart's standpoint often raises philosophical issues but sometimes fails to 
make an identifiable point upon them. Occasionally, the necessary philosophical 
28
 See Hart: The Concept of Law. 126-127. 
29
 Bix: Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy. op. cit. 21. 
30
 Hart: Postscript, op. cit. IIA. 
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standpoint behind Hart's arguments is missing. My example for that of kind 
mistake will be the issue of the relationship between the context of linguistic 
utterances and the meaning of words which is closely related to Hart 's views on 
the way general classifying terms figure in the application of rules. As that claim 
is by far the most serious of the three, I shall support it with an extensive 
analysis. 
The text of The Concept of Law suggests that Hart hoped to take advantage of 
the term "open texture" in relation to his analysis of the formulation of rules: 
"uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general 
classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact. 
Natural languages like English are when so used irreducibly open textured."31 
"In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, inherent in the 
nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide."32 The 
use of the general classifying term and its consequences is the point of one of 
Hart 's famous examples: the rule "no vehicles in the park". "Vehicle" is a 
general term and the consideration of it in the context of a rule leads us to 
recognize the difference between the plain cases and the problematic borderline 
cases. By means of the standard instances ("If anything is a vehicle a motor-car 
is one.") we can grasp the plain cases (i.e. "Motor-cars are excluded from the 
park."). 
The plain cases have characteristic features—some of which the borderline 
instances may either possess or lack. Actually, the lack of some relevant features 
makes them borderline cases. In some respects, they seem to be vehicles, in 
some others, they do not. However, that does not seem to account for our 
problem. Hart surprises the analyst with treating here "airplanes" and "bicycles" 
as borderline cases. Does he mean that it is dubious whether they are vehicles or 
not? No. Hart treats them as dubious only with respect to the given rule. "Does 
'vehicle' used here include bicycles, airplanes, roller skates?"33 The rule as 
such has something to do with our recognition of plain and borderline cases. 
Hart does not recommend to interpret the general term as such, independently 
of its context determined by the rule. 
31
 Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 125. 
32
 Ibid. 123. 
33
 Ibid. Italics are mine. 
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We would need further clarification of the interplay between the context and 
the general term but it is nowhere to be found in The Concept of Law. The plain 
cases do not represent an ideal semantic element that can be found by way of 
contemplation. A kind of familiarity in the practice of action and communication 
renders them plain: "There will indeed be plain cases constantly recurring in 
similar contexts."34 "The plain case, where the general terms seem to need no 
interpretation and where the recognition of instances seems unproblematic or 
'automatic', are only the familiar ones, constantly recurring in similar contexts, 
where there is general agreement in judgments as to the applicability of the 
classifying terms."35 
At that point, Hait seemed to take into account the interplay between the context 
and the general term but it was his only step in that direction. Nevertheless, it 
enables us to rule out Fuller's criticism which took the distinction of the "core" and 
the "penumbra of meaning" as based upon a certain semantic theory that isolates 
the meaning both from the use and the internal structure of language.36 At least, 
it allows for an important conclusion: Hart's position cannot be clarified or 
supplemented by a view of language in which meaning and context are in any 
sense independent. 
That is worth noting because there is a conception that would supplement Hart 
with a semantic theory of that kind. Frederick Schauer, in his Playing by the 
Rules, analyzing Hart's views on rules and their interpretation, contended that 
meaning must be in a sense "acontextual". "My analysis of the concept of a rule 
... assumes ... that the meaning of language is not wholly explained by the 
unformulated purposes for which a speaker employs that language, nor wholly 
explained by the particular context in which that language is used. In other words, 
the potential divergence between rule and justification assumes that both 
language and meaning are at least partially acontextual."37 Schauer claimed that 
the point of his analysis was that particular contexts in themselves cannot account 
for the meaning of the linguistic utterances. 
He considered an example of finding a group of shells on the beach looking 
something like "C-A-T". The group of shells makes me think "cat". "My ability to 






 See Fuller: Positivism and the Fidelity to Law... 668-669. It does not mean that Fuller is 
to blame for a mistake here: Hart 's "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" upon 
which he reflected seems to be much less subtle than The Concept of Law. 
37
 Schauer, F.: Playing by the Rules. Oxford, Clarendon, 1991, 55. 
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a rather closely grouped array of reactions to that same shell pattern, demonstrates 
the phenomenon I call semantic autonomy, the way in which language cames 
something by itself, independent of those who use it on particular occasions."38 
Instead of acontextuality, Schauer preferred to put the emphasis on the difference 
between particular and universal (or baseline) contexts.34 The universal contexts 
make us think of certain things despite the particular contextual conditions: 
whenever I see "C-A-T" I think cat. In Schauer's theory, the role of practices and 
constantly recurring instances is secondary to that of the semantic contents (fixed 
in language). The meanings that exist independently of particular contexts enable 
us to formulate, understand, obey and disobey rules. That leads Schauer to regard 
the distinction of formulated and unformulated rules as crucial. The formulation 
of the rule "activates" the semantic contents that specify the requirements of the 
rule for us. "[T]he ability to explain the constraints of an unformulated or 
unformulatable rule is a difficult task, and one quite different from the task of 
explaining the potential constraints of a formulated rule."40 "We have seen in 
this section that formulated rules can guide because the formulation provides the 
semantic content by virtue of which we can say that a rule is followed or 
broken."41 
One can see the way it can be connected with Hart's arguments in The Con-
cept of Law. His concern is very much the formulated rule that contains general 
terms. The features of general terms produce the plain cases and, at the same 
time, are responsible for the "open texture" of law. If Hart insisted that the use of 
general terms in formulating rules is an indispensable condition of the existence 
of law,42 Schauer could offer a philosophical explanation of what that condition 
consists in. As I argued above, Hart did not seem to subscribe to a semantic 
theory like that of Schauer's. But it is not necessarily a good news and a sign of 
subtlety. It may well imply that Hart failed to see the consequences or the 
implications of his own theoretical device. I concluded that Hart seemed to 
assume the interplay of general terms and contextual conditions but that interplay 
was not clarified. But can it be clarified in his conceptual framework anyway? If 
38
 Ibid. 56 
39
 See ibid 57. 
40




 "If it were not possible to communicate general standards of conduct, which multitudes 
of individuals could understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain conduct 
when occasion arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could exist. Hence the law must 
predominantly, but by no means exclusively, refer to classes of person, and to classes of acts, 
things, and circumstances." Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 121. 
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someone takes it as a personal mission to provide the missing elucidation, can he 
opt for a solution that is not parallel to that of Schauer's? It is possible that any 
further step to clarify the conception leads to formidable tensions. Is it right 
seeking the solution in the interplay between general (classifying) terms and 
contexts? It seems obvious that the clarification must concentrate upon the 
features of general terms and their significance in formulating rules for the 
conception is based upon those features and that significance. However, it is not 
at all obvious that the solution can be found there. 
Hart's conception seems to be heavily dependent upon the idea that, if there 
are plain cases, it is because the general classifying terms mark out standard 
instances of their meaning. "General terms would be useless to us as a medium 
of communication unless there are such familiar, generally unchallenged 
cases."43 At this stage, it is worth considering one of Fuller's arguments against 
Hart. Although Fuller wrongly attributed a comprehensive semantic theory to 
Hart, the way he tried to show the absurdity of presupposing standard instances 
behind the general terms, remains interesting. The argument is targeted upon the 
whole idea of plain cases which do not require the consideration of the aim or 
purpose of the rule, and can guide only by virtue of the meaning of its 
constitutive words. "Is it really possible to interpret a word in a statute without 
knowing the aim of the statute? Suppose we encounter the following incomplete 
sentence: 'All improvements must be promptly reported to...' Professor Hart 's 
theory seems to assert that even if we have only this fragment before us we can 
safely construe the words 'improvement' to apply to its 'standard instance', 
though we would have to know the rest of the sentence before we could deal 
intelligently with 'problems of penumbra'. Yet surely in the truncated sentence 
I have quoted, the word 'improvement' is almost as devoid of meaning as the 
symbol 'x ' . The word 'improvement' will immediately take on meaning if we fill 
out the sentence with the words, 'the head nurse', or, 'the Town Planning 
Authority', though the two meanings that come to mind are radically dissimilar. 
It can hardly be said that these two meanings represent some kind of penumbral 
accretion to the word 'improvement'. (...) It should be noted that in deciding what 
the word 'improvement' means in all the cases, we do not proceed simply by 
placing the word in some general context, such as hospital practice, town 
planning, or education. If this were so, the 'improvement' in the last instance 
might just as well be that of the teacher as that of the pupil. Rather, we ask 
43
 Ibid. 123. 
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ourselves: What can this rule be for? What evil does it seek to avert? What good 
is it intended to promote?"44 
One could remark that Fuller's criticism is highly unfair as Hart seemed to 
concentrate upon the standard instances in the context of rules, for the purpose 
of rules. In other words, at the end of the day, certain cases appear to be plain. 
The truncated sentence deprives us of the rule to be interpreted with respect to 
the words. However, the main point of Fuller 's argument is very much relevant 
to Hart: the consequences of glimpsing the interplay between the meaning of 
words and the contextual conditions of their use. It calls into question his 
emphasis on a "general feature of language" as to the use of general classifying 
terms. The main issue raised by Fuller is whether that "general feature" belongs 
more to the varying contexts of linguistic utterances than to the semantic features 
of general terms. As I tried to argue, Hart's arguments lead to that question. If 
we can answer it, we can get rid of some ambiguities that cast doubt on Hart 's 
position. 
Fuller's argument implies an explanation of the interplay between the term 
and its context. Contrary to what Hart contended in the "Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals",45 the general term has no standard instance as 
such. The meaning of the rule and its terms must be elucidated by virtue of 
interpretation with respect to contextual conditions like the purpose of the rule. 
Every act of application involves an act of interpretation. It is a well-known line 
of argument as to our given question. It is a typical alternative to Schauer's 
standpoint that we already found inadequate to Hart's likely intentions. So, is 
that route of explanation open to Hart? Probably not, but, at least, it brings out 
an important feature of Hart's position. He admitted that the interplay between 
the term and its context cannot be found in the universal horizon of inter-
pretation constantly mediating between the given words and the present situations. 
With the idea of plain cases, Hart seemed to wish to escape from the universality 
of interpretation: "The plain case, where the general terms seem to need no 
interpretation and where the recognition of instances seems unproblematic or 
'automatic'..."46 
If Hart rejects the universal need for interpretative mediation between the 
words and their contexts, how can we account for his (slightly ambiguous) re-
cognition of the interplay of general classifying terms and their contexts? Where 
could he find a middle position between universal contexts, acontextual meanings 
44
 Fuller: Positivism and the Fidelity to Law... op. cit. 665. 
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 See Hart: Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, op. cit. 607. 
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 Hart: The Concept of Law. op. cit. 123. Italics are mine. 
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(of Schauer's) and the universal horizon of mediating interpretation (as Fuller 
contended it)? 
It is not to suggest that there is no middle position to be found. The whole issue 
is connected with Wittgenstein's famous remarks on following a rule that 
seemed to seek right that middle position. At first glance, it may be promising. 
There is an indirect link between Hart and Wittgenstein in respect to the "open 
texture" of law. Waismann (who invented the term "open texture") knew Witt-
genstein and was strongly influenced by him.47 One can even point to the 
parallel between certain arguments of "Verifiability" and some remarks of the 
Philosophical Investigations that date back to the 1930's. Waismann writes: 
"There is no need to inquire into the verification of such sentences as 'The dog 
barks', 'He runs', 'He is playful', and so on, as the words are then used as we 
may say in their normal way. But when we say 'The dog thinks', we create a new 
context, we step outside the boundaries of common speech, and then the question 
arises as to what is meant by such a word series."48 Compare it to the 
Philosophical Investigations: "It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is 
clearly prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case. The 
more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say."49 
It does not mean that Waismann's article can be seen as revealing "authentic" 
Wittgensteinian ideas before the publication of the "original thoughts". 
Waismann's position is controversial in this respect.50 What is crucial to us is 
the difference of the contexts of the apparently parallel thoughts cited above. For 
47
 Waismann witnessed the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy when it was in tran-
sition in the early 1930's. He had recorded his conversations with Wittgenstein since 1929 until 
1931. These conversations were published under the title Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle 
(edited by Brian McGuinness, Oxford, Blackwell, 1979) and represent what may be called the 
"verificationist period" in Wittgenstein's philosophy. That was the last phase before the "turn" 
that resulted in Wittgenstein's later views. Waismann saw the verificationism collapsing in 
Wittgenstein's thoughts and giving way to radically new ideas. It may elucidate why the issue 
of verifiability was so important for Waismann and why certain elements of his terminology (e.g. 
hypotheses) date back to his recorded conversations with Wittgenstein. 
48
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Waismann it serves to characterize our use of the empirical terms (as being "open 
textured"). 
For Wittgenstein, that remark is the very last before the famous examination 
of following a rule.51 In some preceding sections one of Wittgenstein's main 
concern was the exactness or inexactness of our use of words. "I say 'there is a 
chair'. What if I go up to it, meaning to fetch it, and it suddenly disappears from 
sight? 'So it wasn't a chair, but some kind of illusion.'—But in a few moments 
we see it again and are able to touch it and so on. - 'So the chair was their after 
all and its disappearance was some kind of illusion.'- But suppose that after a 
time it disappears again—or seems to disappear. What are we to say now? Have 
you rules ready for such cases—rules saying whether one may use the word 
'chair' to include this kind of thing? But do we miss them when we use the word 
'chair ' , and are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning to this word, 
because we are not equipped with rules for every possible application of it?"52 
The issues point forward to the discussion of rule-following, posing the question 
"what enables us to follow rules whatsoever if we are not equipped in advance 
for every possible application?". Part of the answer is the difference between 
normal and abnormal cases (in section 142)—our use of the words is "calibrated" 
on normal cases.53 However, it would be far too ambiguous without the 
clarification of the rule-following activity. By what means can we be equipped 
with rules at all? The difference between Wittgenstein and Waismann lies in 
this direction of questions in the Philosophical Investigations. Although the 
initial problem can be treated as similar (the possible ambiguities of the use of 
this or that word), for Wittgenstein the questions reach far beyond the problem 
of final "undefinability" which was Waismann's main point in his paper 
"Verifiability". 
The irony of the difference is that by way of picking up Waismann's ideas, 
Hart had problems with adopting the basically descriptive term of "open texture" 
to an analysis of rules.54 Hart did not seem to overcome the ambiguities of his 
use of the term while Wittgenstein's treatment of the parallel problem led right 
to the analysis of rules. Was it a secret to Hart? In a sense, not. There are 
remarks that suggest that Hart saw some kind of connection between his idea of 
"open texture" of law and Wittgenstein's analysis of rule-following. Those 
51
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52
 Ibid. 80. 
53
 David Pears took it as one of the crucial conclusions of Wittgenstein's analysis of rule 
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connections, however, are not strong enough to indicate that he relied upon 
Wittgenstein in order to overcome the ambiguities. The notes to the relevant 
chapter of The Concept of Law refer to Wittgenstein's observations as important 
concerning the notions of teaching and following rules55 but that is not 
connected clearly to Hart's own analysis. 
With respect to the relevance of "open texture" to legal reasonig, Hart also 
mentions his "Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence".56 The text comprises 
many arguments familiar from "Positivism and the Separation and Law and 
Morals" and The Concept of Law. "The substantial question therefore is: Does this 
presented case resemble the standard case of a vessel more than it resembles what 
is plainly not a vessel in respect to which a lawyer would acknowledge the legal 
system attaches weight?"57 The reasoning concerning some features of legal inter-
pretation begins with a clear reference to Wittgenstein. "In what sense are legal 
rules vague, uncertain and unclear? Of course no legal rules can determine their 
application and the cases where no difficulty arises are simply those where there is 
general agreement that a case alls within the rule."58 The footnote to this 
paragraph reads as follows: "see the elaboration of the theme that no rules can 
determine their application in Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations."59 That 
may indicate that the recourse to the "agreement in judgments" concerning the plain 
cases in The Concept of Law represents Hart's interpretation of Wittgenstein 
(although it is not much more than mere speculation). 
However, once again we see Hart committed to the idea that the heart of the 
matter is the use of general (classifying, descriptive) terms. "Most of the difficulty 
in applying legal rules to concrete cases arises where (a) there is no difficulty in 
citing clear or standard cases to which the case undisputably applies, but (b) in a 
given case a difficulty is precipitated because some feature present or absent in the 
standard case is absent or present in this case. (...) The crucial question presented 
to a court in all such cases is always one of classification of some presented 
particular. We cannot say that the object is clearly a vessel, a signature or a vehicle, 
or clearly not a vessel, etc., because it shares with both features to which the legal 
55
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system attaches importance."60 "[U]ntil the meaning of the legal rule is settled it 
is impossible to refer to the facts of the case in its terms."61 
The paper seems to throw some light upon Hart's views on legal interpretation 
that cause problems to us. He seemed to incorporate some ideas that may have 
Wittgensteinian origins into his conception and that intention can be traced in The 
Concept of Law as well. Hart used them to strengthen his account of the plain 
cases. "[The plain cases] are only the familiar ones, constantly recurring in 
similar contexts, where there is general agreement in judgments as to the 
applicability of the classifying terms."62 This might be connected to the 
concluding remarks of the analysis of rule-following in the Philosophical Inves-
tigations. " 'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
false?' It is what human beings say that is true and false, and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in forms of life."63 "If 
language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments."64 
Hart seems to contend that the agreement making possible the existence of 
plain cases is reached by way of the common human activity (plain 
cases—"constantly recurring in similar contexts"). However, Hart's reliance 
upon those ideas appears to be secondary when he attempts to clarify the 
conditions of legal interpretation itself. At that stage, he prefers to concentrate 
upon the significance of the general classifying terms and operates with the 
transciption of Waismann's "open texture". The 1955 paper suggests that Hart 
"suspected" the possible links between his and Wittgenstein's problems but did 
not actually recognize them. He picked up a certain idea that he regarded as 
crucial ("no rules can determine their own application") and insisted upon its 
consequences without building his theory of legal interpretation upon them. As 
I argued above, he might have had no philosophy of language that could guide his 
way of making theories and that could explain why he was not capable of over-
coming the multiple ambiguities of his ideas. He relied upon a mixture of 
significantly differing ideas on certain features of rules, using general classifying 
terms, etc. 
That is what I meant in claiming that Hart sometimes has no clearly identi-
fiable position. In certain respects, his arguments are built upon a mixture of 
60
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differing thoughts that is hardly consistent. He cannot be reconciled with the 
straight and sometimes simplistic views of Schauer's and Fuller's. 
It seems that the inquiry into some of Hart's ideas blurred the initial point I 
made about his legal theory. I argued that he is committed to a kind of 
theoretical (philosophical) autonomy. Later, I drew several conclusions about 
Hart's failure to provide a consistent philosophical ground to his theory. I tried 
to point out that failure in several respects. Sometimes Hart seems to subscribe 
to problematic doctrines that are responsible for tensions around some of his 
basic ideas. In some cases (as I am inclined to conclude after the analysis of 
Hart's theory of judicial interpretation) the underlying philosophical doctrines 
are not identifiable or clarifiable and there is much to suggest that sometimes 
there are no underlying philosophical doctrines that could support his position. 
However, by making that point we do not have to withdraw the initial point. 
The initial point was not about the viability of Hart's actual arguments or their 
consistency. It was about a certain approach to making theories about law and 
coping with the arising philosophical questions. The matter of that approach is, 
at least partly, independent of the viability of the actual arguments. In this 
respect, the tensions I tried to point out in Hart's arguments were supposed to 
serve a purpose going beyond the mere criticism of the arguments in question: to 
justify that we are not faced with a "good old theory". 
So far, I have examined formal objections that concern the philosophical 
character of Hart's arguments: the way he reached some of his conclusions. I 
deliberately avoided explicating a substantial criticism that would call into 
question the central elements of his legal theory. However, in the last section of 
my analysis, I shall try to indicate the way my formal objections affect substantial 
elements of Hart's theory. 
Hart's entire theory of law is based upon a given division of the field of 
inquiry that enables him to talk about law in general. (As if he tried to answer a 
question suggested by Winch:65 How can we elucidate the peculiar nature of the 
form of life called "law"?) Hart was engaged in the presupposition that law has 
65
 "[W]hereas the philosophies of science, of art, of history, etc., will have the task of 
elucidating the peculiar natures of those forms of life called ' sc ience ' , 'art ' , etc., epistemology 
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one distinctive nature: law is an analytic unit. He did not raise the issue of a 
possible diversity in the uses of the word "law" that rules out the search for the 
nature of law as a unit of analysis. Hart was committed to disclosing the "general 
nature of law".66 The problems I raised stand in the way of that disclosure. 
In a sense, Hart falls short of the theoretical perspicuity of, say, Kelsen's 
"pure theory of law".67 Kelsen's theory is not weakened by as many internal 
tensions as Hart's theory. Of course, that perspicuity is not an advantage if it 
means that the theory is committed to several obscure metaphysical doctrines. 
Hart was right in thinking that certain philosophical ideas of the 20th century may 
help to reconsider the conditions of making theories about law and that legal 
theory can develop ways of coping with its inherent philosophical problems. At 
the same time, he could not justify his assumption that the reconsideration would 
lead to just another comprehensive theory of law. 
Hart's theory is an unfortunate compromise between two differing ideas. On 
the one hand, it shows the power of a discourse that does not put forward ready-
made philosophical doctrines but tries to develop the suitable arguments in the 
course of the investigation. It does not guarantee the "right" outcome and does 
not mean that Hart's actual arguments are viable. It concerns not only this 
question of plausibility. Rather, it is about the search for the best available ways 
of clarification without recontextualizing the problems by means of a grand 
theoretical machinery. Hart often unfolds his position by way of considering 
various examples that run contrary to certain theoretical expectations and does 
not lend themselves to the abstract, comprehensive explanations. (He does not 
explicate his views on the issue of the imperative theory of law or the obedience 
to law by opposing a range of doctrinal statements to another range of doctrinal 
statements. He constructs examples that can be compared to different situations 
with different implications.68) On the other hand, Hart's enterprise implies the 
conviction that the various considerations on law can find a point of reference in 
the nature of law—disclosed in the analysis. 
I do not wish to argue that any of the two is prior or primary to the other. It 
is more important to contend that those ideas are in tension and their tension is 
a basic one in Hart's legal theory. To justify that claim I would like to refer to one 
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of our conclusions on Hart's theory of legal interpretation. Hart relies upon 
differing arguments that have diverse philosophical implications and some of his 
arguments have no clear philosophical character. One could hardly determine his 
position in comparison with either a strong interpretationism (of Fuller) or a 
view on language that presupposes acontextual meanings (see Schauer). That 
"slipperiness" may cast doubt on the consistency of Hart's theory of legal inter-
pretation but it certainly does not exclude or degrade the merit or the significance 
of his particular arguments and considerations. Nevertheless, this philosophical 
"elusiveness" is extremely damaging to the idea of a comprehensive legal theory. 
A clear philosophical standpoint should mediate between the particular 
arguments and the disclosed nature of law—showing the inherent connection of 
the implications of the arguments and the statements on law as such. If the 
philosophical character of the arguments is not accommodated to the general 
statements on law by means of a philosophical conviction, one can hardly tell by 
means of what they could be accommodated. Hart seems to set a criterion to 
himself without taking its consequences seriously in his theory. He never 
considered the criterion in its own terms and never compared it to the features 
of his own arguments. 
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declarations of acceptance—such as the rules governing withdrawal or termination of declarations 
or its admissibility, the legal effects of reservation and restrictions attached to declarations, 
interpretation of declarations—depend on how one looks on the legal character of the clause. The 
article analyses the two main views about the legal character of the clause. One trend will em-
phasize the unilateral nature of the system of the clause, while the other will conceive of the 
resultant relations as between states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court as a 
contractual relationship. 
Keywords: International Court of Justice, compulsory jurisdiction, optional clause 
In international legal literature, the term "optional clause" is construed to mean 
Article 36. para. 2. of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It allows 
the states to unilaterally declare that they recognize the jurisdiction of the Court 
as compulsory in specified categories of legal disputes, in relation to any other 
states accepting the same obligation. 
The optional clause itself is the result of a compromise, after the first world 
war, which was achieved during the negotiations in the Committee of Jurists 
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drafting the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.1 This clause 
does not in itself impose any obligation on states parties to the Statute; it merely 
creates a possibility for them to assume, by a unilateral declaration, additional 
obligations in excess of those contained in the Statute with respect to the juris-
diction of the Court. It was in consideration of this that Kelsen wrote, the 
jurisdiction referred to in Article 36. para. 2. of the Statute „is not 'compulsory' 
in the true sense of the word. In order to establish true compulsory jurisdiction of 
the International Court of Justice, the Statute would have to provide that any 
member of the judicial community, party to any case whatever, is obliged to 
recognise the jurisdiction of the Court if the other party refers the 
dispute to the Court."2 Judge McNair described the machinery provided by Ar-
ticle 36. para. 2. in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case as of contracting-in, not of 
contracting-out? 
In addition to para. 2. of Article 36, paras. 3. to 5. are also frequently 
consigned to the optional clause insofar as they set out yet more elements of the 
additional obligations related to the so-called compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court. Consequently, there is in fact a broader concept of the optional clause, 
namely one that comprises not only para. 2 of Article 36. but all the provisions 
concerning the conditions for and the manner of making declarations of accep-
tance as well as the validity and other aspects thereof within the meaning of 
Article 36 of the Statute. 
The features of the optional clause in the broader sense can be summed up as 
follows: 
the additional obligations are effective in relation to other states accepting 
the same obligation (reciprocity);4 in other words „A declaration under this 
clause undoubtedly constitutes an international engagement binding on the state 
concerned in relation to any state also making a declaration under the Optional 
Clause."5 
1
 See Hudson, M. O.: The Permanent Court of International Justice. New York. 1934. 
2
 Kelsen. H. : The Law of the United Nations. Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1951. 522. 
3
 C f . ICJ Reports 1952. 116. 
4
 On the reciprocity see Thirlway, H. V. A.: „Reciprocity in the Jurisdiction of the 
International Court". Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 1984. 97-137.; Brown Weiss, 
E.: „Reciprocity and the Optional Clause" In: The International Court of Justice at a Crossroad 
(Ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch) Transnational Publishers, Inc. Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1987. 
82-105. 
5
 Anand, R. P.: Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Asia 
Publishing House, New York, 1961. 143. 
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additional obligations may not be assumed except with certain reservations 
or limitations, of which para. 3. of Article 36 mentions but two: reciprocity and 
a certain period of time; 
the legal effects of declarations containing such additional obligations, which 
were made between the two world wars and are still in force recognizing the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, pass on 
to the United Nations International Court of Justice by virtue of para. 5.;6 
declarations accepting the International Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
must be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who trans-
mits copies thereof to the states parties to the Statute and to the Registrar of the 
Court. 
The declarations made by states under Article 36. para. 2. of the Statute form 
a special system, which is some times called the "system of compulsory 
jurisdiction", or "optional clause system". That denomination is not completely 
correct and it would be more precise to say that the "optional clause system" or 
"system of compulsory jurisdiction" consist of two elements: the optional clause 
of the Statute and the declarations made under Article 36. para. 2. of the Statute. 
Although, as it was mentioned before, the Statute itself does not impose any 
obligation on the states parties to the Statute concerning the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
The question concerning the legal character of the optional clause system 
deserves attention not only because it embodies a theoretical issue, but also 
because it is of great practical relevance, considering that the answers to be given 
to a number of important matters associated with declarations of acceptance—such 
as the rules governing modification or termination of declarations or their 
admissibility, the legal effects of reservations and limitations attached to 
declarations, interpretation of declarations depend on how one looks on the legal 
character of the clause. 
For that matter, the legal character of both the optional clause system and 
declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction have lately attracted the 
interest of international lawyers once again, not least by reason of the fact that the 
International Court of Justice has repeatedly been seized on these issues in several 
of its more recent decisions. 
6
 On the differences between the original Statute and the present Statute see Rosenne, S.: 
The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice. A. W. Sijthoff-Leyden; 1965. 
367-368. 
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In the literature on international law, there are two views to be distinguished 
about the legal character of the optional clause system. Both poits of view start 
from the proposition that states recognize the clause by lego-technically unilateral 
declarations. However, a difference between the two approaches is revealed in 
one's perception of the system resulting from the declarations. One view 
emphasizes the unilateral nature of the optional clause system, while the other 
conceives the resultant relations as between states accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court in a treaty-like relationship. As a third category of 
opinions one can mention those authors who are saying that the relation between 
states established by their declarations is a sui generis international engagement 
having bilateral and multilateral elements.7 
Proponents of either the unilateral or the treaty-like nature cite various 
decisions of the two Courts, each of which undoubtedly contains a half phrase, 
isolated from its context, that may appear suitable to support one or the other 
point of view. 
The problem of the optional clause is put by Anand in this way: "The question 
is whether such an 'international engagement' is constitutionally to be regarded 
as founded upon a unilateral legislative act done vis-à-vis the Court, or as 
founded upon a bilateral, consensual transaction effected by the joining together 
of the declarations of any given pair of states through the Optional Clause."8 
The uncertainty of the views on the relations established using the basis of 
declarations of acceptance is well reflected in the separate opinion of Judge Sir 
Robert Jennings submitted in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua, „Obviously, the making of a declaration 
under the Optional Clause establishes some sort of relationship with other States 
that have made declarations; although it is not easy to say what kind of legal 
relationship it is."9 According to the British judge, that relationship is created by 
a great variety of unilateral declarations, all having the common element of being 
made within the framework of Article 36. para. 2. of the Court's Statute. „The 
declarations are formal statements of intention; and statement of intention made 
in a quite formal way. Obviously, however, they do not amount to treaties or 
contracts; or at least, if one says they are treaties, or contracts, one immediately 
7
 Cf. Szafarz, R.: The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 
Martinus Nijhoff Publisers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993. 80. 
The author of the present article, as it will be explained latter on, do not think that this is a 
separate category of opinion. 
8
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9
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has to go on to say they are a special kind of treaty, or contract, partaking only of 
some of the rules normally applicable to such matters."10 
In the beginning of the 1970's, Iglesias Buigues wrote that neither the views 
of legal scholars, nor the Courts rulings or the opinions submitted by the Court's 
members have taken a clear point of view on the legal status of the declarations 
of acceptance." Nowadays it is difficult to agree with that statement, especially 
because, as it will be seen later, in the last years the Court unquestionably adopted 
a clear position on the legal character of the declarations and the system established 
by the declarations of acceptance. 
The view that a multilateral treaty-like relationship is established as between 
states accepting the optional clause is widely held in international legal literature. 
It should be added that, in this case, the contractual relationship has been 
formulated by several related instruments rather than by a single one. There is no 
doubt about the well known postulate of treaty law that a treaty can be embodied 
in two or more instruments.12 Obviously, if it is seen as a contractual regime, the 
system of the optional clause is to be included in this category. 
In the legal practice of the two International Courts, it is the Electricity 
Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case and the Case concerning the Right of Passage 
over Indian Territory that are usually relied upon for justifying the contractual 
character. 
In the Electricity Company of Sofia case, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice referred to the date of the establishment of the juridical bond between two 
states, Belgium and Bulgaria, under Article 36 of the Statute.13 In his separate 
opinion, Judge Anzilotti wrote: „As a result of these Declarations, an agreement 
came into existence between the two States accepting the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court, in conformity with Article 36 of the Statute and subject to the 




 Cf. Iglesias Buigues, J. L.: "Les déclarations d'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire 
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The other case, frequently mentioned in connection with the contractual 
character, concerns the Right of Passage case. However, this case, as will be 
treated at a later stage, can be invoked to bear out the contractual character just 
as it can be cited in support of the unilateral character. In this case, the Inter-
national Court of Justice certainly had in mind some sort of a contractual relation-
ship between states parties to the optional clause system, declaring that "The 
contractual relations between the Parties and the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court resulting therefrom are established ' ipso facto and without special 
agreement', by the fact of the making of the Declaration".15 
Statements about the contractual character of the system, established by 
declarations of acceptance, are also to be found in the separate or dissenting 
opinions submitted by members of the Court. Judge Anzilotti, answering the 
question whether the Iranian declaration of acceptance in the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Co. case (which he calls, not incidentally, a declaration of "adherence") was 
unilateral or bilateral in character, Judge Alvarez writes: "the Declaration is a 
multilateral act of a special character; it is the basis of a treaty made by Iran 
with the States, which had already adhered and with those which would sub-
sequently adhere to the provisions of Article 36. para. 2. of the Statute of the 
Court".16 
Also, in his separate opinion given in the case of Certain Norwegian Loans, 
Sir Hersh Lauterpacht touches briefly on the legal character of the declarations 
of acceptance. What was stated by the Court regarding the unilateral nature of the 
declarations of acceptance in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case is construed by 
Judge Lauterpacht to mean "no more than that the declaration is the result not of 
negotiations but of unilateral drafting. Whether it is a treaty or a unilateral 
declaration, it is—if it is to be treated as a legal text providing a basis for the 
jurisdiction of the Court a manifestation of intention to create reciprocal rights 
and obligations."17 Lauteipacht goes on to compare the optional clause to a 
multilateral treaty concluded under the auspices of the United Nations General 
Assembly, and he visualizes the declarations of acceptance as an accession to a 
multilateral treaty elaborated by the General Assembly.18 In the South West 
Africa cases, Judges Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in their joint 
dissenting opinion write that "The quasi-contractual character, which is 'optional 
clause' declarations made under paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute are 
15
 1С] Reports, 1957. 146. 
16
 1С J Reports, 1952. 125. 
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 ICJ Reports, 1957.49. 
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sometimes said to posses, would arise solely from the multiplicity of these 
declarations and their interlocking character, which gives them a bilateral or 
multilateral aspect. A single declaration, if it stood alone, could not be an 
international agreement. "19 Then, the two judges stress that declarations of 
acceptance can in no way be identified with a "treaty or convention", referred to 
in paragraph 1. Article 36 of the Statute as providing for the Court's 
jurisdiction.20 
Again, in a separate opinion given in the Nicaragua case, Judge Mosler 
adverted essentially to the contractual character when he said that the basis of the 
operation of the Optional Clause is the consensual bond, and that comes into 
being at the time at which another State deposits its declaration.21 
Several prominent writes on international law refer to treaty-like relations 
between states parties to the optional clause system. For instance, Hans Kelsen 
in his monumental work on the United Nations asserts that "The unilateral 
declaration of one state together with the unilateral declaration of another state 
constitute an agreement. This agreement, it is true, has not the character of a 
'special agreement* within the meaning of the term used in Article 36. paragraph 
1. But it is a general agreement in so far as the states by making the declaration 
referred to in Article 36. paragraph 2, in relation to one another, agree to 
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes, in case one party 
brings the dispute before the Court. Hence the jurisdiction of the Court under 
Article 36. paragraph 2, is based on a general agreement of the parties to the 
dispute, just as under Article 36, paragraph 1, states by a treaty may assume the 
obligation to refer to the Court certain or all possible disputes which may arise 
between them."22 The British Professor, Herbert Briggs, similarly argues for the 
contractual character, and, in a lecture delivered at the Hague Academy of 
International Law in the 1950s, he said: "A Declaration accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 36. (2) of the Statute is not a 
contractual engagement undertaken by the declaring state with the Court. It is in 
the nature of a general offer, made by declaring to all other States accepting the 
same obligation, to recognize as Respondent the jurisdiction of the Court, subject 
to the limitations specified in the offer."23 In the same lecture, Professor Briggs 
19




 ICJ Reports, 1984.466. 
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also spoke about a "consensual bond accepting compulsory jurisdiction" existing 
between two declaring states.24 In connection with the views propounding the 
contractual character, Iglesias Buigues writes that, in the opinion of most authors, 
declarations are unilateral acts, which nevertheless have contractual effects 
(effects contractuels) in the sense that declarations contain sufficient elements for 
them to produce effects of a contractual character, albeit they remain unilateral 
ones. According to Iglesias Buigues, it is the parties ' agreement on the 
Court's jurisdiction that forms the basis of the contractual relation. This is 
brought into being by the fact that the declarations of states are actually offers, 
made to each other and constituting a chain of offers and acceptances thereof, in 
the sense that when a state deposits its declaration with the Secretary-General it 
is accepting the offers of those states which have made declarations previously 
(namely the other states parties within the optional clause system) and is 
submitting, on its part, an offer to any state making a declaration subsequently.26 
According to the author, that offer can, at this point, be conceived of as being 
merely a general offer whose real content will be determined when the 
declarations are applied in a concrete case. The degree to which the declarations 
of two states overlap will become apparent in that event.27 
The view that accession to the system of the optional clause is an offer and an 
acceptance of the earlier offers, is not foreign to the members of the Court either. 
That idea was expressed by Vice-President Badawi in his dissenting opinion in 
the Right of Passage in the 1950s, and it was formulated again more than four 
decades later by Vice-President Weeramantry in the case concerning the Land 
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. In the Right of Passage, 
Judge Badawi says: "When article 36 of the Statute uses the words 'ipso facto and 
without special agreement', it stresses the conventional character of Declarations 
and it confirms that character by the expression 'in relation to any other State 
accepting the same obligation'". Some lines further he emphasizes the importance 
of the offers and the acceptances thereof of the declarations of acceptance by 
saying „But what creates the agreement here, as in every other meeting of wills, 
is always the basic idea of offer and acceptance. ... Translated into legal 
terminology, the system of Declarations constitutes a contract by correspondence 
between the declaring State and the other States through the agency of the 
Secretary-General as an intermediary who, in these cases, constitutes a stage in 
24
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the transmission."28 In the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria, Vice-President Weeramantry analyzed deeply 
the question of offers and acceptances and, comparing the national legislation of 
different states, came to the conclusion that acceptance of an offer was necessary 
for a contract to come into being and that a contract was made only if the offeror 
had been notified of the acceptance of his offer. In other words, in the case of 
mutual obligations created on the basis of Article 36. para. 2. of the Statute in 
respect to the Court's jurisdiction, the offeror must be informed of whether or not 
his offer has been accepted, for, failing acceptance of the offer, one cannot speak 
of agreement.29 For that matter, some authors interpret the phrase in the Statute 
"ipso facto and without special agreement" in a way that is suggestive of the 
contractual character of the optional clause. This was indicated in Vice-President 
Weeramantry's dissenting opinion in the aforesaid Land and Maritime Boundary 
case; in it, Judge Weeramantry stated that "What Article 36, paragraph 2, 
provides is that where a declaration is filed, no special agreement is necessary, 
as the declaration has a compulsory force of its own."30 
The contractual character is emphasized by Stanimir Alexandrov of Bulgaria 
and Renata Szafarz of Poland in the more recent literature on the subject. In 
support of the contractual character, Alexandrov refers to the origin of the 
optional clause and its treaty character, the UN Secretary-General's role in 
receiving and registering notices of declarations made under the optional clause, 
and the practice of states in the making their declarations.31 According to Renata 
Szafarz, "...the legal system based on the optional clause is a sui generis or quasi-
treaty (which is virtually the same thing) legal structure, which consists of 
contractual and unilateral elements, and which establishes a set of (at present) 
1431 parallel bilateral relationships. Every relationship consists of contractual 
(both multilateral and bilateral) elements and a unilateral element. The provision 
contained in Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute constitutes the multilateral element. 
Owing to the reciprocity principle reservations constitute the bilateral element. 
Non-symmetrical formal conditions contained in declarations constitute the 
unilateral element."32 
28
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Edith Brown Weiss from the USA similarly argues for the contractual 
character.33 
After emphasysing the contractual character of the optional clause system, 
Alexandrov describes certain specific features of the declarations of acceptance 
which are the following: the declarations are not treaty texts resulting from 
negotiations, unilateral declarations include an element of vulnerability and 
unpredictability, the mutual consent of the parties under the optional clause is 
determined on the basis of reciprocity, obligations assumed by declarations of 
acceptance arise only when a special dispute is submitted to the Court.34 
With respect of the above mentioned characteristics, it is difficult to agree not 
only with Alexandrov's conclusion, but with the element vulnerability as well. 
He sees the elements of vulnerability and uncertainty in the fact that, as they 
involve erga omnes obligations, the declaring state runs the risk, as the Court 
found in the Right of Passage case, of being immediately sued by a newly 
declaring state.35 The author exemplifies the elements of vulnerability and 
uncertainty by the Nicaragua case, claiming that in making its declaration 
accepting the Court 's compulsory jurisdiction, the United States was not in a 
position to foresee that by the 1980s its relations with that small Central 
American State were to worsen so much as to cause Nicaragua to bring an action 
against it before the International Court of Justice. One can argue that the said 
element is in fact an attribute not only of the optional clause system. It may 
happen in the case of any treaty that relations between the contracting parties 
come to deteriorate markedly over time and that, in the space of perhaps a few 
years, let alone decades, the relationship of two states may undergo a change 
precluding any application of a treaty they signed earlier. A long list of examples 
could be cited of interstate relations to illustrate other similar situations. In 
practice, however, states take care of safeguarding their interests in a considerable 
part of related treaties, and if relations between the contracting parties come to 
deteriorate to the extent that the parties do not find it desirable to apply a treaty 
inter se, they usually take steps to denounce or terminate the treaty concerned. No 
such "judicious" steps will normally be taken in respect to declarations of 
acceptance, and it is not rare that, even when relations with a certain state or 
certain states tend to worsen, no steps are taken to avoid submission of a dispute 
to the Court, that is, the elimination of the practical application of the optional 
clause. What is more frequent, however, is that only when a question or a 
33
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complex of problems becomes "delicate" for a state, it resorts to modifying or 
denouncing its declaration of acceptance either in order to prevent certain delicate 
matters being brought before the Court or when the dispute is already before the 
Court it tries to hamper the Court's decision-making process. As an example one 
can refer to Iran, which in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Teheran case, after the indication of certain provisional measures by the Court 's 
order of July 5lh 1951, it terminated the 1933 declaration of acceptance of the 
Imperial Government of Persia. India did the same owing to the proceeding 
initiated by Portugal concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory. As it 
is well known, the Court in several cases dealt with the territory of South West 
Africa and, after the judgment of 1967, South Africa gave notice of the 
withdrawal and termination of its declaration of acceptance made in 1955.36 In 
the 1970's, Australia and New Zealand submitted applications instituting 
proceedings against France in respect of the dispute concerning the holding of 
atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in the Pacific Ocean, consequently, the 
French Government withdraw its declaration accepting the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction. 
This is what the United States practically did in the Nicaragua case with a 
notification on 6th April 1984 signed by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. 
George Schultz, by which the Washington Administration wanted to modify its 
declaration of acceptance.37 The whole matter stirred up a storm because the 
United States was actually "late" taking that step and did amend its declaration 
after it had suspected or had learnt from some source that Nicaragua was to 
submit an application against the USA to the Court.38 However, as is known, the 
Schultz-note became effective after half a year when the proceedings instituted 
36
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by Nicaragua were under way, owing to the reservation containing the 1946 US 
declaration of acceptance and expressed "to remain in force for a period of five 
years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice may be given 
to terminate this declaration".39 Had the State Department of the United States 
acted in due course, that is, had it modified its declaration at an earlier stage of 
deterioration in its relations with Nicaragua, the legal dispute in reference would 
not have come before the International Court of Justice on the basis of the 
optional clause. 
Moreover, the plea of deterioration in relations as an unforeseeable element 
in connection with declarations of acceptance is misleading for the added reason 
that such declarations relate to acceptance of the jurisdiction of an international 
judicial forum, which is clearly tantamount to states reckoning with the 
emergence of disputes and having in mind future recourse to the particular 
judicial forum for the purpose of achieving settlement of their disputes. There-
fore, the element of uncertainty as a source of specific problems ensuing from 
deterioration of relations is hardly acceptable in the case of declarations of 
acceptance, for, by making such declarations, states count a priori on the 
emergence of disputes, which nevertheless entail, as it were, deterioration of 
relations between the parties. Of course, the picture varies from case to case with 
regards to the degree to which relations between the parties worsen before 
submitting their disputes to the Court. One can undoubtedly cite numerous 
examples from the practice of the International Court of Justice to demonstrate 
a spectacular worsening of relations between two states and instituting of 
proceedings before the Court under such circumstances; relevant instances are, 
among others, the Right of Passage case, the Nicaragua case and recently the 
cases brought by Yugoslavia, concerning the Legality of the Use of Force, against 
ten NATO states. Obviously, when a dispute between states is bought to Court on 
the basis of diplomatic protection accorded to natural or legal persons, the 
deterioration of relations is less spectacular than in the above mentioned cases. 
From the foregoing it becomes clear that the conception of the system of the 
optional clause as a contractual relation based on unilateral declarations is a rather 
widespread approach. Incidentally, most of the quoted authors fail to provide a 
really incisive analysis of this question, confining themselves to summary 
statements instead. The related aspects are given fuller treatment by authors like 
Iglesias and Alexandrov. 
39
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III. 
The views emphasizing the unilateral character of the system of the optional 
clause likewise invoke various decisions of the two International Courts, such as 
those handed down in the Phosphates in Morocco case, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
case, the Norwegian Loans case, the Nuclear Tests case, the Nicaragua case and, 
among the latest disputes, the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria and the Fisheries Jurisdiction case between Spain 
and Canada. 
In the Phosphates in Morocco case, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
found, in respect to the unilateral character of the declarations of acceptance that 
"The declaration, of which the ratification was deposited by the French Government 
on April 25th, 1931 is a unilateral act by which that Government accepted the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction.40 
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the International Court of Justice took a 
similarly clear stand, emphasizing that "... the text of the Iranian Declaration is 
not a treaty text resulting from negotiations between two or more States. It is the 
result of unilateral drafting by the Government of Iran, which appears to have 
shown a particular degree of caution when drafting the text of the declaration."41 
This is confirmed by Judge Hackworth's dissenting opinion in the same case (the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case) to the effect that "when a State has filed a declaration 
under the Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute accepting jurisdiction, it 
has performed a voluntary act. Is has voluntarily and unilaterally notified the 
world that it is prepared to submit certain classes of disputes to judicial 
examination by this Court."42 
As often as not, the literature on the subject offers the comment that, in contrast 
to the process of treaty-making, no negotiations take place when declarations of 
acceptance are made and that the text by which a state recognizes the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction is not a matter of negotiations.43 
It is obvious that these statements were reflecting the unilateral character of 
the declarations and not the unilateral character of the optional clause system 
itself. 
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As mentioned earlier, the Right of Passage case can also be invoked in proof of 
the unilateral character of system of the optional clause. There is no doubt, that in 
the judgement delivered concerning the preliminary objections in this case, one can 
find statements of the Court that, as quoted previously, suggest the establishment 
of a contractual relation (rapport contractuel) between states parties of the optional 
clause system. However, regarding the process in which such a relation is 
established, the Court leaned to the unilateral character in rejecting India's second 
preliminary objection and pointed out that the only requirement for the validity of 
declarations of acceptance was that the parties should deposit them with the 
Secretary-General, there being no further obligation such as notification to the 
states parties to the Statute or lapse of a specified period of time after deposit.44 
All this leads one to raise questions about whether the Court, in referring to 
contractual relations, really had in mind contractual relations between states parties 
within the optional clause system. If the Court had indeed conceived of the system 
of the optional clause as a contractual relation, it would have accepted the argument 
of the Indian Government that the declaration of acceptance not only had to be 
deposited with the Secretary-General, but the Secretary-General had to transmit 
copies thereof to the states parties to the Statute and that the declaration was not 
valid until the Secretary-General had fulfilled this obligation.45 This contradiction 
gives rise to the question of what the Court really meant by the terms "contractual 
relation" (rapport contractuel) and "consensual bond" (lien consensuel). 
In the Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France), the Court, while recognizing 
the unilateral character of the declarations of acceptance, stressed that they may 
have the effect of creating legal obligations.46 Ten years later in the Nicaragua 
case, the Court came to address rather extensively the legal character of the 
declarations of acceptance and the admissibility of formulating reservations to 
them, emphasizing: "Declarations of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court are facultative, unilateral engagements, that States are absolutely free 
to make or not to make. In making the declaration the State is equally free either 
to do so unconditionally and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify 
it with conditions or reservations."47 After a few lines, the Court went on to 
pronounce that „The coincidence or interrelation of those obligations thus remain 
in a state of flux until the moment of the filing of an application instituting 
proceedings. The Court has then to ascertain whether, at that moment, the two 
44
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States accepted 'the same obligation' in relation to the subject-matter of the 
proceedings...".48 This quotation is a quite clear indication that in the Court's 
interpretation the states parties to the system of the optional clause undertake, by 
accession to the clause, a unilateral obligation, which will create a bilateral legal 
relationship at a later stage. This is activated when concrete disputes are referred 
to the Court, and the content of such legal relationship is clearly determined by 
the conditions, reservations and other limitations, which the parties may have 
formulated in their respective declarations. 
The question concerning the legal character of system of declarations of 
acceptance has lately been addressed in more depth by the International Court of 
Justice in two cases, notably the case concerning the Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria and the Fisheries Jurisdiction case. In 
both cases the problem of the legal character of the system of the optional clause 
arose by the question whether the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is 
applicable to the declarations of acceptance. 
In the Land and Maritime Boundary case, Nigeria as defendant submitted 
eight preliminary objections, with the first one affecting the legal nature of the 
system of declarations. In that objection, Nigeria contended that Cameroon had 
accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction on 3 March 1994 and that the 
United Nations Secretary-General had transmitted the Cameroon declaration to 
the parties to the Statute eleven-and-a-half months later. Nigeria maintained, 
accordingly, that when Cameroon filed the application on 29 March 1994, 
Nigeria did not know nor was in a position to know that Cameroon had acceded 
to the optional clause system. Hence, so the Nigerian argument went, Cameroon 
had "acted prematurely" and had breached its obligation to act in good faith had 
"abused the system instituted by Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute" and had 
disregarded "the condition of reciprocity". In contrast Cameroon referred to the 
Right of Passage case where the Court held that "the Statute does not prescribe 
any interval between the deposit by a State of its Declaration of Acceptance and 
the filing of an Application by that State."49 Nigeria argued that the judgment 
in the Right of Passage case is an isolated one, and the interpretation given in 
1957 to Article 36, paragraph 4, should be reconsidered in the light of the 
evolution of the law of treaties which has occurred since, and with special regard 
to Article 78(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.50 
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The Court, for its part, upheld its ruling in the Right of Passage case and 
reiterated its statement that the declaring state need not deal with the Secretary-
General's functions or with his fulfillment or non-fulfillment thereof, "The legal 
effect of a Declaration does not depend upon subsequent action or inaction of the 
Secretary-General. Moreover, unlike some other instruments, Article 36 provides 
for no additional requirement, for instance, that the information transmitted by 
the Secretary-General must reach the Parties to the Statute, or that some period 
must elapse subsequent to the deposit of the Declaration before it can become 
effective.51 The Court stated that its decision in the Right of Passage case, in 
contrast to what Nigeria contended, could not be considered an isolated one and 
that, for its part, it had confirmed it in the case concerning Temple of Preah 
VilieaP2 and in the case concerning Military arid Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua,51 The reference to Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties is not relevant since the International Law Commission in its final draft 
in connection with the deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval of treaties turned to the judgment of the Court in the Right of Passage 
case (Preliminary Objections) in which the Court in the analogous situation held 
that the deposit itself of instruments of acceptance of the optional clause 
establishes the legal nexus with other states parties to the system of the optional 
clause.54 
With regard to the system of the optional clause, the Court pointed out the 
following: "Any State party to the Statute, in adhering to the jurisdiction of the 
Court in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, accepts jurisdiction in its 
relations with States previously having adhered to that clause. At the same time, 
it makes a standing offer to the other States party to the Statute which have not 
yet deposited a declaration of acceptance. The day one of those States accepts 
that offer by depositing in its turn its declaration of acceptance the consensual 
bond is established and no further condition needs to be fulfilled."55 Thereupon 
ensues the situation, which the Court described in 1957 as one whereby "every 
State which makes a Declaration of Acceptance must be deemed to take into 
account the possibility that, under the Statute, it may at any time find itself 
subjected to the obligations of the Optional Clause in relation to a new Signatory 
51
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as the result of the deposit by that Signatory of a Declaration of Acceptance."56 
This notwithstanding, the Court unequivocally ruled out the requirement to give 
any notice to the state making an offer. That was reflected in its finding that 
"There is no specific obligation in international law for States to inform other 
States parties to the Statute that they intend to subscribe or have subscribed to 
the Optional Clause."57 
In their dissenting opinions appended to the judgement, several judges 
expressed the view that the Court should revise its findings in the Right of 
Passage case. That view was shared by Vice-President Weeramantry58 and 
Judges Koroma and Ajibola, who, in their respective dissents, similarly stressed 
that it was time to reappraise the relevant provision of the Statute and the Court's 
findings in the Right of Passage case. 
In connection with the legal character of the optional clause, Judge Koroma 
writes that declarations made under the clause cannot be deemed to be contracts, 
which does not mean, however, that the relationships thus established by them 
exhibit no peculiarities of contractual relations and that in certain contexts the 
rules governing contractual relations equally apply to declarations made under 
the optional clause. According to Judge Koroma, a so-called consensual link 
between states concerning the Court's jurisdiction comes into being on the basis 
of declarations of acceptance only after the Secretary-General has transmitted 
such declarations to the states parties to the Statute. Declarations do not by 
themselves substantiate the Court's jurisdiction until their transmission by the 
Secretary-General to the other states parties to the optional clause system, and 
publication of declarations in the Journal of the United Nations cannot replace 
the statutory duty of the Secretary-General's under Article 36, para. 4, of the 
Statute.59 
Thus, in the case concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria, the International Court of Justice upheld its position 
stated in its earlier decisions, although, as has been mentioned, Nigeria tried to 
achieve a revision of certain findings of the Right of Passage case. It should be 
noted that such efforts of the Nigerian Government revealed no small measure 
of naivety, for if the Court had accepted the position that the declarations of 
acceptance become effective, not on the deposit thereof with the Secretary-
General, but after "a reasonable time" from that date, and should such reasonable 
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time be somehow related to the date of the transmission of declarations to the 
states parties to the Statute, the question arises of exactly how much time is to 
be regarded as "reasonable". One thing is sure, namely that the period of eleven 
and a half months, which elapsed from the deposit of Cameroon's declaration 
of acceptance with the Secretary-General's Office to the transmission thereof 
to the states parties to the Statute, exceeds any reasonable length of time. The 
conclusion to emerge from this could easily have been that the Secretary-
General's Office wasted quite some time in transmitting Cameroon's 
declaration, a reason that might give rise to questions about whether the legal 
relationship concerning the Court 's compulsory jurisdiction under the optional 
clause did exist at the time Cameroon filed its application. Obviously, in the 
interest of preserving the prestige of the World Organization, the Court could in 
no way have come to such a conclusion, so the Court could be expected to maintain 
its view formulated in its earlier judgements, namely that the effect of declarations 
of acceptance is not conditional on their transmission by the Secretary-General to 
the states parties to the Statute. 
The legal character of the system of declarations of acceptance in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case involved a difference of views between Spain and Canada about 
the rules on the interpretation of reservations made to declarations acceptance.60 
Spain held that interpretation of reservations to declarations of acceptance is 
subject to the law of treaties, whereas Canada emphasized the unilateral nature of 
declarations and reservations and contended that the reservations should be 
interpreted in a natural way, with particular regard for the intention of the reserving 
state.61 
For its part, the Court came out once again in favor of the unilateral nature of 
declarations when it explained that such acceptance is a unilateral act of state 
sovereignty regardless of whether or not special limitations are placed on 
acceptance, and then it reiterated its finding in the case concerning the Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria half a year earlier. Concerning 
the interpretation of declarations of acceptance, the Court held that the rules on 
interpretation of declarations are not identical with those established for the 
interpretation of treaties by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and that 
those provisions of the Convention may by analogy be applied only to the extent 
60
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compatible with the sui generis nature of a unilateral acceptance of the Court's 
jurisdiction.62 
The unilateral character of declarations was reaffirmed in a separate opinion 
appended to the judgement by Judge Oda, who wrote: "It is clear, given the basic 
principle that the Court's jurisdiction is based on the consent of sovereign States, 
that a declaration to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 
36, paragraph 2. of the Statute, and any reservation attached thereto, must because 
of the declaration's unilateral character, be interpreted not only in a natural way and 
in context, but also with particular regard for the intention of the declaring State. 
Any interpretation of the respondent State's declaration against the intention of that 
State will contradict the very nature of the Court's jurisdiction, because the 
declaration is an instrument drafted unilaterally."63 
Most recently, the International Court of Justice has again been confronted with 
a situation similar to that which Portugal created in the 1950s and which brought 
into the limelight the Right of Passage case, namely that a state filed an application 
with the Court a few days after its declaration accepting the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction had been deposited. That situation emerged in spring of 1999, when 
during the air strikes by NATO forces, on 25 April 1999, Yugoslavia deposited its 
declaration accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction and then, four days later, 
on 29 April, it instituted proceedings before the Court against ten NATO member 
states separately, "for violation of the obligation not to use of force", and accused 
these states of bombing Yugoslav territory.64 In the case of six states (Belgium, 
Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom), the Belgrade 
Government based the Court's jurisdiction on the optional clause in addition to the 
Genocide Convention and, in the case of some states, on other treaties in force 
between the parties, e.g. in the case of Belgium Yugoslavia invoked, as an 
additional ground of jurisdiction, Article 4 of the Convention of Conciliation, 
Judicial Settlement and Arbitration between Belgium and the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, signed in Belgrade on 25 March 1930. 
Simultaneously with the application, Yugoslavia submitted requests for 
indication of provisional measures, asking the Court to order the ten NATO states 
to "cease immediately its acts of use of force" and to "refrain from any act of threat 
or use of force against Yugoslavia". By Orders of 2 June 1999, the International 
Court of Justice rejected the Yugoslav request for indication of provisional 
62
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measures. The Court in the cases of two states, the United States and Spain, found 
that it "manifestly lacks of jurisdiction to entertain Yugoslavia's application" and 
that "it cannot therefore indicate any provisional measures"65 while in respect of 
the remaining eight states, including those that are parties to the optional clause 
system, it adopted the position that is was prima faciae without jurisdiction.66 In 
the cases whereby Yugoslavia invoked the optional clause beside the Genocide 
Convention as a basis for the Court's jurisdiction, the Court based its conclusions 
on a reservation of the Yugoslav declaration of acceptance on 25 April 1999, 
limiting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction to "disputes arising or which may 
arise after the signature of the present Declaration, with regard to situations or facts 
subsequent to this signature." According to the Court, the legal dispute arose 
between Yugoslavia and the NATO respondent states well before 25 April 1999, 
the date when Yugoslavia accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.67 
As for the Court 's decisions, of greatest interest to our subject is the fact 
that, in dismissing the Yugoslav request for the indication of provisional 
measures, the Court did not even touch on the question that Yugoslavia had 
recognized the Court 's compulsory jurisdiction only a few days before the filing 
of applications. Considering the political background to this case, we think that if 
the Court had wished to depart in the slightest degree from its position as stated in 
65
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the Right of Passage case, the NATO's air strikes case would have provided a 
good opportunity for the Court to break away from its earlier findings. In all 
likelihood, the international community would have approved of the Court's 
finding that the matter of whether Yugoslavia was a party to the system of the 
optional clause at the time of filing the applications was under serious question, 
since it had deposited its declaration of acceptance only a few days before. 
However, the Court did not consider that aspect, taking it for granted that 
Yugoslavia was a party to the system of the optional clause, and in five 
cases - Yugoslavia v. Belgium, Yugoslavia v. Netherlands, Yugoslavia v. Canada, 
Yugoslavia v. Portugal, and Yugoslavia v. United Kingdom—it gave judgement 
on the basis of a ratione temporis reservation to the Yugoslav declaration, which 
excluded the retroactive effect of the declaration, without ascertaining the validity 
of the declaration itself.68 This course taken by the Court reminds us in many 
respects of what happened in the Norwegian Loans case, in which the Court 
similarly gave judgement on the basis of a reservation, the validity of which was 
strongly questionable.69 
As it was mentioned before there is a third category of opinions saying that 
the relations established by the declarations of acceptance is a sui generis system 
having multilateral and bilateral elements.70 In that concept the Statute is the 
multilateral element and the declarations are the bilateral. That approach is rather 
misleading especially because the Statute itself (although it is the bases of the 
unilateral declarations of acceptance) is not comprised in the system established 
by the declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
The foregoing goes to show clearly that, in the view of the International Court 
of Justice, declarations of acceptance are unilateral acts and that the system 
constituted by them cannot be regarded as relations of a contractual nature. The 
question arises (all the more so, since several authors of the pertinent literature 
68
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consider the system of the optional clause to be a contractual one) as to the 
aspects in which this system differs from treaty based relations between states. 
To answer this question, we should like to subject to scrutiny two peculiarities 
of the optional clause system, notably the practice of states in making, termi-
nating or withdrawing declarations of acceptance and the Court's reactions on the 
one hand, and the states' practice in making reservations to declarations of 
acceptance and formulating objections to reservations, on the other. 
1) The legal character of the system of the optional clause is shown by the 
existing practice adopted by states in making, terminating or withdrawing 
declarations as well as by the Court's attitude on them. 
As is known, both the Statute and the Court's Rules of Procedure are silent 
on the termination of declarations of acceptance and how states parties to the 
optional clause system can get rid of their obligations concerning the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction, that is, it is entirely left to the decision of the declaring 
state how and under what conditions to break free from the "bonds" of the 
clause. Several states have certainly included in their declarations various 
provisions on termination, denunciation or withdrawal, but not a single reference 
to them is to be found in a no negligible part of the declarations of acceptance. 
It should be noted that in a considerable part of declarations not even such 
provisions imply any real restriction, for what the declaring states do is no more 
than reserve the right to denounce their respective declarations with immediate 
effect. States have in practice availed themselves of this possibility and have 
often modified or denounced their declarations of acceptance. In fact, the Court 
itself has never taken a definite stand on this matter, and all it did in the 
Nicaragua case was to confine itself to spelling out that "...the right to ter-
mination of declarations with indefinite duration is far from established. It appears 
from the requirement of good faith that they should be treated, by analogy, 
according to the law of treaties, which requires a reasonable time for withdrawal 
from or termination of treaties that contain no provision regarding the duration of 
their validity."71 For all these reasons it would be difficult to term this system 
of commitments undertaken on the basis of the optional clause as being of a 
contractual character, one that a state may freely choose to leave at any time. The 
same point was made by Judge Oda in his separate opinion submitted in the 
Nicaragua case when he stated that "For a treaty containing such a clause 
containing conferring a unilateral right entirely to alter or terminate terms of the 
treaty with immediate effect would surely be impossible: it would not be treaty. 
71
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Yet this is now almost normal practice in declarations of acceptance of the 
Optional Clause."72 
True, there exist quite a few known declarations which contain provisions on 
certain time-limits, periods of notice, etc, on the termination or denunciation of 
the instruments, but it should be stressed that it is left in every case to the 
declaring state to decide whether or not to include such provisions in its 
declaration. Should a state choose to subject termination of its declaration to 
certain conditions, e. g. a period of notice, its act amounts to nothing else than 
self-limitation of its own will. This is well illustrated by the 1946 US declaration 
of acceptance, which contains the clause that to "remain in force for a period of 
five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice may be 
given to terminate this declaration." In the Nicaragua case the Court held that the 
clause of the six months' notice was freely and by its own choice added to the US 
declaration of acceptance and that was a formal condition concerning the 
creation, duration and extinction of the US declaration of acceptance. "The 
notion of reciprocity is concerned with the scope and substance of the 
commitments entered into, including reservations, and not with the formal 
conditions of their creation, duration or extinction. It appears clearly that 
reciprocity cannot be invoked in order to excuse departure from the terms of a 
State's own declaration, whatever its scope, limitations or conditions."73 
In other words, a state may not invoke reciprocity to depart f rom the 
provisions on the formal conditions, entry into force, duration or extinction of 
its own declaration of acceptance. By this ruling, the Court clearly confirmed the 
tenet that the States are free in formulating all the conditions of validity, 
termination etc of their declarations of acceptance. If, however, a declaring state 
has, of its own will, incorporated any limitation in its declaration of acceptance 
it will be bound by them. 
In contrast to the foregoing, the entry into force of treaties, the conditions for 
their denunciation or termination are subject to the agreement of the contracting 
states determined in the course of the elaboration of the treaties, or, failing 
relevant provisions or agreement, the general rules of international law will 
apply, meaning that the said matters are in reality determined by the members 
of the international community and are governed by the rules of customary or 
treaty law.74 In the case of the optional clause, as is indicated by what has gone 
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before; all these matters are for the declaring state to decide, the decision not to 
be restricted in any way by the will of other states or any rule of international 
law. 
2) The differences between relationships established under the optional 
clause and the treaty like relations can be disclosed in respect of both 
reservations to declarations acceptance and objections to reservations. It should 
be observed that the whole plethora of questions concerning reservations to 
declarations of acceptance goes far beyond the scope of the present study and 
therefore only a few aspects thereof will be discussed.75 
A) Reservations to or limitations on declarations of acceptance differ from 
reservations made to treaties primarily in that, as mentioned above, in the case 
of declarations there is no agreed text elaborated by the parties, from which a 
state making a reservation decides to depart, i.e. modifing the terms of the treaty 
as adopted. That was expressed by the Court in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case 
by saying: "Conditions or reservations thus do not by their terms derogate from 
a wider acceptance already given. Rather, they operate to define the parameters 
of the State's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court."76 So 
what we have here is not exclusion or modification of a right or an obligation 
included in an agreed text reflecting the common will of the contracting parties, 
and the reservation is not subject to the consent of the other parties to the 
treaty.77 As is shown by eight decades of practice, states are completely free to 
make reservations under the optional clause and have a discretion as to both the 
obligations they undertake in their declarations of acceptance and the conditions 
under which they do so (i.e. which disputes, relevant states and period of time 
they accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court). For declarations of 
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acceptance there are no rules whatever to prescribe any sort of uniformity or 
similarity of content in any aspect. This was expressed by the Court in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case (Spain v. Canada), by stating that "Conditions or reservations thus 
do not by their terms derogate from a wider acceptance already given. Rather, they 
operate to define the parameters of the State's acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court."78 
B) The effect of reservations to declarations of acceptance are always 
restrictive in nature. It is a declaration of acceptance without any reservation or 
limitation that represents the broadest scope of commitment concerning the 
Court 's compulsory jurisdiction, and it is by such a declaration of acceptance 
that a state recognizes the Court 's compulsory jurisdiction—without any limi-
tation, whether ratione materiae or ratione personae or ratione temporis—in all 
disputes covered by para. 2, subparas, a) to d), of Article 36 of the Statue. In the 
case of a reservation to a treaty, it can happen that the reservation modifying or 
excluding a provision of a treaty will actually result, for the reserving state, in a 
right or perhaps an obligation broader in scope than that originally embodied in 
the treaty. 
3) Reservations to declarations of acceptance contain much more elements of 
uncertainty than do reservations made to treaties. 
Given the principle of reciprocity, which can be deemed to be the basic 
element of the entire system of compulsory jurisdiction, reservations to decla-
rations of acceptance serve to modify the obligations and rights not only of the 
declaring state, but, in theory, also of the rest of states parties to the optional 
clause system whenever a state party to the system submits to the Court a dispute 
with a state, which made the particular reservation or limitation. The principle of 
reciprocity means that the reservation or limitation made by the applicant state 
can be relied upon against it by the respondent state and visa versa. All this carries 
in it the element of uncertainty that not a single party to the optional clause system 
is in a position to know whether, in a future concrete dispute, it may get advantage 
or disadvantage from a reservation or limitation to the declaration of another state 
party to the system. This possibility is undoubtedly not foreign to treaty law either. 
Thus, in the case of declarations of acceptance, reservations or limitations offer a 
possibility for exclusion with respect to practically unforeseen, or very much 
foreseen, disputes, with the eventual benefits or disbenefits of that possibility, 
both to the state making a reservation or posing a limitation and to the state or 
states as adverse litigants (s) in a concrete case, being subject to change 
depending on the subject-matter of a particular dispute. One can state that it is not 
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so far from the truth in supposing that also lying behind the rather rare practice 
of raising objections to reservations or limitations by states parties to the system 
of the optional clause is perhaps the fact that preclusion of certain issues or of 
disputes relating to a certain period from compulsory jurisdiction meets with 
approval by other states parties to the system. Of course, all this is very difficult 
to exemplify, but it can easily be supposed that, for instance, reservations 
excluding disputes connected with certain armed conflicts can be placed in this 
category and that preclusion of such disputes from submission to the Court meets 
with the approval of all states involved in a particular armed conflict. 
Numerous instances could be cited of a reservation or limitation by a party to 
the system of compulsory jurisdiction being subsequently "advantageous" or 
"disadvantageous" to the rest of states parties to the system. In fact, as for when 
the reservation or limitation made in a declaration will result in advantage or 
disadvantage to another party of the system is likely to vary from case to case. 
The latter case is met with whenever the Court admits the respondent state's 
preliminary objection based on a reservation contained in the applicant state's 
declaration of acceptance. This can be instanced by, inter alia, the case of Certain 
Norwegian Loans, in which Norway, as the respondent state in the preliminary 
objections relied upon a reservation placed by France upon its undertakings. In 
that case, the Court stated: "In accordance with the condition of reciprocity, ... 
Norway, equally with France, is entitled to except from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court disputes understood by Norway to be essentially within 
its national jurisdiction."79 Thus, the Court admitted Norway's objection and 
ruled that it was without jurisdiction to pronounce upon the merits of case.80 
What has been discussed previously permits the following summary of conc-
lusions. 
Declarations of acceptance are unilateral acts interconnected by Article 36 
of the Statute and allowed by the provisions thereof to grow into a system of 
rights and obligations. Under specified conditions, the declarations set up 
consensual link between states81 that are parties to the system, which concerns 
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 ICJ Reports, 1957. 24. 
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 See Judgment of July 6th, 1957. Certain Norwegian Loans. ICJ Reports, 1957. 9-28. 
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 Cf. Waldock, С. H. M.: "Decline of the Optional Clause". British Yearbook of 
International Law, 1955-56. 263. 
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acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. It should be stressed, how-
ever, that the mutual rights and obligations created by that link remain 
suspended until the submission of a concrete dispute to the Court. Until an 
application is filed in a concrete dispute, the mutual rights and obligations of 
states parties to the optional clause system mean nothing more than that these 
states being qualified for lawfully filing applications with the Court. In other 
words, the legal possibility exists of litigation between them before the Court. 
As can be seen, this is only a possibility for establishment of bilateral relations, 
a possibility which, in fact, depends on becoming a reality through the over-
lapping of declarations of acceptance of the states that are parties to the given 
case. 
The specific feature of the optional clause system is evidenced more clearly 
by the fact that it is not impossible in principle for the declarations of two states 
to be prevented by different reservations and limitations, from overlapping at all, 
so that the declarations virtually "walk past each other", coexisting without the 
two states being bound by any concrete bilateral relationship. Where declarations 
overlap, the date of filing an application can be seen as a kind of critical point. 
The Court examines, during the proceedings, the existence of its jurisdiction with 
an eye to that point of time. This was manifested in the Nottebohm case, in which 
the Court ruled that once the Court had been approached in the prescribed 
manner, it must exercise its powers conferred by the Statute. "An extrinsic fact 
such as the subsequent lapse of the Declaration, by reason of the expiry of the 
period or by denunciation, cannot deprive the Court of the jurisdiction already 
established."82 The Court adhered to this principle in the Nicaragua case as well, 
when it continued the proceedings after the expiration of the six-month period as 
specified in the American declaration of acceptance, thereby giving effect to the 
modification of its declaration by the Note of 6 April 1984, which excluded the 
Court's compulsory jurisdiction in its disputes with any Central American state or 
arising out of or related to events in Central America. 
The unilateral nature of declarations of acceptance or the system established by 
them is evidenced by the practice of making, terminating and modifying 
declarations as well as by the legal practice of the Court in respect of reservations 
made to declarations of acceptance and of objections raised to reservations. 
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Abstract. The article provides a short insight into the functioning of one of the most interesting 
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Introduction 
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, usu-
ally referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement has not only put an end to one of 
the bloodiest conflict in the Balkans but created the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a new international legal entity. This Agreement in fact is a new 
type of modern international agreements, which not only creates a state but 
provides for a radically new mode of institutional state-building process based on 
an international treaty. At the very heart of this Agreement lies the state-building 
agenda, the constitution itself of the new state forms an integral part of the 
Agreement (see Annex IV of the Agreement). In the history one can hardly find 
such a bizarre situation, when an international legal instrument intrudes so deeply 
into the process of state-building agenda, imposes so detailed internal rules on the 
structure and institutions of an emerging state. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement was initialled on 21 November 1995 in Dayton 
(USA) and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 by the representatives of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic 
V i k t o r M a s e n k ó - M a v i , Senior R e s e a r c h Fellow, Ins t i tu te for Legal S tudies , Hungar i an 
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of Yugoslavia. The signing of the Agreement was witnessed by the representatives 
of the European Union, French Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Russian 
Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States 
of America. The instrument in fact is the result of the USA involvement into the 
recent peace-making efforts in the Balkans: following the failure of different EC 
and UN sponsored negotiations over the issues of former Yugoslavia (including 
Bosnia) between 1992-1995, in July 1995 the USA assumed a leading role and 
within a short period of time forced the parties in the conflict to sign the Peace 
Agreement, which is a rather complex legal document. It contains 12 separate 
annexes, several side-letters and different concluding statements.1 
The Agreement established a vast network of international commitments of 
different nature, involving individual states of the Balkans, entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and international institutions. Apart from the three Balkan states 
directly involved into the conflict (Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic 
of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) the two entities of the newly 
emerging state, that is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Republika Srpska have also accepted binding commitments on the basis of the 
provisions of the Agreement.2 In addition to all these, a great number of 
international organisations (different UN institutions, NATO, OSCE, Council 
of Europe) received special mandate under the Agreement and its annexes. 
The system of documents called as the Dayton Peace Agreement consists of 
the followings: 
1) The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(which for the most part contains articles on the approval of the listed 
Agreement on Regional Stabilisation 
Agreement on Inter-. Entity Boundary Line 
Agreement on Elections 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Agreement on Arbitration 
Agreement on Human Rights 
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons 
annexes) 
2) Annex 1/A 
3) Annex 1/B 
4) Annex 2 
5) Annex 3 
6) Annex 4 
7) Annex 5 
8) Annex 6 
9) Annex 7 
1
 The text of the documents adopted at the Dayton conference see in International Legal 
Materials, Vol. 35. 1996. 
2
 Thus for example, in almost all of Annexes adopted to the Agreement the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska are signatory parties. 
THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS... 55 
10) Annex 8 Agreement on Commission to Preserve National Monu-
ments 
11) Annex 9 Agreement on Establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Public Coiporations 
12) Annex 10 — Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace 
ettlement 
13) Annex 11 — Agreement on International Police Force. 
It is not easy to summarise the extremely complex legal and institutional 
innovations introduced by the Agreement. On the one hand, it produced some 
immediate positive results in the region by ending the military conflict, stopping 
the atrocities and upholding the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 
the other hand, its long term aims related to the institutional compromises raise 
many questions and seems to be far from being perfect and long-lasting. Hereby 
I would like to point out only some of the most interesting institutional 
innovations. 
Firstly, as a result of the Agreement the name of the state has been changed, the 
term "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina"(which was in use from 6 April 1992 
when Bosnia became an independent state; before 6 April 1992 the term "Socialist 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" was in use) was dropped and the official 
name of the newly emerging state has become "Bosnia and Herzegovina".3 But 
it was not just a simple change of names, because the internal structure of this 
state has been modified also. The new State of Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
become a complex state consisting of two units, that is the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. These units are being referred to in 
the provisions of the Agreement as entities. The establishment of these units was 
in fact a recognition of the actual situation in the country, which at the beginning 
of the 1990s lost practically its integrity due to the creation of different self-
proclaimed independent territories. On 7 April 1992 the new "Serb Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina" was proclaimed at Pale, a small village outside 
Sarajevo. On 8 April 1992 the Croatian Defence Council was formed and on 3 
July 1992 the "Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna" was established. The 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a result of some latest events. It was 
established by the Washington Agreement of 1 March 1994 signed by Haris 
Silajdzic and Mate Granic with the aim of putting an end to the Croat-Muslim 
conflict and detaining the Serb Republic expansion in Bosnia by establishing a 
3
 See Article 1 (§ 1) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Croat-Muslim Federation.4 The Dayton Peace Agreement in fact sanctioned these 
earlier developments, legitimised the accords reached in Washington and 
recognised the de facto events related to the Serb Republic. The only exception 
is the issue of the Herceg-Bosna Community or Republic: it is not mentioned in 
the Dayton Agreement because it is considered to cease to exist legally after the 
entering into force of the Washington Agreement. 
Secondly, The Dayton Peace Agreement is based on the idea of recognising 
and maintaining Bosnia as a multi-ethnic state. Considering the historical 
development of the country there was in principle no other option left for the peace-
makers. The population of this small country has always been mixed, consisting 
basically from three dominant nationalities, that is Muslims (Bosniacs), Serbs and 
Croats. At the beginning of the 1990s the population of the country included 44% 
Muslims, 33% percent Serbs and 17% Croats. The Agreement recognised the 
earlier notion (used also by the Tito regime) of the constituent peoples: the new 
Constitution of the State states that Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs are constituent 
peoples and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.5 The idea of multi-ethnicity has 
received a very clear recognition in the structure of the main state institutions. Both 
of the two Houses of the Parliamentary Assembly are structured on this idea: the 
House of Peoples comprises 15 delegates, two-thirds from the Federation and one-
third from Republika Srpska, and the House of Representatives consists of 42 
members, two-thirds elected from the Federation and one-third from the Republika 
Srpska. The Presidency of the new State consists of three members, one Bosniac, 
one Croat and one Serb, who are directly elected from the respective territories, the 
Bosniac and Croat from the Federation, the Serb from the Republika Srpska. In the 
Council of Ministers two-thirds of the ministers should be appointed from the 
Federation and one-third from the Republika Stpska. The deputies of all ministers 
should not be of the same constituent people as their ministers. Among the nine 
members of the Constitutional Court there should be two Bosniacs, two Croats and 
two Serbs (the remaining three members are judges from foreign countries). The 
same applies to the Governing Board of the Central Bank, where the Governor is 
a foreigner appointed by the International Monetary Fund and the members are 
representatives of the three constituent peoples.6 
Thirdly, on the basis of The Dayton Peace Agreement the structure of the 
new State of Bosnia and Herzegovina is rather peculiar due to establishment of 
4
 The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted by the 
Constitutional Assembly of the Federation at the session held on 24 June 1994. 
5
 See the Preamble. 
6
 See Articles IV, V, VI and VII of the Constitution of the State. 
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a pyramid of competing sovereignties having several layers. The two constituent 
units mean not only a simple territorial partition of the administration in the 
country (the Croat-Muslim Federation encompasses 51% and the Republika Sipska 
49% of the country's territory) but they are both de jure and de facto some sort 
of mini-states with all attributes of sovereignty. On the other hand, the newly 
established central State of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an extremely weak state 
with very limited attributes of sovereignty many of which are just formal ones 
because the powers of the entities serve as a stumbling block to realise them in 
practice. Thus, for example, the State has no army, has no police forces, has no 
judiciary. Until recently only the Constitutional Court and the Human Rights 
Chamber were the only judicial bodies at the level of the State.7 The powers of 
the institutions established at the level of the State has been specified in a rather 
restrictive manner. The following matters are within the competence of the State: 
a) foreign policy, b) foreign trade policy, c) customs policy, d) monetary policy, 
e) finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,/) immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulations, g) inter-
national and inter-entity criminal law enforcement, including relations with 
Interpol, h) establishment and operation of common and international communi-
cations facilities, i) regulation of inter-entity transportation,/) air traffic control. 
All other powers and competencies not listed above belong to the entities.8 Both 
of the entities have their own constitutions establishing their separate govern-
mental structures possessing all attributes of an independent statehood (starting 
with the symbols characterising a state, such as flag, anthem, coat of arms, 
capital, and continuing with such vital elements as the legislature, the executive 
branch, the judiciary, the constitutional courts, the ombudsmen, the army, the 
police, the municipality system etc.). 
In addition to all these, while dealing with the peculiar features of the 
structure of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one should mention also the 
recently solved dispute over the inter-entity boundary line in the Brcko area. The 
two entities were unable to reach agreement as to which entity should control the 
Brcko area in northeastern Bosnia, therefore an arbitral tribunal was established 
to decide where to place the responsibility for the future governance of the area. 
The tribunal issued its final award on 5 March 1999 and on 7 December 1999 the 
Statute of the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted (enacted 
7
 Recently the High Representative imposed a law on the creation a third type of Court at 
the State level, which would have limited competence. 
8
 See Article 8 (§ 1) of the Constitution of the State. 
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on 8 March 2000).9 According to the rulings of the final award the Brcko 
District is a single administrative unit of local self-government existing under the 
sovereignty of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But a closer look to the 
Statute of the District reveals a rather perplexing fact. The District appears to be 
a third entity within the State. The functions and powers of the District are much 
wider than those of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has its own legislative 
body, government, police, courts and public prosecutors. 
Fourthly, The Dayton Peace Agreement has established a wide-ranging inter-
national controlling mechanism in Bosnia, which fulfils not only the simple task 
of supervision and guidance but functions as a real decision-making authority. 
The international community is involved into almost all vital fields of insti-
tutional state-building activity in the country, including both military and civilian 
aspects of this activity. Ultimate military authority lies with the international 
peace-keeping forces, presently the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and 
for the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Agreement responsibility 
rests with the Office of the High Representative(OHR). The High Representative 
has become the principal actor of the international community in Bosnia, who is 
being assisted by a staff of more than 700 people. His powers in the latest years 
have been considerably widened, in case of need he is entitled to adopt and 
enforce laws and has the right to dismiss any public official in the country.10 The 
OHR is assisted by a range of other international institutions, such as the OSCE, 
the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the UNCHR, 
the European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM), the International Police 
Task Force (IPTF), the Council of Europe. Bosnia's stability largely depends on the 
activity of these international institutions, the quasi-protectorate system seems to 
be in need for a longer period of time. 
9
 The Final Arbitration Award and the Statute of the Brcko District see in: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Essential texts. Third revised ed i t ion . Office of the High Representat ive, 
2000. 
10
 The post of the High Representative has been established on the basis of Annex 10 of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement. His Off ice has become the supreme civilian authority in the country. 
He is entitled not only to impose new laws but can also modify directly any laws adopted by the 
parliaments of the entities or the State. Within Bosnia no authority can judge his actions, there 
is no possibility of appeal by anyone or anybody against hid decisions. The Human Rights 
Chamber has also acknowledged that that it is not competent ratione personne to deal with 
complaints directed against the High Representative. 
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Annex 6 as the Main Human Rights Instrument within 
the Dayton Structure 
The Dayton Peace Agreement has put an end to one of the most violent conflicts 
which emerged as a result of the disintegration of former socialist Yugoslavia. The 
events which happened between 1991 and 1995 in this dismembered country are 
still in need of explanation and careful study. The events of these years shocked 
Europe, which after 45 years of relatively peaceful development suddenly realised 
that a part of the continent was set ablaze, that the long-forgotten scenes of 
destruction and sufferings of the Second World War came alive. In Europe for the 
first time after 1945 there was a war again, with all its frightening and horrendous 
consequences. We still do not have reliable data on these consequences, but the 
estimated figures speak for themselves. About 4 million people moved from the 
place of their residence, seeking refuge, permanent of temporary either abroad or 
in other parts of Yugoslavia. More than 200.000 lost their life in the bloody 
conflict, and the number of missing persons account for more than 25.000. Apart 
from these so-called visible signs of suffering and loss, there was another 
shocking experience also: it turned out that it is very easy to manipulate the 
psychology of European nations and nationalities, to turn them against each other 
with the help of nationalistic ideologies within a very short period of time, and 
to generate national hatred leading to unimaginable atrocities. Torture, arbitrary 
executions, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing which is simply a nice 
euphemism for genocide, were widely used by the participants of the conflict. It 
is probably not an exaggeration to state that in these years "exactly half a century 
after the Nazi holocaust, a second genocide occurred in Europe".11 
In light of these events it is not surprising that the issue of human rights 
occupies a prominent place within the whole Dayton peace settlement. In Article 
VII of the General Framework Agreement it is stated: "Recognising that the 
observance of human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons 
are of vital importance in achieving lasting peace, the Parties agree to and shall 
comply with the provisions concerning human rights set forth in Chapter One of 
the Agreement at Annex 6." Annex 6 which is called as Agreement on Human 
Rights provides for a detailed system of human rights protection in the newly 
established State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the catalogue of rights to 
be protected and the machinery taking care of this protection. 
11
 See Nowak, M.: Lessons for the international human rights regime from the Yugoslav 
experience. Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Vol. VIII. Book 2. 2000, 147. 
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The Agreement on Human rights has been signed by three parties, by the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (predecessor of the State of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika 
Srpska. In other words, it establishes binding obligations both for the State and 
its entities, and in the proceedings before the established enforcement bodies 
these three signatory parties are the respondent parties. 
The catalogue of rights to be guaranteed and protected at the first glance 
seems to be extremely far-reaching. Article I of Annex 6 reads: "The parties shall 
secure within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally recognised 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights and freedoms 
provided in the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols and the other international agreements 
listed in the Appendix to this Annex." The Appendix mentioned above contains 
a list of 16 international human rights agreements, including the Genocide 
Convention, the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the war victims, the Refugee 
Convention, the two UN Covenants on Human Rights, the Convention against 
Torture, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the 
Protection of Migrant Workers, the European Charter on Regional or Minority 
Languages etc. However, Article II of Annex 6 has established a clear limitation 
as to the applicability of rights provided by the instruments listed in the 
Appendix: the violation of these rights can only be considered if the issue of 
discrimination is also present. On the other hand, the rights provided in the 
European Convention and in all of its Protocols should be secured without any 
condition or limitation. Furthermore, the European Convention and its protocols 
are directly incorporated into the Bosnian legal system and they enjoy priority 
over all other law.12 
On the basis of Annex 6 the Parties with the aim of assisting them in 
honouring their obligations related to the protection of Human Rights have 
established the Commission of Human Rights. The Commission consists of two 
parts: a) the non-judicial part, that is the Office of the Ombudsman, b) the 
judicial part, that is the Human Rights Chamber. The Ombudsman — who is 
appointed by the chairman-in-office of the OSCE and who may not be a citizen 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina carries out the usual functions of an ombuds-
12
 Article II (§ 2) of the Constitution of the State reads: "The rights and freedoms set forth 
in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These shall have priority 
over all other law". 
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man.13 He or She investigates alleged human rights violations, issues finding 
and conclusions following the investigation, presents reports and recommen-
dations to the competent governmental bodies, publishes reports on the 
established violations. The Ombudsman has no competence of issuing binding 
decisions. 
The Human Rights Chamber is the judicial part of the machinary, its decisions 
are final and binding. The Chamber is composed of 14 members, of which six are 
nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina and eight are internationals. The six national 
members are appointed by the Federation and the Republika Srpska. The 
Federation is entitled to appoint four members (two Bosniacs and two Croats) and 
the other two national members are appointed by the RS. The international 
members are appointed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
for five years.14 All members should posses the qualification required for 
appointment to high judicial office or should be jurists of recognised competence. 
Both the Ombudsman and the members of the Chamber cannot be held criminally 
or civilly liable for any acts carried out within the scope of their duties, and the 
international members are accorded the same privileges and immunities as are 
enjoyed by diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. 
The law enforcement machinery under Annex 6 is in fact a copy of the 
European Convention machinery. The drafters of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
being aware of the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina in the forseeable future would 
not become a contracting state of the European Convention decided to establish 
temporarily, at least until Bosnia joins the Council of Europe, the Commission of 
Human Rights substituting the system functioning in Strasbourg. That explains the 
very particular situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is not a member state 
13
 The first Ombudsman appointed was Ms. Gret Haller (formerly a Swiss ambassador) of 
and at present Mr. Frank Orton (formerly Swedish Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination) 
has been appointed as the second Ombudsman of the State. 
14
 At present the composition of the Chamber is the following: Ms. Michele Picard (from 
France, President), Mr. Giovanni Grasso (from Italy, Vice-President), Mr . Dietrich 
Rauschning (from Germany, Vice-President of Panel I), Mr. Rona Aybay (from Turkey), Mr. 
Jakob Möl ler (from Iceland), Mr. Manfred Nowak (from Austr ia) , Mr. Andrew Grotrian 
(from Great Britain), Mr. Viktor Masenko-Mavi (from Hungary, Vice-President of Panel II), 
Mr. Hasan Balic (from the Federation, Bosniak) , Mehmed Dekovic (from the Federation, 
Bosniak) Mr. Zelimir Juka (from the Federation, Croat), Mr. Mato Tadic (from the Federation, 
Croat), Mr . Miodrag Paj ic (from Republika Srpska, Serb), Mr. Vitomir Popovic (From 
Republika Srpska, Serb). At the end of 2000 the mandates of all judges had expired, however 
they all have been re-appointed for another 3 years up to 31 December 2003. 
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of the Council of Europe, formally not a contracting party of the European 
Convention, but at the same time is bounded by the provisions of the Convention 
and has an enforcement institution with competence similar to that enjoyed by the 
Convention organs. The Office of the Ombudsman should have been the substitute 
of the European Commission of Human Rights and the Human Rights Chamber 
should have functioned in the capacity of the European Court of Human Rights. 
In practice, however, it has not been materialzed fully, the two parts of the 
Commission developped their practice seperatly, the Office of the Ombudsman 
has never become a body similar to that of the European Commission of Human 
Rights. For the sake of objectivity one has to mention that its mandate under 
Annex 6 has been formulated differently than that of the European Commission 
of Human Rights mandate. 
Following the initial difficulties faced by both parts of the Commission 
of Human Rights (related to financies, facilities and staff) in the years of 
1996-1997, nowadays both institutions have aquired a solid reputation within 
the Bosnian legal system. The rise of the efficiency of the Human Rights 
Chamber is especially striking: in the years of 1996-97 it was dealing with a 
couple of dozens of applications, however, by middle of 2001 it has adopted 
more than 1000 decisions, including decisions on the merits, decisions on 
admissibility, strike-out decisions, decisions on compensation claims, decisions 
on request for review.15 The increase in the case-load of the Chamber is also 
a clear indication of its rising importance: by the end of August 2001 the 
number of the applications registered with the Chamber exceeded 7,500.16 The 
Chamber presently during its monthly sessions is capable of dealing with more 
than 100 applications. One has to point out two other factors which contributed 
to the efficiency of the Chamber. By the year of 2000 it has managed to 
establish a small but dedicated and professionally well-prepared staff in its 
Sarajevo Office (The Registry of the Chamber), the number of which is about 
30 persons, including both domestic and international lawyers (the latter are 
either recruited or seconded by the governments taking an active and leading 
role in the maintenance of the Dayton accords). By this time the Camber has 
managed to adopt its leading decisions in repect of all of the so-called complex 
type of cases. These cases posed considerable difficulties for the Chamber 
15
 The Chamber publishes its decisions annually in special volumes both in English and in 
Bosnian languages. These volumes can be obtained from the Registry of the Chamber: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, ul. Musala 9. 
16
 The monthly statistics are available from the same address: 
E-mail:chamber.humanrights@ohr.int. 
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because of their legal complexity and because of the weight of their con-
sequences for the respondent parties. They include such issues as the death 
penalty in Bosnia, the fate of the appartments possessed by the former Jugoslav 
National Army, the nature of the so-called occupancy right over the appartments 
and the right of return of occupancy right holders, the frozen bank accounts 
issue (accounts kept in hard currencies by the citizens before the war and frozen 
during and after the war), the pension cases (the right to a pension acquired on 
the basis of provisions existed in the former Socialist Yugoslavia), the freedom 
of religion (the right of religious communities in the country), the independence 
of the judiciry, the notion and content of discriminatory practices in labour 
relations, the criminal jurisdiction in respect of war crimes (in light of the Rules 
of the Road Agreement).17 In deciding these type of cases the Chamber all the 
time has been facing serious difficulties connected with the complexity of the 
Bosnian legal system. This legal system encompasses laws enected in the former 
Socialist Yugoslav Republic. Many of these laws are still valid, because both 
the independent Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the entities have 
incorporated into their legal system these formerly adopted legislative acts; and 
even after the adoption of the Dayton Peace Agreement they were kept in force. 
Annex II of the Constitution of the State on Transitional Arrangements clearly 
states that "all laws regulations and judicial rules of procedure in effect within 
the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina when the Constitution enters into force 
shall remain in effect to the extent not inconsistent with the Constitution, until 
otherwise determined by a competent governmental body of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina". The work on cheking the whole legislation in the country in 
order to eliminate inconsistencies has never been performed in a systematic 
manner, hence it quite a challenging task to establish which laws are still in 
force and which were repealed. Thus for example, nobody can answer what is 
the fate of the laws and regulations adopted by the former Herceg-Bosna 
17
 On 18 February 1996 The Signatory Parties of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Rome 
signed a special agreement (called Rules of the Road) which establishes some limits on the 
criminal jurisdiction of the Parties in respect of wa r crime trials. In order to prevent arbitrary 
arrests and detentions the Parties agreed that the prosecution of war crime criminals would be 
carried out by them on the basis of prior consent of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. The second subparagraph of § 5 of the Rules of the Road Agreement reads: 
"Persons, other than those already indicted by the International Tribunal, may be arrested or 
detained for serious violations of international humanitarian law only pursuant to a previously 
issues order, warrant or indictment that has been reviewed and deemed consistent with 
international legal standards by the International Tribunal...". 
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Rebublic.18 The existing legal system includes also the laws adopted by the 
State and the entities after the entering into force of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, and in addition to that there is an extensive set of laws imposed by 
the High Representative. 
The Chamber as a sui generis instititution ( being neither a pure domestic 
institution, nor a classical international body) has been empowered with 
competencies which were not similar to that of the Strasbourg organs. From the 
very beginning of its existence it was entitled to receive applications directly 
from the applicants and not only via the referral of the Ombudsman (as it is 
known the European Court of Human Rights before the acceptance of Protocol 
11 had no such competence). It was empowered also with the right of review: if 
the application is decided by a panel of the Chamber the Plenary on the motion 
of the concerned parties in the case may review the decision (this possibility was 
introduced into the Strasbourg system only after the adoption of Protocol 11). 
The nature of orders of the Chamber is also differs from those enjoyed by the 
Strasbourg bodies: the Chamber has the power to order provisional measures 
(involving both negative and positive actions to be taken by the respondent 
parties) and in its decisions on the merits with the aim to remedy the breach 
established can adopt orders related not only to monetary compensation but also 
orders to cease and desist (Article X of Annex 6). 
The applicants can address their complaints against any of the three Signatory 
Parties to the Annex (Respondent Parties) and the Parties themselves are entitled 
to file complaints (inter-entity complaints) before the Chamber. In Article VIII 
(§ 1) of Annex 6 there is a clear specification of those who can apply to the 
Chamber: "any Party or person, non-governmental organisation, or group of 
individuals claiming to be a victim of violation by any Party or acting on behalf 
of alleged victims who are deceased or missing...". 
Any application made under the above-mentioned paragraph should be 
submitted in a written form and should set out the followings: 
a) the identity of the applicant 
b) the name and the address of his representative, if any 
c) the name of the respondent party against which the application is 
lodged 
d) a statement of the facts 
18
 The Chamber in its proceedings made some attempts to clarify f rom the Agent of the 
Respondent Party the so-called issue of the "Herceg-Bosna laws", but received no clear answer. 
See for example, Case No. C H / 0 0 / 5 4 8 0 Aziz Dautbegovic and 51 other villagers from Duge 
against The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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e) the statement of the rights alleged to have been violated 
f) a statement of any provisional measure or other remedies sought.19 
For the applicants it is necessary also to demonstrate that they had taken all 
necessary actions and steps to have the matter complained of settled before the 
competent domestic organs (the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies) and 
to show that the application has been submitted to the Chamber within six months 
from such date on which the final decision was taken (the six-months rule). The 
Chamber in deciding which of the filed applications should be accepted apart 
from these two very important requirements takes into account other criteria also, 
thus, it would not deal with those applications which: a) contain substantially the 
same matter which has already been examined by the Chamber or has already 
been submitted to another procedure or international investigation; b) which it 
considers incompatible with the Agreement, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse 
of the right of petition; c) which are pending before any other international human 
rights body responsible for the adjudication or any other Commission established 
by the Annexes of the Dayton Peace Agreement.20 
All of the applications should be examined whether they are compatible or not 
with the Agreement, and the Chamber in its practice distinguishes three types of 
compatibility issues, namely: compatibility ratione temporis, compatibility ratione 
materiae and compatibility ratione personae. The Chamber is entitled to examine 
only those complaints in which the applicants claim that the alleged violations are 
connected with the facts and actions occurred after 14 December 1995. According 
to the generally accepted principles of international law, it cannot decide whether 
events occurring before the entry into force of the Agreement involve violations of 
human rights.21 The applicant's should always be related to the rights protected by 
the Agreement, hence complaints alleging the violation of those rights which fall 
outside the scope of the protected rights would be declared as incompatible 
ratione materiae.22 The Chamber should clarify also the issues related to the 
standing of the parties in cases reaching it (ratione personae issues), in other 
words, to establish the Respondent Party which is responsible for the alleged 
19
 These requirements are set forth by the Rules of Procedure. 
20
 See, Article VIII of Annex 6. 
21
 See the Chamber's first decision in the case No. CH/96/1 (Matanovic). 
22
 See for example the cases No. CH/98/548 (Ivanovic), CH/99/189 (Vujovic), СН/99/ 
2340 (Zivanovic). 
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violation15 and to find out whether the applicant can be considered as a victim 
or not.24 
The majority of the cases are being decided by the Chamber without public 
hearings, on the basis of written procedure. Public hearings are held only in the 
leading cases and cases in which the facts are not clear. To the hearing, apart 
from the parties, the applicant (who is entitled to have a representative) and the 
Agent of the Respondent Party, the Chamber summons witnesses and experts 
and sometimes the relevents institutions to act as amicus curiae. Following the 
public hearing the Chamber in camera proceeds with the deliberation of the 
case. 
The organisation of the work of the Chamber, its structure and the procedure 
before it are regulated by the Rules of Procedure.25 These rules specify the 
independent and judicial nature of the Chamber, the solemn declaration to be 
taken by the members and the order of precedence among the members, the duties 
of the President, Vice-President and Vice-Presidents of the Panels (there are two 
panels each consisting of seven judges), the composition and duties of the 
Secretariat, headed by the Executive Officer and the Registrar, the issues related 
to the place, time and date of its sessions (the Chamber holds its one-week-long 
monthly sessions in Sarajevo), the procedures to be followed during its 
deliberations, including the voting patterns, the procedure to be followed in 
registering the cases, in the conduct of the public hearings, the procedure related 
to the decisions on the admissibility and merits, review proceedings, the delivery 
and publication of its decisions 
Conclusions 
Considering the fact that more than five years have passed since the adoption of 
the Dayton Agreement, one has to put the question: is it a success story or a 
failure. There is no simple answer to this question. The main objective of this 
peace agreement has been undeniably achieved: it has put an end to madness, 
established peace in the country. But the long-term aims have not been realised. 
23
 The Chamber is not bound by the applicant's choice of Respondent Party, it has the right 
to designate in light of circumstances of the case such a Party by itself. See case No. CH/96/31 
(Turcinovic). 
24
 See case No CH/99/2339 (The Islamic Community), case No. CH/99/2339 (Commission 
concerning the location of a graveyard in Banja Luka). 
25
 See, Human Rights Chamber. Rules of Procedure (adopted on 13 December 1996). 
THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS... 67 
There is a very limited progress in the domain of ethnic reconciliation, everything 
in the country is ethnicised (politics, business, education, culture) and the existing 
state institutions are simply a playing-ground of nationalist policies. The rule of 
law is not respected and human rights violations are part of everyday life. Not in 
the sense of some kind of shocking atrocities, but in the form of all-pervasive and 
tacitly tolerated bureaucratic practices. The process of cleaning up the con-
sequences of ethnic cleansing is extremely slow, the issue of the return of 
refugees and displaced persons is an unresolved one. It is still about 1,4 million 
persons(either refugees or displaced persons) are waiting for a better opportunity 
in order to return to their homes. To sum up, the Bosnian society is still far away 
from democratic governance. 
The human rights machinery established by Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement was invented with the aim of introducing democratic values into the 
post-war Bosnian society, including the respect for human rights, immediately 
after the conflict, without waiting for a longer period of time, until the date when 
the country would become an integral part of the family of European democratic 
states. However, this noble intention of the framers of the Agreement has not 
been realised for several reasons. The consequences of the destruction were so 
profound and so far-reaching that no machinery can cope with them in the fore-
seeable future. The country has been fractured politically, socially, economically 
and ethnically, and the corrosive and all-pervasive nationalism has extended its 
roots deeply in all spheres of the Bosnian society. And unfortunately the country 
is being ruled by the same nationalist forces which were behind the confict, such 
nationalist parties as the Serb SDS, the Muslim SDA and the Croat HDZ. The 
Dayton Agreement in fact legitimised their war-time territorial gains and upheld 
the ethnic segregation of Bosnia. The machinery established by Annex 6 is not 
adapted to deal with such wide-scale abnormalities, it is physically impossible 
for one institution to remedy all those violations stemming from this overall 
situation. The Dayton quasi international institutions cannot overtake the 
functions of domestic bodies, it is first of all the latter would have been in a 
position, provided they would have the will, to quarantee a real progress in 
realising the concept of the framers. However, the ethnicised and politicised 
domestic institutions, including the judiciary, the police and organs of local 
administration, are frustrating all efforts aimed at establishing a real rule of law 
in the country. The institutions of Annex 6 do remedy some of the violations, 
and those few who are lucky enough that their cases are decided by them are in 
a position to become familiar with the notion of the rule of law. But these 
institutions can set up only a general trend, can provide an example for the 
domestic institutions how rights should be protected and safeguarded within a 
framework of a functioning democracy. The process of démocratisation within 
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the Bosnian society depends basically on the domestic institutions themselves, 
it is up to them to create a functioning democratic state, and the Dayton 
structures can oly facilitate this process. It would probably take a longer period 
of time, and one cannot rule out the possibility that these structures would be 
replaced by something more workable and viable. 
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contemporary debate between the proponents of punishment and those of amnesty, we will be in 
a better position to make an informed decision when our tum inevitably comes to choose. We 
should pay particular attention to: what amnesty is, including the problems inherent in its 
definition: amnesty's roots in the virtue of forgiveness, which is found in most of the world's major 
religious traditions; amnesty's historical manifestations in cultures that have adhered to those 
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In Homer's The Odyssey, the hero Odysseus faces a vexing dilemma. His ship 
must pass the island of the Sirens, whose beautiful song entrances sailors and 
lures them to their deaths. Odysseus knows that he and his crew cannot resist the 
urge to follow the song, and if they give in they will die on the island. Odysseus 
devises a clever solution: he straps himself and his crew to the masts of their ship. 
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[Hjere the great art lies, to discern in what the 
law is to bid restraint and punishment, and 
in what things persuasion only is to work. 
John Milton, Areopagitica' 
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Even though the Sirens' song entrances him and he strains against his bonds in 
a painful attempt to break free, Odysseus and his crew are prevented from 
following the song to the island and survive. 
Societies sometimes face situations like the one that threatened Odysseus. 
During and after times of especially intense crises such as civil war, military 
dictatorship, massive public disobedience or state terror, prosecution and 
retribution against those responsible for atrocities becomes an extremely 
attractive option. It may also lead society down a road fraught with death. 
Retribution may at the least drain resources that are needed to rebuild society in 
other areas, and may at the most provoke those responsible for crimes to new 
violence or hang as a specter over their heads and thus make it less likely they 
will relinquish power. If the ultimate goal society seeks to reach is social 
harmony, then prosecution and retribution may be like the Siren's song, leading 
society in a direction from which it might never reach its destination. In such a 
circumstance a very painful decision may have be made: society may have to strap 
itself to the masts by granting amnesty and thus avoid costly retribution. 
I. The Foundations: Communities and the Rule of Law 
Failing to punish lawbreakers is a troubling proposition because it strikes at the 
very foundation of civilized societies. Every human society represents an attempt 
to create order out of disorder. One of the great achievements of humankind has 
been the subjugation of the state of nature and the creation of interactive 
communities governed by rules. This is based on the uniquely human realization 
that the freedom of action which exists in the state of nature is ultimately 
destructive; since losing the natural game often means death, and no individual 
can always win, a reasonable individual very quickly realizes that it is in his or 
her best interest to join a community with other individuals, all of whom accept 
certain restrictions on their freedom of action. Adhering to such restrictions is 
only beneficial to an individual, however, if the other members of the community 
obey those same restrictions. If others do not obey the rules then an obedient 
individual is placed at a serious disadvantage; ultimately such an individual 
incurs the same detriment that he or she sought to avoid by accepting restrictions 
in the first place. 
Why do individuals obey? There is both a carrot and a stick. The carrot is the 
escape from a Hobbesian life that is "nasty, brutish and short." When the 
members of a community follow rules it creates the regularity and security that 
facilitates the development of family, creativity, wealth, and other things that 
improve the quality of life. The stick is the threat of punishment, the knowledge 
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that breaking the rules will yield retaliation from the community that decreases 
the offender's quality of life. The forms that punishment takes are myriad, as are 
the justifications for punishing. But whether punishment be for deterrence, 
retribution, rehabilitation or any other reason, the result is the same: breaking the 
rules results in retaliation by the community that creates an unpleasant situation 
for the offender. Since, as noted supra, obeying the rules is of benefit to an 
individual only if those same rules are obeyed by the other members of the 
community, it logically follows that any offender within the community must be 
punished, no matter where that offender falls in the community's hierarchy. This 
principle is known as the rule of law. 
Abrogating the rule of law by failing to punish certain lawbreakers is a very 
serious matter indeed. A policy of amnesty seeks to accomplish precisely this, 
and thus its importance cannot be overstated. Indeed, amnesty is one of the most 
important policy choices any society can make. Should the rule of law be 
forgiven or is it so sacred that exceptions should never be made? This question 
has aroused spirited debate not only in the scholarly community, but also in 
societies themselves. A comprehensive answer, in either case, would certainly fill 
many volumes, and is thus well beyond the scope of this short study. Indeed, 
though a great deal has been written on the debate over amnesty, the literature 
often overlooks several important preliminary questions: What is amnesty? 
Where did it come from? How and why is it used? The answers to these questions 
help form an understanding of the nature of amnesty, and understanding the 
nature of amnesty is necessary if we are to become informed participants in this 
grand debate. 
II. A General Definition of Amnesty 
The fact that different legal criteria exist in each country makes it impossible to 
provide an all-encompassing definition of amnesty. A general definition is 
possible, though even this is not an easy task. Webster's defines amnesty simply 
as "the act of an authority (such as a government) by which general pardon of an 
offense is granted, often before trial or conviction, especially] to a large group 
of individuals,"2 and one legal encyclopedia defines amnesty as "an exercise of 
the sovereign power by which immunity to prosecution is granted by wiping out 
the offense supposed to have been committed by a group or class of persons prior 
2
 Webster's New International Dictionary 71 (3rd ed. 1971). 
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to their being brought to trial."3 Both of these definitions include four salient 
features. First, amnesty wipes out a particular past offense so as to exclude the 
possibility of punishing the offenders. Second, amnesty is granted by the 
government or sovereign power, not by ordinary individuals. Third, amnesty is 
granted generally, meaning it is granted to a group of individuals who have 
committed the same offense and not to a specific individual. Finally, amnesty is 
granted before conviction, presumably in order to prevent the trial and punish-
ment of the offenders. 
Black's offers even more features. It defines amnesty as: 
1. A sovereign act of oblivion for past acts, granted by a government to all 
persons (or to certain persons) who have been guilty of crime or delict, generally 
political offenses treason, sedition, rebellion and often conditioned upon their 
return to obedience and duty within a prescribed time. 
2. A general pardon or proclamation of such pardon from subjects' offenses 
against the government; while usually exerted on behalf of certain classes of 
persons, subject to trial but not convicted, it is not confined to such cases. 
3. A declaration of the person or persons who have newly acquired or re-
covered the sovereign power in a state, by which they pardon all persons who 
composed, supported, or obeyed the government which was overthrown.4 
Black's demonstrates something very important about amnesty: the term does 
not easily lend itself to a single, universal definition. While affirming the afore-
mentioned focus on groups, governments and the erasure of past offenses, Black's 
suggests that amnesty may also be used to wipe out offenses for which 
individuals have already been convicted and punished. Also, Black's stresses the 
political nature of the offenses, which are generally covered by amnesty in 
modern societies. 
The confusion among lexicographers as to what amnesty actually means is 
reflected in the application of the concept in the real world. Indeed, acts termed 
"amnesty" take different forms in different countries at different times, and often 
the term itself has become interchangeable with other terms such as pardon and 
clemency. However, there are a few common themes that do emerge and that do 
make it possible to craft a general definition. Amnesty is an action, undertaken by 
the sovereign (or representatives of the sovereign), by which a class of individuals 
who have committed certain political offenses—either against the sitting regime 
or as a means of maintaining a prior regime—have their offenses legally forgotten, 
though not necessarily forgiven, and are granted immunity from prosecution, 
3
 67A C.J.S. Amnesty § 29 (1955). 
4
 Black's Law Dictionary 76 (5th ed. 1979). 
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punishment or further punishment.5 Obviously this definition leaves a great deal 
of leeway in the administration of specific amnesty policies. Amnesty may affect 
those who have committed a political offense but have not yet been convicted and 
punished or those who have already been punished. Amnesty may be directed at 
those who have offended against the sitting regime or those who committed 
offenses in the name of a prior regime. Amnesty may be very broad and granted 
in "blanket" form, without regard to the special circumstances of each offender, 
or may be very specific, requiring a case by case analysis of each offender to 
determine whether he or she meets all of the criteria. Amnesty may or may not be 
layered with conditions, such as loyalty oaths and restitution. These options allow 
policies of amnesty to be tailored to meet the peculiar demands of individual 
circumstances. The core definition of amnesty offered supra, however, has 
remained the same. 
III. The Foundations of Amnesty 
The word "amnesty" is derived from the Greek amnestia, meaning forgetfulness 
and forgiveness.6 Though some efforts have been made to distinguish the con-
cepts of forgiveness, mercy, forgetfulness and the like,7 these distinctions are 
more of semantic interest than real importance. Such terms are certainly used 
interchangeably in practice.8 Thus, let us consider the foundations of amnesty 
5
 The emphasis on political offenses is of more contemporary relevance, since ancient 
amnesties were often granted to all types of offenders. See infra. 
6
 Webster's, supra note 2, at 17. The word amnesia is also derived from this Greek root. 
7
 See, e.g., Murphy, J. G. and Hampton, J.: Forgiveness and Mercy (1988). Murphy argues 
that forgiveness and mercy are two separate concepts. Forgiveness is granted to a wrongdoer 
only by the person against whom the wrong was committed (Ibid, at 21). Mercy, on the other 
hand, is something granted by the person or body charged with punishing the wrongdoer, usually 
the state (Ibid, at 167). Under this categorization, amnesty could only be an act of mercy and not 
of forgiveness, since amnesty is granted by the state and not by the individuals directly wronged 
as a result of the offender's acts. 
8
 This raises one of the largest problems in examining the practical application of amnesty; 
namely, those charged with granting it are rarely as careful in choosing their words as scholars 
such as Professor Murphy are. As shall be seen infra, amnesty is often viewed and referred to 
as a form of forgiveness, mercy, forgetfulness, pardon, clemency, reprieve, reconciliation, obli-
vion, absolution, impunity, forbearance, etc. See generally R. Newton Barger: Amnesty: What 
Does It Really Mean? (1974). While it may be possible to draw philological distinctions between 
these terms, practically it becomes impossible. See Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152-153 
(1877). 
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from the perspective of those who have granted it in modern times. This entails, 
in particular, an examination of the roots of forgiveness and mercy (generally 
found as virtues in the world's major religious traditions and then reflected as 
cultural and social values in human societies subscribing to those religions) as 
well as historically important grants of amnesty. 
A. The Religious Virtues of Forgiveness and Mercy 
1. The Judeo-Christian Tradition 
The values of forgiveness, reconciliation and mercy are central to Judaism and 
Christianity. In the Old Testament, God is widely described as "merciful and 
gracious, slow to anger, ... forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin."4 The 
Bible extols this virtue in humans as well. Consider, for example, the story of 
Joseph. Joseph is sold into slavery by his brothers, who are jealous of the special 
favor their father, Jacob, shows him.10 Joseph becomes ruler of Egypt, and upon 
Jacob's death Joseph's brothers petition him for forgiveness.11 Joseph not only 
forgives them, but welcomes them into his home and agrees to provide for them and 
their families.12 
The New Testament, of central importance to Christians, is also replete with 
examples of forgiveness and mercy. Consider Jesus' famous exhortation to his 
followers "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who 
curse you, pray for those who abuse you. ... Be merciful, even as your Father is 
merciful.... [Fjorgive, and you will be forgiven."13 Or consider Paul's Letter to the 
Hebrews, in which he proposes that by following these teachings and being 
merciful one may "draw near to the throne of grace, [and] receive mercy."14 
2. The Islamic Tradition 
Forgiveness and mercy are equally important characteristics of Islam. Indeed, one 
of the names of Allah is Al-Rahman, which means "The Merciful One."15 
Muhammad teaches throughout the Qur'an that forgiveness from Allah is a per-
son's reward for his or her forgiveness of others. For example, Muhammad 
9
 Exodus 34:6-7. See also Nehemiah 9 :17-19 and Psalms 86:5. All references are to the 
Revised Standard Version of the Bible (1952). 
10
 Genesis 37:27-28. 
11
 Ibid, at 50:15-17. 
12
 Ibid, at 50:19-21. 
13
 Luke 6 :27-28 ,36-37 . 
14
 Hebrews 4:16. 
15
 8 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics 559 (ed.: James Hastings, 1915). 
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acknowledges that "The recompense for an evil is an evil like thereof," yet holds 
that there is an act of even higher virtue than retaliation: "[B]ut whoever forgives 
and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from Allah."16 Likewise, "Those 
who spend [i.e., give charity] in prosperity and adversity, who repress anger and 
who pardon men; verily, Allah loves."17 Later, Muhammad appeals to his 
followers to behave as Allah Himself would behave: "[L]et those among you who 
are blessed with graces ... pardon and forgive. Do you not love that Allah should 
forgive you?"18 
3. The Eastern Religions: Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism 
Forgiveness and merciful behavior are not only characteristics of the eligious 
tradition encompassing Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In Hinduism, righteous 
conduct (,dharma) is defined principally in passages from two scriptural works, 
The Bhagavad Gita and The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad.19 Chapter 16 of The 
Bhagavad Gita distinguishes between the divine (righteous) and demoniac (evil) 
natures. "Charity, self-control, ... absence of anger,... majesty, forgiveness [and] 
absence of malice ... are the endowments of one who is born with the divine 
nature,"20 while "[h]ypocrisy, arrogance, ... anger [and] harshness ... are the 
endowments of one who is born with the demoniac nature."21 This theme is 
supplemented in The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, which lists as the three cardinal 
virtues self-restraint, charity and compassion.22 By refraining from anger and 
vindictiveness, restraining oneself, and acting with charity, compassion, forgiveness 
and mercy, one may hope to attain a higher level of existence. 
Buddhism, too, views forgiveness and mercy as a means to attaining 
happiness and Nirvana. In the Dhammapada,23 the Buddha sets down the con-
ditions for achieving happiness. "We live happily indeed, not hating those who 
16
 Ch. 42, verse 40. All references are to The Noble Qur'an (Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-
Hilâli & Muhammad Muhsin Khân trans., 1993). 
17
 Ch. 3, verse 134. See also Ch. 42, verse 37. 
18
 Ch. 24, verse 22. 
19
 See generally Morgan, K. W.: The Religion of the Hindus. 1953. 
20
 Ch. 16, para. 1 -3 . All re ferences are to The Bhagavad Gita (Eliot Deutsch trans., 
1968). 
21
 Ibid, at para. 4. 
22
 The Thirteen Principal Upanishads 150 (Robert Ernest Hume trans., 1949). 
23
 Meaning "The Way of Truth," this is a collection of speeches composed by the Buddha. 
It is a part of the Sutta Pitaka, the basic canon of Buddhism. All page references are to The 
Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha: Early Discourses, the Dhammapada, and Later Basic 
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hate us! ... He who has given up both victory and defeat, he is contented and 
happy. ... Let a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome evil by good."24 
The Buddha goes on to exhort his followers to refrain from punishing those who 
have done wrong, for "[b]y one's self one suffers. ... The wicked man burns by 
his own deeds, as if burned by fire."25 "He who, seeking his own happiness, 
punishes beings..., will not find happiness after death."26 
Confucianism also incorporates the value of forgiveness. Indeed, the highest 
Confucian value is Jen, benevolence toward others that necessitates compassion, 
love and mercy.27 
All of the above religious teachings affected the cultures in which they gained 
prominence, and thus it is unsurprising that the exercise of amnesty, as a 
manifestation of the general socio-cultural recognition that forgiveness and mercy 
are virtues rather than vices, is found in so many different societies. Of course, 
the desire to fulfill religious obligations has not been the only consideration of 
those who have granted amnesty, as we shall see presently. 
B. The Historical Roots of Amnesty 
The exercise of mercy by the sovereign is not a modern phenomenon. Indeed, 
for as long as there have been written laws there has been an institutionalized 
power of mercy, pardon and amnesty. The Code of Hammurabi (c. 1700 
B.C.E.), the first written law code, provided that the king could pardon 
adulterers.28 In the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, general amnesties were 
granted to all offenders (except sorcerers, murderers and adulterers) on religious 
occasions such as Easter.29 Let us consider in particular the circumstances of 
three especially developed traditions of amnesty: Athens, China and England. 
We shall consider the implications of these amnesties when we consider the 
different types of amnesty discussed infra. 
24
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1. Amnesty in Athens 
Among the earliest and best-recorded amnesties of the ancient world were those 
granted by Athens.30 The first was granted in 481 B.C.E., and though it was not 
explicitly termed an amnesty it did lay the foundation for amnesty in the fu-
ture.31 In Athens, politicians who happened to fall out of favor were frequently 
classified as enemies of the state and ostracized. In 481 B.C.E., with a large 
proportion of its most prominent political leaders in exile, Athens was threatened 
with invasion by the Persian Emperor Xerxes I. Faced with this prospect, and 
fearing that the exiles would aid the Persians, the major political factions in Athens 
offered to allow the exiles to return with full restoration of their civil rights. The 
offer was accepted and the Persian invasion was repulsed.32 
Building on this precedent, the Athenians tried amnesty once again to aid the 
city-state in a time of great turmoil. In 404 B.C.E., Athens capitulated to the rival 
city-state of Sparta following the Peloponnesian War. The Spartan general Lysander 
established a council of Spartan sympathizers to rule Athens. Known collectively as 
the Thirty Tyrants, these rulers exiled thousands of Athenian democrats and 
imposed a harsh dictatorship on those who remained. Several political parties that 
had originally supported the Tyrants revolted, leading to the outbreak of civil war 
in 403 B.C.E. Realizing that they could not win without the help of the 
democrats, these parties invited the exiled general Thrysabulus to return to 
Athens. Upon his return, Thrysabulus agreed to aid the rebels in exchange for a 
promise by the parties to grant amnesty to the remaining exiles. The deal was 
struck, the Tyrants were overthrown and the exiles returned home. The amnesty 
was credited with "restoring] civil peace in [Athens] after revolutions and 
counter-revolutions,"33 and earned the Athenian government the respect of other 
city-states who had withdrawn their support following Sparta's victory.34 
2. Amnesty in China 
Perhaps nowhere was the system of amnesty more highly developed than in 
Ancient China. Indeed, amnesties were granted in China more frequently than in 
any other ancient civilization.35 Amnesties were first recorded in 1027 B.C.E. 
30
 Dorjahn, A. P.: Political Forgiveness in Old Athens: The Amnesty of403 B.C. 1 (1946). 
See also Damico, A. J.: Democracy and the Case for Amnesty 24-26 (1975). 
31




 Balogh, E.: Political Refugees in Ancient Greece 63 (1943). 
34
 Dorjahn: op. cit. 53. 
35
 McKnight: op. cit. intro. xi. 
78 ROBERT PARKER 
under the emperors of the Western Chou dynasty and quickly became a staple of 
Chinese leadership.36 Influenced by the teachings of Confucius, Chinese 
emperors believed that the Mandate of Heaven included an obligation to behave 
mercifully, "to cleanse the wicked so that they might have the chance to begin 
afresh."37 If an emperor failed to fulfill the Mandate it was believed that the 
gods would withdraw the Mandate and transfer it to another, who would then 
overthrow the old dynasty and establish a new one. Thus, Chinese emperors 
issued amnesties and granted mercy with almost competitive zeal. 
For example, in the ten years of his reign (205 B.C.E.-195 B.C.E.) Emperor 
Han Kao-tsu proclaimed eight universal amnesties forgiving the transgressions 
of all offenders in the empire.38 Emperor Ch'eng (r. 33 B.C.E.-6 B.C.E.) 
believed that a total eclipse of the sun was a sign from Heaven of his failure to 
fulfill the Mandate by being sufficiently merciful, and thus he granted a universal 
amnesty in order to prove his worth and appease the gods. In a rare 
acknowledgment of the fallibility of the emperor, the edict pronouncing the 
amnesty stated "The blame [for the eclipse] lies upon Us Ourself. ... Our faults 
and errors [must] be pointed out."39 
In 1 B.C.E. Emperor P'ing issued a tract explaining the necessity of amnesty 
in China. "[A]n ordinance of amnesty," he explained, "is for the puipose of 
giving the empire a new beginning. ... [It allows criminals] to purify their hearts 
and renew themselves."40 As time progressed, however, such enlightened 
benevolence gave way to more practical concerns. For example, amnesties were 
often granted when prisons became overcrowded.41 The Ming Emperor Yung-lo 
(r. 1403-1425) began granting amnesty to certain classes of offenders in the 
summer and winter to relieve them of the extreme temperatures those seasons 
brought to the prisons, a practice that continued until the Ch'ing dynasty began 
to collapse in the 19th Century.42 
3. Amnesty in England 
The exercise of mercy in ancient England is very similar to that in other parts of 
Europe and thus serves as an excellent example for this part of the world. In 
36
 Ibid. 2. 
37
 Ibid. 2-3 . 
38
 Ibid. 16. 
39
 Ibid. 17. As with European monarchs, Chinese emperors traditionally referred to 
themselves in the plural. 
40
 Ibid. 30-31. 
41
 Ibid. 116. 
42
 Ibid. 101-103. 
FIGHTING THE SIRENS' SONG: THE PROBLEM OF AMNESTY.., 79 
England, in contrast to China, broad grants of amnesty were eschewed in favor 
of pardons in individual cases.43 Ine of Wessex (r. 688 C.E.-725 C.E.) is the first 
English king to have recorded the use of a royal pardon,44 though it was not until 
the reign of Edward the Confessor (1042 C.E.-1066 C.E.) that the "royal 
prerogative of mercy" was established, vesting the power to forgive breaches of 
the law in the king alone.45 When the Normans under William the Conqueror 
overthrew Edward's successor Harold, they retained the prerogative of mercy and 
it became traditional for a general amnesty to be proclaimed each time a new 
Norman monarch was crowned.46 
As the monarchy grew more stable and centralized the use of the royal pre-
rogative of mercy became more frequent and far-reaching. It became common, 
for example, for kings to entice soldiers into their service by promising them a 
general amnesty for any crimes they might commit (such as murder, rape and 
looting) while in His Majesty's service.47 In time the power became absolute, 
extending to every case under the law. It was not until the ascendancy of 
Parliament in the 17th Century that civil cases, murder and rape were removed 
from the scope of royal pardons.48 
The English Civil War, however, provided another opportunity for the broad 
use of the royal prerogative of mercy. The defeat of the Royalists by Parliament 
in 1648 led to chaos as various factions scrambled to fill the void in leadership. 
Order returned under the lord protectorship of Oliver Cromwell in 1653, only to 
evaporate again upon Oliver's death in 1658. His son and successor, Richard, 
proved incapable of managing the affairs of the state and the monarchy was 
restored in 1660 under Charles II. Yet an important question remained: what was 
to be done with the thousands of royalists and counter-revolutionaries who had 
been hunted and imprisoned under the Cromwell regime? And further, what 
43
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should be done with Cromwell's supporters now that the royalists had returned 
to power? Charles saw an opportunity to assert royal authority while simul-
taneously restoring normality to the state, and in 1682 he issued the Declaration 
of Breda: "[So] that those wounds which have [for] so many years ... been kept 
bleeding may be bound up,... we do grant a free and general pardon ... to all our 
subjects."49 Parliament acquiesced and the royal prerogative of mercy was 
reestablished.50 
III. Criticism of Amnesty 
The foregoing examples of amnesty may give the impression that the decision 
to grant mercy is easy and free from detractors. This is false. Granting mercy 
defeats the normal outcome that enforceable laws are designed to effectuate. 
Rules need to be enforced, for otherwise they are useless as rules and instead 
become mere guidelines that are recommended but not required. Thankfully, no 
society has ever reached a point where it was so merciful, where pardon and 
amnesty were so frequent, that any offender could be assured of forgiveness 
regardless of the crime. Such a society would certainly degenerate into chaos and 
the rule of law would be at an end.51 Yet social systems around the world have 
found a place for mercy. As shall be seen, striking a proper balance between 
amnesty and retribution, between impunity and justice, is not an easy task.52 
49
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A. Classical Arguments Against the Exercise of Pardon and Amnesty 
Given the destructive impact tampering with the rule of law can have, it is little 
wonder that pardons and amnesties have been much maligned. Indeed, distaste 
for the concept of sovereign mercy was common among classical theorists of 
government, law and crime. 
Montesquieu, for example, argued that state mercy was proper in monarchies 
where offenses are considered to be against the crown, but that state mercy was 
anathema in a republic. Republics, Montesquieu argued, recognize the sove-
reignty of all the people, and thus an offense can only be forgiven or overlooked 
by the people themselves.53 William Blackstone agreed, arguing that "one of the 
great advantages of monarchy [is] that there is a magistrate, who has it in his 
power to extend mercy, wherever he thinks it is deserved. ... In democracies, 
however, this power of pardon can never subsist; for ... nothing higher is 
acknowledged than ... the laws."54 
Cesare Beccaria took a much harder line against pardon and amnesty, arguing 
that laws should be absolute and no one, even a monarch, should possess the 
power to abrogate the rules. "See to it that the laws are clear and simple," 
Beccaria instructed, "and that the entire force of the nation is united in their 
defense, and that no part of it is employed to destroy them."55 Immanuel Kant 
took a similar hard line, though out of concern for the subjects of the laws and 
not for the laws themselves. First, Kant saw pardons granted by the sovereign 
as necessarily furthering the sovereign's own interests and thus treating the 
recipient as an object.56 Second, Kant argued that individuals had a right to 
have the state punish wrongs done to them. "With respect to a crime of one 
subject against another, [the sovereign] cannot exercise this right [of pardon], for 
in such cases exemption from punishment constitutes the greatest injury towards 
his subjects."57 
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В. Contemporary Arguments Against the Exercise of Pardon and Amnesty 
Criticism of amnesty and pardon has persisted to the present day. The desire to 
see justice done, to see offenders punished and the law vindicated, is as power-
ful today as it has been in the past. Today, however, an international legal 
system and a heightened consciousness of human rights bolster this desire. 
Governments are regarded as having an "obligation to ... investigate [offenses], 
to prosecute those responsible [no matter who they may be], and to compensate 
the victims."58 
Pardon and amnesty would seem to vitiate this obligation. "[Amnesty] ... for 
systematic and widespread violations of human rights is a betrayal of our human 
solidarity with the victims..., to whom we owe a duty of justice, remembrance, 
and compensation."59 The rights of victims, it is argued, cannot be "barterîd 
away" by national authorities who grant amnesty to the offenders,60 but can 
only be forgiven and mitigated by the individual victims themselves.61 The 
duty of the state is to prosecute and punish unless the individual victims tell it 
otherwise. 
Amnesty critics rely extensively on the obligations of states under inter-
national law. For example, Articles 4, 12 and 14 of the Convention Against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( 1984) 
require states to criminalize the use of torture, investigate allegations of torture 
and ensure legal redress for the victims of torture, respectively. Article 5 of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) 
requires states to criminalize genocide, and Articles 1, 4 and 6 of that convention 
require states to try those suspected of genocide and, if found guilty, to punish 
them. Clearly, it is argued, states may not grant amnesty to those that 
international law expressly requires states to punish. Similar arguments have been 
made regarding the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (as well as the First and Second 
Protocols of 1977), since the violation of such international obligations is 
considered an offense against humanity and not simply against a single state's 
victims.62 
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IV. Types of Amnesty 
Despite the objections to amnesty noted supra, states persist in granting it. Why? 
What concerns can there possibly be that override enforcement of the law? We 
may identify three types of amnesty: moral amnesty, just amnesty and political 
amnesty. 
Before we examine each of these types, it should be noted that they are not 
mutually exclusive. In practice no amnesty is entirely consistent with one type 
or another, simply because the factors and feelings that motivate human beings 
to engage in certain acts are always numerous and complex. In determining 
which type of amnesty is applicable to a given situation, therefore, we are 
concerned with the primary motivation behind it, not the only motivation. 
A. The Three Types 
"Moral" amnesties are those that are granted primarily because of a perceived 
moral or religious obligation to be merciful on the part of the grantor. Moral 
amnesties do not portend to condone the actions for which the offenders are 
amnestied, nor do they have as their primary purpose the accomplishment of 
some other goal. Rather, they are granted out of a belief that mercy is a legitimate 
end in itself. Often the sovereign who grants a moral amnesty feels a sense of 
obligation to be merciful in order to fulfill the expectations and mandate of a 
higher power. Mercy is viewed as a necessary part of the social fabric that the 
sovereign has a duty to provide; failure to do so would be akin to the sovereign 
failing to rule. 
"Just" amnesties are those granted to offenders who have committed acts that 
should not have been criminal; there is a sense that the amnestied offenders "did 
the right thing."63 The primary motivation for this type of amnesty is a belief 
that justice (i.e., punishment for offenders and freedom from punishment for non-
offenders) can only be served if amnesty is granted. Thus, the recipients of a just 
amnesty are treated as if they were non-offenders because their offense is deemed 
by the sovereign to be either unworthy of punishment or not properly an offense 
at all. Just amnesties condone the offense. They are not granted out of any sense 
of moral obligation to be merciful, nor are they granted as a means to bring about 
any result other than relieving the offenders from an unjust situation. 
"Political" amnesties encompass everything else. They are granted as a means 
of achieving an ulterior goal. They represent a determination by the sovereign or 
63
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the sovereign's representatives that mercy and forgiveness of offenders is an 
efficient tool to accomplish a goal that has very little to do with the amnesty 
itself. They do not condone the target offense, nor are they designed to remedy 
an unjust situation, nor are they granted out of a sense of moral obligation as an 
end in themselves. Political amnesties often take the form of attempts to promote 
healing and recovery following a period of acute social stress and division, with 
those who are seen as the cause of the stress granted amnesty in order to avert a 
cycle of injury and retaliation. 
B. Categorization of Examples 
Having identified the features of the three types of amnesty, let us now attempt 
to categorize the examples of amnesties discussed supra. Consider: (a) the 
Athenian amnesties of 481 B.C.E. and 403 B.C.E.; (b) the Eastern Roman 
amnesties on religious holidays; (c) the amnesties of the Chinese Emperors Han 
Kao-tsu, Ch'eng, P'ing and Yung-lo; (d) the Norman practice of granting amnesty 
at the ascension of a new monarch in England; and (e) Charles II's amnesty 
following the English Civil War. 
The amnesties of Emperor Ch'eng and the Eastern Roman amnesties on 
religious holidays are moral amnesties because their primary motivation appears 
to have been a moral or spiritual conviction that mercy was appropriate given the 
occasion. Emperor Ch'eng believed that a solar eclipse was a reflection of 
Heaven's displeasure with him and thus he felt compelled to engage in a merciful 
act to satisfy what was perceived as a requirement the gods had attached to the 
Mandate of Heaven. The issuance of amnesties on religious holidays in the 
Eastern Roman Empire likewise seems to have fulfilled a perceived obligation to 
God. In neither case was the primary motivation to condone the offenses for 
which amnesty was granted, nor was it to achieve an ulterior goal beyond 
securing the pleasure of a higher power. Given the extraordinary frequency and 
universal character of the amnesties of Han Kao-tsu at a time when China was at 
relative peace, it seems likely that these amnesties were moral as well, a result of 
taking to an extreme the perceived need to be merciful in order to fulfill the 
Mandate of Heaven. 
It is harder to classify the amnesties of Emperor P'ing and the Normans. Both 
contain elements of moral and political amnesties. P'ing granted amnesties with 
the avowed purpose of purifying criminals and allowing them to begin afresh. 
Perhaps he viewed amnesty as a necessary step in the spiritual redemption of an 
offender which, as the embodiment of Heaven on Earth, he was obliged to foster. 
This would make his amnesties primarily moral in character. However, P'ing 
could also have meant that amnesty gave criminals an opportunity to return to 
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society, make restitution to their victims and begin contributing and producing 
within society again. If this was P'ing's primary motivation then his amnesties 
would be political, since he sought to use amnesty as a tool to promote some 
other goal. Likewise, the granting of amnesty by Norman kings upon their 
ascension to the throne might have been primarily designed to prove to God their 
benevolence and capacity for mercy and behave as it was perceived God wanted 
them to behave. If this were the primary motivation, these amnesties would be 
moral. However, it is equally likely that such amnesties might have been used by 
"[n]ewly enthroned rulers ... to reassure potential enemies, [since amnesty could 
help] men on shaky thrones ... to strengthen their position."64 Amnesties 
primarily motivated by such concerns would be political. 
The amnesties granted by Emperor Yung-lo, Charles II and the Athenians all 
represent political amnesties. Yung-lo amnestied prisoners in the summer and 
winter, thus saving them from the extreme temperatures of those seasons. Such 
an altruistic action might at first seem to denote moral amnesty, but scholars 
have convincingly demonstrated that amnesties such as these were primarily 
designed to relieve prison overcrowding and save tax revenue at times when it 
was needed elsewhere.65 As one scholar has noted, "The genius of ... Chinese 
statesmen [was their ability to] transform inevitable and distasteful acts into the 
quintessence of benevolent free will."66 
The other two examples of political amnesties are clearer. Charles II's avowed 
purpose, to "[bind] those wounds which have [for] so many years ... been kept 
bleeding," clearly shows an attempt to promote national healing and stability, 
and shows no signs of condoning the actions of the offenders or fulfilling a 
moral obligation to be merciful. The Athenian amnesties of 481 B.C.E. and 403 
B.C.E. are even more clearly political. They were granted at a time of social 
danger and strife with the express purpose of allowing offenders to "contribute 
to the fullest possible mobilization of national support against the enemy."67 
There was no recognition of the Tightness of the offenses and no moral belief in 
the necessity of mercy. The purpose of these amnesties was clearly to achieve 
an ulterior goal. 
None of the above examples offer an amnesty that is just. The Athenian 
amnesty of 403 B.C.E. might have been a just amnesty had the political parties 
which agreed on the amnesty done so because they believed that the exiled 
w
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democrats had been right in opposing the Thirty Tyrants and their punishment 
was thus unjust. However, the parties that agreed on the amnesty had supported 
the expulsion of the democrats, so the amnesty had to be political, not just. The 
just form of amnesty is rare because it is often not recognized as amnesty. For 
example, the decriminalization of subversion and the release of those imprisoned 
for that crime in post-apartheid South Africa and post-communist central and 
eastern Europe are policies of just amnesty, though they are rarely viewed in 
those terms. An example of just amnesty that may strike the reader as even more 
strange is the liberation of German concentration camps by Allied forces near the 
end of World War II. In a sense, however, Allied commanders determined that 
the "offenses" committed by the prisoners held in those camps (being a Jew, 
Roma or Slav, being a German who was not sufficiently cooperative, etc.) were 
not in fact offenses at all and therefore punishment was, to put it mildly, unjust. 
It is telling that Allied commanders did not, as a rule, liberate true criminals from 
German prisons, since it was determined that they were indeed deserving of 
punishment. 
C. Amnesty in the Modern Age 
All modern amnesties are political amnesties. This statement may seem strange 
given the foregoing discussion, but consider the alternatives. Amnesties are 
simply no longer granted primarily on moral grounds. An examination of the 
reasons for this would certainly fill many volumes and is far afield of the focus 
of the present study. Let us at least suggest, however, that a general trend toward 
secularization in world societies, coupled with a greater reliance on worldly rather 
than spiritual explanations for human behavior, has led to a decreased belief that 
moral and spiritual obligations of mercy should guide state policy.68 Just 
68
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amnesties are still granted yet they are rarely if ever recognized as amnesties. 
Instead they are often characterized as liberations, as was the case with the 
"liberation" of German concentration camps in World War II. In other words, 
amnesty carries with it "connotations of guilt and absolution. ... [I]t may be 
inferred that some real crime was committed and is being pardoned."69 Since a 
just amnesty would be given for an act that is to be condoned, there would 
generally be no "real crime" and thus it would seem strange to think in terms of 
amnesty. Even when the concerns of just amnesty are present when a re-
cognizable amnesty is granted, political considerations usually overshadow 
them.70 Why? Again, a thorough study of this question would require an 
examination far beyond the scope of this study. However, let us suggest the 
possibility that political leaders can only safely condone violations of the law 
when there is an overwhelming consensus in the society that the law is wrong. 
Such a consensus is extremely hard to achieve in modern societies in which 
information and political consciousness are far more widespread than in the past. 
And in democracies especially, such a consensus on the impropriety of the law 
would most likely lead to the law being changed anyway, making amnesty 
unnecessary. 
The political nature of modern amnesties is evidenced further by the debate 
over amnesty. As was discussed supra, modern criticism of amnesty targets 
political amnesties exclusively. The notion that states have a duty to do justice 
and punish offenses rather than "barter away" the rights and lives of the victims 
by granting amnesty to offenders would not be a valid criticism of just amnesties, 
since in such cases there is a social consensus that those offenses should not have 
been criminal in the first place. It also would not be a valid criticism of moral 
amnesties, since moral amnesties do not view amnesty as a trade off but rather as 
a justifiable end in itself. Furthermore, there is no indication among modern 
critics of amnesty that they have considered a duty on the part of the sovereign 
that runs counter to the duty to do justice, namely the duty to be merciful that is 
central to moral amnesties. 
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 Kader Asmal et al., Reconciliation Through Truth: A Reckoning of Aparthied's Criminal 
Governance 56 -57 (2nd ed. 1997). 
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 Consider, for example, the amnesty granted to Vietnam War draft resisters in the United 
States. Many considered the Vietnam War to be immoral and wrong, and thus those who refused 
to participate in it were widely believed to have done the right thing. However, the amnesty draft 
resisters received was justified by its grantor. President Carter, not by condoning their offenses 
but by appealing to the need to heal and stabilize the nation. See Proclamation No. 4483,42 Fed. 
Reg. 4391 (1977) and Exec. Order No. 11967, 42 Fed. Reg. 4393-4394 (1977). 
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Furthermore, consider the arguments advanced by those who argue in favor 
of amnesty. Overwhelmingly they speak of a difficult choice, a "cruel paradox" 
in which "settlement [of social division] is impossible without amnesty."71 As 
one proponent of amnesty writes, amnesty critics must consider the "view from 
the trenches"72 and realize that "the factual context may frustrate a government's 
effort to promote the prosecution of persons responsible for human rights abuses, 
except at the risk of provoking further violence."73 
These arguments contemplate a state that must make a choice between 
amnesty and peace or retribution and possibly further war. Amnesties made as a 
result of that choice are, by definition, political. 
V. Summary 
Amnesty is a difficult concept to define, given that it means so many different 
things to scholars and practitioners and is often used interchangeably with terms 
denoting other forms of mercy and forgiveness. Nevertheless, it is possible to say 
that, in general, amnesty is an action, undertaken by the sovereign (or 
representatives of the sovereign), by which a class of individuals who have 
committed certain political offenses—either against the sitting regime or as a 
means of maintaining a prior regime have their offenses legally forgotten, though 
not necessarily forgiven, and are granted immunity from prosecution, punishment 
or further punishment. 
As difficult as amnesty is to define, however, it is even more difficult to put 
into practice. Indeed, amnesty is a concept wrought with contradictions and 
paradoxes: on the one hand, it conjures feelings of benevolence and virtue that 
71
 Torricelli, R. G.: Amnesty A Nasty Necessity for Peace in Haiti: A Settlement is Close, 
But Only a Pardon Will Get the Military to Accept Aristide, L. A. Times, May 6, 1993, at B7. 
72
 Nino, C. S.: The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case 
of Argentina, 100 Yale Law Journal, 2619, 2622 (1991). 
73
 Ibid, at 2639. See also Zalaquett, J.: Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political 
Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 
Hastings Law Journal 1425 (1992) and Goldstone, R.: Exposing Human Rights Abuses: A Help 
or Hindrance to Reconciliation? 22 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 607 (1995). In the 
French legal tradition this is known as the conflict between the légalité principe (the principle 
of legality, which dictates that all crimes, no matter how small, must be prosecuted and punished) 
and the opportunité principe (the principle of opportunity, which dictates that prosecution and 
punishment should only be undertaken when they will have good results for society). Interview 
with Árpád Erdei, supra note 68. 
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are extolled by the religious and cultural traditions of most societies; on the other, 
it contradicts the rule of law and seems to violate basic notions of justice. This 
apparent assault on the anticipated course of justice has inspired a great deal of 
criticism from both classical and contemporary sources. And yet, despite this 
criticism, amnesty has persisted throughout recorded history on three grounds: 
moral, just and political. In contemporary practice, all amnesties are political, and 
it is around political amnesties that the modern debate between critics and 
proponents of amnesty revolves. 
In The Odyssey, Odysseus made the right choice: by strapping himself and his 
crew to the masts of their ship, as painful as that was, they were able to resist the 
Sirens' song and survive. In times of intense crisis, should states follow Odysseus' 
lead? Even though the rule of law generally commands the ship of state along a 
course toward punishment for offenders, are there times when that course should 
be altered for the sake of peace, lest the ship itself be dashed to pieces among the 
rocks of retribution and further violence? These are very difficult questions, and 
there is no need to attempt a definitive answer here. By understanding more about 
the nature of amnesty, however, we are better equipped to attempt one in the 
future. 
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The Idea of the "Third Reich" in the German Legal, 
Philosophical and Political Thinking in the 20,h Century 
1. The idea that after the Nazi takeover the German political propaganda machine 
strongly supported the naming of their land the "Third Reich" (Drittes Reich) is 
a misperception shared by many historians, political scientists as well as lawyers 
all around the world even today. It is much less known that Hitler himself was 
never in full support of this expression even tough it proved quite effective both 
before and after the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) 
takeover.1 A circular letter that was issued by the Ministry of People's Education 
and Propaganda of the German Empire {Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung 
und Propaganda) on 10 July, 1939 explicitly forbade the official use of "Third 
Reich". According to this circular letter Germany's official name is f rom this 
point on "Greater German Empire" (Großdeutsches Reich).2 It is worth pointing 
out that the "Greater German Empire" {Großgermanisches Reich) used by the SS 
cannot be considered official either. 
Years later on 21 March, 1942 the Ministry of People's Education and 
Propaganda issued a circular letter with provisions for the official name of the 
"new Germany". It was to be called "Empire", quite possibly modelled after the 
British Empire.3 The goal of using the expression of "Empire" was to illustrate to 
the world that the newly acquired lands include territories annexed or occupied by 
Gábor Hamza, Professor of Law, Eötvös University, Budapest, H-1053 Budapest, Egyetem 
tér 1-3., Hungary. 
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1
 During Hitler's official visit to Italy in May 1938, the German press repeatedly referred 
to the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation (Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation). 
See Klemperer, V.: LTI. La langue du lile Reich, Paris, 1996. 158 (In German original: LTI — 
Notizbuch eines Philologen. Leipzig, 1975.) 
2
 In contemporary German legal textbooks the term "Greater German Empire" (Groß-
deutsches Reich) was used instead of Germany. See Huber, E. R.: Verfassungsrecht des 
Großdeutschen Reiches, Hamburg, 1939. 
3
 It is noteworthy that the name of the weekly paper released by Germany for foreign 
countries between 1940 and 1945 was Das Reich. This paper of the Nazi Germany contained a 
wide range of political, historical and literary information and was in print even in April 1945. 
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Germany without any international validity, altogether ca. 841 000 sq. km.4 The 
same circular letter limits the use of the expression to Germany, emphasizing that 
there is only one Empire and that is Germany.5 The use of the term "Third 
Reich", however, implied a serial empire which is comparable both in deeds and 
leaders to the empire, an idea that was entirely incompatible with the self-
conscience of the imperialistic national socialism which fancied to be looked 
upon as the pinnacle of German history. 
2. In a historical sense the First Empire was estabilished by Otto I in 962 
who was crowned emperor by Pope John XII in Rome. This empire is also 
known as the Holy Roman Empire (Sacrum Romanian Imperium, Heiliges 
Römisches Reich) which existed till 1806.6 The "Second Empire" was founded 
on 18 January, 1871 in Versailles after the Franco-Prussian War and remained 
the most influential political and military power in Europe until its dissolution 
in November 1918. In a sense the Weimar Republic can be considered an 
"intermezzo" (Zwischenreich) between the "Second Empire" and the "Third 
Empire".7 
Following the Christian doctrine of Trinitarianism the three empires can be 
thought of in a religious and messianic way as follows: the "First Empire" is 
related to the Father, the "Second Empire" to the Son, while the "Third Empire" to 
the Holy Spirit. According to such an interpretation the "Third Empire" would 
4
 According to a German official statement the territory of Germany in 1942 without Elsace, 
Lorraine, Luxembourg, the Czech-Moravian Protectorate (Reichsprotektorat Böhmen und 
Mähren) and Poland (the total size of these lands was 160 000 sq. km) was 681 000 sq. km. 
Previous to the Peace Treaty of Versailles the size of the "Second Reich" (which is often called 
"altes Reich") was 540 000 sq. km. This substantial change is primarily due to the annexation 
of Austria (Anschluß), the Czech-Moravian regions following the Munich Agreement and the 
Polish regions (e. g. Warthegau) after the beginning of World War II. After the creation of the 
"Social Republic of Salö" (Repubblica Sociale di Said) a part of Northern Italy, the so-called 
"Voralpenland" which includes Southern Tirol and the coastline of the Adriatic ("Adriatisches 
Küstenland"), became part of Germany. It is, however, difficult to decide whether these territorial 
acquitisions, from a legal viewpoint, were occupied or annexed. 
5
 In legal terminology, primarily in administration, one comes across the euphemistic 
expression "Verreichlichung" quite often. 
6
 For the international legal status of the Holy Roman Empire see F. Berber: Internationale 
Aspekte des Heiligen Römischen Reiches. In: Festschrift für Th. Maunz zum 80. Geburtstag, 
München, 1981, 17-25. Regarding the relationship between the idea of the renovatio imperii and 
the Holy Roman Empire see Földi A. Hamza G.: The History and Institutes of Roman Law, 5th 
revised and enlarged edition. Budapest, 2000, 114. 
7
 For the most recent literature see Dufraisse, R.: Le Troisième Reich. In: Les empires 
occidentaux de Rome à Berlin, ed. J. Tulard, Paris, 1997, 449. 
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constitute the zenith of history and the perfect symbiosis between the real and ideal, 
satisfying the profetic requirement of Ibsen and Lessing8 that the contradiction 
between Christianity and Antiquity be dissolved. This "Third Empire" would 
follow a distorted era of Christianity that would be realized by the arrival of a 
new Messiah. 
3. It is furthermore worth mentioning that in Ernst Krieck's Die deutsche 
Staatsidee (1917) the "Third Empire" appears not as a historical or political, but 
rather as a moral idea. Krieck alludes to Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the author of 
Reden an die deutsche Nation, a work that was rather influential in the latter's 
era. By 1919 Dietrich Eckart uses the "Third Empire" with a political and 
nationalistic content.9 
Ernst Fraenkel (1898-1975) a lawyer who immigrated after the National 
Socialist takeover, quite rightly uses the term Doppelstaat ("Dual State") to 
describe the autocratic national socialist system, emphasizing the double nature 
of the national socialist political rule. To insure the normal functioning of the 
economy a Normenstaat is in effect in the areas of civil, trade, corporate and tax 
law. On the other hand only professional experience i.e. knowledge plays a part 
in securing political power (Maßnahmenstaat).10 
4. In the preface of his work Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876-1925) 
emphasizes that the notion of the "Third Empire" is ideological (Weltan-
schauungsgedanke), that rises above reality. Moeller van den Bmck's work 
quickly becomes widely known in Germany and has a large influence on the 
thinking of the young intellectual class with nationalistic feelings." The 
disappointment felt after the very harsh political and economic terms of the Peace 
Treaty of Versailles that were imposed on Germany after the First World War 
undoubtedly helped shape the thinking of this class. The same work only very 
8
 In his work "L'éducation du genre humain" (86.) Gotthold Ephraim Lessing foretells the 
"new eternal Gospel", which means the "third era" (90.). 
9
 It is worth pointing out that the title of Stefan George's (1868-1933) work is "Das neue 
Reich" in which the expression "völkisch" occurs. 
10
 See: Fraenkel, E.: The Dual State, New York, 1941. (reprint: 1969). This work only 
appeared in German translation in 1974 (Der Doppelstaat, Frankfurt am Main-Köln). For Ernst 
Fraenkel's view of the state see: Brünneck, A. v.: Ernst Fraenkel (1898-1975), Soziale 
Gerechtigkeit und pluralistische Demokratie. In: Streitbare Juristen, Eine andere Tradition, 
Baden-Baden, 1988, 415-^25. 
11
 In the 3rd edition of Das dritte Reich (1931) Hans Schwarz emphasizes that national 
socialism accepts the name "Third Reich" and named the federation's paper Oberland based on 
the title of Moeller van den Bruck's work. 
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slowly becomes known outside of Germany. The Solingen born author, who came 
partly from a traditional Prussian military family, was greatly influenced by the 
philosophy of Nietzsche. His affinity to the Pan-German ideas is also quite 
strong. He is rather well acquainted with the most influential European countries, 
since he visited England, France, Austria, Italy and Russia between the turn of the 
century and the outbreak of the First World War. He was never really concerned 
about the unique ethnic problems of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. With the 
exception of the Dual Monarchy and Germany he vehemently criticizes the major 
Western European powers, especially their political system and structure. To him 
the ideal "power" is Germany, his homeland, without which—according to 
him—no stability can or will exist in Europe. 
The conservative philosopher feels antipathy for the Western democracies 
primarily towards France and England. He introduces the democratic system of 
these countries in an ironic belittling way. According to him it is only a fiction 
that the nation (natio) is made up of formally equal individuals. Moeller van den 
Bruck is convinced that Germany is predestined to lead Europe for the historical 
ties it has with the Holy Roman Empire (Sacrum Romanian Imperium). He states 
that in its history the Holy Roman Empire was never able to amalgamate itself 
into a real political community (politische Gemeinschaft). The Holy Roman 
Empire is almost exclusively dominated by the notion of territoriality 
(territorialitas), the result of which is centurial territorial dismemberment. This 
limits the development of German ethnic identity. The birth of the "Second-
Empire" -despite the involvance of the political unity—failed to change this 
situation. The state further remains autocratic and is viewed as a "foreign body" 
by its citizens. 
Moeller van den Bruck also condemns the Weimar Germany, in which all of 
the political views are superficial and not reflective of society. He strongly 
criticizes the Weimar constitution of 1919 as well, since in his opinion it is unable 
to provide the united Germany with an acceptable constitutional framework. Only 
with the elimination of its pseudo-values can Germany fulfill its mission of 
reviving Europe, something it is obligated to do with its rich ties to the Holy 
Roman Empire. It is the duty of the young generation to revitalize the dormant 
German intellectuals. They have to intuitively oppose and revolt against the 
deceiving values. Only as a result of such a "revolution" can the "Third Empire" 
come into existence. 
The birth of the Third Empire, however, automatically assumes the territorial 
unification of the German ethnic group, that is the termination of the system of 
the Treaty of Versailles. The substantial growth of the German population can 
provide the nation with the necessary strength to attain its goal. 
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5. It is quite interesting from the viewpoint of the "Third Reich" to briefly 
analyze the Article 61 of the Weimar Constitution. According to this article 
German-Austria after joining Germany receives proportional representation in the 
Imperial Council (Reichsrat). Even till the accession German-Austria (Deutsch-
Österreich) is endowed with the right of consultation. Later Germany was forced 
to declare the passage void. According to Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles 
Germany binds itself to acknowledging and respecting the independence of 
Austria. Austria's independence is inviolable. Only with the consent of the 
League of Nations (Völkerbund) can the status of Austria be modified. This 
condition, however, led the peace conference to the inclusion of Article 88 in the 
text of the third draft of the peace treaty signed with Austria on 2 September, 
1919. According to this article Austria's independence is inviolable and is always 
dependant on the consent of the League of Nations. This article of the treaty is in 
unison with the decree that Austria must make a commitment to refrain from any 
action that could directly or indirectly threaten its independence. 
It must be emphasized that this section opens the floor to a very wide range 
of interpretations. The expression "Jesuit section" used by John Maynard Keynes 
is quite telling of this section.12 It was viewed positively by the followers of 
Pan-Germanism, since it left the door open for the unification with Germany 
(Anschluß) through a rather peculiar interpretation. 
6. The emphasis of Moeller van den Bruck's philosophy is on the social or 
more specifially nationalistic demagogy. According to Moeller van den Bruck the 
integration of the pheripherial classes into society and the German nation would 
be the solution to serious differences within the society of the Weimar Republic. 
Closely related to this idea, of course, is the goal of developing a national identity 
as soon as and as efficiently as possible. All this is a kind of anti-capitalist 
reaction and a significant contribution to the conservative and heterogeneous 
trend of both the conservative and the popular revolutions. The author of Das 
dritte Reich is an active supporter of only the first one. 
Moeller van den Bruck's idea of a "perfect" empire has already been present 
in Lessing's and Ibsen's thoughts concerning the "Third Reich", but was 
influenced primarily by Gerhard von Mutius' value-ideal world view.13 Despite 
12
 The decision, formulated by the Supreme Council on 16 December, 1919 deals with the 
interpretation of the mentioned article. It was sent to chancellor Karl Renner on the same day with 
a lettre d'envoi, that included the Allied Powers' guarantee for the territorial integrity of Austria. 
13
 See Mutius, G. von: Die drei Reiche, Berlin, 1920, 226. Von Mutius writes: "One who 
frees himself of his own self stands in the Third Reich." (Wer sich von seinem Selbst geschieden 
hat, der steht im dritten Reich.) 
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the rejection of modern liberalist ideals and the formulation of a plan for a "new 
European order", the leaders of Germany's political and ideological life refused 
to accept Moeller van den Bruck's idea of the "Third Empire" that was originally 
trademarked by idealistic rather than politically relevant thoughts. This general 
hostility was further reinforced by the publication of a strong critique of Moeller 
van den Bruck's views in 1939. It is also worth mentioning that the expression 
"Prussian style" (Preußischer Stil) comes f rom Moeller van den Bruck. The 
ideas of the conservative intellectual philosopher are especially popular with the 
conservative German "national" intellectuals.14 During the Great Depression 
of the early 30 's Moeller van den Bruck is often cited by many adherents of this 
group. 
7. Followers of the idea of conservative revolution are the writers, historians, 
economists and lawyers who had close ties with the Die Tat cultural journal 
published by Ernst Horneffer in Jena between 1909 and 1939. A majority of 
these people consider themselves to be the intellectual successor of Horneffer in 
some way.15 After Horneffer, Eugen Diederichs (1867-1930) takes over as the 
magazine's editor. During Diederich's editorial years the paper gains a more 
religious, social and cultural political appearance. From April 1913 the sub-title 
of Die Tat becomes "Social-religiöse Monatschrift für deutsche Kultur", well 
reflecting the changes in ideology of the paper. During the First World War the 
paper is out of print. In 1921 the sub-title of Die Tat is changed by Diederichs 
to "Monatschrift für die Zukunft deutscher Kultur", implying a change in style 
once again. The goal of the paper is changing Germany's political and cultural 
life.16 The articles published in the Die Tat welcome the fall of the empire and 
follow a new socio-religious aristocratic thinking. Diederichs provides space for 
both the national socialists and the liberals.17 The "community of people" 
(Volksgemeinschaft) wishes to bring a halt to the social and political decline of 
the bourgeoisie through the simultaneous creation of a national socialist and 
14
 Carlo Schmid writes in his memoirs, that in the 1930's the members of Tübingen Wiking-
Bund, a nationalistic student group, read the works of Moeller van den Bruck. See Schmid, C.: 
Erinnerungen, Bern-München, 1979, 143. 
15
 Essays and critiques are published by distinguished writers and philosophers such as 
Hermann Bahr ( 1863-1934), Paul Ernst (1866-1933) and George Simmel (1858-1918) in the 
Die Tat. 
16
 According to Diederichs the current leading bourgeoisie (bisher geistige Schicht des 
Bürgertums) cannot be the carrier of culture in the future. (Träger der Kultur nicht walten kann). 
See: Diederichs, E.: Die neue "Tat". In: Die Tat, Heft 7, October 1929, 481. 
17
 Fritsche, K.: Politische Romantik und Gegenrevolution. Fluchtwege in der Kriese der 
bürgerlichen Gesellschaft: Das Beispiel des "Tat"-Kreises, Frankfurt am Main, 1976, 45. 
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authoritarian state. He furthermore demands a "revolution from the top" 
(Revolution von oben). 
8. It is necessary to mention Eugen Rosenstock who further developed the 
ideas of Diederichs. His work on the European revolutions, published in the early 
1930's is quite influential. The same can be said about economist F. Fried who 
uses facts to demonstrate the serious crisis of capitalist production. According to 
him the solution to this problem is an authoritarian economic system. Rosenstock 
is further disturbed by the gradual impoverishment of the middle-class, and the 
drastic strengthening of a rather small elite in the political and cultural life of 
Germany. This evermore powerful group barely constitutes one-tenth percent of 
a 60 million large Germany, yet it seems to create an unabridgable gap between 
itself and the rest of society. He believes that the only solution to this problem is 
not only economic expansion, but also a substantial increase in exports. In order 
to achieve this Germany needs to become self-sufficient economically and must 
switch to an authoritarian system politically. 
9. Carl Schmitt ( 1888-1985), a renowned professor of law and the author of 
the well-known work Der Hüter der Verfassung (1931) was also a person with 
close ties to the Die Tat. In this greatly influential work, through closely studying 
the Weimar Republic, he reaches the conclusion that in historic dimensions the 
state becomes "overpowering", directly leading to the rise of a totalitarian state. 
In many respects Carl Schmitt's Gegenspieler is Hermann Ignatz Heller (1891 -
1933) who quite appropriately writes that "the need for a strong person is the 
bourgeoisie's way of expressing its desperation. Through the strenghtening of the 
working masses they feel that not only they own political and economic interests, 
but also the entire European culture is threatened... The only thing left for the 
desperate bourgeoisie is to place all their faith into a strong person."18 
Heller, who becomes a full professor of public law at Frankfurt am Main 
University in 1932, is a committed supporter of the Weimar Republic. The fact 
that in the same year he was the legal representative of the faction of the social 
democrats of the Prussian provincial diet in the so-called Preußenschlagverfahren 
seems to only reinforce this fact. It must be pointed out that Heller thinks that the 
18
 Hermann Heller writes: "Von grosser Wichtigkeit ist es, dass neufeudale Kraftpose und 
den Schrei nach dem starken Mann als den Ausdruck einer Verzweiflungsstimmung des Bürgers 
zu erkennen. Erschreckt durch das Avancieren der Arbeitermassen, glaubt er nicht nur seine 
eigenen politischen und ökonomischen Herrschaftsansprüche bedroht, sondern sieht zugleich das 
Ende der gesamten europäischen Kultur nahe. [. . .] Begreiflich, dass diesem verzweifelten Bürger 
nur die Hoffnung auf den starken Mann übrig bleibt." See Heller, H. I.: Rechtsstaat oder 
Diktatur? Tübingen, 1930, 17-18. 
98 GÁBOR HAMZA 
modern state and its era are entirely incompatible with the class-stratification. As 
he indicated in his rather fragmented work, Staatslehre which was published after 
his early death, a modem state is both a social and democratic constitutional state, 
that by definition excludes the possibility of a strong person-led authoritarian 
state.19 
10. Certainly worth mentioning is Hans Zehrer, who became the editor of the 
Die Tat in October 1929.20 He is regarded as a supporter of the "conservative 
revolution" and the opponent of parlamentary democracy. After World War II 
Zehrer becomes the editor-in-chief of the Die Welt, and modifies the sub-title 
(.Monatsschrift zur Gestaltung neuer Wirklichkeit) established by his predecessor 
Adam Kuckhoff. In 1932 he adds the adjective "independent" (unabhängig) to 
the original subtitle. The Die Tat becomes the intellectual interpretative forum for 
national socialist ideas although keeping a distance of from Hitler a id 
underestimating the dangerousness of the NSDAP. As the solution to the instable 
political and economic system of the Weimar Republic, Zehrer envisioned a new 
system, the "Third Reich", as a fundamentally different, religion based corporate 
political system. 
This new system, which is in essence a 20lh century version of Luther's 
directorate, would be led by a new elite with "folk roots". In Zehrer's opinion 
only a return to the Lutheran Reformation can stop both communism and national 
socialism from fulfilling their ultimate goal of establishing an authoritarian 
system. In accordance with Zehrer's interpretation the "Third Reich" would have 
an eschatologie political structure that had its foundations in the Reformation. 
11. The intellectuals of the Die Tat, especially Giselher Wirsing, the person 
who becomes the editor of the review after the Nazi takeover in 1933, con-
centrate on Germany's relations with Central Europe. Starting 1934/35 Wirsing 
shortens the review sub-title to "Unabhängige Monatsschrift". This is 
"confirmed" or seems to be confirmed by the unique, yet already true fact that 
the "transformation of reality" has already taken place. From 1936 the ord 
"independent" disappears and only "Deutsche Monatsschrift" appears on the cover 
of the paper. In March 1939 the publication of the Die Tat comes to an end by 
merging with the "Das XX. Jahrhundert" magazine. Despite the political, 
19
 For the importance of Heller 's view of the social state with respect to the German 
constitutional thinking see: Staatslehre in der Weimarer Republik. Hermann Heller zu ehren. 
Hrsg. von Ch. Müller und I. Staff, Köln, 1985. 
20
 Adam Kuckhoff takes over the editing of the Die Tat from Diederichs in April 1928. 
Kuckhoff only works at the journal for one year. In August 1943 he gets executed by the Nazis 
as a member of the "Rote Kapelle". 
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ideological changes it has gone through the years the Die Tat becomes very popular 
in Germany, especially during Zehrer's editorial years. The circulation of the paper 
reaches a yet unprecedented 30 000 copies. In addition Tat-clubs (Tat-Kreise) are 
born all throughout Germany, forming intellectual debate forums. 
According to Wirsing, Germany's future is primarily influenced by South-
eastern Europe (Südost-Europa). He is convinced that the goal of Germany's 
enemies or perceived enemies is to encircle the country. It is for this reason that 
Germany needs to establish a closed national "living-space" (Lebensraum). He 
is convinced that self-sufficient German economy should open towards 
Southeastern Europe instead of the increasingly hostile financial world. At the 
same time Wirsing, similarly to most of his colleagues of the Die Tat, does not 
wish to continue or renew the old policy of annexation. Wirsing essentially 
revives the Mitteleuropa-Plan (1848-50) which states that Germany's expansion 
should be directed towards Central Europe instead of the West. This latter option 
has been limited, anyway, by the Locarno Treaty in 1925. The ultimate goal of 
the expansion is to establish the so-called Großwirtschaftsraum (Greater 
Economic Space). The Mitteleuropa-Plan is generally associated with Friedrich 
Naumann (1860-1919), however, it was the Prussian-born Karl von Bruck 
(representative of Trieste in 1848 in the Viennese Parliament and financial 
minister of Austria between 1855-1859) who first developed the financial aspect 
of the plan.21 
12. Moeller van den Bruck was the intellectual center for the other group of 
intellectuals who sympathized with the idea of "conservative revolution". These 
people were united under the Berlin-based Juni-Club and were led by Moeller 
van den Bruck's friend Heinrich von Gleichen. There is a close relationship 
between the Juni-Club, organized around figures of Moeller van den Bruck, 
Heinrich von Gleichen and Martin Spahn from Berlin and the Deutscher 
Hochschulring (DHR), an organization established and actively participating at 
most German universities after World War I.22 The Ring-Bewegung is primarily 
characterized by conservatism, a nationalistic attitude and due to disorientation a 
21
 It must be mentioned that Constantin Frantz, a political opponent of Bismarck, feels 
nostalgic towards the Holy Roman Empire. According to Frantz the three "Germanies" (Prussia, 
Austria, and the "third Germany"), which include the South and Central German states, may 
provide the real defense against the French and Russian expansion. Frantz's idea is anti-Nazi and 
was rather popular in German circles outside of Germany. See: Genton, F.: L'Europe Centrale, 
une idée d'Europe, Dijon, 1997, 362. 
22
 At some universities the name of the Deutscher Hochschulring is Hochschulring 
Deutscher Art (HD A). 
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trend-seeking at the beginning. The ties are particularly strong in Berlin which is 
illustrated by the fact that the centers of the Hochschulring are in the headquarters 
of the Juni-Club. The Juni-Club is rather active in Berlin, in particular it exhibits 
educational activities of political nature. In November 1922 Martin Spahn, one 
of the leading figures of the Juni-Club establishes a "Political Collegium", where 
he regularly organizes lectures. From 1923 the Collegium's name changes to 
"Hochschule für nationale Politik", where he holds private "university" classes. 
These classes are visited primarily by youth who sympathize with nationalist 
ideals, such as Werner Best, a lawyer and one of the most well-known national 
socialists having a law degree.23 
A prominent member of the Juni-Club is Edgar Jung. The Austrian economist, 
philosopher and sociologist, through the influence of Othmar Spann (1878-1950), 
propagates the rebirth and revival of the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation.24 This view is quite similar to Moeller van den Bruck's call for the 
establishment of the "Third Reich", since both of them reach back to the Holy 
Roman Empire for ideological support. Without going into an extensive analysis 
of the question, it must be pointed out that the linking of the Holy Roman Empire 
with the Germans as an ethnic group is entirely unhistorical. 
13. Even based on this brief summary it can be ascertained that the idea of the 
"Third Reich" dates back a long time. In traces it is already present in Fichte's 
ideas. The idea of the "Third Reich" has quite an influence on the thinking of the 
conservative cultural philosophers, primarily Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. It 
is also present in the works of the era's influential literary, political and economic 
scholars. However, not even the often eschatologie "Third Reich" is a uniformly 
interpreted idea. For political and philosophical reasons the national socialist 
regime isolates itself from the idea of "Third Reich" already by the end of the 
1930s. The "conservative revolutionary" branch of the Deutsche Bewegung 
(German Movement) including all branches of the "conservative revolution" 
as unacceptable as an ideological base for the national socialist rulers. 
23
 See: Herbert, U.: Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und 
Vernunft. 1903-1989, 2. durchg. Aufl . Bonn, 1996, 55. 
24
 In contrast with Adam Smith and David Ricardo's liberal economics Othmar Spann, the 
founder of social economics and universalism in philosophy, develops a new view for studying 
the so called Ganzheitslehre. In his opinion the construction of a "real state" (wahrer Staat) 
assumes the new, profession based establishment of the economy and the state (Ständestaat auf 
berufsständiger Grundlage). Through opposing the various trends of liberalism and marxism 
Spann exerts great influence on the conservative Austrian thinkers. Following the Anschluß 
Spann was stripped of his professorship in Vienna. Thereafter he took an active part in the 
formulation of the so-called Korneuburger Eid, an oath of the Austrofascist Heimwehr. 
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The "völkisch" branch of the Deutsche Bewegung is an entirely different 
matter. This latter one cannot be considered a uniform movement either, since it 
includes the Schwarze Front trend that later came into conflict with the national 
socialist ideals and the Landvolkbewegung,2S a movement unfolding at the end 
of the 1920s in Schleswig-Holstein and one that wobbles between anarchy and 
corporatism as well. Of all these different movements the Führerprinzip idea, 
symbolized by Hans F. K. Günter, Richard Walter Darré and Alfred Rosenberg 
became the official ideology of the national socialist Germany, in which the idea 
of the "Third Reich" no longer played a role. 
25
 Here we point out that the trend represented by Ernst Niekisch is part of the Deutsche 
Bewegung's "völkisch" revolutionary branch. Ernst Niekisch is also one of Moeller van den 
Bruck's students. 
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ALF MASING * 
Networking and Basic Ideas to Understand 
Constitutional Adjudication in Europe 
One thousand years ago the first Hungarian King, King Stephen the Saint, wrote 
in his admonitions to his son the following sentence: 
"Time esse iudex, gaude vero rex esse et nominari".' 
In a time the king was empowered to both: to govern and to judge, this sentence 
expresses a reflection on the usage of power. The wisdom of the sentence is that a 
successful government needs courage and good mood, whereas the adjudication 
needs an increased rationality, a specific imposed rationale. The differentiation 
between governance and jurisdiction that is expressed in this sentence might be 
among the first references to the differentiation of power in midaeval thinking. This 
differentiation envolved to the principle of separation of powers and this principle 
opened the way to the idea of constitutional adjudication and is still today one of 
its fundamentals. Therefore constitutional adjudication can be characterized as a 
review of an already taken decision by a state organ on the grounds of arguments 
that already should had guided the decision-taking, but the claiments argued that 
than these arguments have not taken into proper consideration. The constitutional 
court is the organ to decide the supposed neglegence. 
The establishment of separate independent constitutional courts in various 
European country marks one of the major achievements in the institutionalisation 
of legal reflexion and adjudication in the 20th century. The first constitutional 
courts were founded in the aftermath of the First World War in Czechoslovakia 
and Austria. The mastermind of the idea of an independent constitutional court 
was the legal scholar Hans Kelsen from Austria, who took part in the drafting of 
the Austrian Constitution and it is said that the establishment of the constitutional 
court was his most beloved child. In his own words he gives the following 
reasoning about the implementation of a separate constitutional court: 
Alf Masing, Visiting Fellow, Institute for Legal Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Budapest, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30., Hungary. 
1
 In English: "Be afraid to be judge, but enjoy to be King and to lead". Tibellus Secreti 
Stepani Regis de Institutone Morum ad Emericum Ducem, 1930. Fitz József (editor): caput V 
§ 4, Seite. 10. OK. 350.103. 
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"The law-giving-body understandably sees himself only as a free creator of law 
and not as an by the constitution bound organ of application of law, although it is 
the latter according to the idea. In order to realize this latter insight, it should not 
be the parliament the garantee of this idea. Only a from the legislator separated 
body, a from him and from every other authority independent body must be set 
apart, to nullify the unconstitutional acts of the legislative. This is the institution of 
the constitutional court."2 
During the course of the 20th century the independent constitutional court was 
established in Germany (1952), Italy (1956), Yugoslavia, Spain (1979) Portugal 
(1982), Polen, Hungary (1990), Russia and many more now democratic countries 
of the former communist hemisphere. 
The special feature in Germany's constitutional jurisdiction is the constitutional 
complaint that everyone can ignite, who feels hurted in his/her rights or interests 
and can make a reasonable claim on constitutional grounds against a given law or 
administrative or judicial decision. This showed up as a powerful instrument that 
provides the constitutional court with the possibility to influence the legislature and 
common court's adjudication substantially. 
The special feature in Hungary's constitutional jurisdiction consists in the 
possibility that every citizen is entitled to turn directly to the constitutional court 
with the argument that a specific provision of a statute or decree of the 
government or city council is not in conformity with the constitution. Through 
this actio popularis there are a lot of cases brought before the court and so the 
court got an exceptional opportunity to contribute and to influence the building 
up of the rule of law in Hungary. 
Already in the beginning of the 1970s the constitutional courts, specially these 
of Germany, Italy, Austria with the initiative coming from Yugoslavia, started 
networking together. These courts established a series of conferences that are now 
taking place every three years with alternating sites and topics. In nower days the 
series of conferences is a quite institutionalised undertaking named "The 
Conference of the European constitutional Courts". One of the constitutional 
courts is choosen as the organizer of the following conference. Every conferences 
has a specific topic and all participating constitutional courts send a lengthy 
report about their respective case law and deliberations, whereas the organizing 
court writes a summarizing report that serves as basis for further discussions. The 
penultimate conference took place in Budapest in 1996 and addressed the juris-
diction on the freedom of expression and the separation of powers (see web-site: 
2
 Kelsen, H.: Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, in: Hans Kelsen oder die 
Reinheit der Rechtslehre. Ed.: Friedrich Koja, 1988, 130. 
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www.mkab.hu). the most recent conference was held in Warsaw (Poland) in the 
year 1999. At the Warsaw conference 23 constitutional courts took part in full 
member status and the choosen topic was the jurisdiction in matters of freedom 
of conscience and religion (see web-site:www.trybunal.gov.pl). During the 
conference a task force reported to the conference about the further insti-
tutionalisation of the conference and their proceedings and the organisation of the 
mutual cooperation in the time between the conferences and with other inter-
national organisations. 
The best counterpart and partner for strenghening the network of consti-
tutional courts is the Commission on Democracy through Law of the Council of 
Europe (called the Venice Commission).3 The Venice commission was founded 
in 1990 with the task to provide the necessary advice for implementing the rule 
of law and mastering the change to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 
countries. The Commission consists of delegates from the, in the European 
Council participating countries and many delegates are personally experienced 
in matters of constitutional adjudication. The Venice Commission meets annually 
in Venice and is engaged in many projects of advising the legislature in European 
countries. In reference to the constitutional jurisdiction the Venice Commission 
gives advice toward the proper setup and implementation of constitutional 
jurisdiction. The commission takes also care about the building up of a computer 
aided database on constitutional jurisdiction. The inspiring insight of the work is 
that the commitments of the European States according to the European 
Declaration of Human Rights require good working conditions of constitutional 
in all member states. 
The Venice Commission and the conference of the European Constitutional 
Courts are planning to coordinate and to harmonize their effort and started talking 
about to establish a well organised network for consultation purposes in 
constitutional jurisdiction. These consultation efforts and the undertaking of 
comparative constitutional law lead to deliberation basic ideas of constitutional 
adjudication. According to the results of my research the basic ideas of consti-
tutional adjudication can be summarized and extracted from four concepts that 
are reflecting the constitutional jurisdiction in the constitutional framework and 
societal reality in the nowadays European Countries. 
Firstly Hans Kelsen himself developed the concept of purity of lawdoctrine 
and an understanding of constitutional jurisdiction in order to advocate the 
decision to implement this jurisdictional institution. The basic insight of Hans 
Kelsen is the legal nature of the state. Every official doing of the state can be 
3
 See web-site: www.venice.coe.int. 
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reflected on the basis of legal reasoning and this legal reasoning is done within 
the framework of the pyramid of norms. The exercise of state-power is bound in 
the vessels of law. The usage of governmental power is simultaneously an 
enactment of possibilities that are provided by law and is placed in the proper 
place of the pyramid of norms. In this understanding not only the administrative 
exercise of power is application of law, but also the legislation and the 
adjudication in the courtroom. Letting here aside the famous basic norm the 
constitution is on the top of the pyramid of norms and the basic task of the 
constitutional court is the repressive control of legislative actions refering to their 
character as application of the constitution. Consequently Kelsen refers to the 
work of the constitutional court as a negative legislator and systemizes the rulings 
of the constitutional court as legislative actions. The main quality standard that 
derives from this concept is the quest for the purity of the legal arguing. The 
constitutional court is committed to legal rationality. The convincing power of its 
rulings is mainly deriving from the purity of the legal reasoning that applicate a 
higher norm towards the creational process of a minor norm. Transparency of the 
decision-taking may open a reflection on the question, what is guiding the 
decision and whether the decision is sufficiently based on legal arguing. 
The second here depicted concept is the concept of open society created by 
Sir Karl R. Popper. Popper outlined the basics of democratic society based on 
his experience as an scientist of physics. The starting point is for him the ethos 
of the scientist. The basic task of the scientist is to detect unkown fields and to 
confront the challenges created by unexpected experimental results to the so far 
reached knowledge. The best attitude for the scientist is therefore to be open-
minded and ready to accept falsifications to presumed deliberations. 
In his political thinking Popper refuses the standard question of politics 
"Who should reign?" and formulates instead the question: 
"How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers 
can be prevented from doing too much damage?"4 
The answer is originating from the guidelines of the citizen-participative 
democracy. In line with Popper it can be argued that the constitutional court is 
one possible institution within the citizen-participative democracy. On request 
of the citizen the constitutional court can overturn bad normsettings before they 
can do too much damage. 
Popper estimates institutions as consciously creatable entities with specific 
goalsettings and supplements of means. Popper formulates in the following way: 
4
 Popper, K.: The Open Society and its Enemies. 1950. 120. 
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"Institutions are like fortresses. They must be well designed and properly 
manned."5 
Equally the constitutional court can be seen as a consciously planable social 
institution that follows a specific goalsetting and can be optimized according to 
this goalsetting in a piecemeal approach. According to Popper the plan for the 
constitutional court would be to have an institution that might be directly 
accessible to people and is acting in the overall task to hinder damage resulting 
from bad governance and normsetting. This is done not only by direct inter-
ventions like the handling and judging of accusations against ruling men, but 
mainly by strenghening the rule of law in its both understandings: to foster the 
implementation of human and to secure the binding power of law. 
The concept of open society according to Popper contains implicitly a certain 
notion of freedom. As an element of direct democracy the constitutional court 
stands in close relationship to the citizen. On the one hand by turning to the 
constitutional court citizen might get a solution against a norm that is 
endangering his persuit of happiness by unfair rules, on the other hand the citizen 
gives a feed-back to the legislator, how he understands a specific norm and how 
this norm affects him. This provides the rulings of the constitutional court with 
a specific task and quality standard of customer orientation that includes the task 
to mediate between citizen and legislature. The quality control question is, 
whether the court's ruling and procedure are responding with good understanding 
and care to the quest of the citizen and are hereby fostering the openness of the 
society. 
The third concept is the concept of the critical theory of society that is mainly 
the concept of the Frankfurt school of social philosophy initiated by Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. The critical theory takes a starting point 
from the abhorrence about the possibility of fascist and humanity denying 
governance and postulate the educational task of hindering humanity denying 
governance. This task is fulfilled through emancipatoric efforts. This main goal 
of the critical theory is therefore to detect hidding or open violence expressing 
behaviour and to enhance fields of communication by enlightenment. The 
rationalisation of unreflected violent behaviour creates an emanzipatoric gain. 
The found consent after going through a structered dialogue imposes the antizi-
pation of the other as an trustworthy being and creates mutual trust to a 
responsible usage of freedoms. Jürgen Habermas formulates the starting point in 
the following way: 
5
 Popper, K.: The Poverty of Historicism. ARK, edition 1986, 66. 
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"After a century that, more than any other, has taught us the horror of existing 
unreason, the last remains of an essentialist trust in reason have been destroyed. 
Yet modernity, now aware of its contingencies, depends all the more on a 
procedural reason, that is, on a reason that puts itself on trial."6 
According to Habermas the rechtsstaat is not achievable and not preservable 
without radical democracy. In awareness of a presumly unlimited recognition of 
acting according to self interests the communicative acting is the decisive road 
to integration within the society. Norms are therefore on the one hand real limits 
that guide to alignments of behaviour, on the other hand they unfold social-
integrative power on the basis of intersubjective acknowledged normative 
assumptions that are offers for commitment to the addressees. 
Habermas formulates the basic task of a constitutional court in this way: 
"However one thinks the interpretation of the constitution with direct 
influence to the operation of the legislature should be appropriately institu-
tionalized, the detailing of the constitutional law done by a constitutional court 
of last instance increases the clarity of law and safeguards the coherence of the 
legal order".7 
The constitutional court is therefore chicken and egg of the rechtsstaat in the 
same time. It is the product of the commitment to the rechtsstaat by the 
constituante and is an institution that enshrines procedures towards the 
development and fostering of the rule of law. Concerning the improvement of the 
clarity of law and the preservation of the coherence of the law system the consti-
tutional court is in a kind of pioneer situation. The rulings of the constitutional 
court take part in specific discourse situations that are found in the society and 
show an impact on the longterm societal development. In formulation of quality 
standards it can be said that the rulings contribute to the clarity of law and 
safeguard the coherence of the legal order, if they reflect a sensitive sensibility 
towards the needs and challenges of the ongoing process of societal discourses 
about the fostering of the rule of law and develop an educational force in these 
ongoing processes towards multiplying and deepening the emancipatoric gains. 
Goal of the fourth here mentioned concept, the functional-structural system 
theory that was manly developed by Niklas Luhmann, is enlightenment. The 
starting point is the presumption that societal systems are acting similar to living 
specimens that are self-organizing and communicating with their environment. The 
society as a whole creates a system that possesses the ability to communicate and 
to develop and contains important partial autopoietic systems that are possessing 
6
 Habermas, J.: Between Facts and Norms. 1996, preface: XLI. 
7
 Habermas, J.: Faktizität und Geltung. 5lh edition 1997, 297. 
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an independent own ability to communicate and to develop. Equally the 
constitutional court can be seen as an autopoietic system, because it develops its 
own internal organisation, stands in reference with the society and other systems 
and is functioning under observance within is given functional description in the 
societal system. 
Luhmann stresses that the signs of modernity in the modern society are only 
here and now being developed. The main attention gets therefore the question 
how best to gain and prepare the future. The creation of a set of values that is 
motivated by coming from the future and towards the enabling of future and their 
constant development creates a process, all systems of the society are engaged in. 
The constitutional court can be seen as a relief for the constantly overworked 
legislature that cannot anticipate the extrem dynamic developments within its 
codifications. Codification is therefore only one part of the legislation. Based on 
the legislative power of its decisions the constitutional court can bring together 
the processes of value creations that are ongoing in the society aiming at the 
creation of an higher level of identity and its formulation with binding authority. 
Luhmann formulates the maxime that is guiding the process of value creation in 
this way: 
"Basic thesis of the above deliberations was that the form of differen-
tiation—today: primarly orientated on functions—must be harmonized with the 
norm structure in such a way that operative closure and autonomy of the systems 
is not blocked but on the other hand it is made clear that the systems are bound 
to the society and therefore imply for them external reverence towards the 
society"8 
The substantial result of this understanding in the constructive putting 
together of the process of value generation that is under way in the society and 
can be put into legal language by the constitutional court. Constitutional juris-
diction is therefore a value generating voice n the framework of the society. 
Constitutional jurisdiction is not alone the decision about constitutional/un-
constitutional, but also a closer interpretation of the values found in the 
constitution. Substantial quality control standard for the constitutional court is 
therefore the appreciation of the value settings in responding to the actual needs 
of the modern society. Constitutional jurisdiction is substantially taking part in 
the endeavour to create a successful future for the society. 
Overviewing the four here presented concepts it can be said that there is 
considerable variance within the different concepts in the way of thinking and 
describing constitutional jurisdiction. This paper aimed to show that every 
8
 Luhmann, N.: Gesellschaftstheorie und Normentheorie. 1993, 26. 
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concept is suitable to provide a valuable insight in the basic ideas of modern 
constitutional jurisdiction. Common to all concepts is the implicit or outspoken 
trust in the values of reasoning and enlightenment. Within the two described net-
works, the Conference of European Constitutional Courts and the Venice 
Commission, a substantial discourse about the preliminaries of quality control in 
constitutional adjudication may take place based on these outlined basic ideas. 
The so far quite abstract principles could be made more operational through 
comparative analyses of court-rulings and reflections on the organisation of the 
court's procedures. Nevertheless the establishment of a constitutional court 
presents the opportunity to increase rationality and enlightenment within the 
society and therefore is a support for the endeavours to strenghen the society to 
meet the challenges of the future of modern society with their increased 
sensitivity to peaceful settlements of conflicts and the increasing better 
implementation of human rights. 
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JÓZSEF SZABADFALVI * 
Some Reflections on the Anglo-Saxon Influence in the Hungarian 
Legal Philosophical Traditions 
When analysing the Hungarian traditions of legal thinking, we generally 
emphasize two remarks.1 Firstly, as a characteristic feature deriving f rom the 
geographical conditions and historical-cultural ties of Hungary, the adaptation 
and interpretation of the achievement of Austrian and German jurisprudence are 
to be mentioned. Secondly, the dual nature of the legal thinking of this region of 
Europe is stressed, which comprises a tendency towards legal conservatism and 
an uptodate interpretation of the most current legal philosophical trends. The 
József Szabadfalvi, Professor, University of Miskolc, H-3515 Miskolc, Hungary. 
E-mail:jogszabi.@ gold.uni-miskolc.hu 
1
 See from the literature on the subject of History of hungarian legal philosophy: Somló, 
В.: "Die neuere ungarische Rechtsphilosophie" Archivfiir Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 
1, 1907-08, 315-323; Finkey, F.: A tételes jog alapelvei és vezéreszméi [Principles and ideas 
of positive law], Budapest, 1908; Horváth, В.: "Die ungarishe Rechtsphilosophie" Archiv fiir 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 24, 1930, 37-85; Szabó, I.: A burzsoá állam- és jog-
bölcselet Magyarországon [The bourgeois philosophy of state and law in Hungary], Budapest, 
1955; Hanák, T.: Az elfelejtett reneszánsz. A magyar fdozófiai gondolkodás századunk első 
felében [The forgotten renaissance. Hungarian philosophical thinking in the first half of our 
century], Bern, 1981; Szilágyi, P.: "Fejezetek az ELTE Állam- és Jogelméleti Tanszékének tör-
ténetéből" [Chapters from history of ELTE's Department of theory of law] in Acta Facultatis 
Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestiensis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, 
Tornus XXVI, Budapest, 1984, 105-153; Samu, M.-Szilágyi, P.: "Az állam- és jogelmélet 
oktatásának története egyetemünkön" [Teaching history of theory of state and law in our 
university] in: Horváth, P. (ed.): Az Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar szerepe a magyar jogtudo-
mány fejlődésében, Budapest, 1985, 313-392; Loss, S.—Szabadfalvi, J.—Szabó, M. H. Szilágyi, 
I. Ződi, Zs.: Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetéből [Sketches from 
the history of Hungarian legal philosophy], Miskolc, 1995; Perec, L.: "A belátásos elmélettől 
a mezőelméletig. A magyar jogfilozófia fél évszázada: Pikler, Somló, Moór, Horváth" [From 
the theory of discretion to the theory of law field. Half century of hungarian legal philosophy: 
Pikier, Somló, Moór, Horváth] Századvég, 1998, 10, 73-94; Szabadfalvi, J.: Jogbölcseleti 
hagyományok [Traditions of legal philosophy], Debrecen, 1999, and "Transition and Tradition. 
Can Hungarian traditions of legal philosophy contribute to legal transition?" Rechtstheorie, 
1999, Beiheft 20, 1-19. 
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most outstanding Hungarian philosophers of law have been characterized by the 
latter specific feature. In the following, I will describe the lesser-known Anglo-
Saxon influence while giving an overview of Hungarian legal philosophical 
thinking. 
Three great periods natural law, legal positivism and neo-Kantianism are to 
be distinguished in the history of legal philosophy in Hungary up to the mid-
twentieth century, mostly following the traditions of legal thinking in Europe. 
The interpretation of the remarkable contemporary English scientific attitude and 
its achievements first appeared in Hungarian legal philosophy through the work 
of Ágost Pulszky (1846-1901) in the last decades of the 19th century.2 In his 
early works Pulszky was mainly concerned with the theories of More, Bacon, 
Hobbes and Locke, the classical representatives of English social philosophy. 
Later in his career Pulszky focused on the ethnological attitude represented by 
Lubbock, Waitz, McLennan, Tylor, Morgan and Maine. In 1875 Pulszky 
completed the translation of Henry Maine's Ancient Law. He also attached over 
a hundred-page notes of their own scientific value to Maine's work.3 Afterwards 
he wrote a critical review of Herbert Spencer's philosophy, who was considered 
as innovator of the contemporary social scientific thinking. His major work titled 
The Theory of Civil Law and Society was published in Hungarian in 1885, and in 
English in 1888.4 Inspite of a favourable reaction to his work, he was not able to 
achieve his main goal, i.e. to enter and be accepted in the English scientific public 
life. However, Pulszky's work, according to Hungarian legal philosophy, is still 
fundamental, since the publication of this book laid the cornerstone of legal 
positivism in Hungary. In his work Pulszky considered Maine's comparative-
historical attitude and his theoretical theses were based on Spencer's ideas. In a 
chapter on the questions of legal philosophy he mentioned names of English 
authors such as Clark, Holland, Lightwood and Pollock, whose achievements he 
2
 Pulszky's main works of legal philosophy: A római jog, s az újabbkorí jogfejlődés 
[Roman law and modern legal development], Pest, 1869; "Az angol jogbölcselet történetéhez" 
[On history of english legal philosophy] Budapesti Szemle, 1875, 126-148; A jog és államböl-
csészet alaptanai [The fundamental doctrine of philosophy of law and state], Budapest, 1885; 
A jog és állambölcsészet feladatai [The tasks of philosophy of law and state], Budapest, 1888. 
3
 Maine, H.: A jog őskora, összeköttetése a társadalom alakulásának történetével, s viszonya 
az újkori eszmékhez [Ancient law, its connections with the early history of society and its relation 
to modern ideas], (A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia megbízásából fordította, bevezette és 
jegyzetekkel kísérte Pulszky Ágost [Ágost Pulszky translated, wrote introduction and notes on 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences's authority]), Budapest, 1875. 
4
 Pulszky, Á.: The Theory of Civil Law and Society, London, 1888. 
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considered in his work. When analysing legal concepts, he attempted to create 
definitions similar to analytical explanations. 
The positivist doctrine reached the peak of its history in Hungary with the 
work of Gyula Pikler (1864-1937) at the turn of the century.5 In his early works 
Pikier devoted attention to the inner contradictions of Spencer's theory against 
the intervention of state. Pikier did not consider Spencer's classical liberal 
attitude, which was based on biological conceptions as acceptable, and he 
emphasized the need for increased state intervention for the sake of society. 
Pikler's later works are all characterized by a discussion with Spencer whose 
theories he, on one hand, analyses for the support of his own theories, but on the 
other hand, he criticises and evaluates them. Spencer's influence is revealed in 
his theory of the evolution of law, or in his theory of 'discretion'. 
The period after the tum of the century brought a significant change in the 
history of both the European and Hungarian philosophy of law. This process in 
the Hungarian legal philosophy is reflected in the activity of Bódog Somló 
(1873-1920), the most remarkable representative of Hungarian legal philoso-
phical thinking.6 His career of a quarter of century can be divided into two 
stages. The positivist first stage is viewed as the one under the influences of 
Spencer's evolutionist sociology, Pikler's doctrine of discretion, and partly the 
materialistic philosophy of history. During the second stage of his scientific 
career, he turned to neo-Kantian philosophy establishing the most prospering 
period of Hungarian legal philosophy so far. At the turn of the century Somló 
belonged to the group of scientists who occasionally criticised, and at the 
5
 Pikler's main works of legal philosophy: Bevezető a jogbölcseletbe [Introduction to 
philosophy of law], Budapest, 1892; Az emberi egyesületek és különösen az állam keletkezése 
és fejlődése [The origin and development of state in particular], Budapest, 1897; A jog kelet-
kezéséről és fejlődéséről [About the origin and development of law], Budapest, 1897. 
6
 Somló's main works of legal philosophy: Állami beavatkozás és individualizmus [State-
intervention and individualism], Budapest, 1903; Jogbölcselet [Legal philosophy], Pozsony, 
1901 ; Jogbölcseleti előadások [Lectures on legal philosophy], Kolozsvár, 1906; "Masstäbe zur 
Bewertung des Rechts" Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 3, 1909-10, 508-522; 
"A jog értékmérői" [Values standards of law] Huszadik Század, 11, 1910, 1-14; "Das Wert-
problem" Zeitschrift für die philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 1912, 66-95; "A jog 
alkalmazásáról" [About legal application] Jogállam, 10, 1911, 2-3, 97-103, and 177-189; "Die 
Anwendung des Rechts" Zeitschrift für das privat und öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart, 38, 
1911, 55-74; "A szokásjog" [The legal custom] in: Farkas Lajos emlékkönyv, Kolozsvár, 1914, 
339-369; A helyes jog elméletéről [About right law theory], Kolozsvár, 1912-13; Juristische 
Grundlehre, Leipzig, 1917 [2. ed: 1927, and reprinted: Aalen, Scientia Verlag, 1973]; 
Jogbölcsészet [Legal philosophy], Budapest, 1920. 
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same time attempted to improve Spencer's doctrines. In his book on state 
intervention Somló introduced the increasing role of state as the consequence 
of the development of contemporary monopolistic capitalism. Somló was 
capable of revising Spencer's remarkable views ans also tried to find innovative 
explanations. 
Juristische Grundlehre, Somló's major work, published in German in 1917 
approaches the realm of law from the standpoint of contemporary neo-
Kantianism.7 In the introduction of his work, he devoted a separate sub-chapter 
to the connection between his own theory and John Austin's, the most out-
standing representative of English analytical positivism, who revealed his legal 
philosophy in his Lectures on Jurisprudence. Somló considered the way of 
creating concepts as common in the two theories. He, when introducing a 
number of legal concepts, established his own conceptual apparatus through 
refining Austin's concepts. The strict positivism and consistency of Austin's 
theory may have appeared attractive for Somló, and also appeared suitable for 
corresponding to neo-Kantian theses. 
In the prevailing neo-Kantian philosophy, from the early 1930s Barna 
Horváth (1896-1973) established a new colour in the Hungarian traditions of 
legal philosophy.8 The originality of his views was revealed in his synoptic 
7
 Somló, В.: Juristische Grundlehre. Lipcse, 1917. 
8
 Horváth's main works of legal philosophy: "Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit" Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, 1, 1928, 508-544; "Természetjog és pozitivizmus" [Natural law and legal 
positivism] Társadalomtudomány, 8, 1928, 212-247; "Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit" Inter-
nationale Zeitschrift für Theorie des Rechts, 4, 1929, 1-54; "Die Gerechtigkeitslehre des 
Sokrates und des Piaton" Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 10, 1930, 258-280; "Die 
Gerechtigkeitslehre der Vorsokratiker" Studi Filosofico-Giuridici dedicati a Giorgo Del Vecchio, 
Modena, 1930, 336-372; Die Gerechtigkeitslehre des Aristoteles, Szeged, 1931; "Hegel und das 
Recht" Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 12, 1932, 52-89; Bevezetés a jogtudományba 
[Introduction to jurisprudence], Szeged, 1932; Rechtssoziologie. Probleme des Geselschaftslehre 
und der Geschichtslehre des Recht, Berlin-Grunewald, 1934; "Sociologie juridique et Théorie 
Processuelle du droit" Archives de Philosophie du Droit et de Sociologie Juridique, 5, 1935, 
181-242; "Macht, Recht, Verfahren" Archiv fiir Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 30, 1936, 67-85; 
A jogelmélet vázlata [Sketch of legal theory], Szeged, 1937; "Der Sinn der Utopie" Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht, 20, 1940, 198-230; "Der Rechtsstreit des Genius. I. Sokrates" Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht, 22, 1942, 126-162; "Der Rechtsstreit des Genius. II. Johanna" Zeitschrift 
für öffentliches Recht, 22, 1942, 295-342; "Der Rechtsstreit des Genius, II. Johanna" Zeitschrift 
fiir öffentliches Recht, 22,1942, 395—160; "Prolegomena zur Soziologie" Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie, ("Ungarn-Heft") 37, 1943, 50-67; Angol jogelmélet [English legal theory], 
Budapest, 1943; "Between Legal Realism and Idealism" Northwestern University Law Review, 
48, 1954,639-713; "Rights of Man: Due Process of Law and Excès de Pouvoir" The American 
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attitude and the functionally related procedural legal view. His achievement is 
represented in conforming two basic paradigms. The parallel existence of neo-
Kantian and pragmatic-empirical attitudes, and their relation to each other was 
regarded as a breakthrough not only in Hungarian but also in European legal 
thinking. Horváth's study trip in England in 1929 resulted in his being con-
cerned with English legal culture. He became involved in studying the works of 
Hobbes, Bentham and Austin, among the remarkable figures of English legal 
philosophy, as well as those of Roscoe Pound, a most outstanding philosopher 
in American jurisprudence. His connection with Leonard Hobhouse, English 
sociologist, and Moris Ginsberg, his student, influenced the elaboration of his 
procedural legal attitude since Horváth adapted from their views the division of 
four types of social evolution. After coming home from England, Horváth 
reported in a number of papers on the achievements of both American and 
English jurisprudence. The experiences and impressions he gained in England 
urged him to complete the history of English legal philosophy. 
From the late 1930s József Szabó (1909-1992), one of the most gifted 
contemporary legal philosophers, got to know the achievements of Anglo-
American jurisprudence through the work of Horváth.9 In his works on legal 
philosophy, Szabó attempts to discredit the neo-Kantian model by using the 
outcomes of criticism, according to Hume, and the American legal realism. 
Szabó, in his works published in the early 1940s, attempted to create a 'neo-
realistic' approach to the concept of law. Citing the ideas of Jerome Frank, 
Edward Robinson and Thurman Arnold, the most outstanding personalities of 
American legal realism, Szabó abandoned belief in legal security, which was, in 
his opinion, revived by a faulty logical philosophy of law. In his theory he also 
used Frank's doctrine of fact-sceptics and rule-sceptics. When appreciating 
Szabó's work one can suggest that, in a similar way to the evaluation of 
Journal of Comparative Law, 4, 1955, 539-573; "Field Law and Law Field" Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 8, 1957, 44-81; "Moral. Recht und Politik" Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 14, 1963, 218-252; "Comparative Conflicts Law and the 
Concept of Changing Law" The American Journal of Comparative Law, 15, 1966-67, 136-158; 
"Twilight of Government of Laws" Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 64, 1968, 1-26. 
9
 Szabó's main works of legal philosophy: A jog alapjai [The foundations of law], 
Budapest, 1938; A jogászi gondolkodás bölcselete [Philosophy of lawyer 's thinking], Szeged, 
1941; "Hol az igazság? A bírói lélektan problémái" [Where is the justice? Problems of judge ' s 
psychology] Társadalomtudomány, 22, 1942,1 ,1-55; "Wahrheit, Wert und Symbol im Rechte" 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, ("Ungarn-Heft") 37, 1943, 101-121; "Der 
Rechtsbegriff in einer neutralistischen Beleuchtung" Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffenliches 
Recht, 1, 1948, 3, 291-331. 
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Horváth's work, he also gave particular pragmatic explanations to classical neo-
Kantian problems. Doing so, he created the possibility for a prolific interrelation 
of two legal cultures, and abolished the previous one-sided Austrian and German 
orientation in the Hungarian legal philosophical thinking. Regretfully, however, 
Szabó was not able to create a further systematic explanation to his theory of 
legal philosophy called 'neo-realistic'. 
From the early 1950s, neither the achievements of Anglo-Saxon legal think-
ing, nor the leading theories of Western European philosophy of law were to be 
mentioned without denunciation.10 Theories and legal philosophers called 
'bourgeois' were merely appreciated, with few exceptions, by the philosophers 
of law who were deprived of publicity. 
We can claim that in the establishment of Hungarian positivist legal philo-
sophy, and in the natural law theories having been discredited, Maine's and 
mainly Spencer 's doctrines played a decisive role. Without the prolific in-
fluence of the representatives of English philosophy and legal philosophy, the 
process of Hungarian legal philosophy becoming independent could not have 
been boosted. In this respect, the general statement cited previously, is definitely 
to be revised. However, while Hungarian legal positivist attitude was not able to 
avoid the influence of Spencer's theory, neo-Kantian legal philosophers, with some 
features of eclecticism, were capable of including the achievements of 
contemporary English-American jurisprudence in their theories. We can, with good 
reason, claim that from the establishment of legal positivism to the mid-twentieth 
century, English and American philosophy of law exerted profound influence on 
the theorists of Hungarian philosophy of law, and played a significant role in the 
continuous renewal of Hungarian jurisprudence. 
The mid-1980s signalled the revival of Hungarian legal philosophy. By 
this time the Soviet type Marxism has lost ground in legal philosophical 
literature. Further confirmation of the previously unquestionable paradigms 
have not put researchers' existence into risk any longer. For jurists concerned 
with legal theory, it was only a choice of values to decide which paradigm 
would be fundamental for them. One of the forms of finding new ways was 
provided by studies in Hungarian traditions of legal philosophy before the 
year of change, which were carried out by the concerned researchers still 
alive and the younger generations who view this kind of tradition as a 
10
 See about this Szabó, I.: A burzsoá állam- és jogbölcselet Magyarországon [The 
bourgeois philosophy of state and law in Hungary], Budapest, 1955. 
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neglected value and take responsibility for the rehabilitation of their 
predeccessors' work.11 
11
 See from the literature on the subject: Karácsony, A.: "Jog és erkölcs. Kelsen és Verdross 
szerepe Bibó jogfelfogásának alakulásába" [Law and moral. The role of Kelsen and Verdross in 
the legal concept of Bibó] in Dénes, I. Z. (ed.): A szabadság kis körei. Tanulmányok Bibó Istrván 
életművéről, Budapest, 1999, 166-187; Kupa, L.: Pulszky Ágost bölcselete [Ágost Pulszky's 
philosophy], Budapest, 1996; Loss, S.—Szabadfalvi, J. Szabó, M . - H . Szilágyi, I— Ződi, Zs.: 
Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetéből [Sketches from history of 
Hungarian legal philosophy], Miskolc, 1995; Nagy, E.: "Erény és tudomány. Vázlat Somló 
Bódog gondolkodói pályájáról" [Virtue and science. Sketch of Bódog Somló ' s philosophical 
career] Világosság, 23,1981,12, 764—772, and "Pulszky Ágost társadalom- és államtana" [Ágost 
Pulszky's theory of society and state] Szociológia, 5 ,1977, 2, 207-213, and "Bevezetés Horváth 
Barna: Demokrácia és jog című tanulmányához" [Introduction to Barna Horváth 's Democracy 
and Law] Medvetánc, 1985,2-3, 294-303, and "Lehet-e tudományos a világnézet? Pikier Gyula 
értékmentes jogszociológiája" [Can ideology be scientific? Gyula Pikler 's value-free legal 
sociology] Világosság, 33, 1991, 2, 81-92, and "Elhajló pályaképek. Bibó és Horváth Barna" 
[Divergent careers. Bibó and Barna Horváth] in Dénes, I. Z. (ed.): A hatalom humanizációja, 
Pécs, 1993, 84—90; Perec, L.: "A belátásos elmélettől a mezőelméletig. A magyar jogfilozófia 
fél évszázada: Pikier, Somló, Moór, Horváth" [From the theory of discretion to the theory of law 
field. Half century of hungarian legal philosophy: Pikier, Somló, Moór, Horváth] Századvég, 
1998, 10, 73-94; Paczolay, P.: "Moór Gyula jogfilozófiája" [Gyula Moór ' s philosophy of law] 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 44, 1989, 10, 505-512; Pokol, В.: "Moór Gyula és Horváth Barna 
jogkoncepciója" [The legal conception of Gyula Moór and Barna Horváth] Magyar Jog, 40, 
1998, 5, 257-267, and "A XIX. századi magyar jogelmélet" [The 19th-century of hungarian legal 
philosophy] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 53, 1998, 7 - 8 , 287-293; Solt, K.: "Moór Gyula 
jogfilozófiájáról" [About Gyula Moór ' s philosophy of law] Holmi, 6, 1994, 12, 1850-1862; 
Szabadfalvi, J.: "Moór Gyula pályakezdése" [The beginning years of Gyula Moór's career] 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 44, 1989, 10, 497-504, and '"Demokrácia és jog ' . Adalékok Horváth 
Barna politikaelméletéhez (1945/46.)" ["Democracy and Law". Some aspects on the political 
theory of Barna Horváth] Magyar Közigazgatás, 40, 1990, 7, 605-613, and Gyula Moór Egy XX. 
századi magyar jogfdozófus pályaképe [Gyula Moór. A sketch of a 20th-century hungarian legal 
philosopher], Budapest, 1994; "Vonzások és taszítások — Moór Gyula és Horváth Barna 
kapcsolata" [Attractions and repulsions — the relations between Gyula Moór and Barna Horváth] 
Magyar Jog, 44, 1994, 11, 654-660, and '"Coactus tarnen volui!' Bibó István jogbölcseleti 
munkássága" ["Coactus tamen volui!" István Bibó's activity in legal philosophy] Forrás, 22, 
1995, 12, 13-21, and "Egy derékba tört életmű margójára: Szabó József jogbölcseleti 
munkássága" [On a margin of interrupted life-work. József Szabó's legal philosophical activity] 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, 53 1998, 12, 493-504, and Jogbölcseleti hagyományok [Traditions of 
legal philosophy], Debrecen, 1999, and "Bibó István és a szegedi iskola" [István Bibó and the 
school of Szeged] in Dénes, I. Z. (ed.): A szabadság kis körei. Tanulmányok Bibó Istrván 
életművéről, Budapest, 1999, 125-152, and "Wesen und Problematik der Rechtsphilosophie. Die 
Rechtsphilosophie on Gyula Moór" Rechtstheorie, 30, 1999, 1-25, and "Transition and 
118 JÓZSEF SZABADFALVI 
A key precondition for us for being included in the European scientific 
life again is to know our traditions in legal philosophy and to apply all the 
research finds that our predeccessors have accumulated. However, we also 
have to be careful about fragmented oeuvres and they are to be compared to 
the scientific level of the concerned period. If we realise that there is a lack 
of original ideas and the theories only belong to the second line, we have to 
express this. On the other hand, however, we should be proud of what is 
valuable even today. 
Finally, we must clarify that, from the end of the 19-th century, Hungarian 
legal philosophical thinking have supported the bourgeois transformation and 
the establishment of a modern civil society, according to the demand for 
modernisation of the society. Ágost Pulszky, Gyula Pikler, Bódog Somló, 
Gyula Moór, Barna Horváth, József Szabó and their students have become 
fighting representatives of Hungarian progress and they visioned a modern 
20th-century Hungary. In this ambition a great role can be attributed to the 
'empirical state', which is the driving force of modernisation, to the 
realisation of what kind of development can satisfy the needs of society, to 
'correct law' required for achieving the goals, to the investigation of the 
nature of law supporting the regime, and also to the comparison of empirical 
reality and the related norms, and to everything that can provide the widest 
Tradition. Can Hungarian traditions of legal philosophy contribute to legal transition?" 
Rechtstheorie, 1999, Beiheft 20, 1-19; Szabó, J.: "Moór Gyula emlékezete" [Memory of Gyula 
Moór] Polis, 1989, 3, 17-21, and Ki a káoszból, vissza Európába [From chaos to Europe], 
Budapest, 1993; Szájer, J.-Tóth, Á. (ed.): Moór Gyula 1888-1950 [Gyula Moór 1888-1950], 
Budapest, 1988; Szilágyi, I.: Bibó István (1911-1979). Vázlat pályafutásáról és életművéről 
[István Bibó (1911-1979). A sketch of his career and life-work], Miskolc, 1990; Varga, Cs.: 
"Somló Bódog esete a pécsi jogakadémiával" [The affair of Bódog Somló with the law school 
of Pécs] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 35, 1980, 8, 543-546, and "Bevezetés Hans Kelsen: Tiszta 
Jogtan с. művéhez" [Introduction to Hans Kelsen 's Pure Theory of Law] in Kelsen, H.: Tiszta 
jogtan, Budapest, 1988, XI-XVIII ; Varga, Cs. (ed.): Aus dem Nachlass von Julius Moór, 
Budapest, 1995, and Somló, F.: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie (Ausgewählt und eingeleitet von 
Csaba Varga), Budapest, 1999; Zsidai, Á.: "Tény és érték. Moór Gyula és Horváth Barna 
jogfilozófiai vitája" [Fact and value. A legal philosophy debate between Gyula Moór and Barna 
Horváth] Jogtudományi Közlöny, 44, 1989, 10, 513-519, and "A perspektíva tüneménye. 
Horváth Barna jogfilozófiája" [Phenomenon of perspective. Barna Horváth's philosophy of law] 
Világosság, 32, 1991, 12, 917-927, and "Bibó István a jogfilozófus. Horváth Barna és Bibó 
István szellemi közössége" [István Bibó as legal philosopher. Bama Horváth and István Bibó's 
spiritual community] in Dénes, I. Z. (ed.): A hatalom humanizációja, Pécs, 1993, 91-108, and 
"A Tiszta Jogszociológia" (Bevezető tanulmány) [Pure legal sociology. An introduction] in 
Horváth, В.: Jogszociológia, Budapest, 1995, 11-58. 
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scope of freedom in the Kantian view. This list could be continued but even 
so we might perceive what kind of ambition our predeccessors had taken 
upon themselves. Although they could not provide a safe recipe but they have 
established the starting-points for us, since even today we often face the same 
problems and we do not have divergent goals, though we tend to achieve 
them by drawing on different paradigms. 
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A N D R Á S FÖLDI and G Á B O R H A M Z A : A római jog története és institúciói (History 
and Institutes of Roman Law). Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, Hungary, 2000, 
XL + 715 p. 
This textbook on Roman law which can be viewed as a 'Handbuch' in German 
sense, rather than a usual textbook was first published in November 1996 by 
András Földi and Gábor Hamza and was recently published in its fifth revised 
and enlarged edition in September 2000. [An English translation of the textbook 
will be published by the Kluwer Law International.] The authors make a great 
first impression with their choice of book cover, showing a lifelike, colorful 
reconstruction of the Forum Romanian. The depiction suggests that Roman law 
is not a ruin of the past but is to be reconstructed as part of our present and 
future. 
The original character and the broad theme covered by this remarkable book 
are reflected in its title: History and Institutes of Roman Law. The History of 
Roman Law, which is a mandatory discipline of the law school curriculum in 
many European and other civil law countries outside of Europe, treats the 
external history or äußere Geschichte, comprising the history of constitutional 
framework as well as the history of legal sources of ancient Rome. In this text, 
autonomous chapters are devoted to such topics as the international relations of 
ancient Rome, the Roman concept of law, and the subsequent history of Roman 
law in the Middle Ages and in the Modern World. András Földi and Gábor 
Hamza go beyond history and address institutes, the systematic and dogmatic 
presentation of Roman law, which should not be confused with legal institutions. 
The size and the coverage of this textbook significantly exceeds any Roman 
law textbooks previously published in Hungary, and considering its exceptionally 
rich documentation, the text takes an illustrious place in the bibliography of 
international treatises on Roman law. Among today's handbooks, it can be 
compared with the revised version of the classic Jörs Kunkel Wenger textbook 
(reworked by Honsell, Mayer Maly and Selb). [H. Honseil et al., Romisches 
Recht, aufgrund des Werkes von P. Jors, (1987).] The Hungarian textbook, how-
ever, gives the reader considerably more than the Jörs Kunkel Wenger textbook 
by treating a number of Roman legal institutions also from the viewpoint of their 
contemporary significance. 
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The textbook's exceptional advantage is its logic and consistent classification 
of the material, which is fortunately stressed not only by the hierarchical system 
of titles, but also by the consistent high quality typography. 
In the introductory section of the book, the authors list an extensive general 
bibliography of Roman law related works, including a number of the most recent 
publications. [András Földi & Gábor Hamza: A Római Jog Története és 
Institúciói (History and Institutes of Roman Law) XXVI-XXXIV (5th ed. 2000).] 
The special bibliographies before each of the sixty chapters contain some works 
published even in 2000. 
In the historical part of the treatise [at 3-150.], the authors present the Roman 
state and administration in a detailed way, considering every single period. The 
discussions, which are in many ways original, help serve the researchers of the 
history of public law and the history of administration with considerable in-
formation. 
The main novelty of the historical part of the textbook is, however, the 
surprisingly wide-ranged and data-rich presentation of the continuity of Roman 
law. The chapter embracing the subsequent history of Roman law begins with the 
Middle Ages and continues through our modem era. Geographically speaking, the 
textbook extends to all of the continents except Australia and Antarctica. This 
voluminous section's approach to the subsequent history of Roman law differs 
from the well-trodden paths. It can be viewed as a brief comparison of different 
jurisdictions retaining significant Roman law influences. This chapter can be used 
as a concise encyclopedia of comparative law. 
The reader can find out, for example, which sources have been taken into 
consideration during the process of drafting the Civil Codes of Louisiana, 
Quebec, and different Latin American countries. Readers also can follow the way 
Roman law has reached South Africa and Sri Lanka, and the role Roman law 
played in influencing Roman-Dutch law in these countries. The authors also have 
analyzed the various forms of the effects of Roman law on the development of 
law in the United States. The authors have managed to condense almost all of the 
European and some non-European countries' private law history into only a few 
pages, including names, data, and an abundant bibliography. 
It is remarkable how much work is concentrated into this chapter. Further, the 
information, which was collected from a wide range of authoritative sources, is 
properly arranged. This section of the textbook is equal to or surpasses the value 
of an encyclopedia of comparative private (civil) law. In this regard, the authors 
have achieved a unique synthesis, even on the international level. They emphasize 
the remarkably enduring and embracive influence of Roman law on the European 
legal tradition. Here, we learn that the center of the Roman law-cultivation has 
returned to a considerable extent in the twentieth century from its age-long 
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wandering to Italy, after its partial reception and high-level cultivation in France, 
the Netherlands, and Germany. 
Additionally, within the frame of the historical section, the authors pay atten-
tion to the history of canon law and private international law. Also in this part, 
the authors provide precise definitions of a number of legal notions having 
fundamental relevance like legal (juristic) relation and legal institution (Rechts-
institut in German, institution juridique in French). Finally, the attention of the 
reader is turned to the thought-provoking discussion about the relations of law 
and morality, particularly regarding the concept of equity. 
The major part of the textbook is about the presentation of the Institutes, with 
the following structure: Procedural Law, including an outline of criminal pro-
cedure; Law of Persons and Family Law; Law of Things; Law of Obligations, 
with an Appendix on Criminal Law; and Law of Succession. All five institutional 
sections contain an autonomous chapter on the continuity and subsequent fate of 
the legal institutions discussed. 
The authors combine historical and dogmatical methods in their presentation 
of the "Institutes." The historical method primarily appears in the presentation of 
the legal institutions' formations and the special stages of their development. The 
dogmatical analysis is not neglected, but instead it takes an almost absolute 
priority. The dogmatical analysis considerably relies on the classical dogmatical 
system, worked out mainly by the representatives of the German historical school 
of jurisprudence. The analysis undertaken by the authors of the textbook not only 
imitates, but in some instances reconsiders, the achievements of the German 
historical school of jurisprudence. 
In the section entitled Procedural Law [151-202.], discussions about the term 
actio are brought to light as important to contemporary lawyers. The under-
standing of different judicial procedural forms is presented by publishing one 
dozen "praetorian formulas." These formulas, which can be likened to the writs 
in English medieval law, are essential in understanding not only the procedural 
law, but also the system of substantive law rules. From the modern jurist's point 
of view, special attention should be paid to the comprehensive analysis of the 
subjective and objective meaning of the term bona fides. The way of looking at 
the presentment of executive procedure and non-judicial procedure is original. 
The textbook describes the Roman antecedents of the public notary (tabularius, 
tabellio) by sketching the continuity of this institution from the Middle Ages to 
our modern era. 
In the section entitled Law of Persons and Family Law [203-272.], the 
discussions about the concept of family and kinship contain many original ideas, 
especially by the accurate presentation of the terms família proprio iure and 
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agnatio. In the part treating the Law of Things [273-378.], the wide analysis of 
the term causa, which extends to the continuity as well, is truly notable. 
In the part dealing with the Law of Obligations [379-592.], the authors have 
shaped a logic and modern system. The discussions about validity and efficacy 
of the legal transaction, damages, and civil liability are important, even from the 
point of view of the modern civil law and legal philosophy. The presentation of 
actiones adiecticiae qualitatis is also valuable and original. Discussions about 
the rules and continuity of societas or partnership should attract the modern 
corporate lawyer's attention. From the other parts of the section Law of Obli-
gations, the detailed presentation of crimina or crimes in the Appendix on 
Criminal Law is particularly worthwhile. 
In the section treating the Law of Succession [593-668.], the authors provide 
remarkable discussions about the legal relationships in the law of succession and 
about the validity and efficacy of the testament that are based on a detailed 
research of sources. Here, the authors raise some basic questions that should be 
answered by experts of civil law. The presentation of the background of the 
conceptual history of the law of succession is also unique. 
The most important virtue of the dogmatical sections is the answering of 
questions which emerge on the basic level but whose answer cannot be found in 
other textbooks. In this way, the authors skillfully link problems of Roman and 
present day law, leading to a better understanding of several institutions of 
contemporary legal systems. 
The authors emphasize that the Roman jurists had an advantage over the 
lawyers of our era. This advantage was due to their way of thinking, which was 
less determined by legal rules of strict implementation. Their approach to law 
was, as a result, considerably more flexible. 
Despite the rigorous scholarly effort made by the authors, the textbook also 
has a few shortcomings. For instance, the Roman regime of the law of in-
heritance was not exhaustively analyzed. Hopefully, the authors will treat this 
extremely large subject in later editions of the textbook in a more detailed 
manner. Similarly, the reception and the subsequent fate of the Roman law is to 
some extent unevenly dealt with. The authors paid less attention to the sub-
sequent fate of the law of persons than the analysis of the subsequent fate of the 
law of obligations. 
Summing up the characteristics of the work under review, the textbook of 
András Földi and Gábor Hamza is impressive in erudition and imaginative in 
argument and offers the reader an up-to-date treatment of the Roman law and a 
partial treatment of the history and dogmatics of the modern private law that is 
outstanding, even on an international level. The authors have combined the 
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scholarly and systematic treatment of the material, displaying an astonishing 
range of their knowledge with clarity of exposition. Differing views or opinions 
are quite often alluded to and contrasted when the occasion demands. 
This work is outstanding not only because of its modern and original 
character, but also because it contains an astonishing array of information. One 
of the greatest strengths of the History and Institutes of Roman Law lies in the 
copious collection of the sources, which are not limited to antiquity or of pure 
Roman law. The volume's three indices include a long and valuable index of 
sources, an index of names, and a subject index. Both practicing lawyers and 
those who are interested in theoretical questions of law will find this textbook an 
indispensable reference work. 
As for the recognition of this textbook in Hungary, the reviewer has to 
mention the fact that this work is referred to in the judicial practice as if it were 
a "book of authority". Moreover, it is worth mentioning that this textbook 
recently received the Award "The Best Legal Textbook" granted by the Eötvös 
Loránd University in Budapest. 
Francis A. Gábor 
GÁBOR JOBBÁGYI: Személyi és családi jog (Law of Persons and Family). 
Pázmány Péter Egyetem, Jog és Államtudományi Kar, Vol. 8. Szent István 
Társulat, Budapest, 2000, 347 p. 
In 2000 a new textbook was added to the pool of books in Hungarian law 
education. Gábor Jobbágyi's work was published by Szent István Társulat in a 
high quality form with the objective to give an overview of the law of "persons" 
and "family law" to be used by students at the university. Compared to previous 
textbooks, it represents a new approach covering the subject matter and attached 
areas in a deeper and extended way. The author rather means to elucidate 
theoretical and practical gaps than to present a brand new system of the law of 
persons. Since the work was intended to be used by students, it gives a clear and 
understandable outlook of the subject facilitating understanding and studying. Its 
logic follows the respective statutes (Hungarian Civil Code and Family Code). 
The scope of civil law respecting private-autonomy is surpassing its limits in 
regulating financial relations only. On the other hand, the provisions of the 
effective Hungarian Civil Code contain the opposite statement. "This Act governs 
the financial and certain personal relations of the citizenry, the state, local 
governments, economic and social organizations, and other persons. Other 
statutes pertaining to the aforementioned relations shall, unless otherwise 
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stipulated, be construed in concert with this Act and in consideration of its 
provisions". Considering the definition, it may seem that in addition the Act may 
seem to emphasize the priority of the financial relations and to protect and 
regulate nothing but the personal relations connected to the financial relations. 
Notwithstanding more than fifty years ago it was clarified in European law 
development that protection provided by the civil law had to be independent from 
the financial relations, which are dominant and thus the difference remains 
quantitative rather than qualitative. We have to realise that financial and personal 
relations are equal. We could summarise the present statement as a fraction in 
mathematics. Financial and personal (family) relations would make up the 
numerator and autonomy characterising such relations would be the denominator. 
Although there are some differences between the two relations it does not cause 
any problem to find the common feature of them however, as mathematics also 
accepts the difference between the numbers in the numerator (even-odd; positive-
negative; prim-non prim; etc.). Returning to law, we can find basic distinctions 
indeed between the two different kinds of legal relations, however they are co-
ordinated and supplement each other (there is no bracket before or after them 
which would put them in a subordinated position). That is why it is a necessary 
and significant venture to summarise the law of Persons and the Family law in a 
comprehensive and consistent manner. 
In the past decade numerous comprehensive studies and textbooks have been 
published in the law of contracts and law of things, adjusted to the rule of law, 
however the law of persons and family law has been neglected so far by 
Hungarian scientists. Necessary and essential change of approach (both in the 
attitude and in the law dogmatic) has been urged both in this area and in financial 
relations from the beginning of the 1990s but the above fact is true indeed. 
Although, the relevant regulations were amended in several relations, the 
recodification of this field of law in the scope of the constitutionality (rule of law) 
did not take place, the application of law and jurisprudence are destined to adopt 
the "inheritance" adequately. The theory of law and the jurisprudence are 
essential means of this work. Appropriately the education of law should 
communicate a modemized, adapted law of persons and family law reflecting the 
principles of the new legal system based on regulations in power. The book 
considers again the Family law as an integral part of civil law (law of persons) 
with a relative independence, which is the main feature of the book. This 
approach is based on the history of law being in harmony with the dogmatic of 
almost all west-European effective legal systems (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch-BGB, 
Viertes Buch: 1297-1921 §§; Code Civil, Livre Premier- des persones, Titre 
V-XI. etc.), however it is still regarded as controversial in Hungary. According 
to the above approach, the author attempts to extend and apply the basic institu-
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tions and view of the civil law to the relations of the family law, and to reveal 
existing points of contact between the two laws. This explains why the book con-
siders marriage as an agreement between a man and a woman. 
It is more typical for the legal institutions of the family law (marriage, family) 
than other legal institutions that they are primarily regulated by moral norms and 
not by legal ones, and the necessity of following such norms is of enormous 
importance. For this reason the author endeavours to explain the exact content of 
the referred moral grounds. 
Irrespective whether the reader can accept each part of the textbook or not, 
presumably everyone agrees that the goal is a unified, constitutional and up-to-
date treatment of the issues of the personal and family relations, that the author's 
wish to accomplish it is a timely and necessary venture. 
With this reflection I would recommend this book to all students and all 
interested instructors and researchers of the profession. 
Zsuzsanna Martonyi 
CSABA VARGA: The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept. 2nd ed., 
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1998, 193 p. 
The book discusses George Lukács and law from three aspects. First, it attempts 
to bring to the surface bibliographical and theoretical motives that point to 
Lukács' early encounter with problems of law, and also to define the sources of 
his legal education. Secondly, it analyses within the context of his oeuvre those 
trends that amounted to the nihilization of law, as well as those that subsequently 
led to the approval of the sets of institutions of modern formal law. Third, it 
discusses the theoretical importance of problems raised by the philosophical 
exposition of modern formal law. 
The sphere of problems covered by the author's ambitions is not limited only 
to classical ones, such as the duality of morality and legality, or that of natural 
law and positive law, but also involves questions of legal theory that have perhaps 
exclusively been expressed in philosophical terms by Lukács' posthumous 
Ontology. These questions include, among others, the understanding of legal 
phenomenon as a complex of mediation, and, within it, the place of legal 
objectification; the way in which the dialectics of the use of coercion appears in 
law; the role of the logical, the formal and the systematical in the processes of 
law, and the ways in which manipulation shapes them in actual practice; what to 
regard as characteristic of the formation of concepts in law; how all these are 
embroidered by the ideology of the legal profession; and, finally, what the rela-
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tive autonomy of law consists of, together with its manifestations, consequences, 
and also manifold limitations. 
As one of its first critiques, Eugene Kamenka (Canberra) has noticed, the 
author's fundamental theme is the contrast between the epistemological approach 
(condemned as simplistic and leading to unmediated antinomies) and the 
ontological one. On this basis, the author elevates what is in effect a historical 
and sociological approach to law, which has to be comparative. Consequently, it 
is to describe the actual workings, regularities and effects of the legal system, 
instead of its preferred or projected principles. Continuing the early criticism's 
line, Paul Browne (Ottawa) has remarked that using the method and categories 
of a late Marxist Ontology, the author concludes law to be a dynamic, 
contradictory and complex process, which by the same stroke must both fulfil the 
social need for a set of abstract and all-encompassing norms and respond to 
specific concrete needs not readily reducible to an abstract system. And to 
achieve this, all administration of the law must homogenise and manipulate those 
heterogeneous cases with which it deals, in order to attain conformity with both 
the enacted legal norms and the dominant social imperatives. Concretely, law is 
determined by the dialectic of the formal system of legal norms (which codifies 
prescriptions embodying social needs) and the concrete practice of the law as 
manifested in the behaviour of the citizenry and the organised activities of the 
branches of the state responsible for promulgating and enforcing laws. That is the 
reason why as early as in 1987 Frank Benseier (Paderborn) identified the whole 
undertaking as an autopoietical synthesis, born within legal theorising at a 
pioneering time. 
As to its conclusions, law is expected to mediate in such a way that social 
determinations involved in law should be asserted through the peculiar autonomy 
of the law. For law has its goal beyond itself, embodied in the mediated 
complexes. At the same time it has its own system of fulfilment, that is, it is 
expected to realise social targets, transformed into legal ones, by fulfilling its own 
system of requirements. This equals to saying that in the functioning of law the 
formal rationality, carried by the organising principles of validity and legality, 
has to realise material rationality in a socially concrete way. Due to such a 
contradiction, law only be a manipulated mediation at the most. For neither 
validity, nor legality is a definition prevailing in the field of the total complex. As 
principles of construction and functioning within the legal complex, they are but 
postulates with a restricted sphere of operation only. If the motion of legal 
complex comes into conflict with other complexes, only their interrelationship 
may decide whether the social total motion will go on as influenced by the tenden-
cies of motion of the legal complex temporarily, or the superiority of strenghts 
of those other complexes ends by subduing the legal one. Nevertheless, dramatic 
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moments are not of common occurrence in the life of law. Still, manipulation 
seems to be its everyday form of existence. For as a socially existing 
phenomenon, law itself is process-like; its practice is equal to its continuous 
formation. This unbroken formation manifests itself in actualising those meanings 
of the legal norm that are—within the given process a function of diverse social 
and legal factors concretely given at those time. Since genuine definition of 
meaning in language can be approximate at best, there always remains a certain 
scope for motion. And therein every displacement and shift of emphasis, maybe 
indiscernible in itself, can add up to substantial changes in the long run. 
The reality and the ideology of law co-exist in a contradictory unity. The 
ontological description of legal functioning may cast light on the basis of manipu-
lation at any time: on the social forces channelling legal mediation through the 
total process in a given way, independent of the kind of formal surrounding and 
logical ideal law-application has. This reality conflicts with the lawyers' ideology 
about the autonomy of law and its logical application. The ideology in question 
is based on false consciousness, yet, from an ontological point of view, it has a 
real task; namely, as a kind of professional ideology, it is expected to transmit 
and help implement in practice the rules of game, i.e., the declared principles of 
operation of a given profession. Or, in another formulation, the law's ideology is 
expected to force the lawyer to seek the service of society through the satisfaction 
of the system of fulfilment proper to law, that is, to maintain on-going 
functioning in the name of law as a functioning within the framework of the law. 
Hence it follows that Janus-facedness, i.e., the practice of double talk, is a 
necessary corollary of lawyers' activity. They are to talk of law whilst they are to 
transfigure real social conflicts of interests into conflicts within the law, then to 
refine even these into conflicts of a mere appearance. In other words, they are 
settling real conflicts while they seem but to operate with legal enactments in a 
logical way. 
N. N. 
CSABA V A R G A : Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. [Philosophiae 
Iuris] Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1999, vii + 279 p. 
The author, known for his achievements in legal philosophy and methodology, 
has polished and refined this series of lectures for over two decades. In their 
present form they introduce the reader to reasoning in law by leading him/her 
through the possibilities, boundaries and traps of assuming personal responsibility 
and impersonal pattern adoption that have arisen in the history of human thought 
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and in the various legal cultures. The author seeks to disclose the actual processes 
hidden by the veil of patterns followed in thinking, processes that we encounter 
both in our conceptual-logical quests for certainties and in the undertaking of 
fertilising ambiguity. When trying to identify definitions lurking behind the 
human construct of facts, notions, norms, logic and thinking, or behind the 
practice of giving meanings, he discovers tradition in our presuppositions, and 
our world-view and moral stance in our tacit agreements. Recognising the 
importance of the role communication plays in shaping society, he describes our 
existence and institutions as self-regulating processes. Since law is a wholly 
social venture, we not only take part in its oeuvre with our entire personality, but 
are also collectively responsible for its future. 
In quest for the methodological directions of thinking—through surveying 
legal development (with instances such as classical Greek antiquity, the dikaion-
period, praetorian law, and Justinian's codification in Rome, as well as enligh-
tened absolutism, and the codificational idea of the Code civil), the formation of 
the vision of geometry (with Euclid, the challenge by Bolyai and Lobachevsky, 
as well as Einstein's revolutionary turn), and the basic trends of the development 
of thought itself tending towards either autonomy (as exemplified by the New 
Testament argumentation, Cicero's rhetoric, Augustine, the Talmudic teaching, 
Orthodox Christianity, as well as modern "irrationalism") or heteronomy 
(exemplified by Thomas Aquinas, Grotius and Leibniz)—, fertilising ambiguity 
and axiomatism are defined as ideal patterns corresponding to the former, 
respectively the latter, alternative. In the way in which language is used and 
ordering representations, schemes, as well as sequences of and links to 
conclusion are formed, creative uncertainty, standing for the former alternative, 
is characterised by responsiveness, personal responsibility, flexibility and 
evolutive development, with autopoietical world-view in the background, served 
by a concept of law open to principles but having no gaps, therefore reasoned 
inductively as if patterned by the logic of problem-solving, on the one hand, 
and geometrical thinking, standing for the latter alternative, is characterised by 
predetermination, personal irresponsibility, rigidity and revolutive change, with 
mechanical world-view in the background, served by a concept of law objecti-
vated, although full of gaps, therefore applied deductively as if demonstrated by 
the logic of justification, on the other. Within this duality in the approach to law 
as text, paradigms of thinking—its conventionality and cultural dependence—are 
considered with special emphasis on understanding underlying notions like fact, 
concept, logic, thinking, as well as the existence of a norm. Facing with di-
lemmas of meaning, both theories of meaning (lexicality, contextuality, her-
meneutics, open texture, deconstructionism) and the social construction of 
meaning (by speech-acts and in social institutionalisation) are treated so that 
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autopoiesis lurking behind the scenes and the overall systemic response gained 
eventually through autopoiesis can be outlined. In conclusion, the nature of law 
(taken as a process, constituted multifactorally, and built up from individual 
acts) and of legal thinking are defined. Enclosed in appendix, some of the 
author's earlier papers question whether or not law can at all be conceived as a 
system and as a set of enactments, inquire institutions as systems, and outline the 
notion of legal technique. 
According to the author's conclusion, anything can exclusively be qualified 
as 'legal' or 'non-legal' in one or another recognised sense in which law has 
originated (posited as a rule, taken as an authoritative decision and/or as actually 
practised), and, respectively, it can only be qualified as 'more legal' or 'less 
legal' in any (combination) of the above senses. Being formed in an uninterrupted 
process, neither the totality nor individual phenomena of law can at any time be 
taken as uniform or complete, or unchangeably identical with itself/themselves. In 
other words, law can only be identified through its motions and computable states 
of 'transforming into' or 'withdrawing from' the distinctive domain of the law, and 
in a relative sense at the most, as it is measured to the aforementioned levels of 
qualifying either 'more legal' or 'less legal'. 
Thereby both society at large and its legal professionals, especially judges, 
actually contribute to—by shaping incessantly—what presents itself as ready-to-
take, according to the law's official ideology. For our initiation, play, role-
undertaking and human responsibility lurks behind the law's mask in the backstage. 
Or, this equals to realise that all we have become subjects from mere objects, actors 
from mere addressees. And despite the huge variety of civilisational overcoats, the 
entire culture of law is still exclusively inherent in us who experience it day by day. 
We bear it and shape it. Everything conventional in it is conventionalised by us. It 
has no further existence or effect beyond this. And with its existence inherent in us, 
we cannot convey the responsibility to be bom for it on somebody else either. It is 
ours in its totality so much that it cannot be torn out of our days or acts. It will thus 
turn into what we guard it to become. Therefore, as the author concludes, we must 
take care of it at all times since we are, in many ways, taking care of our own. 
N. N. 
Instructions for Authors 
Acta Juridica Hangarica publishes original research papers, review articles, book reviews and 
announcements in the field of legal sciences. Papers are accepted on the understanding that they 
have not been published or submitted for publication elsewhere and that they are subject to peer 
review. Papers accepted for publication by the editorial board are subject to editorial revision. 
A copy of the Publishing Agreement will be sent to authors of papers accepted for publication. 
Manuscripts will be processed only after receiving the signed copy of the agreement. 
Permissions. It is the responsibility of the author to obtain written permission for quotations, and 
for the reprinting of illustrations or tables. 
Submission of manuscripts 
Acta Juridica Hungarica prefers electronic submission of manuscripts. Manuscripts should be 
sent as attachment by e-mail in word file to lamm@jog.mta.hu or on disc to Prof. Vanda Lamm 
(Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1250 Budapest, Országház 
u. 30. PO Box 25. Hungary) with operating system M S Windows 95/98 or RTF, Word 6.0/97 
or te / file. A printout should also be sent. 
Presentation of manuscripts 
Manuscripts should be written in clear, concise, and grammatically correct English. The printout 
should be typed double-spaced on one side of the paper, with wide margins. The order should 
be as follows: title page, abstract, keywords, text, appendix, acknowledgements, notes, 
references, tables, figure captions. For more information see our homepage: http://www.akkrt.hu 
or contact the editor. 
Title page. The title should be concise and informative. A short running title of no more than 40 
characters should also be supplied. This is followed by the initial(s) of first name(s) and surname 
of the author(s), and the name of the institution the author works at. The mailing address, e-mail 
address and fax number of the corresponding author must also be given in a footnote. 
Abstract should not exceed 200 words. 
Keywords should not exceed 10. 
Text 
Acknowledgement 
Footnotes should only be used if absolutly necessary. 
References in the text should follow the author-date format without comma. Where there are 
more than two authors, the name of the first author should be used, followed by et al. 
Publications by the same author(s) in the same year should be listed as 1999a, 1999b. List the 
references in chronological order in the text and in alphabetical order at the end of the paper. The 
style and punctuation of references should conform to that used in the journal. See the following 
examples: 
• Hall, D.R., Crespi, B.J., Bookstein, R.L. (1998): Fluctuating Asymmetry in the Honey Bee: 




• Ridley, M. (1996): Evolution. 2nd ed., Blackwell, Oxford. 
• Smith, B.G. (1998): Evolution of New Metabolie Functions. In: Nei, M.. Koehn, R.K. (eds): 
Evolution of Genes and Proteins. Sinauer, Sunderland, Mass., pp. 234-455. 
Tables. Each, bearing a title, should be self-explanatory. They should be mentioned in the text, 
numbered consecutively with Arabic numerals and placed on separate sheets at the end of the 
manuscript, following the References. Their approximate position should be indicated on the 
margin of the manuscript. 
Advertisements may be inserted by the rates of the Publisher. 
Reprints. Twenty-five reprints of each paper are supplied free of charge. Additional reprints can 
be ordered on a Reprint Order, which is enclosed in the proofs. 
Budapest, 2001. május 21. 
Lamm Vanda 
Printed in Hungary 








HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Editor-in-Chief Vilmos Peschka 
Akadémiai Kiadó Kluwer Academic Publishers 
Budapest Dordrecht / Boston / London 
I 
H U I S S N 1216-2574 
H U N G A R I A N A C A D E M Y O F S C I E N C E S 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Editor-in-Chief VILMOS PESCHKA 
Board of Editors G É Z A H E R C Z E G H , ISTVÁN KERTÉSZ, 
T I B O R KIRÁLY, F E R E N C MÁDL, ATTILA RÁCZ, 
ANDRÁS SAJÓ, TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
Editor VANDA LAMM 
Acta Juridica Hungar ica presents the achievements of the legal sciences and 
legal scholars in H u n g a r y and details the Hungar ian legislation and legal 
literature. T h e journal accepts articles f rom every field of the legal sciences. 
Recently the editors have encouraged contributions f r o m outside Hungary , 
with the aim of covering the legal sciences in the whole of Central and 
Eastern Europe . 
Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to 
ACTA JURIDICA H U N G A R I C A 
H-1250 Budapest , P. O. Box 25 
Tel.: (36 1) 355 7383, Fax: (36 1) 375 7858 
Distributors 
for Hungary for all other countries 
AKADÉMIAI KIADÓ KLUWER ACADEMIC 
P. O. Box 245 P U B L I S H E R S 
H-1519, Budapest , H u n g a r y P. O. Box 17, 3300 Dordrecht, 
Fax: (36 1) 464 8297 T h e Nether lands 
ht tp : / /www.akkr t .hu Fax: (31) 78 639 2254 
h t tp : / /www.wkap.n l 
Publication programme, 2001: Volume 42 (in 4 issues). 
Subscription price: N L G 542.00 (USD 248.00) per a n n u m including 
postage & handling. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica is abst racted/ indexed in Informat ion Technology 
and the Law, International Political Science Abstracts, Political Science 
and Government Abstracts. 
© Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 2001 
AJur 42 (2001) 3-4 
HUNGARIAN A C A D E M Y O F SCIENCES 
3 0 9 7 8 0 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
HUNGARIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
Vol. 42. Nos 3^1. 2001 
CONTENTS 
STUDIES 











AI.EX ANDER VIDA 
N . N . 
N . N . 
IN MEMÓRIÁM 
LÁSZLÓ BODNÁR 
The Removal of Ethical and Mora l Content f r o m 
Tort Liability 133 
Constitutional Law in Twenty Years from Now 149 
Regulation in Sport as a Borderline Case between 
State and Law Regulation and Self-Regulation 159 
Legal Scholarship at the Threshold of a New Millennium 181 
Legal Cultures in the European Union 203 
The Notion of eEurope within the EU from a Legal 
Perspective. Challenges for the Candidate Countries 
after the Swedish Presidency 219 
Domestic Violence in Hungary, Concerning the 245 
Public Opinion, the Researches and the Data 
Available 
Highlights of the New Telecommunications 
Regulatory Framework in Hungary 255 
Democracy and Human Rights in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: The Peace Treaty of Dayton 261 
LUCAS, A.—LUCAS, H. J.: Tra i té de la propriété 
littéraire et artistique (A Treat ise on Literary and 
Artistic Property) 267 
CSABA VARGA: A jog társadalomelmélete felé 
(Towards a Social Science Theory of Law) 273 
CSABA VARGA: A jog mint folyamat (Law as Process) 275 
IN MEMÓRIÁM KÁROLY N A G Y ( 1 9 3 2 - 2 0 0 1 ) 2 7 9 
M A G Y A R 
M S J Ö I W Á N Y Q S A K A D É M I A 
KÖNYVTARA 

1 2 1 6 - 2 5 7 4 / 2 0 0 1 / USD 5 .00 
© 2001 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapes t 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
42, Nos 3 -4, pp. 133-148 (2001) 
V I L M O S P E S C H K A * 
The Removal of Ethical and Moral Content from Tort 
Liability 
Abstract. The essay deals with the moral and ethical content of the tort liability in connection 
with the treatment of the problem in the w o r k s of professor Ferenc Mádl. First of all. the 
author outlines the legal historical background of the issue. Later, he concerns with the ethical 
bases and justification of the tort liability. In this respect, the au thor attempts to point out that 
the moral element of the tort liability—culpability—is getting pushed to the background and has 
lost much of its importance. Later, he touches upon the a t tempts to preserve those moral 
grounds. Finally, the au thor reveals the tendency that subjective, morally based liability is 
overshadowed by strict liability in respect to the civil law tort liability. 
Keywords: civil law tort liability, liability and ethics, moral and ethical responsibility, strict 
liability 
"Draw b e g i n n i n g and end 
together in the union." 
(J. W. Goethe) 
Legal History: A Bird's Eye View 
Tort liability in civil law is in a crisis. László SólyonTs words' capture the 
essential point aptly: "The modern role of culpability limiting liability finds 
itself more and more at variance with the principles and practice of increasing 
the strictness of liability, while at the same time, in an effort to uphold the 
principle of education, the resulting, almost too demanding requirements have 
to be couched in the rhetoric of subjective responsibility." This makes the 
provision of new theoretical foundations for tort liability, analysing and 
understanding the present crisis of such liability an inevitable task. This task, 
V i l m o s P e s c h k a . M e m b e r o f the H u n g a r i a n A c a d e m y o f S c i e n c e s , B u d a p e s t , H - 1 0 1 4 
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in turn, cannot be tackled to any satisfactory degree unless we cast an at least 
cursory glance at the history of the limitation of tort liability, with special 
regard to the not insignificant role played therein, by the moral category of 
culpability. The confines of the present contribution allow us space sufficient 
only for a mere outline of the major tendencies of legal history, an outline 
which is easy to glean from the detailed and thorough-going monograph written 
by Professor Mádl. : 
The general tendency emerging from the history of the regulation of tort 
liability chimes with the motto of the present paper. "Materials from the most 
ancient sources of Roman legal history", Géza Marton writes,5 "generally 
confirm the view, which is widely known and, indeed, beyond doubt among 
comparatists: that liability began, in Rome as well as with other ancient peoples, 
as objective liability, i.e. as liability for the effect. The tortfeasor is liable on 
the basis of the harmful effect of his act, and to the actual extent of the result 
of his act rather than in terms of his intentions (Erfolghaftung). As early as in 
the course of the evolution of Roman law, this objective understanding of 
liability changes into a conception of subjective liability, i.e. liability under-
stood as culpability. According to Jhering, it is one of the greatest achievements 
of Roman lawyers "to have given the upper hand to the view that liability for 
an act, and thus tort liability, can only be ascertained on the basis of culpability 
rather than merely the resulting damage."4 The appearance and growing pre-
ponderance of the idea of culpability and subjectively grounded responsibility 
in legal regulation is one of the first stages in the important social-historical 
process which we may call as the influence of ethical considerations upon the 
law.5 This consists in the attempt to involve the internal aspects of actions such 
as culpability, intention, negligence, particular motives etc. in the range of legal 
regulation, all of which are undoubtedly moral categories, both historically and 
in character. At the dawn of historical development, when primitive rights focus 
almost exclusively on the external aspects of forms of human conduct, i.e. 
regulation takes the perceivable, external manifestations and consequences as 
its point of reference, there is no indication of any relevance attributed to 
:
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intentions, motives and the culpability, i.e. the internal aspects of acts. "This 
indifference originally sprang from the fact that the existence of people living 
in a social community was a solely communal existence in which conduct 
required by the community counted as the only natural form of conduct."6 The 
individual was immersed in natural communities, he or she was a dependent 
part of a larger whole. This had two consequences, on the one hand, people 
knew each other well so they were mutually aware of each other's motives,7 
and they had an undeveloped, diffuse awareness of themselves as personalities, 
on the other.8 All these social fac ts explain the indifference of early, 
primitive rights to the inner aspects of human conduct. This situation changes 
as a result of a number of economic and intellectual developments including 
the accelerated growth of a culture of individual personality, a concomitant 
of the powerful progress of private property and the exchange of goods, the rise 
of the individual from natural communities, as well as the growing influence 
of intellectual manifestations of economic and social changes such as the 
Byzantine-Christian emphasis on the mental," Hellenisation, the appearance of 
the ideal of humanity, the spread of the Christian conception of man as a being 
endowed with free will.10 In light of these social and ideological factors the 
exclusive attention of the law to the external aspect of human conduct, the 
exclusion of the internal aspect (intention, motive, culpability etc.) f rom legal 
judgement, proved much too rigorous and the process of the ethical influence 
on law, i.e. the intrusion of the internal aspects of conduct into legal regulation 
started. However, the influence of ethical considerations upon the law, i.e. the 
removal of legal indifference to the internal aspects of conduct, commenced 
only when the smooth functioning of law had been disturbed, i.e. when legal 
rules, instead of being flatly asserted in their most direct meaning, began to 
be applied indirectly, i.e. via a preliminary elaboration of illegal forms of 
conduct and processes a historical precondition to which Georg Lukács drew 
attention." 
6
 Eörsi, Gy.: Jog-gazdaság-jogrendszertagozódás (Law, Economy and the Divisions of the 
Legal System). Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1977. 36. 
7
 Lukács: op. cit. 213-214. 
8
 Eörsi: Jog-gazdaság-jogrendszertagozódás, op. cit. 36. 
9
 Marton, G.: Kártérítés. Kértérítési kötelmek jogellenes magatartásból (Compensation. 
Liabilities for Damages Arising From Unlawful Conduct). Általános Nyomda és Grafikai Intézet, 
Budapest, 1942. 49-50. 
10
 Sólyom: op. cit. 69 -70 . 
" Lukács: op. cit. 213. 
1 3 6 VILMOS PESCHKA 
The influence of ethics on the legal regulation of tort liability continued in 
feudal times—as is pointed out by Mádl12- both in the early and the late middle 
ages. In this period of legal history "The majority of rules regulating liability 
for delicts make the finding of liability in principle and consistently conditional 
on the culpable conduct of the doer."13 No change in this situation can be 
recorded in the late 18th and in the 20th centuries when the principle of 
responsibility for civil wrongs as based on culpability reigns triumphant. As 
Mádl shows in detail,14 the systems for the regulation of tort liability evolved 
in late 18th century Prussia and early 19th century France and Austria are based 
on the principle of culpability. Important civil codes of the 20th century—such 
as German BGB, Swiss ZGB and CO as well as the Italian Codice civile—also 
treat culpability as the basis of responsibility for delicts. "The basis, or general 
rule of responsibility in these codes ... is culpability."15 
The trend in legal development which emerged at the end of the 19th century 
brought with it a setback in the progress of culpability-based responsibility, i.e. 
responsibility on a moral basis, and a gradual decline in its influence. The 
contemporary trend in positive legal regulation ushered in objective liability and 
other, more rigorous forms of liability. This should not be taken to mean that 
earlier systems of regulation had rested completely on foundations defined by 
culpability, completely lacking any traces of objective liability. Indeed, 
analysing the Roman lex Aquilia and the regulation of custodia responsibility 
in Roman law Géza Marton showed that objective liability was a concept not 
unknown to classical Roman law.16 The increasingly powerful presence of 
objective liability in legal regulation in the late 19th and the 20th century 
(whose most important stages are the provisions of the Rechtshaftpflichtgesetz 
of 1871 concerning the objective liability of dangerous industrial activities, the 
legal regulation of damages caused by motorcars in 1909, the set of regulations 
defining the liabilities of railway companies which became effective in 187417) 
and the trend toward absolute liability to which Mádl drew attention in 1964,18  
are all signs of a decline and crisis19 of culpability-based responsibility for 
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civil wrongs, i.e. of the retreat of ethical content from tort liability. Rodiere20 
had every reason to write that the instruments derived from the traditional 
concept of liability prove insufficient in face of the requirements of the nuclear 
age. The causal link in the traditional sense as an absolute criterion of 
responsibility becomes doubtful, culpability even more, and vis ttmior seems to 
be a relic of the stone age: individual, only individual responsibility, be it of a 
capitalist enterprise, provides no guarantee for the compensation of the damage 
caused. The decay of culpability-based responsibility, the weakening of ethical 
influence and the retreat of moral content from liability is indicated not only by 
the growing influence of objective liability as evidenced in positive legal 
regulation, but also by the beginning transformation and re-interpretation of 
culpability, an important conceptual element in responsibility or civil wrongs. 
Before I outline this latter development, however, I need to make a brief but 
useful detour. 
An Ethical Intermezzo 
In this passage we need to consider the ethical or moral component of tort 
liability in civil law. The appearance of the subjective element, the triumph of 
culpability in tort liability celebrated by Jhering, aimed at a relaxation of the 
rigour of law. Legal regulation hoped to attain this goal by giving room to the 
subjective aspect, the moral ingredients of action, by re-establishing civil tort 
liability on the subjective foundation of culpability. With this we have arrived 
at the most vulnerable point of responsibility for civil wrongs, at the moral, 
ethical, i.e. subjective basis of responsibility or, more specifically speaking, at 
culpability. Culpability is beyond any doubt a moral category. Legal history 
clearly shows that the idea of culpability comes from morality into the law 
where it becomes the foundation of responsibility for civil wrongs. But let us 
stop for a moment and ask: what does "culpability" mean in the context of civil 
responsibility for civil wrongs? What we have here is a precipitation of an ethic 
of intention and consequence in legal regulation. While formerly legal 
regulation pivoted on the act and its consequence, the causal link between the 
two, now attention is directed at the subjective aspect of action, intention, 
negligence, motives and moral ingredients, at a consideration not only of the act 
and its consequence but also of what the actor's will or intention aimed at. But 
20
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the question is: what does culpability mean in civil law dealing with wrongful 
acts to begin with? That the question is not a simple one is shown by the 
vehemence with which Géza Marton, an eminent expert on civil tort liability, 
objects to the idea that moral categories could have a part to play in civil tort 
liability.21 According to him, moral categories such as culpability, negligence 
etc. have no place in tort liability in civil law; their application in civil legal 
regulation and practice is "an abuse of the notion, which is originally of a moral 
substance, a conceptual forgery resulting in self-delusion." Géza Marton's 
diagnosis is correct: notions such as culpability, mens rea, malice, negligence 
etc. which have come to be incorporated into civil tort liability do not have the 
same content as they have in the moral sphere. Brought into the realm of legal 
regulation with the content they originally had in the moral sphere, these moral 
concepts, principles and categories proved untenable in their new context and 
underwent substantial transformation and transfiguration. Marton states with 
indignation that these moral categories undergo such a radical transformation 
by the time they emerge in their legal form that their use in legal regulation 
amounts to an abuse of moral notions. 
The removal of moral content f rom tort liability in civil law is manifested 
in the above-mentioned increasing preponderance of objective liability, on the 
one hand, and in the transformation of the moral component, i.e. culpability, on 
the other. The subjective component of responsibility, i.e. culpability, undergoes 
such a pervasive transformation in legal regulation that it has hardly any link 
left with what is called culpability in ethics and morality. The transformation we 
are speaking of is best described as an objectivisation of the notion of 
culpability.22 The primary locus of the removal of moral content f rom civil tort 
liability is not the increasing prevalence of objective liability, but the disguised 
transformation of culpability, of the subjective component. Transplanted into 
the realm of civil tort liability, the moral notion of culpability undergoes a 
change, acquiring new content and a new point. The legislator has no choice but 
to tie "culpability" or "no culpability" to abstract and typical objective criteria, 
in the same manner in which the abstract, objective standard of due care 
expressed in the model of the "bonus pater familias", which was faithfully 
adopted by later regulation,23 applied to everybody. 
21
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It is worth pausing for a moment at this point. Marton is right in seeing a 
digression from the moral notion of culpability24 in the emergence of the 
notion of "what can be expected from somebody" in law in the form of general 
expectability (e.g. good family father, merchant) or particular expectability (i.e. 
general in the given context see Hungarian Civil Code Article 339) i.e. the 
determination of the degree of culpability in terms of class, society, certain 
professions, social status etc. rather than of the individual. What happens in 
reality is that moral terms and categories originally adjusted to the needs of 
individual cases are re-formulated in law at the levels of particularity and 
generality, and with this culpability, negligence etc. lose their moral character 
in legal regulation. Moral notions are transformed into ethical ones, and 
paradoxical as this may sound, this entails a removal of moral content from 
responsibility for civil wrongs, a purification of the same. Appearances point 
to the contrary: in order for these moral categories comprising internal aspects 
of human acts to exert their influence in law, i.e. a sphere of activity geared 
primarily to the external features of those acts, they have to be assimilated 
to this external objectivity and thus their other second essential character-
istic—uniqueness, individuality , has to be given up and they have to be made 
to conform to the generality prevalent in law. Thus the legal appreciation of the 
alleged internal aspect of the act in legal regulation involves a transformation 
of the individual import of these inherently internally directed moral categories 
into the particular and the general. 
This transformation, however, is no longer performed in a direct relation-
ship between morality and law. It was Hegel's important insight that the 
mediating sphere of particularity between morality and law is the ethical.25 
This appearance of the ethical in civil tort liability involves not only a removal 
of moral content from responsibility for civil wrongs but also a rather special 
regulation of such responsibility. A closer look at the categories serving as 
expressions of and standards for evaluating the internal aspects of acts in law 
reveals that these categories, i.e. culpability, mens tea, negligence etc. derive 
from ethics and social mores rather than being moral in nature. The individua-
lity and subjectivity of moral categories expressing and regulating the internal 
aspects of acts are transformed in the ethical into particularity, on the one hand, 
and into a definite union between the subjective and the objective, on the other. 
In social mores the act is defined not by the internal components of conduct, 
24
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let alone its aspect which is exclusively internal to the individual person. The 
decisive moment, which produces a paradoxical result in the legal regulation 
of responsibility for civil wrongs, is that the act is defined by the consonance 
between the external and the internal, where the connection between morality 
expressing the internal and the norms of social mores determining the external 
is but a further consequence and expression of that harmony. The role played 
by the norms of social mores and the transposition into the social in the 
individual sphere result in a socialisation and generalisation of exclusively and 
purely moral categories. Thus, here, the locus of the moral standard of culpa-
bility, negligence etc. is not the individual but some sort of social (family, 
class, group) standard guideline (norm). Moral categories are made subordinate 
to the norms of mores (society), they dissolve into the ethical. It is this form 
of moral norms transformed in the ethical and invested with a particular content 
that intrude into legal regulation, e.g. responsibility for civil wrongs in civil 
law, driving out the subjective, moral component. Consequently, the legal 
categories expressing and evaluating the internal components of acts (culpa-
bility, negligence etc.) are no longer simply the same corresponding moral 
categories. Géza Marton is right in asking "What element of culpability is there 
in somebody's personality deviating from the norm? Is there a point in, can 
there be any justification for, shifting the meaning of a concept, for the 
purposes of a narrow profession, until it has nothing in common with the 
original? After all, the concept of culpability is an ethical, not a legal concept, 
which has only an auxiliary part to play in legal scholarship.26 An attitude of 
Kierkegaardian scepticism is most appropriate here: are we enriching or 
dethroning the concept of responsibility or civil wrongs and its subjective basis 
in extending it and stretching it to such extremes?27 The transformation of 
moral categories into a standard of some sort even if, not always legitimately, 
it is considered ethical in responsibility for civil wrongs means that beside the 
fact of harm caused, which is prohibited by law, the judge has to take into 
consideration another norm in his judgement on responsibility for wrong done, 
but this other consideration is not the wrongdoer's subjectivity, culpability, 
intention or negligence. Let us think of the standard of the bonus pater familias, 
the carefulness of the good merchant etc. or of "general expectability in the 
given situation" indicated in Article 339 of the Hungarian Civil Code. Géza 
Marton hits the tail on the head when he writes that "The culpability which the 
judge will thus pronounce will have very little in common with genuine moral 
26
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culpability."28 For whether the alleged subjective basis of civil responsibility 
is the generality of the bonus pater familias or the particularity of general 
expectability, it will by no means be the subjective, moral culpability of the 
wrongdoer, the individual as against what can be expected of him. What we 
have is a judgement of the conduct causing damage on the basis of a social and 
ethical norm which is rather loosely and widely formulated and elevated into 
the sphere of legal regulation. Marton's unfavourable verdict on this system 
and theory of legal regulation captures the absurdity of the attempt flippantly: 
"The standard of the bonus pater familias and this can be said about all other 
alleged subjective standards , which is erroneous in its internal concept, is just 
as wavering and leading to inconsistency in its practical application. It lacks 
what is an ineluctable ingredient of a standard: being constant, unchangeable 
and easily perceptible. You cannot use a rubber tape for measuring."24 
A Rear-Guard Fight 
It must not be left unnoticed that there have been important attempts to uphold 
culpability, the subjective basis of responsibility for civil wrongs. The scholarly 
literature on the subject is enormous, and the confines of the present essay 
cannot be extended as far as to give space to their recapitulation. This is, 
indeed, unnecessary, since we have a profound analysis of the subject from 
Géza Marton,30 yet Gyula Eörsi's argument in defence of the subjective basis 
of the theory of responsibility enunciated in the Hungarian Civil Code deserves 
to be analysed. Eörsi writes that "Subjective and objective responsibility are no 
opposites, "objective" is the terminus of a continuum of responsibility".31 
The contrast between subjective and objective civil responsibility dissolves 
in the determination of the extent of responsibility, of culpability: "The 
threshold of liability, in principle, lies where it begins that what is objectively 
unavoidable."32 Thus the final terminus and measure of civil liability is 
objective avoidability, more specifically the fact that it is objectively possible 
28
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to avoid causing damage, or in other words, the tortfeasor had a pair of 
alternatives from which he could have chosen the line of conduct which does 
not lead to the causing of harm. To sum up, the final terminus of civil liability 
is the existence of a choice between alternatives. If the causing of harm was 
objectively unavoidable, i.e. the wrongdoer had no alternative, one cannot 
meaningfully speak of civil liability. 
It cannot be disputed that civil liability and responsibility in general can 
only be understood against a background of social ontology, more specifically 
the condition that the individual actor always acts within and chooses between 
a range of alternatives defined by social existence, since conditions set by 
society never determine the person's will and activity completely. "The 
particular person may make a bad decision and may ruin himself as a result of 
it. Thus the determination which springs from social existence is always 'only' 
the determination of some alternative decision, the scope of his various 
opportunities, a mode of influencing, something that never occurs in nature."33 
Clearly, if a person, determined by the network of social conditions, could act 
only as he in fact acted, there can be no talk of responsibility, even 
responsibility under civil law, of blaming him for the act. The possibility of 
choice, the pattern of choosing between alternatives is a precondition of res-
ponsibility in general and responsibility in civil law matters in particular, a 
precondition which is provided by the ontology of social existence. 
With this Gyula Eörsi seems to get to the antithesis of his original thesis, 
i.e. the two kinds of responsibility founded on a subjective basis, since one of 
its ultimate poles, or its terminus in principle, is the objectively unavoidable, 
i.e. not innocence. Of course, he is perfectly aware of this fact, and that is 
exactly why he writes, while trying to keep objective liability within the realm 
of responsibility based on a subjective foundation, that "culpability makes no 
sense without personal and internal aspects", and "nor does liability without 
internal aspects".34 He therefore makes an attempt to keep within the range 
of subjectively based responsibility the various forms of objective liability such 
as activities involving enhanced degrees of risk, tort liability caused by ultra 
hazardous activities, and to place them on subjective foundations, in other 
words, to save the subjective foundations of civil responsibility in this area. For 
unless these norms and forms of liability can be regarded as one end of the 
scale of subjectively based concepts of responsibility, unless as he says—the 
33
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subjective aspect can be understood as a necessary component of liability, there 
will be no justification for placing the objective forms of liability, and the 
complex institution of liability in general, within the institution of responsibility 
for civil wrongs: their placement will be conceptually equivocal and both 
theoretically and practically untenable. 
Seeing this danger, Eörsi tries to save the subjective basis of responsibility 
for an account of so-called objective liability and develops a remarkable and 
inventive theory. The conceptual move underlying his account boils down to 
the claim that the subjective basis of responsibility is to be seen not only in the 
subjective aspects which lead to the external act, the internal aspect (e.g. 
culpability, intention etc.) which contributes to the judgement on the act, but 
also in the change effected in the tortfeasor's mind by the application of 
objective civil liability, i.e. in the subjective aspect involved in causing damage 
and its legal regulation which Eörsi ingeniously adapting an aesthetic category 
borrowed from Georg Lukács calls (for the sake of argument) "the- state-after-
the-effect"35 of the legal regulation of civil liability. The "state-after-the-
effect"—according to Lukács36- is "the additional content by which a person 
returning from the world of the work of art into the world of ordinary, 
everyday concerns is enriched". Adapted to the concept of civil liability this 
reads as "the additional content by which the person held for damages or 
informed of a judgement to that effect, is enriched in his ordinary, everyday 
world."37 This additional content is a transformation of the mind (education) 
which will prevent the person from performing acts which lead to civil liability. 
Thus civil liability is seen to retain the subjective character of responsibility. 
The difference is that while this was previously located in the subjective 
aspects (culpability etc.) which lead to the performance of the wrongful act, 
now, replacing retrospection by a future-oriented approach, the subjective 
nature of civil liability is seen as founded upon those subjective processes and 
elements which enter the scene after judgement is passed, after the actor is 
found liable under civil law, appearing as the "state-after-the-effect" of civil 
law liability: holding someone liable for damages under civil law effects a 
transformation of the actor's mind which will prevent him from committing 
similar acts in the future. Thus civil liability has a place only where there is a 
chance for the educational-preventive effect to set in, in other words, where 
" Ibid. 
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civil law qualifies the act as something that can be laid to someone's account, 
i.e. "optimistically qualifies it as unfavourable",38 imposing some disadvantage 
on the doer in the hope that his mind will take a favourable turn in consequence. 
Accordingly, civil tort liability emerges as subjective because it has the 
potential for fulfilling an educational-preventive function. Thus the subjective 
basis of civil liability is no longer seen in culpability or in morality, nor even 
in ethics (if that is what we have in the case of a social standard such as the 
bonus pater familias, general expectability in the given situation etc.): it is 
supposed to lie in blameworthiness, which is basically a moral category, but 
that is not what is meant in this context. Blameworthiness does not rest on 
subjective processes and aspects of the act prior to, and leading up to, the act: 
it is based on processes and aspects which may materialise after the act, which 
are optimistically judged as bringing about a transformation of the mind which 
is subservient to the prevention of similar acts. Thus objective liability falls 
within the range of subjectively based responsibility for civil wrongs because 
it builds on blamewirthiness, the "optimistically unfavourable" assessment of 
the act, on the preventive educational function. That is, we no longer have a 
case of the removal of moral or ethical content from responsibility for civil 
wrong. This argument tries to save the subjective basis of civil liability by 
founding its subjective character on the subjective processes and aspects which 
emerge after the act under consideration rather than on those before the act, its 
consequents rather than its antecedents, on its future rather than its past. 
Propounded by Gyula Eörsi, these arguments once inspired me to write an 
essay in which I tried to preserve and uphold the subjective basis of 
responsibility for civil wrongs.34 The gist of those arguments and efforts boils 
down to the claim that the locus of the subjective basis of responsibility in civil 
law is the ethical rather than morality, and that forms of liability which are not 
influenced by this impact of ethics on the law, with both ethical and moral 
contents removed from them (e.g. objective liability), i.e. liability no longer 
resting on the subjective basis of culpability, are to be banished from the 
system of civil liability, all of which was supported by reference to the need for 
the range of present-day objective liability to be located in an area of the legal 
system outside the institution of responsibility. Gyula Eörsi had every reason 
to be amazed at this argument,40 since such a philosophical account of civil 
38
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liability was based on the error (inspired by the inebriation with the concept of 
responsibility for civil wrong based on culpability, which was enthusiastically 
upheld for several centuries) that responsibility makes sense only when the 
actor is negligent or culpable, i.e. is internally in the wrong. Fortunately, my 
argument succeeded not only in amazing Eörsi but also in provoking him to 
further thought, as a result of which he substantially modified his previous 
defence of the subjective basis of responsibility and placed risk allocation? In 
the centre of his conception of civil responsibility. "The antagonism between 
'sub' and 'ob' vanishes and is replaced by degrees or nodules of risk allocation 
along a continuum, tolerantly dragging with it traditional, established, in-
adequate terms."41 What is more, subjective responsibility is no longer moral, 
or ethical: it is a technical term with an etiolated content. In speaking of res-
ponsibility for civil wrong, Eörsi writes, "by virtue of its practical orientation, 
law employs the terms 'culpability' and 'negligence', knowing that they often 
mean something different from their ordinary or philosophical meaning."42 
Legal Liability 
With responsibility for civil wrongs having lost its moral and ethical contents, 
the question arises as to what is left for civil liability to be based on? The 
internal mental world of the subject, culpability and negligence and other 
subjective motives become increasingly faint and irrelevant to legal regulation. 
The error I committed in my earlier paper was due to my failure to distinguish 
between legal liability and ethical responsibility, and to my restricting the 
understanding of liability (while not disregarding existing civil regulation, see 
Hungarian Civil Code Article 339) to what I saw as ineluctable components of 
responsibility for wrong, to the wrongdoer's fault or culpability . This internal 
component, this subjectivity, whether of a moral or ethical nature, is 
undoubtedly a result of ethical influence on the law. However, law is primarily 
directed toward practical purposes, and developments in the economy, in 
traffic, motor transport and engineering had exploded such a concept of civil 
responsibility as based on a subjective understanding. The question arises: if 
felelősségi jogi száma kapcsán (Reflections in Amazement at the Special Issue of Jogtudományi 
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ihe subjective basis of responsibility for civil wrong has evaporated and 
discarded, what is civil tort liability based on? My earlier argument was clearly 
aimed at philosophically explaining and thereby theoretically upholding these 
subjective foundations of civil responsibility. It is equally clear today that this 
attempt was both historically and theoretically mistaken. The theoretical 
mistake consisted in restricting responsibility, and thus legal liability to notions 
based on moral or ethical foundations, failing to distinguish between various 
forms of responsibility, despite earlier attempts by Géza Marton to ground 
those distinctions.43 Equally mistaken was the civil law regulation effective 
at the time which relied, and still relies, on a putative subjective basis available 
for finding responsibility for wrong in civil law cases. The jurisprudential error 
consisted primarily in supposing that civil responsibility stands if it is grounded 
in moral or ethical considerations, i.e. of culpability, otherwise it falls. This 
claim seems to be substantiated by the influence of ethics on law, which can 
be verified from legal history. Yet, it can be shown that responsibility is viable 
not only on a moral or ethical basis. 
Considerations of social ontology—to which I referred earlier indicate that 
responsibility, and thus civil liability, is grounded in an aspect of social 
ontology which can be described as choice between alternatives. The subject's 
fault can be seen in having chosen the wrong alternative. Whether he did it 
intentionally, negligently, culpably etc. is immaterial to his liability as long as 
he was in the position to choose, if he could have acted otherwise. To find 
someone liable for damages under civil law, the ultimate starting point to which 
recourse must be taken is the fact of damage done. The ground of liability, 
however, is the breach of the legal norm which prohibits persons from causing 
damage, thus illegality. The problem of responsibility is thus transposed to a 
different level of consideration: the question is no longer whether the causing 
of damage can be seen as blameable or culpable; it is whether the subject-at-
law has breached the rule which prohibits him from causing damage, whether 
he had the possibility of avoiding causing damage, of choosing a lawful line 
of conduct, i.e. of not causing damage. In so far as there was a possibility of 
choosing between the alternatives of lawful and unlawful conduct, the subject-
at-law is liable for his unlawful act. In this perspective, undoubtedly, the 
problem of responsibility for civil wrong becomes directly focused on unlaw-
fulness and causality, consequently on reparation, and the idea of preventing 
unlawful conduct enters only as an indirect consideration. At the same time, the 
need for a proof of innocence, the difficulty and delicacy of Beweisnotstand 
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analysed so meticulously by Géza Marton44 disappears. It would be a misunder-
standing to think that this amounts to absolute liability. The breech of the legal 
norm which prohibits subjects from causing damage results in tort liability only 
if the alternative of abstaining from causing damage was open to the tortfeasor. 
As long as such a pair of alternatives is not available, i.e. the actor is not in the 
position to choose between a lawful and an unlawful line of conduct, he cannot 
be held liable for damages under civil law. This is recorded and safeguarded 
by the rules which set out conditions of necessity, circumstances beyond 
control, vis maior, lawful defense, contributory conduct of the aggrieved party 
etc. These rules translate the general prohibition against causing damage into 
particular and typical terms. 
Thus we arrive at a problem of legislation which cannot be left unanalysed 
since it sheds light on the self-contradiction involved in culpability-based 
responsibility. The attempt to regulate responsibility for civil wrong via the 
concept of culpability, i.e., in fact, via a social standard (bonus pater familias, 
expectability in the given situation etc.) actually presupposes and applies two 
norms for the purpose of defining and finding responsibility for wrong. One is 
the general prohibition against, and the unlawfulness of, causing damage, the 
other is the general expectability of a certain kind of conduct in the given 
situation. If it is agreed that the content of a legal norm optimally concentrates 
on the particular and typical, then we may legitimately suppose that the 
legislator introduces a general prohibition against causing damage because 
subjects can be generally expected to conduct themselves in specific social 
situations in such a manner as to avoid causing damage, to abstain from acts 
which will cause damage. The general prohibition against causing damage, 
while importantly qualified by the circumstances exempting the actor f rom 
tortious liability, lives up to the requirements on the particular content of legal 
norms. It is therefore pleonastic and superfluous to repeat this norm, i.e. a norm 
with a particularised content, in another norm, i.e. the rule of general 
expectability. Eörsi draws attention to the fact that in as many as 90% of cases 
of objective liability it can be shown that the wrongdoer is culpable, i.e. can be 
seen to have deviated from what can be generally expected in a situation of the 
kind in question.45 However, if causing damage is prohibited because the 
subject can be generally expected under consideration of the exempting 
circumstances- to avoid causing damage, then it is completely pointless to 
appraise and judge the tortious conduct a second time, by the norm or standard 
44
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of general expectability in the situation given. This only provides scope for 
the legislator to set the standard of expectability in a given situation. Let me 
quote Marton's words again: "You cannot use a rubber tape for measuring."46 
I must honour Eörsi's ironic request47 and state, on the basis of the foregoing 
considerations and arguments pointing toward the retreat of moral and ethical 
content from responsibility for civil wrong based on a subjective foundation 
has no justified place in the system of civil tort liability. 
Beginning and End 
On the basis of the history of civil tort liability and the theoretical conclusions 
which can be drawn from it, we can state that the beginning and the present, 
post-modern end of tort liability have met again to form an union, albeit this 
union does not lie at the same level and is not to be understood in the same 
sense as before. Of course, history has not ended, so the history of civil tort 
liability is not over, either. Whether in the sense of Hegel's "triadic" schema, 
or in the sense of Nietzsche's "eternal return of the same", everything is 
starting anew, and, even if certain tendencies can be guessed, the future 
remains beyond human foresight and calculation. Horace's admonition "Quid 
sit futurum eras, fuge quarere..." applies to the future course of the 
development of civil tort liability, as well. 
46
 Marton: op. cit. 66. 
47
 Eörsi: Elmélkedések és álmélkodások. op. cit. 838. 
1216-2574 /2001 / USD 5.00 
© 2001 Akadémiai Kiadó. Budapest 
A C T A JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
42, Nos 3-4, pp. 149-157(2001) 
A N D R Á S S A J Ó 
Constitutional Law in Twenty Years from Now ** 
Abstract. The principles of constitutional law as those of many other disciplines seem to 
develop and to be replaced by new paradigms in the light of globalization. The present 
article using the genre of constitutional futurology attempts to determine whether this change 
is real or an illusory impression, and to predict the future of constitutional law and of 
scholarship reflecting on constitutional issues. A mighty forecast emerges from the interplay 
of opposing forces. While the withering away of the constitutionalist paradigm is 
unlikely partly because of the lack of a new generation of legal scholars following new 
patterns of thinking, partly because there is no reason to assume that the prevalent socio-
economic order would cease to exist . the essay maps a number of possible challenges like 
genetic engineering or personal computers interconnected in the World Wide Web- , which 
constitutionalists shall expect to face in theory and in practice alike. 
Keywords: Constitutional Law 
Following the professional attitude of market forecasters, I would like to offer 
two perspectives on the constitutional law of the next two decades. 
The first perspective is based on the immortal French commonplace: "Plus ça 
change.. .". The more it changes, the more it is the same thing. This might be 
true in the case of constitutional law, too. What creates, than, the impression 
that constitutional law is changing? The legal profession requires original 
publications. The easiest claim to originality is in writings about novelty. 
Academics have to write many articles. So we have constant reports of 
development. But is constitutional law changing? As far as constitutionalism, 
the essence of modern constitutional law is concerned, namely constitutiona-
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lism, there were not it was not subject to too many intellectual developments 
in the past 250 years. Constitutionalism is a long-term paradigm. Even consti-
tutional review which is perhaps the single most efficient characteristic and 
influential development of constitutional law in the past eighty or so years or 
so was already perceived as an intellectual need by the Abbe de Sieyès and 
others in during the French Revolution. The constitutionalist paradigm survived 
some of the most important challenges one could imagine, namely among them 
the crisis of parliamentarism, attempts of corporativism and various forms 
instances of totalitarianism. It constitutionalism survived even its apparent 
insignificance. What has been changed genuine developments in constitutional 
law concerned mostly democracy and the underlying concept of equality. The 
result was the extension of the electoral basis. A few constitutions recognize 
the constitutional importance of parties; and many constitutions incorporate 
equality. But many political changes were not, or only very superficially reflected 
in constitutional law, if at all. A few constitutions recognize the constitutional 
importance of parties; and many constitutions incorporate equality. 
The stabil i ty of the cons t i tu t iona l p a r a d i g m creates se l f -conf idence . T h e 
se l f -decept ion is unders tandable : it is very diff icul t to inven t a new Utopia 
about a l iving, though pa ra lyzed , Utopia. 
If one looks into the socio-economic factors influencing constitutional 
arrangements there seems to be no reason to believe that a new paradigm will 
emerge in the next twenty years. One can assume that the current socio-
economic order a global market based on enormous disparities—is good for 
another twenty years. There are no known internal conflicts that would suggest 
a fundamental and successful challenge to the current mode of life. Self-
confidence suggests that constitutionalism will operate under our present-day 
assumptions, and partly due to these conditions. It will operate in those 
countries where it has already good social and cultural chances of existence. 
As there is no reason to assume that the prevalent differences of the world 
will cease to exist in the allegedly global economy, therefore the chances of 
further successes of thick (non-superficial) constitutionalism are poor. Some 
forms of intellectual resistance to constitutionalism are known already. Among 
these challenges "Asian values"-type objections are the most successful 
prevalent today. Other phrases denouncing the imperialism of constitutionalism 
as an "alien or foreign" force will come in due course f rom autocrats to be. 
Because constitutional law is so closely related to the core notion of the 
constitutionalist paradigm, the legal mind cannot expect changes in constitu-
tional law other than incremental and quantitative. At first glance there are no 
sufficient institutional interests, no decisive political actors, no economic forces 
which have sufficient interest stake or enough destabilizing power to make one 
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think that constitutional law will he fundamentally different from what we 
know today. To imagine a different constitutional law fundamentally different 
of what we know today is in a way the denial of lawyer's logic, which is based 
on the cult of the existing status quo. The legal mind might be critical but it is 
hardly imaginative in the sense of daring to go beyond the existing system. 
The legal mind dictates that the change will be quantitative, or secondary 
from the perspective of constitutionalism. The prevailing forms of consti-
tutional reasoning will continue to reign, partly because new Denkforms, topoi, 
new legal arguments have enormous difficulties in a stare decisis oriented, 
consistency based system like lawsystem based on respect for stare decisis and 
a search for consistency, such as law. It is not an by accident that many if not 
most constitutional arguments were known at the time when constitutional 
adjudication begiun; most of our topoi are inherited. The change is produced 
by the abuse of topoi. 
Strong challenges to the state of affairs come at moments of deep social 
crisis: this is what happened at the time of the Great Depression when scientific 
considerations and consequentialism was advocated to the detriment of consti-
tutional legal values. This phenomenon, however, turned out to be short lived, 
or perhaps, simply became a new legitimation for judicial deferentialism in 
matters of state administration. 
A similar inertia is expected in regard to constitutional argumentation. 
Changes of arguments require, as a minimum, a whole generational change. At 
the moment I don't see an emerging new generation of legal scholars, nor 
judges influenced by them, who would follow new patterns of thinking that 
would eventually result in a paradigm change once this generation comes to 
social domination in twenty years. In fact, if one peruses the topics topoi and 
key arguments of twenty some years old legalaw reviews and judicial decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court or the German Constitutional Court these 
articles and decisions would not look antiquated today. 
As to the internal structures of constitutional law, there will be quantitative 
changes without a revolution of quality. The quantitative change herein this 
sense means not only a further increase of in the constitutionalization of 
disputes (not without necessarily entailing more activist courts). The increased 
constitutionalization will be primarily be geographic. As to positive law, I 
assume that constitutional texts continue to change more or less in line with the 
prevailing trend. According to the prevailing trend in twenty years most consti-
tutional texts will be on the average 20 per cent different f rom what they are 
today. Perhaps 50-100 countries will have one or more new constitutions, 
including a fair number of states creating their first constitution ever, for the 
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simple reason that these states did not exist before. (Currently Africa is having 
a constitution-rewriting exercise that might be repeated in the future.) 
There will be probably be slightly more countries with rather deep constitu-
tionalist structures, and there will be many more states with superficially 
constitutionalist arrangements. A somewhat shallow acceptance of certain 
ornamental elements of constitutionalism, however, does not entail respect for 
the anti-authoritarian spirit of constitutionalism. There might be more constitu-
tional democracies in twenty years f rom now but it is not to be taken for 
granted that emerging or even existing democracies will be stable, or that their 
constitutional structures will resist authoritarian and other anti-constitutionalist 
pressures. There is no guarantee that as a result, there will be more people 
living in constitutional regimes than today, even if there might be more states 
adhering to constitutionalism. 
Constitutional law will be more international, or even intellectually more 
global. There will be more countries may be expected to which give up more 
of their national sovereignty. This, however, is not likely to result in funda-
mentally new structures, simply it will bring up give rise to new forms of 
federalism, primarily ethnic federalism. 
In light of long term trends and paradigms there is little constitutional 
futurology has to offer. Today historians are dealing with contemporary history, 
even present history. Here from this perspective even the future looks to be 
past history. It is not accident that no great constitutionalist ulopia (like that of 
Rousseau's about the glass-wall city) was written construed in the last couple 
of centuries. 
I am not saying that constitutional law has not changed in the past scores, 
or that (or because of that) it will not change in the future. After all, one would 
have difficulties in any country of the world to pass a constitutional law exam 
using a ten-year-old textbook. People and scholars rightly feel that there are 
new problems and new solutions. Most of those solutions, however, use 
existing intellectual and constitutional techniques, represent returns to long 
existing or may be forgotten paths, or copy with enormous impacts in a given 
society what is long established and or passe elsewhere. 
It is time to turn to the counter-forecast. To indicate the level of change: 
So, as it is always the case in social meteorology, there is area different 
readings of the data. After all, according to Thomas Jefferson every new 
generation should have a new be able to create its own constitution. From the 
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perspective of nations and states, there is certainly a lot of change is to be 
expected if one assumes that generational changes will bring constitutional 
changes. The last score has seen the disappearance of many pseudo constitu-
tions, allowing for the development of constitutional structures in East Central 
Europe. Such changes were unforeseeable. One cannot rule out similar un-
foreseen events, even if the new constitutional regimes did not result in new 
forms of constitutional law. The social situations and challenges were 
unique the constitutional answers did not show much originality. Nor did the 
actors wish to attempt originality. The process was one of both democratization 
and nation-state building. (Unfortunately, modern nationalism, by its nature, does 
not favor liberal constitutionalism.) It is likely that some African countries may 
move in the same direction, although the stability of these emerging regimes will 
remain questionable. 
One can foresee new developments in constitutionally motivated equality. 
After all, this is the more apparent trend of the last fifty years- namely 
increased formal equality. But it will not result in an equality revolution. It 
will perhaps bring us closer to the gender equality; there might be more 
protection to minority and disadvantaged groups. However, constitutional law 
will not become the tool of redistributive egalitarianism. 
Less authoritarianism (less formalism), more privacy, more consumerism, 
these are the values of the generations to come to power in twenty years. 
Institutional needs and complexities might trigger some other changes. In 
particular, constitutional institutions and actors have their own needs which 
dictate special growth patterns of constitutional law. 
Certain demographic predictions indicate that many societies will face 
poverty, a phenomenon that undermines constitutionalism, or at least results 
in state dependence. Thus, poverty which makes individual autonomy based 
constitutional regimes based on individual autonomy unlikely. The pressure for 
growing immigration to better to do regions will grow. This either results in 
greater heterogeneity of societies, a projected trend which will challenge 
existing concepts of citizenship and entitlements, or it will in increase barriers 
to immigration (free movement of people) which to some extent brings a 
restrictive element into the constitutional regimes. A happy combination is that 
there will be an increase of heterogeneity, which may open the constitutional 
systems to creative multiculturalism. More likely, heterogeneity will increase 
social and possibly legal discrimination. 
The taken for granted national homogeneity of the constitutional self, once 
taken for granted, will become more and more problematic. New constitutional 
differences of identity will beg constitutional accommodation. Religion might 
represent a new tension for the project of modernity as represented in the 
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constitutional state. The revival of religious fundamentalism tends legitimizes 
accommodationist forms of church and state relations. The increasing accom-
modation may increase social and legal fragmentation, undermining the neutral 
state project of state neutrality. Such accommodationism, however, has the 
tendency to impose restrictions on freedoms as we know them in public life 
in the name of religious sensitivities. At the end of this trajectory competing 
intolerances may to some extent replicate (and reinforce) ethnic division. 
In addition to factors of change in the socio-economic system there is a 
crucial ongoing institutional phenomenon which will continue in the future in 
the economically developed countries and perhaps to a lesser extent in other 
countries joining the club of the well to do. This ongoing process is commonly 
described as the privatization of the state. Even if this privatization will go on 
at a much slower pace it will have a continued impact on constitutional 
structures. The privatization phenomenona entails the risk that the public 
domain will shrink, resulting in increased private power and domination. 
Private police and private distributive and security services (from food safety 
to health care) may result in increased social risk, unfairness and inequality. 
The constitutional system runs the risk of becoming insignificant. There are 
well-known answers to this challenge, which in a way predate the increased 
privatization of the state. 
The German doctrine of third party effect and the much more restricted 
"state action" doctrine of the United States indicate that constitutional law 
(and, hence, the concept of the public) intended to penetrate private spheres 
perhaps to guarantee the constitutional promise of equal citizenship. These 
doctrines are of limited power, partly because of the built in respect of for the 
private autonomous spheres, and, partly because of the limited capacity of the 
constitutional legal system and even of the public authorities, which tried to 
implement these public concerns in the non-governmental sphere. Given these 
shortcomings the constitutional actors might not be able to steer the increased 
private domain. It is also possible, of course, that there will be additional 
resources dedicated to supervision with increased bureaucracies which have 
their own constitutional problems. The EU anti-discrimination initiatives in 
regard to the private sphere indicate that there might be a need for additional 
bureaucracies which than again require additional resources to supervise the 
constitutionality of their activities. 
As a reaction to totalitarianism, and partly as a solution to socially divisive 
inequality and discrimination, fundamental rights protection became a major 
enterprise of constitutionalism in the last fifty years. This enterprise relies on 
specialized actors like constitutional courts, supreme courts, special agencies 
of rights protection and special procedural measures, like generous rules of 
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standing. The Supreme Court of India has demonstrated courageous imagi-
nation in that regard. In addition, there is growing internalization in the area 
of human rights turned into fundamental rights (freedoms, liberties). In this 
sense, the internationalization means refers to both source and procedure. To 
the varying extents the national constitutional rights originate in international 
conventions and practices. There is a growing tendency to recognize the juris-
diction of supranational agencies (including courts) in the protection of such 
rights. This trend is likely to continue and grow. It is much less predictable to 
what extent these trends will become universal: how global the universalism 
of human rights will become. On the one hand many great powers (United 
States, China) may continue to resist the formal recognition of the trend in 
practice, although they may play lip service to it. Other countries will insist 
on reservations, which will make the universalism apparent. This trend is 
noticeable in the case of many Islamic countries. Increased social 
heterogeneity will result in growing domestic tensions. It is quite likely that 
a localist criticism of universal human rights will retake some of the advances 
of universal human rights. The emerging rhetoric of globalization as 
imperialism and that of "Asian values" illustrates this trend. 
In those countries where the rights revolution will continue a different 
problem may arise. The mushrooming of fundamental rights will result in 
mutual restriction of rights. Traditional freedom enhancing rights will be 
restricted to favour other interests elevated to rights. The institutional 
equivalent of the rights revolution is the phenomenon called 'government by 
judges'. It seems that the delegitimation of the political branches helps this 
trend to continue, but within twenty years it will reach its limits everywhere. 
Government by judges cannot survive its own success. The success of this 
technique was based on the partisan delegitimation of the political branches, 
but once the courts will take too many costly political decisions they will share 
the fate of the more visibly directly political branches. Moreover, lack of 
accountability and the related erosion of judicial integrity may result in a 
rethinking of the constitutional meaning of the current arrangement of judicial 
independence in the next twenty years. 
All the above socio-economic challenges and needs of adoption, as well as 
the possible changes dictated by internal and institutional forces of consti-
tutional law remain within the confines of the long-term constitutionalist 
paradigm of constitutionalism. There are, however, two major technological 
changes under way which might influence the choices of the generations 
coming to maturity. Genetic engineering and new information technologies are 
the two most often mentioned examples. The first one is challenging bioethics 
as we know and it may result in the constitutionalization of a new bioethics 
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of unknown contents. Human genetic engineering may reshape human relations 
in a fundamental way, which may reformulate basic concepts of human 
dignity. The second major technological change resulting in reshaping social 
interaction is based on synchronic, decentralized electronic communication and 
information. 
Personal computers interconnected in the World Wide Web may create 
radically new forms of social communication including political communi-
cation, bringing in opening a new chance for participatory democracy based on 
daily referenda. This, of course, might completely reshape political repre-
sentation as we know it; and this in fact may result in a radically different 
constitutional arrangement. Traditional forms of representative government 
including parliamentarism as well as elected officials who struggle with 
legitimacy deficit will face a fundamental challenge. In ten years computer 
based referenda on a daily basis will be available to all in most mature 
democracies at no additional cost. Therefore the free mandate of the delegates 
and even the necessity of delegation can be questioned and will become 
problematic. 
I am not advocating teledemocracy or electronic direct democracy. But one 
cannot deny that these new technologies of permanent referendum challenge the 
traditional paradigm of constitutionalism based on the representativeness of 
government. If legislation and even executive decision-making is replaced by 
home computer voting, if the "one day freedom" on election day ridiculed by 
Rousseau becomes obsolete, because elections and elected bodies as decision 
makers are superfluous, constitutionalism will be about agenda setting and 
reasonable limits on the amendability of the outcomes of electronic voting. 
Legislation as we know will become obsolete. 
This is not to say that parliaments and other assemblies will not be able to 
resist the temptation. The technology-based criticism of impotent and corrupt 
government will be there. The technology to replace this kind of decision-
making by direct participation will be there. It is much less clear who are the 
politically interested power groups, which will successfully mobilize people for 
electronic democracy. But after all, who had foreseen that the ruling elites of the 
19th century will move towards to extension of the franchise, a move which 
prima facie seemed to be against their class interests and male chauvinism? 
These changes have nevertheless occurred for specific reasons. Among the 
unintended consequences one finds the creation of the opportunity or need of 
modern parties. 
Electronic democracy, if it occurs, has the potential to restructure the 
organization of political will formation and will maximization. Interest groups 
will be in the position to bypass political parties, and new forms of political 
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dialogue and influencing will emerge. This is, certainly, the greatest challenge 
to constitutional structures as we know them. New constitutional design has to 
provide for arrangements that guarantee stability among the conditions of 
electronic chaos (call it responsivity, if you wish). There will be an increased 
need to provide protection against the tyranny of the majority of the moment, 
or, (actually, the a faction of the minute). 
Is there a conclusion to be drawn for the next twenty years? As good post-
modernists, let us combine the wisdom of the meteorologist with that of the 
market analyst. It will be sunny, but there is a market for umbrellas, raincoats, 
and new constitutional commentaries. 
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are dealt by the study. 
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1. The object of the sport regulations 
According to the commonplace definition, the law regulates social and legal 
relations, estahlishes general rules of behaviour for them and the adherence to 
them is ensured ultimately and potentially, directly or indirectly, through 
coercion of public power by the state. 
The object of those rules that concern sport is the sport itself, the activities of 
sport generally. It seems to be simple at the first sight, and the relevant initial 
questions are: what is sport at all, what qualifies as sport, who is a sportsman? 
It could be an initial point that as the years go by the scope of sport is being 
constantly extended.' Originally, only the competitive sport was called sport 
and those who have participated in the organized games were called sportsmen. 
Actually the public opinion regards only the best ones, the professionals, as 
sportsmen. Why should we call a sportsman as someone who goes to swim or 
run before worktime? This "European aristocratism" was blown away by the 
American free time sport movement. Today the non-organized, non-competitive 
physical exercise and mass sport also qualifies as sport activity. However, free 
Tamás Sárközy, Senior Academic Advisor, Institute for Legal Studies, Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, Budapest. H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30., Hungary. 
' See: Földes, E.: Kun, L. Kutassi, L.: A magyar testnevelés és sport tankönyve. (The text-
book of Hungarian physical education and sport). Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1982, Chapter I. 
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time sport brings several new kinds of sport into the sphere of sport: e. g. nature 
walking tours bicycle endurance races and rowing, eventually the speleology 
(cave research) or climbing of hills or rocks qualify also, which can be hardly 
placed among the traditional branches of sport. On the other hand, we can see 
the more and more fashionable so-called recreation, which is placed some-
where between sport and health care. At one time, the term of sport was 
connected to the requirement of performance, which is actually absent in 
recreational sport.2 
The term of sport can be extended by the various sports of social strata. 
Among them, student sport is the oldest, but for instance, the sport of children 
or seniors also shaped particular ways of sport, or went along with the 
adaptation of the rules of traditional sport branches to the given stratus. A 
special kind of sport is the sport of the disabled, of which a certain part is 
professional (e.g. the so-called Paraolympics, the World Games of Deaf and 
the Games of Organ Transplant Recipients), the rest of it is mass sport or 
recreational sport. The sport of the disabled also brought about several special 
sports, e.g. the racing of wheel-chairs is a kind of athletic competition, etc. 
Originally, sport meant amateur sport, whereby people carried out various 
sports for fun, they were regarded as improductive activity, although there 
were also professional box fighters in ancient Rome. Originally, the Olympic 
Games started as the world festival of amateur sport and perhaps we can 
recall that in the 1950s and 1960s the American millionaire Avery Brundage, 
the President of the International Olympic Committee, deprived some sports-
men and took away their medals for minuscule amounts of expenses paid to 
them. According to his measurement, in the Sydney Olympic Games there 
were no amateurs at all. However, the second half of the twentieth century 
brought along a spectacular advance of professional sport in the Olympic 
Games, the very well paid star basketball players of NBA and the super stars 
of the NHL ice hockey also appear. In other words, the sport that is performed 
for money based on a job contract or enterprenurial contract is also a sport, the 
regular income for sport activity today does not cause any kind of discrimi-
nation. In the team sports today mostly a mixed (amateur and professional) 
competition system exists, and the professionalism more and more spread to 
the individual sports too. 20 -30 years ago we would not have called golf 
aerobics or fitness, as sport however today nobody would dipute their sport 
characteristics. 
:
 The sport without achievements is termed wittily by the German literature "nichtsportliche 
Sport". See: Knut, D. Heinemann, К.: Die nichtsportlichen Sporte. Schorndorf, 1989. 
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Unquestionably, sports are the technical sports, e.g. car racing or motor 
racing, sail glides, parachuting, motor boat racing, etc. Along side the 
development of technics the types of technical sports increase too, e.g. the jet 
ski or surf world championship. Although the managers of the International 
Olympic Committee constantly preach against a gigantic Olympic games, in the 
last decades the sphere of Olympic sports grew too, including e. g. tennis, 
badminton, beach volley ball, and triatlon. More and more popular are the so-
called extreme sports, which are made to sport through television broadcasting 
and displays e.g. the various roller blade sports, climbing or cliff jumping. 
Furthermore, the notion of sport is largely dependent on the geographic 
location and historical traditions of the given country. Dog sled racing is an 
outstanding sport in Greenland, but it will hardly become popular in Hungary. 
Namely the Japanese and other Far Eastern countries bring more and more 
ancient sports to the world, today not only the judo or the karate is well-known 
but the sumo wresting is getting a foothold too. The English originating soccer 
has its alternative overseas, the American football, the English cricket pairs with 
the American baseball. 
For a Spaniard a bull fighter is also a sportsman. Varietas delectat. 
In such circumstances, the definition of sport becomes more dubious. 
Professional boxing is a sport, but why not the free style wrestling? Ice dancing 
is a sport, but why not dancing? Allegedly artist productions or jongleur shows 
are arts and not sports. The public opinion does not regard hunting or fishing 
competition as sports. Prize jumping or harness racing are sports, but horse 
races are not sports. Why not? Maybe due to the fact of bets? However, in the 
framework of betting agencies one can bet on the results of various sports (e.g. 
football championship matches). It can be seen that the diferentiation is rather 
arbitrary indeed. 
According to the § 2. of the European Sport Charter "the sport is every kind 
of such physical activity, which occasionally or in organized form serves the 
advancement of physical and spiritual strenght, development of social relations 
or achieve results at various levels of races." It is obvious that this definition 
includes both the recreational and the competitive sports, it is neutral in the 
question of amateurism and professionalism it integrates the sport with the 
body culture, partly with the health care and healthy way of life. Meanwhile 
this definition includes only the physical sports, it excludes from this sphere 
the intellectual sports, which e.g. went along with the Olympic movements in 
ancient Greece. Of course, the sphere of intellectual sports is also debated as 
only chess is an unequivocally accepted "olympic sport" but if bridge is a 
sport, why not other kinds of card playing, which also involve races as bridge 
does? 
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Followingly it is hardly a task for the law to decide in an arbitrary way what 
is a sport by the strength of a law regulation. (Therefore the regulations of sport 
law with respect to their subject strive to differentiate more and more, use 
general clauses, establish framework rules.) In certain countries the rules of 
sport law do not even define what is a sport, it a "degrades" the question to a 
problem of applier of law.3 
According to the Act LXIV of 1996 in Hungary (§ 1/1): "The sport activity 
is a physical exercise ruled by established rules as recreation or competition, or 
furthermore intellectual activity, which is a part of universal culture and 
includes both the advancement of recreational sport and the competitive sport." 
According to the recently valid Hungarian sport law, Act CXLV § 88. the 
notion is shorter than that in the Act of 1996, although similar in its content: 
"(23.) Sport activity is physical exercise or intellectual activity along certain 
rules which happens in recreation or profession, which serves the advancement 
and maintenance of physical or intellectual condition." 
The specialty of the two valid Hungarian legal regulations: 
a) Contrary to the European Sport Charter, it unambiguosly includes the 
intellectual sports to the sphere of regulation without putting limits to 
them. 
b) It includes both the recreational sports and the competitive sports. 
Since 1998, it explicitly refers to the professional sports too. In the 
definition of the valid sport law there are such notions as "amateur 
sportsman" (1.) "team sport" (3.) "disabled" interestingly it does not 
mention any sport (6.) "professional sportsman" (7.) Spoilsman is a 
natural individual, who performs sport activities" (18.) "recreational 
sportsman" (25.) "competitive" sportsman (30.) "alien sportsman with 
foreign citizenship" § 93 (6.) 
c) However, the reference to certain rules, implicitly, but necessarily 
connect the sport activity with those who establish these rules. These 
can be only some kinds of sport associations. (A non-competitive 
recreational sportsman performs sports contrary to the established rules. 
Therefore such recreational activity falls out of the sphere of sports. 
[The literature of international sport law basically connects the sport 
law to the organized spoil (Verband-sport)].4 
3
 Ketteier, G.: Sport als Rechtsbegriff. Sport unci Recht. 1997. 74-75 . 
4
 See: Deutsch, E. (Publisher): Teilnahme am Sport als Rechtsproblem. Recht und Sport 16, 
1993) or Greyson, E.: Sport and the Law. London, 1988. 11-23. 
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There is no such Hungarian law, which would circumscribe the sphere of sport 
activities. The "sport activity" as such can be accepted by any association 
(social organisation or business company) to its activity sphere in the so-called 
TEÁOR-Index which determines the activities in branches or statistically the 
sport activities are listed only sporadically as examples, such as soccer. It is 
another question that from January 1, 2001, a sport association can be registered 
as only such provided tat if fulfills to the listed criteria in § 20. of the Act on 
sports (among these criteria, reference could not be found along with any other 
substantial criteria which refer to any branch of sports), respectively according 
to the § 88. of the Act on sports (24.) sport enterprise can be a certain kind of 
association (the substance of sport activity is missing here, too.) Meanwhile 
only competitive sportsmen belong to the sport association, company or 
enterprise. (The professionals in labour relation or as individual enterpreneur, 
amateaurs as association inemebers or "based on sport contract" based on civil 
law, see § 88/1. and 7.) of the Act on sports. 
The constructors of these "certain rules" are basically the sport associations 
(special branches of sports). It is certain that those sport branches which have 
"nation-wide special association", qualify as sport. This sphere according to 
the § 24. of the valid sport law necessarily includes the Olympic sports, chess 
and those branches of sport, whose international association is a member of the 
Association of International Sport Societies (AFGIS). If a sport branch-does not 
possess nation-wide association, does not mean that it cannot have a sport 
association, as it is not adequate to the rules of § 24 of sport law which create 
rules for that sport. According to the Civil Law (Ptk.) or the Act II of 1989 on 
association law such sport associations can operate too, which are not listed 
by the special branch associations according to the § 24. (7—9) of the sport 
law. 
Summarising: on the basis of the Hungarian sport law, it cannot be decided 
in substance from the viewpoint of national legal regulation what qualifies as 
sport activity, e.g. the sport of "street fighters" which have sport association 
or the "strong men competition" which is shown by the Eurosport television. 
There are no clear limitations, the modern society is a complex one. On one 
hand, sport grew out of physical education and physical culture, and in that 
sense it is part of education and culture (Notice the desperate struggle of 
those educators, who perform physical culture education against the naming 
by laymen, which was formed historically: namely they are not simply sport 
teachers, but physical educators, trainers too.) On the other hand, sport united 
together with health care, the healthy way of life, and social welfare. In this 
sense, sport is not only an interior affair of the excellent sportsmen, but a part 
of everyday life. Therefore the substantial difficulty from the view of sport 
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law although the openness is a factor which promotes development is the 
impossibility of establishing the contents of sport, namely the sport involves 
state, and public administration regulated by law, in given cases it may 
receive state subsidies, and, if it does not qualify as sport, it cannot receive 
them, etc. 
2. The self-regulation of sport 
According to those individuals, who deal with sport history, sport has 
developed in spontaneous way, actually it grew out of the natural need of the 
human being to move and of its playful nature (homo ludens). Therefore 
turning suddenly to the contemporary times, the constitutional right of the 
human being to perform sports, the state supposeo create to possibility to 
satisfy his needs to move around, can be regarded as human natural law. 
However, following the need for movement of the human being, the following 
consequence arises that 
a) originally it was clearly private activity, in other words a part of the civil 
sphere 
b) it has developed as a part of non-profit sphere, separately from the business 
enterprises (the sport enterprises are the products of the 20th century or 
rather the products of the second half of century). 
Originally, non-competitive sport did not get any regulation on behalf of the 
state and law and, competitive sport was almost exclusively an object of civil 
self-regulation. Namely in the second half of the 19th century, sport organi-
sations (originally sport societies appeared) were aiming to organize the sport 
activities for such individuals, who intended to perform sports (i.e. natural 
persons). Therefore these individuals established them and they became the 
members of their "sport club" at the same time. Historically, a part of the sport 
societies were not even legal entities, actually they operated as civil law 
associations (the German law contrary to the Hungarian law till today does not 
recognize such a society, which is not a legal entity and is not registered by the 
state administration), however, the bigger and stronger clubs required legal 
entity status, a relative detachment from their members. The sport associa-
tions—aimed at the professional organisation of competitions combined their 
efforts, established the sport branch association as assemblies of sport societies 
from the turn of the 20th century. These are generally associations of legal 
entities, sport associations, however they take the form of association, (the sport 
societies became legal entity sport associations). It was easy as originally the 
majority of sport associations were established not as "diversified monster 
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society" of several sport branches, but only one kind of sport was involved, as 
the English rowing or soccer clubs. 
The creation of private law entitity sport clubs and sport associations have 
started the autonomous self-regulation of sport. The sport associations and clubs 
established their characters, i.e. organisational and operational regulations. Only 
such a person could be the member of a sport club or association, who obliged 
himself to adhere to these rules by civil law declaration of intention, one-sided 
legal act. The sport associations created the basic rules—or the occasion of 
championships or cups, the sport associations or eventually the indiviual 
sportsmen had to submit themselves to the rules of competition. The rules of 
competition later involved administrative operative rules—the order of entry, 
the rule of transfering someone to an other sportsclub, etc. The rules of play are 
good, if they adhere to them the competition courts, and disciplinary regu-
lations appeared, etc. According to the international sport law literature, one of 
the most typical characteristics of sport is the creation of rules, norms, the 
establishment of competition rules in their narrower or wider meaning. The 
rules are "quasi legal norms" and for the participants of a given branch of sport 
these are often more powerful than state norms.5 
Competitors can become, anxious, and would like to travel and compare 
their strength and ability everywhere in the world. Therefore the national sport 
associations combine their efforts further and create an international 
association of sport branches, which are legal entities of the country of their 
establishment (registration) in such way that their members are the national 
sport associations of various countries. This way the rules of competition 
became really international (the English soccer rules are used in the whole 
world as football rules), furthermore the races became international—champion-
ships of continents, world championships. The sport of the 20th century is a 
global, international phenomenon, which was emphasized even more powerfully 
by the international Olympic movement resurrected by Baron Coubertain 
(actually the International Olympic Committee itself is a civil law association 
registered according to the Swiss law). The general assemblies and presidential 
bodies of the international associations accept rules of play and these are 
unambigously supranational self-regulating norms of the given branch of sport. 
On both the national and international level, the sport associations intended to 
be exclusive, using a modern term of competition law they wanted to create a 
monopoly and this intention mostly succeeded as it originally met with the 
interests of sportsmen, sport associations and fans of the sports as well. Actually 
5
 See: Kummer, M.: Spielregel und Rechtsregel. Stämpfli, Bern, 1973. 
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the Olympic Games themselves became a worldwide success as there is only one 
Olympic Committee (instead of three), which arranges summer and winter 
Olympics according to certain rules, namely for its members and not for 
everyone. The popularity of professional boxing is significantly jeopardized by 
the fact that various, feuding and awkwardly organized world organisations 
exist, which dedicate world champions, the rules are different and constantly 
change. Therefore the monopoly of sport associations is supported by the 
interest of sport politics too. 
Therefore the international and national sport branch associations in the 
competitive sports are autonomeus civil organisations. 
a) They possess a monopoly of setting rules of competition, i.e. they can 
decide and actually determine the conditions of operating sport activities. 
b) The member organisations and, through them or occasionally directly, the 
sportsmen submit themselves to these competition rules. However, here an 
indirect compulsion exists, because in case a sportsman does not submit 
himself to the norm of the association, he may perform sport in his free 
time, but cannot participate in the competition system of the sport branch. 
(The same principle applies to the sport associations as well.) 
c) The competition rules cannot be controlled, or supervised by outside state 
organisations either officially or upon request -according to the viewpoint 
of the sport organisations. (This priciple is more and more broken down by 
the European Union, mainly in professional sports.) 
d) The debates concerning the competition rules according to self regulation 
cannot be taken out of the organisation. (This rule is more and more 
debated by the countries). The members, ultimately the sportsmen, submit 
themselves to the decisions of the association, different organs of it 
(transfer or disciplinary committee, presidential body, etc.) or a specially 
organized inner "court of honour". On one hand, this way the sport asso-
ciations evade the supervisory control of the state courts in substantial 
matters of sport. On the other hand, they become legislative and law applier 
organs at the same time, very much against the principles of the rule of 
law. However, the rule of law refers to state and public power, which have 
public law character, whilst the sport associations., and societies are civil 
law entities, which are protected by civil autonomy, the principle of legal 
contracts. It is not accidental that in such countries where there is a 
theoretical chance to present sport associations as legal entities under public 
law, or public bodies (e.g. France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland), none of 
the sport associations ever intended to do this, and all of them wanted to 
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remain mere civil law formations. In such a case, the security of consti-
tutional basic rights is not aimed at the sport associations as they stand 
outside public law obligations. 
The defenders of the self-organisation / civil character function of legislation 
and law application as well as, the monopolistic and hierarchical structure of 
the sport, refer to the special ethical character of sport besides its private 
autonomy.6 They refer for example, to the spirit of fair play, i.e. the victory 
is not important, but the participation, and the sport rivals are sport friends at 
the same time, etc. This ethical standard contradicts only the element of sport 
that the substance of sport is the increase in performance, competition, and 
triumph. They could refer more or less to the power of sport ethics substituting 
norms. During the last third of the 20th century, the fair play principal was 
grossly distorted by the enormous incomes related to professional sports. The 
results of sport and the friendship with other sportsmen, unfortunately 
frequently collide with each other. The competitive struggle of sportsmen and 
the original aim of the international sport that aims at the deepening of the 
friendship among the nations are reconciled with each other less and less 
successfully. 
In the last decades, this closed system of sport self regulation has been 
receiving more and more sharp criticism, there has been more and more 
emphasis on the "democracy deficit" of sport.1 On one hand, the states respect 
the norm-setting monopoly of sport associations, less and less i.e. they create 
norms related to sport. Furthermore, in a given case they intend to supervise 
the self-regulating norms. Not only the state has launched an attack, but this 
monopoly as also been criticized by the business community which term the 
sport associations as organisations that intend to be "quasi cartels", and they 
urge competition authority actions against them.8 This organisation as form is 
also criticized by the so-called activist lawyers as well as, who intend to make 
them responsible as a civil law organisation for constitutional basic rights,9 
which is a terminological nonsense according to the traditional notion of law. 
6
 See: Gerhardt, V.: Die Moral des Sports. Sportwissenschaft Moral. 199]. 127-128. 
7
 See this expression by Pfister, P.: Praxishandbuch Sportrecht. Beck Verlag, München, 
1998. 10. 
8
 See: Fikentscher, A.: Kartellrecht im Sport. Ökonomische und rechtvergleichende 
Betrachtungen. Sport und Recht, 1995. 
9
 Essentially this opinion combines the legal remarks by György Kolláth published in "Sport 
plusz" weekly, criticizing the various decisions of the Hungarian Football Federation. 
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3. The causes of the sport regulation role of the state 
Originally, the liberal state in the name of "laissez fair", fulfilling the function 
of "night watch state", did not intend to intervene in this autonomous sport and 
civil sphere. It influenced sport at the most in the framework of school 
education and the physical education of the pupils. (It is not accidental that the 
first sport regulations were not actually sport laws, but physical education laws 
in Hungary, see the ACT LIII of 1921, which will be mentioned later.) The 
other area is the armed forces some sports were hardly performed within the 
civilian framework, such as a large part of technical sports, (e.g. marksmanship, 
or equine sports), therefore riding and the pentathlon were army officer sports 
until the 1960s. In many cases, the state intended to connect the school physical 
education program with the preparation for compulsory military service - see, 
for example, in Hungary, the ministerial degree connected to the Act on physical 
education (1921) about the compulsory setup of junior corps."1 
In the second half of the 20th century, the more powerful intervention of the 
state to sport was induced by the following factors which strengthened each 
other in the capitalist societies. 
a) This aspect is the first in history, although it lost actually its importance due 
to the collapse of Soviet Union, though there are still some remnants (North 
Korea, Cuba)- the state sport politics of the militarist totalitarian dictator-
ship (See the Berlin Olympics of Hitler in 1936), especially the state 
sponsored sport of the socialist countries. The sport successes of the Soviet 
Union or East Germany (and we may mention the 16 gold medals of the 
Hungarian team in the Olympic Games of 1952 which was the peak achieve-
ment of Hungarian sport in the time of "Comrade" Rákosi) had some foreign 
political importance as they had legitimated power in front of international 
public opinion. In these countries, the sport associations were not civil self-
governments, but units of the army, police or trade unions. Furthermore, 
socialist state enterprises, producing cooperatives or units related to various 
levels of public administration, and councils. (In many socialist countries, 
such as in the Soviet Union, there was generally law concerning assoctiations, 
and even if there was, the sport clubs did not qualify as associations.) The 
sport associations which were maintained mainly for the sake of international 
10
 See: Nemes, A.: A magyar sportjog történeti fejlődése. (The historical development of 
Hungarian sport law). In: A magyar sportjog alapjai. (The bases of the Hungarian sport law), 
HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2000. 20-21. 
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relations, were incorporated in a to the state supervision organ of the sport. 
T h e lead ing off icer of the national Olympic commit tee w a s also a state off ic ia l 
(gene ra l ly the pres ident of the sport o f f i c e or one of h i s deput ies) . 
There was no civil sport life in the classical socialist countries (the 
Hungarian "goulash communism" of the 1960s and 1980s, with a quasi 
market economy and soft dictatorship, was an exemption, which strengthens 
the rule). The mass sport, the sport in the residential areas or enterprises, 
was also organized by the state (see the so-called MHK movement in the 
1950s) and the sport facilities were nationalised. Professional sport was 
officially eliminated, and the prime sportsmen were pseudo-amateurs, who 
received their salary in their non-existent job (see Ferenc Puskás, "the 
flying major"). The Western states considered that, due to the legitimative 
power of sport, they have to compete with the socialist countries—in 1952, 
England and France got one Olympic gold medal together and the public 
opinion blamed the government for it. Therefore the free countries had "to 
invest in sports", and the "public money" character of state subsidies 
involved the requirement of legal regulation, 
b) In the second half of the century, we arrived to the Western European 
welfare state, which takes care of the corporal health of its citizens as well. 
Together with the political and economic human and citizen rights, the so-
called third generation constitutional rights also appear, such as: the right 
to the proper environment, approach to culture or information, and the right 
to a healthy life (of course, mainly in the literature, and not in the legal 
regulations). 
The classical political rights require the active role of state, such as the 
right to protection against the state, and the right to culture and health, 
including the culture of movement and the healthy, dynamic life style, e.g. 
the state should build sport facilities, gymnasiums etc. It should, in other 
words, distribute services (Leistungverwaltung-the famous slogan of 
Forsthoff from the 1930s), and give something to its citizens.11 In the 
welfare states, sport became a mass phenomenon, (an organic part of 
everyday life) as a fulfillment of free time. Protanged lifespans due to better 
medical care and drugs has meant that the sport became a part of the quality 
life, which can be performed in any age category, e.g. those tens of 
11
 See: Burmeister, J.: Sportverbandwesen und Verfassungsrecht. Die Öffentliche 
Verwaltung, 1978,1-10. In the Hungarian literature Nemes, A.: A sportjog alkotmányos alapjai, 
a sporthoz való állampolgári jog. (The constitutional bases of sport law, the right of the citizen 
to sport.) In: A magyar sportjog alapjai, op. cit. The bases of Hungarian sport law. 32-33. 
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thousands who participate in marathon races in the big cities or the fact that 
I could have seen myself in the icehockey world championship inVancouver 
of the "old boys" seven team in the above 80 years category and the oldest 
participant was 87 years old. Sport became a kind of entertainment, due to 
the shortened worktime, a widely popular tool of spending time, (motice the 
mass proliferation of residential sport clubs in Western Europe.)12 If 
recreational sport is on the mass scale, then the state subsidy of sport 
becomes an important factor of domestic politics too. The support of sport 
will be a part of the election program, and the movement of politicians will 
starts towards the management of sport associations, and clubs on the 
national and local level, because this way they can become well-known, and 
popular. 
c) In the second half of the 20th century, a large part of sport became a 
component of business life. 
It involved several factors: The mass sport movement should be 
supplied with sport clothing, sport equipment, sport facilities, etc. The 
sport-induced mass production and sales started, as mass consumption 
took shape. Many sport equipment factories were created. The retail 
and wholesale sport stores constituted a special empire within the 
malls. Besides sport becoming a part of tourism, it becames integral 
part of it (holiday complexes similar to sport clubs). 
Professional sport and the professional championship (competition 
system) becames a basic factor in the life of the most outstanding 
sportsmen. An amateur is unable to achieve the highly expected sport 
results due to the lack of time and support. The professional sports-
man performing on the basis of civil law contracts or as an employee, 
or in any other form basically is an enterpreneur himself, and sport is 
the source of his income. The professional competition system dissociates, 
and breaks up the legal cover of the traditional non-profit society. In such 
countries, which are more bound to legal traditions, the term of business 
association (see the German and Austrian Wirtschaftsverein), is less 
spectacular, (the professional department remains inside the association, 
and it is separated only economically and for bookkepping). However, 
the trend is becoming stronger to establish an economic, business 
association for professional sport (generally a public share company, in 
continental Europe with limited liability), which has either completely 
12
 See: Mathieu, T.: Sport und Freizeit. In: Handbuch der kommunalen Wirtschaft und 
Praxis. Ed.: G. Puttner, II. edition, Berlin, 1983. 82. 
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independent owners or is loosely connected to some sport association 
from the aspect of ownership or goodwill. Professional sport in this 
sense becomes a kind of business venture. 
The establishment, ancl operation of sport facilities, organisation and 
its management becomes a business as well. The construction of a 
stadium is a real estate investment, which has multiple functions with 
restaurants, stores, playgrounds, etc. Sport is a fundamental area of 
advertisement ,the name and logo of famous professional clubs and 
outstanding sportsmen are valuable in terms of goodwill, which can be 
sold as an immaterial product, copyrighted, and licenced. The sponsor-
ship business has emerged as well as a merchandising with its market-
building character, called by Ferenc Dénes as "gadget manage-
ment"—sport garbs, caps, key chains, jugs, etc. branded with a sport 
logo.13 One of the more important sport events becomes a whole day 
excursion for the family with playgrounds and play areas, cinemas, 
meeting famous sportsmen, etc. 
The international competitions such as, the world championships, and 
the continental championships attract multinational enterprises, banks, 
insurance companies, which sponsor sport more and more, and use ads 
in the sport. (The "sport show" character, which will be presented later 
has inceased the interest of the transnational giants towards investments 
in sport). 
d) All of these involve the revolution of the media and informatics. Sport was 
always intertwined with the broadcast of news and mass communication. 
An overwhelming majority of the male population in the developed 
European and American countries "read the newspaper from the last page" 
since the 1930s, i.e. they start at the sports page. The television created 
spectacular show sports, which made sport a part of show business.14 It is 
obvious that only a part of professional sport became show sport (mainly 
team sports such as soccer, ice hockey, basket ball, and some individual 
sports too, e.g. boxing, tennis, athletics.) At these sport branches, one of the 
most valuable parts of the intaglible goods concerning sport events was the 
rights of television presentation and to a less extent radio broadcasting as 
well. Today, for, instance about 75% of the income of the American 
professional basketball (NBA) and the professional ice hockey association 
13
 See: Dénes, F.: Sportvállalkozások. (Sport enterprises) ISM, Budapest, 1998. 5 -7 . 
14
 See: Blödorn, T.: Das magische Dreieck: Sport—Fernsehen Kommerz. Neue Medien-
strukturen — neue Sportberichterstattung? Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden-Hamburg, 1988. 
172 TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
(NHL) comes from television rights. In Rome (1960) the television 
company paid US $ 1 million to the International Olympic Committee for 
the broadcasting rights of the "Olympic package". This right in Atlanta 
(1996) surpassed the US $ 1 billion. In recent times we meet other wonders 
of technological progress: space satellite sport channel, independent sport 
television stations, the connection of sex pay television with the sport 
channel, sport transmitted and the Internet, etc. Sport sponsorship -mainly 
carried out by the banks and multinational giant enterprises increasingly 
presumes the existence of sport broadcasting. 
e) If sport is a part of everyday life of human beings, (an object of mass 
interest and consumption), if it has a significant profit-making ability and 
is part of the media power, then it provokes a great change of interpretation 
of politics in sport. Sport facilities and events can be used for a political 
campaign. Sport is one of the means of lobbying, and both national and 
local politicians intend to be top managers in the sport associations, 
increasing their fame and popularity (see Berlusconi or József Torgyán in 
Hungary, not to mention President Chirac's appearence at the latest soccer 
world championship in Paris). The increasingly excessive political aspect 
of sport disfunctional which has to be reckoned with by both the state and 
sport investors. Essentially the previous five factors cause state intervention 
within sports. During the last third of the 20th century in the capitalist 
societies, the monopolistic legislative and norm application function of 
sport autonomies has finished. Sport is not only the world of private interest 
any more, but it partly gets transferred to the sphere of public interest, (i.e. 
it becomes a public task). 
4. The sport functions, tasks of the state 
Essentially the tasks of the state in the field of sports are the following: 
a) Ensuring the realization of the constitutional basic right of citizens—related 
to physical culture and healthy way of life, depending on the economic 
situation and cultural traditions of the given country (i.e. there is no abstract 
law for every form of sport activity, etc.). 
b) Recreational sport and competition sport, are supported through budgetary 
policy of the state. 
c) Complementing the self-regulation of sport with legal regulations of the 
state and, in this framework, the eliminating of the adverse excesses of the 
modern sport for public interest (vulgarisation, commercialism, too much 
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show business and negative aspects of over-politisation). Neither the 
national, nor the international sport associations, are able to stand up 
against the usage of unhealthy drugs without the help of state legislation 
i.e. dopping or taking effective measures against self-defeating trends of 
sport (e.g. the coercive sport star cult of minors). Today sport clubs and 
organisers of sport events are not able to guarantee the security of the 
larger sport events without the help of the state and organs, cannot step up 
against the sport hooliganism, etc. The relation of sport and environmental 
protection is becoming stranger. Sport does not suppose to destroy the 
environment, but to improve it, and be a part of the rational management 
of environment (e.g. the technical sports, water sports, golf, etc).15 
d) The supplementation of the self-management of sport by state administration, 
namely on national, regional and local (municipal and village) level as 
well. Since the Middle Ages, the management of sport appeared in the 
administration of education, culture or health affairs. However in the 20th 
century the administration of sport became relatively independent the sport 
ministries or offices appeared in the governmental management inde-
pendently or mixed with other state tasks, as organs with nation-wide 
competence. In the territorial self-government system were institutionalized 
also (e.g. in the Hungarian counties), and independent special sport organs 
appeared. 
e) Inter-state and international tasks related to sport . T h e in te rna t iona l s p o r t 
l ife is so c o m p l e x recen t ly that the c iv i l o rgan i sa t ion of sport c a n n o t 
p e r f o r m its t asks . E.g . t o d a y it wou ld be hardly p o s s i b l e to o r g a n i z e 
Olympic g a m e s or wor ld c h a m p i o n s h i p s of a main b r a n c h of sport w i t h o u t 
the guaran tees of the state. T h e so-called spor t d ip lomacy is becaming m o r e 
mixed , as it b e c o m e s a c iv i l i an and state t a sk . 
f) The dissolution of the monopoly of sport self-organisations and the 
limitation of related abuses. Civil self-regulation cannot be unlimited, and 
the self-management of sport also requires democratic legal supervision. If 
a sportsman is tied to a civil law contract, the compulsory prescriptions of 
the Civil Code should be applied to the sport contract. If a sport regulation 
is contrary to a compulsory state law, this regulation is null and void. 
Furthermore, if the inner law body of a sport association decides against it, 
then the court of the state is entitled to supervise and correct it despite the 
contrary decision of the sport body. If a professional boxer is in a labour 
15
 See: Tettinger, P. Kleinschmitter, A.: Aktuelle Probleme im Konfliktfeld von Sport und 
Umweltschutz. Juristenzeitung, 1992. 109. etal. 
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contract, his labour contract may have specialities due to the character of 
sport activity, and such kinds of rules will appear in the interact but the 
basic principles of the Labour Code must prevail in the sport as well as. If 
a sport is an enterprise, the economic law, insolvency law, and competition 
law created by the state applies to it. The theoretical substance of the so-
called Bosman-verdict applies here. If the contract of a scientific researcher 
or a ballet dancer expires with his scientific institute or opera house, he or 
she may go "freely" to another employer and his previous employer cannot 
"claim damages" stressing the fact that they educated him or her. If this is 
so, then it should apply to every employee or enterpreneur, including 
professional soccer players (the rightful interests of smaller clubs educating 
the next generation should be secured bye another way). At the same time, 
it should be strongly emphasized that in the capitalist society the covert 
nationalisation of sport is inadmissible. The role of the state in sport can 
be only a supplementary, supportive and influencing one. Sport should 
remain a part of the civil sphere, where the self-organisation and self-
regulation comes similar to the science, arts and other fields of cultural 
life. The public administration should not suppress the autonomy of sport 
associations, through transforming them into half-state organs by black-
mailing them with the state subsidies, supports. The regulation of sport by 
the state should not be over done thus crippling the self-government of the 
sport (it should remain subsidiary).16 The main affairs should remain in 
the legal contract intention of the sportsmen, sport enterprise owners, and 
members of associations. The legal regulation of state should be supple-
mentary, completing the basic rules and rules of competition created by the 
civil law sport association. The state should recognize the characteristics of 
the given sport activity, e.g. in the case of boxing corporal injury cannot 
be mentioned as main rule, etc. The right behaviour of sportsmen in 
competition as a main rule cannot be illegal. The judicial practice is 
inclined to qualify excessive behaviour which goes beyond the rules of the 
given sport (but come from the specialities of the given sport) as illegal 
(e.g. breaking of a leg due to irregular tackling). At the same time, if an ice 
hockey player caused head injury with his stick lifted-up, the court may 
establish the liability of the player who acted against the rules. The criminal 
16
 Especially Professor Pfister from Bayreuth emphasizes the secondary, supplementary role 
of the state norms of sport beside the sport norms. See: Autonomie des Sports, sporttypisches 
Verhalten und staatliches Recht. In: W. Lorenz Festschriften. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1991. 
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responsibility of the player can be established even more so in case of blow 
to on the head of a referee. The case is similar with respect the settlement 
of sport law debates too. As a main rule, the state should not intervene in 
the inner reconciliation and court of honour activities of sport associations 
and clubs, instead the state should not tolerate the tormenting illegalities, 
and infringement of the basic rights of sportsmen.17 Therefore as a 
reasonable compromise of the self regulation and state legislation the sport 
law arbitrage appears, which is both outer and inner, ensuring the 
prevalence of rule of law principles in sport, and but is also connected to 
the institutional self-regulating system of sports. 
5. The sport law as a mixed special law 
In the development of law in the 20th century, the so-called special law 
categories gained and increasing role as particular kinds of legal impacts of the 
increasingly complex technical development and social relations.The two main 
law branches, public law and private law remain. On one hand, both of them 
we differentiated from within, and inner special law branches take shape. On 
the other hand, the borders of public law and private law are becoming 
increasingly relative (according to Béni Grosschmid they are becoming jagged 
or lacy), the so-called mixed special law branches emerge, and in them public 
and private law elements intermingle (this latter phenomenon was described by 
Gyula Eörsi as complex legal fields overlapping the basic law branches).18 
Obviously sport law is not such a kind of law branch as e.g. the civil law, 
criminal law or the procedural laws. However, as in the second half of the 20th 
century, the states regulate the social and economic affairs related to the sport 
in an ever widening sphere. Sport law is appearing as a secondary law branch, 
namely mixed special law, which is aimed at the satisfaction of practical needs. 
In the English, French and German legal field, handbook-type literature is 
appearing in the form of, special periodicals.19 An increasing number of 
17
 Nikiisch, F.: Inhaltskontrolle von Verbandswesen. Heidelberg, 1982.; Stern, K.: Die 
Grundrechte der Sportler. In: Sport und Recht. Hrsg.: Schroeder, A. F. Kauffmann, H. Tübingen, 
1972. 142-146. 
18
 See: Moór, Gy.: Л jogrendszer tagozódása. (The division of law system), Budapest, 
1930.; Eörsi, Gy.: Összehasonlító polgári jog. (Comparative civil law). Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest, 1981. 
19
 Among the comprehensiver volumes, see Werner. F.: Sport und Recht. Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen, 1968.; Grayson, E.: Sport and the Law. Butterworths, London, 1988.; Sport und 
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universities are presenting sport law for law students and for those who are 
interested in sport management. Essentially, in Hungary, during the mid 1990s, 
sport law broke away from the framework of sport administration and belonged 
to a special part of public administration. Meanwhile the requirement to 
cultivate it was pursued as a relatively independent branch of law, an in-
depedent discipliner0 
Sport law includes the following areas of law: 
a) The constitutional bases of sport law. On one hand, that means the main 
elements of sport legislation, the legal framework of state intervention in 
the sport. On the other hand, the basic constitutional right of the citizens to 
perforin sports and the constitutional duty of the state to establish the 
conditions for practicing this right in reality. Concentrating 011 Hungary, the 
"sport constitutional law" includes the basic themes of our sport law, or the 
basic constitutional right of the citizens in this area. It is worth mentioning 
that e.g. § 58. of the Swiss constitution, § 16. of the Greek constitution, and 
§ 79 of the Portuguese constitution explicitly declare the right to sports as 
citizens' rights. This can be derived f rom the Hungarian constitution only 
indirectly, for the most part e.g. from the right to assemble (§ 63), the right 
of public meeting (§ 62), and most importanitly from the right to corporal 
and mental health declared by § 76/D. A general notion of the constitu-
tional law literature is that in the recently valid Hungarian constitution the 
third generation basic rights are regulated incompletely and if a new 
constitution emerges, this deficiency must be corrected. In such a case, the 
right to sports would appear independently, relatively separated from 
cultural rights and right to health. 
b) The most mature part of the sport law is the law of sport public administration. 
Historically this is the oldest part of it, which has developed gradually 
through several centuries in the border areas of education administration, 
cultural administration and health care administration. This sphere includes 
the special central administrative organ of sport on behalf of the state, and 
Recht, i. /?/.; Wise , A. Mayer, В.: International Sportslaw and Business. Cambridge (USA), 
1977.; Schimke, H.: Sportrecht. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt , 1996.; Fritzweiler, 
J. Pfister, В . - Summerer, T.: Praxishandbuch Sportrecht. Beck, München, 1998. 
20
 See: e.g. the university textbooks published by the University for Physical Education, 
mainly edited by Nentes, A. titled: Sport Administration [the chapters on sport administration 
in the Special Part of Public Law (university textbook ELTE AJK) were mainly written by 
Sándor Berényi], Besides- See: HVG-ORAC Edition titled: Magyar Sportjog Alapjai. (The bases 
of Hungarian sport law), H V G - O R A C , Budapest, 2000. 
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furthermore the rights and duties of the territorial and local self govern-
ments related to the sport. In the modern sport administration, the creation 
of rules is becoming increasingly important, e.g. the prescriptions on the 
construction and security of sport facilities, rules on sport event organi-
sation, the activity of special sport physicians or the rules of dopping 
control, various other rules and special branch requirements. It is worth 
mentioning minor offenses and criminal law regulations on sports related 
to sport hooliganism as well. 
c) The sport-related financial law regulations were originally a part of sport 
administration, which later become relatively independent. This part of law 
essentially contains the regulations on state subsidies, aids, and financial 
support to sports. 
d) The points a)-c) dealt with the so-called public law of sport. Similar to the 
Hungarian Act on sport (1996), the various sport laws traditionally include 
these three areas, especially b)-c). However, if we presume sport to really 
a part of the civil sphere, then the sportsman and sport organisation should 
stand in the centre of sport law, i.e. the civil law of sport (the personal and 
property rights of the sportsman, the civil law relations related to his sport 
activities, the sport clubs and associations as civil law legal entity, and the 
sport enterprise as a commercial venture). Actually the sport law of 2000 
in Hungary as far as I know—is the first in the world among the sport laws 
of other countries that made a benevolent (but technically less successful) 
effort to turn the public law-civil law relation in the field of sport law: the 
rules concerning the legal status of amateur and professional sportsmen. 
The sport clubs and associations precede the tasks of the state in this 
legislative rule. The fact that the civil law of sport was hidden until recent 
times is due to the precious few specialties of civil law relations of sport 
compared to the relations of general civil law. The sport clubs were "plain" 
associations. The sport associations at least in the Western countries were 
"association of clubs", and they did not need alteration and distinction 
compared to the general law of associations. The amateur sportsman if his 
sport activity has reached the level at all, which was regulated as the 
recreational free time sportsman performing sport without any legal 
relations or contracts has performed sports as a member of some sport club, 
on the basis of civil law commission as a enterprise kind of "sport 
contract" connected to some sport club. The liability of the sportsman and 
sport club also could be arranged in the framework of the general damage 
and delictual responsiblity regulations of the Civil Code. Due to the special 
kind of sport activity as "perilous operation", one of the most extensive and 
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oldest field of the civil law of sport is sport insurance, but it also does not 
require special legal rules compared to the general insurance of injuries or 
property insurance. Theoretically the spectator can look at a sport event 
according to the same legal conditions ("fan contract") as the spectator of 
a cinema or theatre show, visitor of a concert hall, etc. 
Meanwhile this situation is slowly changing. The civil law of sport 
in recent times was stirred up by the commercial contracts of sport. 
Essentially, due to the dispositive nature of the contract part of civil law, 
these contracts can be constructed without legal regulations also, but the 
practice is beginning to follow the legal regulations also. E.g. the contracts 
related to the right of the professional to play, the sponsorship or profile 
transfer contracts (merchandising,Vermarktung), special kinds of trademark 
or licence contracts appear through the sale of the goodwill of sport 
associations, and the "name", the "brand" is purchased. In the course of 
achievling of television and radio broadcasting rights, a special kind of 
valuable asset-like right is sold by civil law contract. The immaterial goods 
of sport hide several interesting features, e.g. the contracts on the 
possiblities of playing and the rights to enter the championship transfer, 
etc. The commercialisation the of sport starts to give special features to the 
sport associations too, for example the insolvency possibility of sport clubs 
appeared (at first in Germany). 
e) Related to professional sport, two specially mixed public law and civil law 
fields emerged in the private law of sport. The first is the labour law of 
professional sportsmen which is theoretically based on civil law labour 
contracts possessing several specialties. However, this individual labour law 
is slowly but surely related to collective labour law too: trade union-like 
groupings have appeared, and followingly the need for collective bargaining 
appeared in the professional football championship in Hungary. 
f) The other great problem of professional sport is: to find a place in the 
competition law. We shall see that the European Union deals with 
commercial sport basically as a question of competition law. In Hungary, 
only recently some competition law problems appeared: e.g. can the then-
nationalized television be called to competition by a "counter-cartel" such 
as Hungarian show business assoticiations like "Sport TV Ltd"? Can 
economic companies, which are related to each other, and owners of two 
soccer teams, FTC and MTK, hold the majority share of the limited liability 
companies which manage these teams? These types of affairs sooner or later 
arrive to the Economic Competition Bureau or the courts in Hungary. 
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g) The points a)-c) dealt with the public law of sport, the points d)-f) dealt 
with the private law of sport, but both of them from the aspect of domestic 
national law. Meanwhile the international law of sport is emerging more 
and more. The international character of sport, the creation of norms by the 
international sport association and the conflicts of domestic laws first of all 
create several international private law collision problems.21 
Besides the international public law agreements related to sport are 
multiply in their numbers as well. The sport political activity of the United 
Nations is becaming stronger, and is realized mainly in the framework of 
UNESCO. In 1978, the general conference of UNESCO adapted the Charter 
of Physical Education and Sport. More concrete than the activity of 
UNESCO is the sport political activity of the Council of Europe—in 1975, 
they fomulated the Charter titled "Let everybody do a sport"; in 1988, they 
worked out a convention against dopping; and finally in 1992, they adapted 
the already mentioned European Charter of Sport and the Ethical Code of 
Sport. 
h) Sport law became a part of integral law of the European Union in a very 
interesting way. From the Treaty of Rome sport as a cultural activity was 
excluded from the integral law until 1997. However, if sport is an economic 
and business type activity, then the competition law of the Community or 
the regulations related to the free flow of employees affect sport also. The 
infringement of the Community law means infringement of law in every 
country of the Union. The regulations of the national and international sport 
branch associations cannot contradict the law of the Union. The sport 
associations cannot gather in the form of a cartel, and the principle of free 
competition should prevail in business sport also. If an operahouse cannot 
put limits on the number of foreign singers, the soccer association also 
cannot do the same. Every "citizen of the Union" is entitled freely move, 
stay and take a job in the area of the Union. For example, the European 
Court of Justice in the Dona Mantero v. Italian Football Association or in 
the case of Bosman v. Belgian Football Association declared that the 
regulations and actual decisions of the branch associations were explicitly 
illegal.22 
21
 See: Reuter, D.: Das selbstgeschaffene Recht des internationalen Sports im Konflikt mit 
dem Geltungsanspruch des nationalen Rechts. Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1996, 1-12. 
22
 Hornsey, S.: The Bosman Case. The Future of the European Sports Law. The way 
forward for the Millenium. Brussels, 1999. 
180 TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
We have to emphasize that, until the Amsterdam Conference (1997), the 
Union organs always emphasized that they only dealt with the commercial, 
professional sport and sport enterprises. However, later on the Union declared 
the whole sport a political question as "the sport is an excellent tool to 
strengthen the feelings of Europeans to belong to the European integration". 
However, the economic law of the Union still does not touch the recreational 
and amateur sports, the non-profit sport activities.23 
As far as my opinion is concerned, the sport law in the above mentioned 
content and extent as a mixed special law in Europe has virtually taken shape 
and in 2000 even if not in every aspect and mature way emerged in Hungary 
too. Our sport laws of 1996 and 2000 have played a significant part, regardless 
to the fact that they can be justly criticized due to their several shortcomings. 
Meanwhile we have to emphasize that the existence and extent of the sport law 
(e.g. whether it is an administrative law in the traditional way or not), by itself 
is not a decisive factor in the development of sport law. E.g. in France, Italy 
and Spain there is a sport law, where as England and Germany have no Act on 
sports, but certainly the sport law of the two latter countries is more developed 
than the first two countries.24 Therefore the sport law is not related to the Act 
on sports. Furthermore, in the theoretical legal disciplines—e.g. in Hungary, 
Lajos Szamel in the 1960s a lot of experts disapproved of the existence of such 
"functional legislation", which regulated science, arts or sport, or even the 
youth. Namely such laws can be hardly filled with the right content concretely, 
and from the aspect of legal branches, the regulation of these areas is so 
complex, that the Act disintegrates between the law branches, (it is very hard 
to keep it in a frame). Therefore traditional sport regulations were generally 
administrative laws, invitally physical education, later on staying in the sphere 
of education and in recent times relatively independent. The Act on sport of the 
year 2000 is the first attempt to create a complex Act on sport with law branch 
character and in my opinion it is a progressive novelty deserving appreciation 
from international aspect, regardless of its rather low legal technical level. 
23
 See among the works related to this subject: Europäische Kommission. Der Einfluss der 
Tätigkeit der Europäischen Union auf den Sport. Coopers & Lybrand, Brussels, 1995,; Hohe, 
S . -Tie t je , C.: Europäische Grundrechte auch für Profisportler. Juristische Schulung, 1996. 486. 
24
 The national répons on the sports law of European countries. 
See: Will, M. (Editor): Sportrechte in Europa. Recht und Sport. 11. brochure. 1993. 
1216-2574 /2001 / USD 5.00 
© 2001 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 
42, Nos 3-4, pp. 181 -201 (2001) 
C S A B A V A R G A 
Legal Scholarship at the Threshold 
of a New Millennium 
(For Transition to Rale of Law in the Central and Eastern European Region) 
Abstract: Scholarship has already warned us to soundness in relation to modemisationist legal 
reforms. For it consistently ( 1 ) emphasised the framework-creating nature of the otherwise 
prevailing social normativity. and its primordial role in determining social processes, (2) put 
the possibility and demand of organicity with every step in the limelight, (3) did not consider 
the effectiveness of initiating elitist actions to influence overall social movements plannable 
for the long run and with lasting effects. Therefore, it regarded any regulatory legal inter-
vention as the primarily symbolic confirmation with sanctioning of the direction otherwise 
ongoing movements were taking. (4) warned to the damages caused by any adventurer policy 
in as much as they not only fail, but discredit even the thought of change itself. Therefore, it 
(5) gave voice to the advantage of a systematically planned, consistent, convincing, pragmatic, 
and all-comprehensive social programme, as opposed to the occasional temptations of world-
curing intentions, exposed to the alternate danger of sudden forwarding and quick tiring, 
supported solely by intellectual arguments. 
Keywords: Legal scholarship in Hungary; transition to role of law 
It is nearly unavoidable nowadays to start concluding anything without 
mentioning of the cardinal facts of the political system change. Thus, some 
established claims may come to our minds, such as rule of law, human rights, 
pluralist constitutional parliamentary democracy, and so on. All these are also 
expressed by the need to re-establish certain directions and subjects of legal 
scholarship: constitutional law in place of the law of the state, public administ-
ration with a more substantive meaning than mere state administration, human 
rights as eventually expressing a more serious care, and so on.1 
C s a b a V a r g a . P r o f e s s o r of Law, Ins t i tu te f o r Legal S t u d i e s , Hungar ian A c a d e m y of 
S c i e n c e s , B u d a p e s t , H - 1 0 1 4 Budapes t , O r s z á g h á z u. 30. 
E - m a i l : v a r g a c s @ j a k . p p k e . h u 
1
 For the variety of a spec t s and par t icular fea tures of the t rans i t ion process in H u n g a r y and 
the ent i re Central and Eas te rn European reg ion , cf. the au tho r ' s bibl iography in his Transition 
to Rule of Law On the D e m o c r a t i c T rans fo rma t ion in Hungary ( E L T E Project on Compara t i ve 
Legal Cul tures) , Budapes t , 1995, 175-182 [Phi losophiae IurisJ. 
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The balance-sheet of the socialist legal scholarship in Hungary is yet to be 
done. Although we might not have any reason to be ashamed of it, moreover 
to reject it it did its job as it could, becoming known as the exemplary 
workshop of the socialist world, both in monographic elaborations, overall 
outlooks and conceptual analyses, while winning the attention of western 
scholarship due to the pretentious presentation of its principles, comparative 
outlook and sensibility to history -still, the entire range of its problems were 
obviously born within its own medium, that is, within spiritual horizons drawn 
by the battles against some eastern demigods imposed upon it. However creative 
it may have been in adapting to the environment, yet what it could display later 
on in an entirely new spiritual neighbourhood might prove distorted and 
unilateral. Thus, our legal scholarship yearns for theoretical foundations-pre-
conditioning over-thinking and extending the limits on political-philosophical 
grounds within a constitutional framework, as substantiated by the presuppo-
sitions of social sciences.2 
Naturally, we could have foreseen this earlier, at a time when no-one would 
dream about the late collapse of the Soviet empire and western Realpolitik. 
Although, consecutive to the changes, a considerable number of previously 
known facts struck us as new. For even if we were able to collect deep 
impressions on the everyday life of western societies during repeated visits 
to the respective countries, the objectiveness and sharpness of our sight was 
still altered by the unintentional over-optimisation of our enemy's enemy. We 
may confess it today that, although unintentionally, yet we have seen them as 
the embodiments of some ideals or utopianistic dreams, rather than a task to 
be restarted in everyday life practically from the scratch, to be reassumed 
despite daily failures and hindernisses. We were responsive rather to the 
fulfilment of the values denied to us then and there, and not to perhaps 
questioning the principles and ethos behind the certainly pleasant mani-
festations of the respective environment towards the visitor, parallel to 
inquiring about the sufficiency of social organisation, or even the danger of 
its internal emptying. 
2
 As to some of the pre-modern science-philosophical presuppositions of Marxism, cf., from 
the author, Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1999, 
especially para. 4.2.1, 118-121 [Philosophiae Iuris]. 
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Despite clear warnings,3 we were less likely to notice that western legal 
orders, considered then the standards of normality, were undergoing a change 
in paradigms themselves: with social processes channelled towards a juridified 
path while abandoning traditional legal positivism by taking the stand of a 
new, militant kind of social engineering, in which the jurist can be a mediator 
at the most. At the same time, the fora and the procedures requiring a judicial 
decision were multiplied as they were increasingly becoming the subjects to the 
merciless rule of supra-national principles, decision-making bodies and 
pressure groups, to an extent that the outside viewer might see the illusion of 
sovereign change of law sheerly as the internal enforcement of external 
pressure.4 
We must note: the system change and the dawning on laws of the outside 
world came as two processes mutually supporting one another. For the urge 
for reconsideration deriving from the former only strengthened the effects of 
seeing and perceiving the overwhelming gain in ground of changes in the 
outside world and the consequences thereof. 
Nevertheless, our foreseeing capabilities5 proved to be very much limited. 
At the time, we were able to think only in the following way: we are facing 
a learning process which we must start with open hearts. As to myself, I tried 
to express a rather shocking and apparently radical conviction that from the 
Marxism of our socialist legacy not simply the unproved and unprovable 
theses were left behind drawing us back to the past, but also everything 
' For the most conspicuous examples, see Unger, R. M.: Law in Modem Society Toward a 
Criticism of Social Theory, The Free Press, New York London, 1976. ix + 309 p., as well as 
Nonet, Ph. and Selznick. Ph.: Law and Society in Transition Toward Responsive Law, 
Harper Row, New York, 1978. vi + 122 p. [Colophon Books]. 
4
 For an overview of the contradictions emerging from the realisation of the institutional 
expectations of the rule of law in a way over-fulfilled but sheerly sectorally, and, therefore, 
resulting inexorably in a kind of practical anarchy, cf., f rom the author, 'Megvalósulatlanul 
megvalósult, avagy megvalósultan megvalósulatlan jogállamiság' [Rule of Law as Realised 
without its Realisation or Unrealised with its Realisation]. Magyar Nemzet [The Hungarian 
Nation: a daily] (8 April 20001, 8 and 'Önmagát felemelő ember? Korunk racionalizmusának 
dilemmái' (Man Elevating Himself? Dilemmas of the Rationalism of our Age). In: Sodródó 
emberiség (The Human Kind in Drift) ed. K. Mezey, Széphalom Könyvműhely, Budapest, 
2000), 61-93, as well as 'Jogállamiság kihívások keresztútján' (Rule of Law At the 
Crossroad of Challenges). In: Nemzet és jogállamiság (Nation and its Rule of Law) ed. T. Király 
and S. Lezsák. Antológia Kiadó, Lakitelek, 2001. 
5
 Cf., from Varga, Cs.: Trumbling Steps of the New Constitutional State: Everyday 
Constitutional Process [&] Question Marks of Local Legal Tradition. In: Transition, op. cit. 
78-89. 
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hopelessly outworn which the entire approach, ethos, methodological and 
scientific-philosophical bases of our Moscow-controlled Marxism relied on. 
Since, each of us can deny or neglect any principle through a simple 
expression of will, but the underlying approach, the system of presuppositions 
on scholarship to which Marxism offered an answer could hardly be left 
behind without denying our former intellectual self, or surpassing previous 
inclinations. 
Today, it must be considered naive that, despite our concerns, we still 
believed: these are the only difficulties. Although, as soon as we started to 
breath the same air with the European and Atlantic world, which let us down 
some decades ago, it started displaying a different picture, more complex than 
their former considerations. By now, the face of our brave new world started 
to slowly become outlined by very much familiar features (reminding of the 
surpassed ones from many points of view). Rational arrogance, enlightened 
Utopianism, world-saving universal panacea all refurbished from all-curing 
patterns reminding of the French 18th century in the minds, and the rule of 
abstract principles in practice compete for listeners. And all these are coming 
from the opposite direction this time. Their omni-present predominance, 
crushing theoretical arguments and self-imposing manner (through experts and 
aid-programmes) can not only push the relevance of practical experience into 
the background, but, as a result of continuous pressure, even the compulsory 
scepticism by scholarship can be silenced fQr a while as well.6 
Only wisdom may suggest that self-confident certainties often hide deep 
internal uncertainty. Indeed, nothing else can be taken for granted under 
currently changing conditions. For we may state that both actions and their 
theoretical backing are pervaded by 
(1) intellectual unpreparedness (notwithstanding the apparent certainty of 
measures still enforced in practice), 
6
 From the richening literature, cf., first of all, Brietzke. P. H.: Designing the Legal 
Frameworks for Markets in Eastern Europe. The Transnational Lawyer 1 ( 1994), 35-63, as well 
as, f rom Ajani, G.: La circulation des modèles juridiques dans le droit post-socialiste. Revue 
internationale du Droit comparé 46 (1994), 1087-1105 and By Chance and Prestige: Legal 
Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe. The American Journal of Comparative Law XLIII 
(Winter 1995), 93-117. 
See, from the author: A jogváltás paradoxonai (Paradoxes of Legal Change). Magyar 
Szemle V (1996) 12, 1186-1196, and also in his Jogállami átmenetünk Paradoxonok, dilemmák, 
feloldatlan kérdések (Our Transition to Rule of Law: Paradoxes, Dilemmas, Question Marks). 
Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem, Budapest, 1998, 177-186. [A Pázmány Péter Katolikus 
Egyetem Jog- és Államtudományi Karának Könyvei 5.] 
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(2) blindness and miracle-expectation (through interventions imposed as 
a dens ex machina, hardly becoming the organic part of the overall process), 
(3) the so-called Bibó-syndrome (that is, after bitterly experiencing 
dictatorship, the spasmodic approval without criticism of every principle and 
procedure opposable to its danger even if the present lack of our ability to keep 
distance cool mindedly would lead to some sort of practical anarchy),8 and, 
finally, 
(4) the trap of choosing between the West and the West (without any further 
consideration and reflection, due to the undertaking of axiomatic patterns). 
The point is by far not to take an attitude of scepticism making us 
question the results (maybe provisional, yet surely influencing our shifting 
points for the future) of these processes of accelerated change. Notwith-
standing all these, we ought to understand (through establishing the fact and 
thinking its consequences over) that by the unreflected realisation of imported 
patterns, scholarship fails to fulfil its genuine task, that is, reflection. Thus, 
if a situation arises in which abstract principles, derived by others under 
different conditions at some distant time, are granted continuous priority over 
local experience and everyday knowledge, this will betray even the best and, 
indeed, lasting message of our past Marxism, namely, historicity. For no matter 
how satisfied we are to have universal principles declared and undertaken 
finally, we should not forget that even the most universal principles were 
initially born under historically particular conditions to answer historically 
particular challenges in practice.4 
Therefore, it is high time to put the question: is our scholarship truly 
prepared to make a survey of reality? Does it have the empathy, the ethos of 
service and the humbleness to speak on the basis and in the interest of it? Or, 
is it conceivable that all the namings and set of concepts, our entire thinking, 
problem-sensibility, moreover, the thought pattern itself within the framework 
of which we raise our questions, well, according to their methodology, these 
are nothing more than the projections of western thinking, thus, as to their 
8
 Cf., from István Bibó [(1911-1979), philosopher of law and political essayist, first 
silenced after the communist take-over in 1948, then imprisoned as the last Secretary of State of 
Imre Nagy's government on duty when the Soviet troops invaded Hungary in 1956], Democracy, 
Revolution, Self-Determination Selected Writings, ed. K. Nagy (trans. A. Boros-Kazai). 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1991. [Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, 69] [Social 
Science Monographs, Boulder, Co., Atlantic Research and Publications, Highland Lakes, N.J.]. 
9
 Cf., Varga, Cs.: Law and History: On the Historical Approach to Law. In: Historical 
Jurisprudence ed. J. Szabadfalvy. Osiris, Budapest, 2000, 280-285 [Philosophiae Iuris], 
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origin and evolvement, they are the products of different cultures, life-
conditions, experience, ideals, and expectations? 
Obviously, it would be rather silly to search for any hidden justification of any 
opinion in the inquiry. History, as the magister vitae, usually speaks of the respect 
for everything what medieval and modern scholars could suggest for Europe in 
their metaphorical explanation to the functioning of both the universe and human 
society with the invention of the mechanical clockwork: 'brakes', 'checks and 
balances', 'demand and supply', 'feedback', and also prudentia. That is, 
organised life as such is composed of continuous balancing, mutuality, and co-
efficience.10 This was true then and there for God 's world as one system. Our 
present problem is different by its structure from the very beginning. That is to 
say: in a set, in which each component is evolving individually, their contact being 
slow and incidental, without any effects whatsoever, well, may we start the 
description of the whole from a self-imposing self-characterisation, calling it-
self even if only in the so-called world-economic sense 'the centre', and its 
environment, just simply, 'the periphery'? When admitting the facts of the global 
village, do we also undertake the gesture of unscrupulously expanding the centre's 
otherwise existing (political, financial, economic and social) hegemony into a 
scientific monopoly? I think that at the time when Marxism was being enforced as 
a state religion, our scholarship fought enough with fake universalisms and 
uncovered extrapolations, so that now when new temptations challenge us from 
different directions, we should be able to know how we can and should fight them. 
Do we own the resources, independence, and strong past so that if we must 
choose between patterns in peripeteic times, with our old conventions already 
gone but the new ones not born yet, we can do it with the certainty of an over-
thought thought? 
Our faltering steps and over-certainties implying uncertainty might make us 
feel like babies over and over, starting everything from the scratch under new 
conditions, without making use of the experience of past generations and our 
earlier self. This can hardly satisfy us, and our scholarly past does not imply 
this either. It is only a side effect that a number of former products of socialist 
scholarship, especially sociology and ontology of law" will be subsequently 
10
 See Mayr, O.: Authority, Liberty and Automatic Machinery in Early Modem Europe 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore London, 1986. xviii + 265 p. Cf. also. Varga: 
Lectures... op. cit., para. 2.3.3, 83-97. 
11
 As to a legal philosophical foundat ion, see Ká lmán Kulcsár's sociological studies on 
modernisation th rough the law, as wel l as the message of George Lukács ' late Ontology of 
the Social Being in relation to the irreversibility of the e f f ec t s of social acts institutionalised 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AT THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW MILLENNIUM 187 
glorified by it. For in today's perspective, they could display a more exalted, 
responsible, rational, satisfying behavioural pattern and scholarly ethos, sine 
ira et studio proven by theory—as opposed to most of the fashionable (i.e., the 
mainstream) ideals of the present era. 
* 
If scholarship intends to take part in today's tasks, and intends to participate 
in determining potentialities in development and their day-to-day implemen-
tation, some further considerations should also be taken into account. 
First of all, we must continue our scholarly past. Scholarship ought to form 
opinions only by building on reliable philosophical grounds, supported by social-
theory and macrosociology, taking the historical experience and traditional values 
of our nation, as well as the related practical considerations, into account. 
Our scholarship has already warned us to soundness even under socialist 
conditions in relation to modernisationist legal reforms. In its relevant mani-
festations, it consistently 
(a) emphasised the framework-creating nature of the otherwise prevailing 
social normativity, and its primordial role in determining social processes; 
(b) put the possibility and demand of organicity with every step in the limelight; 
(c) did not consider the effectiveness of initiating elitist actions to influence the 
overall social movements (by means of political stands, legal decisions or press 
campaigns) suggestible or plannable for the long run and with lasting effects. 
Therefore, it regarded intervention as the primarily symbolic confirmation (and 
sanctioning) of the direction otherwise ongoing (organised or spontaneous) 
movements were taking; 
in the course of development, on the one hand, and the preservative s ignif icance in social 
ontology of the communitarian memory , on the other. For the former, cf . Kulcsár, К.: 
Modernization and Law. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1992, for the latter, f rom the present 
author. The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept. 1981. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 
1985, (reprint 1999) 193 p., especially ch. VI, as well as 'Towards the Ontological 
Foundation of Law (Some Theses on the Basis of Lukács' Ontology)' Rivista Internationale 
di Filosofia del Diritto LX (1983) 1, 127-142, and also reprinted in his Law and Philosophy 
Selected Papers in Legal Theory (ELTE Project on Comparative Legal Cultures). Budapest, 
1994. 375-390. [Philosophiae Iuris). 
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(d) warned to the damages caused by any adventurer policy that is, utopia-
nistic, uncovered, unserious or fake reforms in as much as they not only fail, 
but they necessarily discredit even the thought of change itself, and destroy the 
prestige of the state and its legal instrumentalities. Therefore, as the utmost 
consequence, it 
(e) gave voice to the advantage of a systematically planned, consistent, 
convincing, pragmatic and all-comprehensive social programme, forwarding 
a means in its partial legal solutions—as opposed to the sometimes accessive 
occasional temptations of world-curing intentions, exhausted in very limited 
elitist group-actions, exposed to the alternate danger of sudden forwarding and 
quick tiring, supported solely by intellectual arguments. 
As a consequence to the fortunate changes in our conditions, the new intel-
lectual undertakings of Europeanism and the system of relations opening 
towards new dimensions give our scholarship a reformatory task- in laying 
theoretical foundations, providing methodological clarification, as well as in 
revealing hidden presuppositions. Some preparatory work has already started 
in legal fields, but, being the first sparrows, we may speak of them only as of 
temporary. 
Although the goal is not to reformulate scientific-philosophical and metho-
dological presuppositions, but in general: we must prepare a critical survey of 
the new results born subsequent to WWII on the European continent and in the 
Anglo-American scholarship, and we ought to rethink their exploitable trends 
filtering them through the tradition inherent in our domestic scholarship. We 
must consider reconstruction from the philosophical, socio-theoretical, historical, 
comparative foundations towards public, private, criminal and economic laws, 
to their respective procedural schemes, and even interstate legal orders, which 
obviously must be complemented by the rebuilding of the entire legal-conceptual 
system (from the bases of law to sectoral legal dogmatics), never performed 
before. We must also pay our debts to the theoretical-legal scholarship of the 
local past, discontinued and neglected for more than half a century.12 We have 
12
 Cf., e.g., Szabadfalvi, J.: Moór Gyula Egy XX. századi magyar jogfilozófus pályaképe 
(Julius Moór: The Oeuvre of a 20th Century Hungarian Legal Philosopher). Osiris-Századvég, 
Budapest, 1994. 199 p. (Jogtörténet); S. Loss [et al.]. Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti 
gondolkodás történetéből. (Portrait-Sketches front the History of Hungarian Legal Philo-
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to reconsider the genuine bases of the theory of the state and Staatslehre. We 
should be able to reformulate the laws of interdisciplinary areas, thus the 
legally justifiable demands of policing, national security, national defence and 
emergency and exceptional situations. We ought to provide scholarly backing 
to practical tasks, for instance, legislation. We also must forward on the 
unfulfilled areas of the relationship between law and morality, as well as of the 
ethics of the legal profession, and other hopes close to law. 
Our general demands to refound scholarship cannot make us forget about the 
compelling nature of revealing some especially timely social problems. For in 
a process of system change some things cease to exist, their place to be taken 
by others, but new unbalances are also born as a by-product to them. The 
unilateral and distorted things of socialism are replaced by other unilateral and 
distorted outcomes. 
The foundational principles of community organisation 'public interest', 
'public order' , 'public security', as well as 'national security' and 'na-
tional defence' have been shaken, and finally emptied by political and 
media intellectuals, moreover, by a widening strata of population as well, 
for they can hardly offer a call-word any longer if they degenerate into the 
function of mere opinion or personal preference. The rich western literature 
sophical Thought). Pulszky, Pikier, Somló, Moór, Horváth, Bibó. Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 1995. 
310 p. Prudentia Iuris 3; Somló, В.: Jogbölcsészei (Felix Somló: Juristische Grundlehre, self-
trans. 1917. ed. P. Takács). Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 1995. 160 p. (Prudentia Iuris 1.); Somló, 
F.: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie hrsg. Cs. Varga. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1999. xx + 
114 p. (Philosophiae Iuris); Moór, J.: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie hrsg. Cs. Varga. Szent 
István Társulat, Budapest, forthcoming. (Philosophiae Iuris); Horváth, В.: The Bases of Law 
(1948), ed. Cs. Varga, append. I. H. Szilágyi. Szent István Társulat , Budapest, forthcoming. 
(Philosophiae Iuris / Jogfilozófiák); Losonczy, S.: Grundriß eines realistischen rechts-
philosophischen Systems (1948) ed. Cs. Varga. Szent István Társulat, Budapest, forthcoming. 
(Philosophiae Iuris / Jogfilozófiák); Losonczy, I.: Jogfilozófiai előadásainak vázlata (Outlines 
of Lectures in Legal Philosophy) 1948. ed. Cs. Varga. Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 
forthcoming. (Jogfilozófiák]; Die Schule von Szeged Rechtsphilosophische Schriften von I. 
Bibó und J. Szabó, hrsg. Cs. Varga. Szent István Társulat, Budapest, forthcoming. (Jog-
filozófiák). 
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expressing communitarian concerns, or communitarian assertion of inte-
rests,13 has had almost no echo in our part of the world whatsoever. 
The previous balance between rights and duties has been broken. The law 
is freed from its moral support. The political elite, entrepreneurs, tax-payers, 
minorities conscious only in demanding, furthermore, even criminals remember 
only the pieces of regulation meeting their interests. It is shameful that neither 
the law-maker nor the law-administrator does support the overall achievement 
of law and order, but, following some prevailing trends, concentrates on 
piecemeal elements. There is no extensive social policy, nor a uniform legal 
policy; the national legal protection and interest safeguarding activity not 
considering it an own task to tackle with it. Furthermore, press publicism, 
which substitutes the numb scholarship in these matters, often strengthens the 
tendencies of disintegration without providing theoretical explanations. 
The idea of human rights, once created as an ideology to restrict arbitrary 
power by setting limits to authoritative action, through its present positivation 
(while preserving some of its original ideological elements) has turned into 
a multi-faceted and multi-functional weapon, under the banner of which battles 
against each other or the state, by this time made a public enemy by these 
fighting groups, can be fought successfully. At the time of its conception, the 
idea of human rights served for social integration through raising the 
oppressed, but today one can already use it also for disintegration and 
deconstruction. At a time when rights were scarce, scholarship in criticism of 
totalitarianism were rather busy to condemn the alleged over-assertion and 
abuse of rights. At present times, built upon the extension and rather aggressive 
assertion of abstract constitutional principles, taken in short-cut as rights, legal 
scholarship continues to remain stubbornly silent (despite the fact that the 
13
 The former already has some class ic Hungarian foundations bo rn in emigration. 
See , e.g., from Bolgár , V.: The P u b l i c Interest: A Jurisprudential and Comparative 
Overv iew of the Sympos ium on Fundamenta l Concepts of Public Law. Journal of Public 
Law, 12 (1963) 1, 13-52; L'intérêt généra l dans la théorie et dans la prat ique ' Revue 
internationale de droit comparé, 1965/2, 329-363; and, on the common foundations, The 
Concep t of Public Welfare: An Histor ical-comparat ive Essay. The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 8 (1959) 1, 4 4 - 7 1 ; T h e Magic of Property and Publ ic Welfare. Inter-
American Law Review II (I960), 283-316 , as well as The Magic of Freedom. In: XXtli Century 
Comparative and Conflicts Law Legal Essays in Honor of H. E. Yntema. Sythoff, Leyden, 1961, 
453^162. The latter is a recurrent topic especially in Journal of Public Law and Revue de Droit 
public. 
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principle of summum ins, summa iniuria was once used to emphasise the virtue 
of soundness already in ancient times).14 
In the meantime, the contradiction wedging socialism from the inside was 
replaced by another contradiction wedging it again from the inside, and this is 
nonetheless problematic. 
Up to the nearest past, in socialism, according to its official ideology, 
jurisprudence was still dominated by rule-positivism, with the rule of brute 
facts only complementing it. Accordingly and reminding somewhat of the 
dual-structure institutionalisation of national-socialism15 , the enforcement of 
own interests at any given time could go on freely (with brutal force, through 
unlawful interference or even by silencing the law), while in neutral areas of 
mass application the petty-minded rule of regulations prevailed. Today's world-
wide practice is dominated by abstract principles, somewhat balanced out by 
the rule of facts. For law has come to overwhelming predominance and has 
become (he mastering power as an autonomous social sub-system. Yet, it 
became emptied from moral support and sterilised into a sheerly procedural 
pattern, offering nothing but a juridified framework for free competition and 
subordination games. The result is some sort of anarchy. Freely available rights 
can now easily be torn to pieces and scattered in all directions by those most 
capable of self-assertion. Both avoiding and abusing the law have turned into 
a pattern rewarded by society, without limits as to its misuse or over-use. No 
scholarly voice speaks of the ones who have broken the law and gain rights 
notwithstanding, for instance, by humiliating once more their past victims 
through the privilege the new rule of law conditions granted to them by 
reinforcing both statutory limitations and, as implied by it, also the legality of 
totalitarianism as a sine c/ua non of any so-called 'constitutional' criminal law 
set-up. "Nobody can profit from his wrong!" the legal maxim once commonly 
14
 Recognising the destructive effects of boundless yearn for justice is one of the basic 
features of early legal cultures. For the legal anthropological treatment of shalom in Jewish and 
Islamic legal cultures, as well as of the Chinese and Japanese ideals of law, and of Michael 
Kohlhaas' story by H. von Kleist, cf., from the author. Lectures... op. cit., para. 2.3.1.8. 
especially at 169 et seq. 
15
 Cf. Fraenkel, E.: The Dual State A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (trans. E. 
A. Shils). Oxford University Press, New York, 1941. xvi + 248 p. 
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accepted in Europe seems to be already doomed to the trash-bin of new 
conditions. 
In socialism, at least the regulation was somewhat own: the product of the 
own parliament, the expression of the own autocracy. Ever since there is a 
flood of new fashion products, which others have invented some other time, 
under some other conditions in another environment, yet they have been 
imposed upon us ready-made, without any adaptation whatsoever. 
We must be aware of the fact that there has always been legal transplantation, 
and what we are concerned about today is only the silence of scholarship, 
maintaining the illusion of not encountering any problems. What is added today is 
a loss of conventions and self-emptying. For changes occurred so unexpectedly 
and stormily, and happened without any commonality in action and conviction 
that they could not generate any organic process, nor could they claim proper 
foundations, or be supported by established principles of organisation. 
Therefore, there can be no surprise if no social order is created f rom 
isolated actions running against each other, mutually weakening or neutralising 
each other's effects- not becoming an organic entity as a common order of 
values, coherent practice (beyond meeting the requirements of a formal proce-
dural rule, that is, all of them being the products of a pluralist constitutional 
parliamentary democracy), or from various pieces of law (thus statutes, judicial 
decisions, local governmental decisions, commissioners' standpoints, or 
procedures lost in the maze of endless processual relevancies), pushed through 
by parliament debates and outside pressure. If law-enforcement is not secure 
and foreseeable, the outcome can only be practical anarchy under the aegis of 
an alleged rule of law. 
Obviously, these are all professional issues: questions of the unity of social 
and legal order, and legal coherence"' but, at the same time (and this makes 
it particularly interesting here and now f rom a theoretical point of view), 
questions of conventionalisation as well. Although, researches of legal 
sociology, legal philosophy and legal methodology have supported it clearly 
and even in socialist times that 
(a) the relative independence of law can be shown only by the homogeneous 
applicability of its technicality.17 Filling it with any contents, or actually 
16
 Cf., for instance, Kulcsár, К.: A konzisztencia problémája a jogi rendszerben. (The 
Problem of Consistency in the Legal System.) In: his Gazdaság társadalom — jog. 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1982, 123-139. 
17
 This is eventually equivalent to the statement of the law's autopoietical self-reproduction, 
i.e., to the response expressed by the binary code of 'lawful' and 'unlawful' , to bipolar 
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making use of it can only be done on the exclusive ground of social practice, 
dissolved in it (as part of social values, social conceptualisation, sensibility, 
tradition, culture and learned abilities), thus sharing its fate.18 Therefore, 
(b) in the medium of the eventually prevailing social normativity, the most 
spectacular components of law, so the official sources of law, are nothing more 
than tips of icebergs, which can indicate any reasonable (interpretable) 
direction only together with other (mostly informal) components of the legal 
functioning. Legal professionals' morals, ethos, willingness and skill to work, 
professional style, public conviction built upon prevailing doctrines, and the 
ways to proceed on within reasonable and officially acceptable procedure: all 
these may crucially shape practice, which, according to its underlying ideology, 
can (could) be created exclusively from and as materialisation of the official 
sources of the law.14 As a result. 
formalism of the exclusive options between 'yes' and 'no' (which I have once described as the 
Manichean negation of dialectic). Cf., for the former. Luhmann, N.: The Coding of the Legal 
System. Florence: European University Institute. 1985. 63 p. [EUI Colloquium Papers, Doc. IUE 
342/85, Col. 94. and, from the present author. Judicial Reproduction of the Law in an 
Autopoietical System? [abstract] in Law, Culture, Science and Technology In Furtherance of 
Cross-cultural Understanding. Kobe, 1987, 200-202, and (text) in: Technischer Imperativ und 
Legitimationskrise des Rechts ed. W. Krawietz, A. A. Martino & Kenneth I. Winston, preface 
E. Kamenka. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1991, 305-313 (Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 11), as well 
as in the author's Theory of the Judicial Process The Establishment of Facts ( 1992). Akadémiai 
Kiadó, Budapest, 1995. 193 p., especially para. 5.4.1 at 157-161. For the latter, see, from the 
author, A joglogika vizsgálódási lehetőségei az újabb megközelítések tükrében (Potentialities of 
Inquiry by Legal Logic in the Mirror of New Approaches). Állam- és Jogtudomány, 1971. 4, 
713-729, reprint in his Jogi elméletek, jogi kultúrák (Theories and Cultures of Law). (ELTE 
Project on "Comparative Legal Cultures"), Budapest, 1994. 90-106 (Jogfilozófiák) and also in 
his A jog mint logika, rendszer és technika (Law as Logic, System and Technique). Osiris, 
Budapest, 2000, 54-57. (Jogfilozófiák). 
18
 Cf., from the author. Comparative Legal Cultures: Attempts at Conceptualisation. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica, 1997. 1-2, 53-63 in its first version as a comment in Changing Legal 
Cultures eds. J. Feest E. Blankenburg. International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Onati, 
1997. 207-217 (Oiïati Pre-publications) , and, for a wider selection of examples, European 
Legal Cultures eds. V. Gessner A. Hoeland Cs. Varga. Dartmouth, Aldershot, Brookfield USA, 
Singapore, Sydney, 1996. xviii + 567 p. (Tempus Textbook Series on European Law and 
European Legal Cultures I ). 
19
 Cf., on the logical necessity of counting with, formulating and introducing pre-
suppositions, from Nowak, L.: Próba metodologicznej charakterystyki prawoznawstwa Poznan, 
1968. 205 p. (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu Prace wydzialu prawa 38) and 
De la rationalité du législateur comme élément de l'interprétation juridique. In: Études de logique 
juridique III, publ. Ch. Perelman. Bruylant, Brussels, 1969,65-86. (Centre Nationale de Recherches 
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(c) despite that the casual steps of legislation give a boost to legal 
development, the medium and contexture in which legal application leads its 
everyday life is still composed from huge a mass of conventionalisations. 
Common behaviour assisting to the actual implementation of the law, or the 
failure thereof, formation of tacit agreements and actually enforced customs 
providing the organising force even in lack of laws, and the legitimising force 
of professional and social consent standing behind them allow us to state: there 
is constitution in England, although not a written one; the legal status of the 
Queen is clear, although not posited; and for the same reason we say it about 
ourselves that, for instance, our legal practice may have undergone a change 
in direction (let us say, in case of divorce unequally for the genders).20 
Consequently, 
(d) when this substrate is hurt, and becomes incapable of fulfilling its 
conventionalising job (expressing a majoritarian system of values to standardise 
everyday legal practice), chaotic situations may emerge. In a process of system 
change, into which some atomised acts of legislation (eventually, encouraged 
by some external pattern without any former domestic precedents, experience 
or training) are being wedged as dens ex machina gestures, a divided social 
substrate, missing direction in a number of perspectives (with a standardising 
support of dubious value, reliability or efficiency), can hardly lead to a better 
result. Therefore, 
(e) in want of other results, some sort of absence of direction, temporarily 
becoming constant, is bound to happen, just as the transitory legitimisation of 
zigzags deriving from unregulated individual and group influences, capable of 
controlling and exploiting unclear situations. Although, as a side-effect, but 
through the accessory dysfunctions undoubtedly asserting themselves in the 
de Logique); on interrelations between the social and the legal. Kulcsár, К.: Jogszociológia (Legal 
Sociology). Kulturtrade, Budapest, 1997. ch. VII, 259-287, as well as, from the present author, e.g., 
Logic of Law and Judicial Activity: A Gap between Ideals, Reality and Future Perspectives (1982). 
In: Legal Development and Comparative Law ed. Z. Péteri V. Lamm. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 
1981, 45-76 and also in his Law and Philosophy, 257-288. 
Regarding its ultimate effects although parallel to deteriorating the law's prest ige-, the 
situation is the same if constraining considerations from the outside are being used for competing 
with the law and replacing it, as, for instance, the variable, yet strictly enforced (at the same time 
restricting the respective domains of the freedom of thought, freedom of speech, freedom of edu-
cation) set of requirements, known as political correctness, in the disciplinary practice of American 
orders of profession (media organisations, publishers, universities, scientific workshops, as well as 
public services and service-providers in general). Cf., e.g.. Hollander, P.: Political Correctness is 
Alive and well on Campus Near You. Washington Times, December 28, 1993, A19. 
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long run, all of this (even without any concrete grievances) can preserve and 
actually forecast the destruction of the law's own ethos, the shattering of 
confidence, and, as the only viable response from wider strata of the population, 
choosing the avoidance of law, transposing popular hopes into a new reform 
movement to be launched by the state in the re-emergence of a new fetish of 
statism, once believed to have been surpassed for ever. 
5. 
In socialism, legal thinking has done a lot to make the institutional set-up and 
functioning of the state and law and also the various reforming attempts more 
humane and liveable within the prevailing framework, at the same time trying 
to make them serve some common fundamental social goals. How much does 
our scholarship assume of the tasks accumulated ever since? 
Under these new circumstances, the clarification of the necessary 
preconditions has at the most arrived at publicistic recording of exploratory 
impressions; not making mention of the fundamental issues, as if it had stopped 
at the analyses conducted under socialist conditions. At present there are no 
answers to the limits of transplantability of the means of legal technicalities, 
neither to the natural barriers to the universalisation of ideas and techniques.21 
Moreover, exhausted in its everyday routine, scholarship seems to have already 
forgotten to even deign to disprove some doubts previously formulated by it. 
In the meantime, foreign literature is flourishing remembering of the 
unsuccessful American legal export to Germany after WWII,22 of the shameful 
billions of dollars committed to South America (sacrificing them on the altar 
of social modernisation to be implemented according to the claim of having 
21
 The first ombudsman E. Letowska, with J. Letowski, wams us- under the heading of "The 
State of Law Is Not a Gift" in their Poland Towards to the Rule of Law (Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe Scholar. Warsaw, 1996) on 10 that "The belief that in order to change the world one 
must first and foremost change regulations and then the rest will automatically take care of itself 
is an expresison of similar thinking based on a belief in the magical force of the law. We have 
a state of law in the constitution, and so we irrevocably will also have one in life. Nothing of the 
kind... Even the program for creating a real state of law in Poland in the fullest possible form still 
has not been drawn up, while its implementation does not have to end in success." 
22
 Cf., e.g., Hoeland, A.: Évolution du droit en Europe Centrale et Orientale: Assiste-t-on 
à une renaissance du "Law and Development"? Droit et Société, 1993. 25, 467-488. 
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founded a scientific social theory,23 or arguing with the World Bank under the 
banner of rationality24)- : putting questions, expressing doubts, giving voice 
to the unchanged/unchangeable validity of ancient truths, furthermore, providing 
us with new realisations. Well, in these days, when international legal export is 
at its peak, and on the ruins of collapsed socialisms, various salesmen and 
tradesmen of the law's technicality are circulating as experts, it seems that the 
academies and universities of the target countries remain stubbornly silent and 
shyly turn their heads. Is it possible that right in these moments they feel the urge 
to live or rejoice over their freedom uncontrollable by anyone? 
The caravan of legal renovation is following its own route ever since, even 
though neither of us know what balms to use when, and under what conditions. 
How should we establish the conditions and criteria of healthy functioning? What 
does historicity mean in today's post-modernity? What are the features of the 
global village ? What is that theoretically justifies a process in which patterns bom 
under historically particular conditions and in specific places are recorded in the 
first round, then the results are exported as a universal and timeless panacea, to 
finally announce it with the tel est notre plaisir gesture as universally valid for 
every human condition? 
The road of cognition and conceptualisation from the initial problem 
sensitivity to its institutional solution is extremely complex. Subsequent practical 
actions must necessarily deal with both more variety and more local specia-
lities.27 Let us recall here the experience of the near past:26 in this century, 
even the most successful ventures of legal reception have proven very limited 
validity and sphere of authority;27 others have failed very early on due to local 
23
 Cf., e.g., Gardner, J. A.: Legal Imperialism American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin 
America. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1980. xii + 401 p. 
24
 Cf., e.g., Mattéi, U.: Introducing Legal Change Problems and Perspectives in Less 
Developed Countries. (Manuscript of an address to World Bank Workshop on Legal Reform on 
14 April 1997.) Berkeley Trento, 1997. 19. 
ъ
 Cf., front Varga, Cs.: Institutions as Systems: Notes on the Closed Sets, Open Vistas of 
Development, and Transcendency of Institutions and Their Conceptual Representations. Acta 
Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 1991. 3—1. 167-178, and also in his Law and 
Philosophy, op. cit. 413-424. 
26
 For a summary, see, front Varga, Cs.: The Law and its Limits. In his Law and Philosophy, 
op. cit. 91-96. 
27
 In Turkey, the local version of the Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch exerted influence 
mainly within the metropolitan environment, despite the consistent decades-long efforts at es-
tablishing its roots. Cf. Starr, J.: Dispute and Settlement in Rural Turkey An Ethnography of Law. 
Brill, Leiden. 1978. xvi + 304 p. (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East XXIII.) 
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resistance;28 the attempts of the WWII victors could only count on moderate and 
temporary success from the very beginning, specifically because of the political 
pressure inherent in them.24 
So, what is the basis of our miracle-expectation? Naiveté, ideological 
character, interest, foolishness, or simply the emptying of the historical memory? 
Or, perhaps, common-sense in the world of various rationalities organised into 
one irrational, that is, the shameful loss of credit of human experience and their 
replacement with post-modem clips of new idols? 
Speaking of ourselves, we can only say that after the collapse of the socialist 
system in the world, in the immense internal diversity of the Central and Eastern 
European region, as a uniform demand, attempted endeavour and partly traversed 
path, we can meet a new and ambitions creation of law and institutions 
everywhere. Rule of law, consistent enforcement of maximum human rights after 
the disintegration of the past social and legal order: this is a programme which 
here and there (and, luckily, especially in Central Europe proper) gave way to 
considerable institutionalisation and traditionalisation, already building itself into 
socio-political processes. At other places, this unambiguously led to the increasing 
predominance of the stronger and the more unscrupulous, to the intertwinement 
of Mafiosi and the state, and to practical anarchy reminding of the weak and 
atomised Western European statehood having existed a thousand years ago.'0 
28
 E.g., in Ethiopia and Iran. For the former, cf. J. Vanderlinden. In: Introduction au droit 
de l'Ethiopie moderne. Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1971. especially 
212ff, and Scholler, H. und Brietzke, P.: Ethiopia Revolution, Law and Politics. Munich, 1976. 
80ff, as well as Transplants Innovation and Legal Tradition in the Hont of Africa Modelli 
autoctoni e modelli d'importazione nei sistemi giuridici del Corno d'Africa, ed. E. Grande. 
L'Harmattan Italia, Torino, 1995. 403. (Non Solo Occidente / Studies on Legal Pluralism 1.) 
29
 E.g., in Germany and Japan. For the former, see Hoeland, passim. 
, 0
 Background materials in international security policy on the true nature and dangers of 
the Russian variant to "rule of law" are rather pessimistic, depicting the recalled conditions as 
reminiscent of 12th-13th centuries' Europe with week statehoods and disintegrated, unorganised 
powers (using Pierre Corneil le 's El Cid as an illustration). See, e.g., from Shlapentokh, V.: 
Russia Privatization and Illegalization of Social and Political Life. Michigan State University 
Department of Sociology: 25th September 1995. 44 p. [CND (NATO: Chris Donelly) (95)459] 
and Decentralization of Fears Life in Post-Communist Society. 1997. 5 p. [CND (NATO: Ch. 
Donelly) (97)026]. For its historical components and their unbroken continuity, see also Smith, 
M. A.: Russia's State Tradition. Camberley, Surrey: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, June, 
1995. 12 p. (Conflict Studies Research Centre E78), McDaniel, T.: The Agony of the Russian 
Idea. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996. and Hedlund, S.: Russian Roots 
of the Russian Crisis Return to an Anti-modern Society. Uppsala: September 1999. 26 p. 
(Department of East European Studies: Working Papers 49). In the light of statistical data (five 
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Our legal scholarship has always been aware of its triple link, even in socialist 
times, and has successfully strived for standing all demands of its tasks. Firstly: 
it immersed in the country's problems; secondly: it fought with the overall 
questions of our region (the socialist block at the time) remarkably; and thirdly: 
it proved successful in providing universal views, searching for answers to global 
concerns, or responding international dilemmas. 
At the end of the millennium, the world itself is changing. Its global village, 
both on the European continent and in the Atlantic region, is announcing the for-
mation of a new law, legal style and culture. Yet, our spiritual choices do never 
stand in and of themselves: they imply practical consequences, which are 
naturally seldom thought through by our intellectualising inclinations.31 Thus, 
the contextuality of our problems may be spiritual, concerning its inspiration of 
thoughts, yet real in its practical consequences (effectiveness, cost impli-
cations).32 
Would our scholarship be able to meet the requirements of this triple task 
today? The experience of the past few years does not seem to reveal the intentions 
of a new start and the actual efforts to materialise them. Concerning global 
dilemmas, thus far our legal scholarship has rather proven to be pattern-follower, 
and striving for standing all demands. In debates requiring creative thinking, the 
place of open-chance reflection is mostly taken by the invention of some 
mainstream opinions considered relevant (and preponderantly brought from a 
times more occurrence of robbery and murder, six times more theft and violence, a quarter of 
million cases of both corruption and economic crimes, etc.), see llynsky, I.: Law and Order. In 
Russian Society in Transition ed. Ch. Williams V. Chuprov V. Staroverov. Dartmouth, 
Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney, 1996. 219-240. For an ultimate account, see 
Cohen, S.: Failed Crusade America and the Tragedy of Post-communist Russia. Norton, New 
York, 2000. 305 p. and, as an admission-cwn-criticism, also Holmes, S.: Transitology. London 
Review of Books 23. 19 April 2001. 8, 32-35. We hold less knowledge regarding farther regions, 
e.g., the nature of the Tche-Tchen variant to "rule of law". 
31
 As a refreshing example, see Western Rights? Post-communist Application, ed. K. 
Lauer A. Sajó. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1996. 386 p. 
32
 See, for example, the comparative analysis of American and Japanese ways of policing, 
where the ethos developed from individualism, respectively communitarianism, providing the 
differences in techniques, and resulted in the poorness of results despite immense invested 
sources, in the first case, and the opt imum effects despite low costs, in the second. Szabó, D.: 
Integration normative et évolution de la criminalité [manuscript]. Institut de France, Paris, 1995. 
51 p. 
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different environment), then followed with a prejudiced compulsion and enforced 
blindly. 
* 
At the threshold of a new millennium, when our nation is at cross-roads again and 
must constantly choose from an entire range of patterns, techniques and tools, 
with these choices influencing the shifting points of the future; well, will our legal 
scholarship be capable of influencing the way of thinking and imagination of 
politicians, citizens, media and the professions? For we can appraise situations, 
prepare statistics, yet we ought to inquire about ideas and the media of reception 
to prepare comprehensive decisions. At this point, we can still face some initially 
unclear circumstances. Sometimes we even forget to put the basic questions. 
We should just demand the answer, even if we may not be able to make up for 
the negligence: Is the nation a tabula rasa to be filled with contents at please? Did 
it have, does it have values, sensibilities, skills, ties, practical successes at all, 
from which extra strength could be gained to build more securely, daringly or 
decidedly?33 
We should know a lot more, things that we did not know yesterday or know 
today. The historical prospects in legal scholarship are deficient, rhapsodic, and 
superficial even about yesterday. Our past is missing, unrevealed and non-
assumed. Bibliographies on legal literature are available only for the last fifty 
years. Corpuses (compilations of sources, volumes of documents on legal sources, 
on state-level and local jurisdiction, initiatives, bills of law), which have filled up 
entire rooms throughout the legal history of luckier European nations, in our case 
were not elaborated yet except for the Corpus Juris Hungarici, and some other 
fragmentary compilations. There are no plans, no scientific policy, no money, nor 
any individual initiative to at least launch this work which has not been done for 
about a centuiy. Neither are there any chances to start this compilational work, or 
to publish them at least in fragments, since a new generation is yet to grow up, 
which has a proficiency in Latin, is prepared to research the sources (available 
33
 Between the two rounds of the first free elections in Hungary, as a staff to the European 
Academy of Legal Theory in Brussels, I have conducted memorable talks with Professor 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, a legal sociologist f r om Coimbra. Both in his quality of a Marxist 
social scientist and social democratic politician, he formulated almost personal concerns towards 
integrating particular local traditions, values and memories of past successes into one scheme of 
launching and substantiating a new political, social and economic development, consciously as 
one kind of psychological support that could ease the complex transformation process leading 
to it. 
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exclusively in Latin until the mid-19th century), and can claim the necessary 
serving disposition to prepare the foundational work, and is able to undertake the 
survey of the sources in Hungarian legal history and legal tradition. Otherwise 
how could these incidental fragmentary elaboration be put together to give one 
uniform picture? How could researches be organised which beyond data-like 
institutional incorporations, could launch the accounting worthy of humanities, 
or the evaluation requiring juristic creativity of processes and performances 
(legal styles, methods, individual local trouvailles)? How could an elevated 
spirituality be born, which would provide thinking achievements, intellectual 
delicacies, joy and spiritual excitement beyond the dry facticity of 
events—similarly to, for instance, English legal historical thoughts always 
promising some vibrating spiritual recharge? 
What can be learned from the tying force of history, tradition, organicity, 
and feeling at ease, if nobody cares about them? When has social theory, legal 
philosophy or history addressed tradition for the last time as the foundation of 
processes of organic human practice? Or its mediatory capacity, its role of 
handing down the body of experience accumulated throughout generations, its 
integrative ability, its exclusive potentiality to merge various movements and 
subtle changes into one enormous move?34 Or, about tradition and reason 
complementing each other? Or the non-subsidiary nature of rationality and 
everyday experience,35 especially the theoretical function of rationality in the 
logic of justification, and the ontological function of practical experience in the 
logic of taking a decision ? 
Marxism was only a compulsory garment. A lot of us could not make peace 
with its science-philosophical presuppositions, neither with its simplifications 
and unjustified extensions, but especially with its only politically justified 
autocracy. Yet, it was still liveable, allowing the respect for history. In want of 
anything better (since we could not use a different conceptual framework), we 
34
 Although all these considerations have already been developed in Max W e b e r ' s 
rationality-theory. Cf., e.g., Szacki, J.: Traclycja. Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 
Warszawa, 1971; Friedrich, С. J.: Tradition and Authority. Praeger, New York Washing-
ton London, 1972. 144 p. (Key Concepts in Political Science); Shils, E.: Tradition. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980; Krygier, M.: Tipologia della Tradizione. Intersezioni 5, 1985, 
221-249; and, as applied to law, see Krygier, M.: Law as Tradition. Law and Philosophy 5., 
1986, 237-262. 
33
 Cf., e.g., Oakeshott, M.: Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. Methuen, London, 
1962. vii + 333 p., especially at 1 -36; and, in a practical context, Kirkpatrick, J. J.: Dictatorship 
and Double Standards Rationalism and Reason in Politics. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1982. 
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could still make use of it to serve life as a magister vitae. It may be destructive 
if abstract principles in a universalised ahistorical context are conceptualised 
now again as exclusive. The mind can be emptied and systematically detached 
from its everyday substrate, and from foundations of human experience and 
practice as a result. 
We ought to talk about the messages worthwhile to be messaged, and about 
what only vanity makes us message we may as well remain silent.36 
36
 For the variety of components, layers (in function of varying approaches), and chances 
of contradictions while the undifferentiated use, of some mainstream notions, cf., as an 
exemplary case study, Fallon, R. H., Jr.: "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse. Columbia Law Review 97, January 1997, 1, 1-56. 
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Abs t rac t . The introductory pan of the essay deals with the notion of legal culture and its 
categories. Later, the author sets forth the characteristics of the common law and the Roman-
German legal cultures, including the legal families within them. He also touches upon the 
tendencies of the development of the German legal and political culture. With respect to the 
integration of the legal systems into the EU. the author argues as an advocate of convergence. 
Both basic legal cultures are being modified as. besides statutory law. judicial law becomes 
significant in the continental legal systems and statutory law complements case law in the 
common law systems. As to the integration of the Hungarian legal culture into the EU. the 
essay points to two principal considerations. On the one hand, when working on making out-
legal culture "euro-conform", we must not forget about maintaining our own legal culture. On 
the other hand, the Hungarian legal culture can contribute to the development of the legal 
system of the EU. e.g. with some of the regulations of our statute on the ethnic minorities. At 
the end. the author shows that the efficacy of the European law is heavily dependant upon the 
national legal systems. 
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I. Introduction 
In the international literature concerning European integration, it seems to be 
a commonplace that there are some "break lines" or "dividing lines" in the 
European Union. These "lines" separate: a) the countries of the centre from the 
periphery; b) the Eastern and the Western member states; c) the Protestant and 
the Catholic nations.1 
I would add a fourth break line to the list: the differences in respect to the 
political and legal cultures. 
Anta l V i s e g r á d y . P r o f e s s o r , Head of C h a i r , Univers i ty J a n u s Pannon ius , P é c s , H - 7 6 2 2 
Pécs , 4 8 - a s tér I., H u n g a r y . 
E - m a i l : v i s e g r a d i @ p t e . h u 
1
 See e .g. Page, E. С . : Patterns and Divers i ty in the E u r o p e a n State D e v e l o p m e n t . In: 
Governing the New Europe. Eds. : I. H a y w o o d E. C. Page. D u k e University Press , Durham, 
1995. 39. 
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It is well known that from the middle ages to the end of the 18th century the 
European continent shared a unified law and a single jurisprudence.2 They were 
based upon the Corpus Iuris Civilis and the Corpus Christi Canonici which were 
later supplemented by several important legal institutions of territorial rights and 
customs. These elements constituted the content of the so called ius commune. 
However, by the 19th century the law had equated with the law of the singular 
nation states. This is to be taken as the origin of our problem at issue. Although 
the legislative efforts of the European Community outlined a unified European 
law in the past decades. 
I hasten to emphasize that the term "break line" is not to be taken in a 
pejorative sense here. I just wish to indicate that the basis for a firm European 
identity could be provided by the maintenance of right exactly these differences 
of legal cultures. 
2. The notion of legal culture and its categories 
The relationship of culture and law is characterized by permanent interaction and 
interdependence.3 The nature of the relationship could be summed up in two 
tenets: on the one hand, law is an element of the culture of a society, and on the 
other hand, there can be no law or legal system not penetrated by the culture of 
the society. 
Legal culture, just like political culture, is a result of historical development. 
The political culture can influence or even mould the characteristics of the legal 
culture.4 The current state of legal culture is always between tradition and 
innovation. The development of a legal culture is a long process. It is not simply 
organic growth it sets the task of preserving the given culture. Having a legal 
culture is neither the insistence upon the given nor change for the sake of change 
only.7 
2
 Rousseau was right in writing at the time that "Il n 'y a plus aujourd'hui de Francais, de 
Allemands, d'Espagnols, d'Anglais merne, quoi qu'on en dise; il n'e que des Europe'ens." 
Rousseau, J. J.: Considerations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, et sur sa réformation projetée. 
In: Ouvres Completes. Vol. 3. Gallimard, Paris. 1964. 
3
 See e.g. Mayer, M. E.: Rechtsnormen und Kulturnormen. Schleuer, Breslau, 1903. 24. 
Fezer, K. M.: Teilhabe und Verantwortung. Beck, München, 1986, 22. 
4
 Tarello, G.: Atreggiamenti dottrinali e mutamenti strutturali dell' organizzazione qiuridica. 
Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica. Vol. XI. ( 1981 ) No. 1. 157-166. 
5
 Schäffer, FI.: Társadalmi környezet és jogi kultúra. (Social Environment and Legal Culture), 
Magyar Jog, Vol. 43. (1996) No. I. 
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The composing elements of legal culture are the following: a) written law and 
"living" law; b) institutional infrastructure (judicial system, legal profession); c) the 
models of legally relevant behaviour (e.g. legal actions); and d) legal cons-
ciousness.6 
In some respects, legal culture can be divided into two parts: "external" 
(lay) and "internal" (professional) legal culture.7 
Some even find it apt to talk about legal "subcultures". The possible use 
of the term could be exemplified by the fact that those unwilling to serve in the 
armed forces are normally found guilty in Northern and South Norway, while 
acquitted in Western and Central Norway.8 
On a global scale, we could distinguish between regulative and orientative legal 
cultures.9 
In regulative legal cultures (typically characteristic of the societies of the 
"euro-atlantic" culture) law is accepted as a rule actually and normatively 
guiding behaviour10 but not always to the same extent. In the common law 
systems, for instance, courts have much greater prestige than in other countries. 
Even the continental legal cultures are far from being homogeneous. Let me 
indicate this with only two examples: as opposed to the German legal culture 
(traditionally setting high value on law and having sophisticated civil 
procedures) the Dutch legal culture is often characterized with the term beleid. 
It means that subjects follow the advantageous laws and evade (circumvent) 
disadvantageous ones at the same time. This might well be illustrated by the 
fact that until the enactment the Ethanasia Act of 1993 (exceptionally per-
mitting aid to suicide), the Criminal Code had prohibited but the medical 
institutions practised active euthanasia. Besides, the Dutch seek to solve their 
conflicts without turning to courts. 
The legal culture of the region of Central Eastern Europe could be charac-
terized by a deeply (historically) rooted attitude manifested in the faith in legal 
6
 See Visegrády А.: Л jog- és állambölcselet alapjai. (The Grounds of the Theory of Law 
and State.) Janus Pannonius Egyetemi Kiadó, Pécs, 2000. 2. 
7
 See Friedman, L. M.: Law and Society. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1977. 76. 
8
 Podgórecki, A.: Dreistufen-Hypothese über die Wiksamkeit der Rechts. In: Studien und 
Materialen zur Rechtssoziologie. Hrsg.: E. Hirsch M. Rehbinder. Opladen, Köln, 1967. 40-43. 
9
 Kulcsár К.: Jogszociológia. (The Sociology of Law.) Kultiirtrade Kiadó, Budapest, 1997. 
137-147. 
10
 Its main characteristics are individualism and rationalism. See Hoecke . M. 
van Werrington, M.: Legal Cultures. Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New 
Model for Comparative Law. International and Comparative Law Quatcrly. Vol. 47. ( 1998) 
No. 3. 5 0 3 - 5 0 5 . 
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regulation and excessive expectations concerning legal regulations. This is 
accompanied (and has been accompanied) by an inclination to perceive social 
problems in a certain legal framework. The efficacy of law was also affected by 
the fact that (besides overcomplicated legal regulations) norms of behaviour 
generated by the actual practice gained primary significance. 
3. European legal families 
The national legal systems integrated by the European Union belong to different 
legal families" within the regulative legal culture. 
I. The common law systems 
Common law systems can be found on five continents and have three represen-
tatives in Europe: English law (practised in England and Wales); Irish law 
(which is a kind of "modified" English law); Scottish law (which has a 
"mixed" character).12 
As the English law provides the model for the common law systems, we 
concentrate upon its features. The characteristics features of the English law are 
the following: 
a) The English law resisted the reception of Roman law in the 15th and the 16th 
century (unlike continental legal systems) following its own way of development. 
b) It must be treated as another essential feature that the English law is not 
codified: most of its rules are not incorporated in statutes. 
" See David R.: Л jelenkor nagy jogrendszerei. (The Major Legal Systems of Our Age.) 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1977. de Cruz, P.: Comparative Law in a 
Changing World. Cavendish, London, 1995. Zweigert, К. Kötz, H.: Einführung in die 
Rechtsvergleichung azf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts. Mohr, Tübingen, 1996. The way I outline 
the legal families of Europe here combines the conceptual devices developed by Zweigert Kötz 
and R. David. Although Zweigert and Kötz heavily criticized David's analysis, I find it apt to 
link together the two categorizations. In this respect, I follow the line of argument put forward 
by Zsolt Ződi. See Ződi, Zs.: A jogrendszerek csoportosítása The Classification of Legal 
Systems. In: Bevezetés a jog- és államtudományokba. ( Introduction to the Science of Law and 
State.) Ed.: Szabó M. Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 1998. 99-101 . 
12
 See Visegrády A.: Angolszász jog és politika. (Anglo-Saxon Law and Politics.) 
Dialóg-Campus Kiadó, Budapest Pécs, 1999. As to the Irish law see Doolan, В.: Principles of 
Irish Law. Gill-MacMillan, Dublin, 1986. As to the Scottish legal culture see Watson, A.: Legal 
Transplants. Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1974. passim. 
LEGAL CULTURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 207 
c) The English law is judge-made law. 
d) It follows from the previously mentioned feature that the rules of the 
English law are less abstract and generalized than the rules of continental legal 
systems as they always refer back to the decision in a particular case. 
e) The English law is an open system. It is based upon a method that allows for 
answering all sorts of legal questions, hut does not contain material legal 
regulations that are to be applied without respect to the circumstances. 
f) And last but not least, as opposed to the Romanistic-German legal 
systems, the English law has a historical character, its development was never 
interrupted, it always kept its unity. So we cannot talk about old and new 
English law; every legal regulation, no matter how old it might be, belongs to 
the present legal system unless it was repelled by a statute or by custom. 
Moreover, the older the legal regulation, the higher the prestige it has. 
II. Romanistic-German (continental) legal systems13 
The Romanistic-German legal system formed the first legal family in the world. 
Its history dates back to the distant past. It stems from the law of the ancient 
Rome but its long development resulted in not only the modification of most of 
its material and procedural norms its underlying conception of law and legal 
norm has also been significantly altered since the time of Augustus and 
Justinian. The legal systems that belong to this category are descendants of the 
Roman law but they carried on its development and brought its institutions to 
perfection. They have never been mere copies of Roman law as many of their 
elements stem from other sources. 
In the continental Europe every contemporary legal system belong to this 
category. It does not mean that Romanistic-German legal systems are not to be 
found on other continents. Reaching well beyond the former boundaries of the 
Roman Empire, it conquered every Latin American country, most of Africa, the 
countries of the Middle East, Japan and Indonesia. This expansion could be 
explained partly by the inluence of colonization and partly by the advantages 
associated with the reception of the legal technique of codification generally 
applied in the Romanistic legal systems in the 19th century. 
The characteristic features of the Romanistic-German legal systems could 
be summed up as follows: 
13
 This section is based upon Z ő d i ' s explication of the issue. See Ződi: op. cit. 
101-109. 
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a) The pillars of these legal systems are the written sources of law (statutes, 
decrees, ordinances). Statutes are primary to other sources of law. 
h) Their law is relatively abstract which means that legal norms are not 
created in association with deciding particular cases (with the intention of their 
application in further cases, like in Anglo-Saxon legal systems) norms determine 
certain patterns of behaviour without respect to the concrete circumstances of 
particular cases. 
c) Legal norms are characterized by a kind of optimal generality, they are not 
too general (as too general norms would throw difficulties in the way of the 
application of law) but general enough to be applied to certain type-situations. 
d) The spheres of the creation and the application of law are strictly 
separated unlike in common law systems. 
e) In these legal systems the primary task of lawyers is the interpretation of 
legal norms. Every possible specification that was left out of the legal norm, 
automatically opens the way to interpretation. Thus, in Romanistic-German 
legal systems, the law consists of not only the legal norms enacted by the 
legislator but the "secondary legal norms" as well, developed by the legal 
practice. 
f) The material of law forms an independent, closed system in which at least 
in theory all sorts of questions could or should be answered by way of "inter-
preting" existing legal norms. 
The Romanistic-German legal systems could be divided into three legal 
families. 
European countries that belong to the Romanistic legal family are: 
1) France (as the "cradle" of the legal family); 
2) Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands (that came to touch with French 
law as a result of French military expansion); 
3) Italy, Spain, Portugal (that were also heavily influenced by the German 
and the Swiss codes which makes them representatives of an intermediary 
type). 
The characteristic features of the Romanistic legal family could be summed 
up as follows: 
a) The code of central significance is the Code Civil (1804) in the legal 
family. This code has a clear-cut structure, free of any feudal elements, any 
"compromises". It leaves almost no room for judicial discretion, its formu-
lations are concise and simple. It is often called the "most bourgeois" civil 
code that laid the foundations for European codification. 
The Code Civil is in force in Belgium, in four Italian regions, two Swiss cantons 
and with some modifications in Baden. Replicas of the Code Napoleon were 
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enacted in the Netherlands (1838), in Sicily (1812), in Parma (1820), in the 
States of Sardinia (1837) and in Modena (1842). As an adapted translation of 
the original, it was instituted in Greece (1841), in the unified Italy (1865) and 
in Romania (1865). And finally, although not as the exclusive source but as 
primary inspiration, it influenced the Portuguese (1867) and the Spanish (1889) 
civil law codification, just like Louisiana and Quebec in North America. 
However, the success of the Code Civil peaked in South America. It was 
took over in its original language in Dominica (1825), and later in translation 
in Bolivia ( 1831 ). The creative adaptation of European models (as mediated by 
French patterns) was first achieved in Chile (1825) that encouraged some 
countries to follow the lead (Ecuador 1861, Columbia 1873) and others to create 
their national code based on the Code (Uruguay 1867, Argentina 1869). 
In Asia, the Code Civil made an impact on almost the same scale but in a far 
less homogeneous way. Its principles are applied in Japan, and all four French 
codes were adapted in Turkey. In Egypt, the first codes (1867, 1883) were 
replicas of the Code Napoleon, the present code (1948) is a developed version 
based on it (which inspired Syria for adapted reception). The civil codes of 
Lebanon (1934) and Venezuela (1942) are also of the French origin, although 
both are to be taken as significantly different to it.14 
aa) The Code Civil regulates the relationship of the statute and the judge in 
a rather radical way. Judges are not allowed to interpret the statute "arbitrarily", 
in matters of legal interpretation they have to turn to the authority of référé 
législatif (established in 1790). 
ab) The Code Civil is the code of the "owner". It was based upon the idea 
of a citizen who makes rational decisions, who is aware of the relevant 
information and the norms of law. The Code strives to guarantee the freedom 
of property and contract as much as possible. 
ac) The Code finds a middle way between abstract principles and concrete 
(casuistic) norms. It determined the paradigmatic style for civil law codifications 
as well as codes on other fields of law for the future. 
b) The Romanistic legal family (unlike the Germanic and the common law 
systems) is characterized by the prevalence of legislature. The influence of 
Roman law quite paradoxically because of the early reception of Roman law is 
much weaker. 
The second legal family of the Romanistic-German systems is the Germanic 
legal family, its "members" are the following countries: 
14
 See Varga Cs.: A kodifikáció, mint társadalmi-történeti jelenség. (Codification as a 
Social-Historical Phenomenon.) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1979. 117-118. 
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1 ) Germany; 
2) Austria; 
3) Switzerland; 
4) the countries of Central Eastern Europe (especially the Chech Republic 
and Hungary). 
As characteristics of this legal family, the following features are to be 
pointed out. 
a) With respect to the development of the Germanic legal family, it proved 
to be a significant factor that, compared to other legal systems, the influence of 
the Roman law asserted itself rather late (only in the 15th century), although 
when came across it was very strong. 
b) The code of central significance in the legal family is the Bürgerliches 
Gezetzbuch (1900) which is a conservative code (unlike the Code Civil). 
The BGB was used in the recodification of the Greek civil law (1940), and 
in the codification of the law of contracts in Poland (1933). It provided the 
basis for the Brazilian (1916), the Mexican (1928), and the Peruvian (1936) 
Codigo Civil as well as the codification of civil law in Japan (1898), Siam 
(1925), China (1929), and Thailand (1962). It also inspired the Italian Codice 
Civile (1942) which is quite remarkable as the Codice Civile of 1865 was 
formulated in French spirit.'7 
ba) The law of the BGB is the law of lawyers, it is characterized by a style 
that strives for accuracy, subtlety and abstraction. Its addressees are not citizens 
but primarily lawyers (of course, in the sociological sense of the word). Its 
institutional constructions and terms are artificial, its language is technical 
(only professionals can understand its true meanings). As its primary focus is 
not conciseness but accuracy, the code is often very complicated. 
bb) The norms of the code are ordered in a specific way that more or less 
follows the structure of the Institutions of Justinian (personal and family law, 
the objects and types of property, the ways of acquisition of property, etc.). 
Many think that the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB 1811) finds a kind of 
middle way between the lawyers' law of the BGB and the application-oriented 
law of the Code Civil. 
The famous Swiss Civil Code (ZGB, 1912) has a distinguished position in 
the Germanic legal family. The ZGB is "deliberately vague" at certain points 
to allow the judge to search for the solution that is the most appropriate in the 
given case. The code is characterized by the extensive use of general clauses 
that are to be interpreted by the judges in the particular cases. 
15
 See ibid. 120-121. 
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The legal family can be characterized by the following features. 
a) This legal family is often regarded as a kind of intermediate version 
between the common law and the Romanistic-German legal systems. 
It resembles the common law systems as it was hardly influenced by the 
Roman law and the wave of codifications in the age of the Enlightenment (e.g. 
the comperehesive codification of the civil law has not taken place yet). On the 
other hand, the similarity to the Romanistic-German systems can also be 
pointed out: judges do not have a central role in the system and there is no 
normative precedent-doctrine. 
The Nordic countries had lived in relative isolation for a long period. Their 
legal institutions were influenced by the French law in the 19th century, the 
German law at the beginning of the 20th century, and the common law 
(especially the law of the USA) mainly after World War II. However, despite 
all these influences, they kept their original character. 
b) The co-operation of the Scandinavian countries is manifested in their 
laws as they make efforts to integrate the content of their legal systems. It could 
be exemplified by the Scandinavian Sales of Goods Act that was passed in 
every Nordic country (Sweden 1905, Denmark 1906, Norway 1907, Iceland 
1922). The act is influenced by both the British Sales of Goods Act (1893) and 
the German BGB. The co-operation is facilitated by their common legal and 
linguistic traditions. 
c) Last but not least, it should be mentioned that judges of higher courts and 
jurists of high authority play an important role in Scandinavian legislatures. 
But let us take a look at the discrepancies with respect to the political 
cultures of the EU member countries as well. In my opinion, political culture 
points to the subjective side of politics,—directly or indirectly to the political 
consciousness of citizens. If we talk about the political culture of a society, we 
refer to the political system internalized in the knowledge, emotions and 
evaluations of the population. Just like the political system moulds the political 
culture, the latter—as an essential element of the environment -"conditions" the 
functioning of the political system including the efficacy of the legal system. 
Instead of the traditional Scottish, Welsh, Basque, Irish, and Catalan 
examples, I would refer to Germany which, once again, has become a unified 
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state but will consist of two distinct political cultures for a long time. These 
political cultures are more different than, say, the political cultures of West 
Germany and Denmark or France. According to some scholars' predictions, it 
will take two generations before we can speak about one common political 
culture in Germany. 
As an indication, let us point to some relevant differences.16 East-Germans 
are still stronger advocates of "law and order" than West-Germans. They regard 
the state as more responsible for illness, scarcity, and unemployment. Most East-
Germans would support a system in which no one up high and down deep, life 
is on safe and regulated track. On the other hand, West-Germans are advocates 
of a system in which everyone has a chance to achieve more than most of the 
others, taking the risk of gaining less than the rest. The East-Germans' demands 
on welfare state are in association with their inclination to accept authoritarian 
leadership or, at least, reacting to it in a rather lethargic way. This corresponds 
with the German political traditions. They agree that the state must have a deep 
impact on the economy. They are hostile to the political parties which was also 
typical of the German tradition before 1945. In East Germany one can experience 
the affection for "round-tables" instead of the sense for party pluralism. 
According to Greiffenhagen, the disconsolate picture is alleviated by a ray 
of hope concerning the young generations. There are some indications that a 
kind of change in value perceptions has taken place in East Germany as well. 
This would explain why the values of the East- and West-German youth are 
rather close to one another. This will obviously have a positive effect upon the 
deepening of European integration, the realization of the rule of law, and the 
efficacy of the legal system. 
4. The possibilities and limits of the approximation of legal systems in the 
European Union 
As it is well known, the European Union launched the most comprehensive 
legal harmonization programme of all times. It concerns not only the 15 
member states but—as a point of orientation the members of EFTA and the 
16
 Grieffenhagen, M.: Politikai kultúra Németországban. (Political Culture in Germany), 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Tallózó. Tizenötödik Füzet, 1995. 4.7. Quint P. E.: The Imperfect 
Union. Cloth, Princeton, 1997. See also Ádám A.: Alkotmányi értékek és alkotmánybíráskodás. 
(Constitutional Values and Constitutional Court Practice.) Osiris, Budapest, 1998. 
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countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well. The goal of the Union is not 
some kind of a "unified law" but the co-ordination of the legal regulations of 
the member states, the elimination of excessive deviations with preserving the 
national legal systems to a certain extent.17 
With respect to this issue, we should touch upon the old debate on the 
applicability of the convergence theory on the European law. 
The advocates of the convergence of the legal cultures of the EU point to 
the common history, common values and traditions.18 
On the other hand, many hold the view that the common law and the 
continental legal cultures are so different to one another that there can be no 
approximation between them.19 
And finally, according to the third view, the above mentioned conceptions 
take legal cultures in a formal sense. We would rather need a sociological 
approach that concentrates upon identities. For example, civil law is often a 
symbol of national identity or a manifestation of national legal culture. This 
might explain why the member states are so reluctant to "harmonize" their civil 
laws. However, the EU set its heart on this harmonization.20 
Without entering the debate here, we deal with some issues of it in brief. 
The first question could be formulated as follows: to what extent does the 
European Union make use of the institutions of national legal systems? Well, 
for example, that incorporation of human rights in the community law is mainly 
due to the German Constitutional Court. As the community law consists of 
mostly norms of administrative nature, many of its basic principles trace back 
17
 See e.g. Evans, A. : A Textbook 011 EU Law. Clarendon, Oxford, 1998. 465. Cabero, 
M.: Fundamentes de Derecho Communitario Europeo. Colex, Madrid, 1989. 177-180. 
Cartou, L.: L'Union européenne. Paris, 1994. 155-158. Gulmann, C. Hagel Sorensen, K.: 
EE-ret. Djof, Kobenhavn, 1988. 287-297 . Lourin, F.: Manuele di diritto della Communité 
Europee. Torino, 1992. 172-190. Kecskés L.: EK-jog és jogharmonizáció. (EC Law and the 
Harmonization of Law.) Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. 1998. 211. 
18
 See e.g. Gerven, W. V.: Bridging the Gap between Community and National Laws: 
Towards a Principle of Homogenity in the Field of Legal Remedies. Common Market Law 
Review. Vol. 32 (1995) 679-702. Joerges, C. Ch.: The Impact of European Integration on Private 
Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective. European 
Law Journal Vol. 3. (1997) No. 4. 378-406. De Cruz: op. cit. 99. 
19
 See e.g. Legrand, P. European Legal Systems are not Converging. International and 
Comparative Law Quaterly Vol. 45. (1996) 52-81. 
20
 See Paasilehto, S.: Legal Cultural Obstacles to the Harmonisation of European Private 
Law. In: Function and Future of European Law. Eds.: V. Heiskanen et al. Helsinki, 1999. 
101-104. De Cruz: op. cit. 99. 
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to the highly developed administrative law of France and Germany. Recently, 
however, the European Court derived some principles—mostly procedural 
ones—from the "natural justice" of English law. This is how the the "right to 
hearing", the "duty of justification", the "right to due process" became part of 
the community law. The community law also borrows from the economic law 
of other member states.21 
Secondly, we have got to talk about the European Court. This is the forum 
functioning as a kind of "forge" of Anglo-Saxon and continental legal cultures. 
Comparative law is a permanently used "tool" in the hands of the European 
Court.22 
The amalgamation of the two legal cultures is also manifested in the fact 
that the European Court applies (basically) the method of case law, although 
its verdicts do not function as precedents. 
The next problem to be explicated concerns the common law. In concreto, 
I have in mind the ever more obvious tendency that the practice of British 
courts-although the efforts to synthesize the Anglo-Saxon and the continental 
legal cultures could also be noticed assimilates with the American model in 
which decisions are based upon principles rather than rules.23 
Finally, we cannot avoid posing the question: is the Hungarian legal culture 
mature enough to European integration, or can the former contribute to the 
latter in any respect? 
Of course, within the bounds of this essay, we cannot answer this 
question in details. What we can do is raising some thoughts concerning the 
issue. 
We should take it as a starting point that during the thousand years of the 
development of our law, besides national aspirations, some factors of harmoni-
zation were also present.24 The latter tendency was driven by aspirations to 
join up to the economic and social structures of the Western countries. In this 
respect, European integration is not the first challenge of harmonization of law 
in our history. 
In the development of the Hungarian legal culture, some positive tendencies 
pointing to "euro-conformity" could have been felt since the political tran-
sitions. Thus, for example, the fact that the transitions remained within the 
21
 See Kecskés: op. cit. 128. 
22
 See ibid. 127. 
23
 See e.g. Levitsky, J. E.: The Europeanization of European Private Law. American Journal 
of Comparative Law, (1994) No. 2. 380. 
24
 See Mádl F.: lus Commune Europae. Jogtudományi Közlöny, Vol. 45. (1990) 3. 
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boundaries of legality and (he consequent practice of the Constitutional Court 
had a positive impact on our legal culture.25 Besides, the harmonization of 
law plays a key role in respect to the consolidation of our regulative legal 
culture. 
I would just refer to the fact that since 1990, we have harmonized most of 
the legal norms listed in the White Papers,26 and we have a good chance to 
complete this process in 2002. 
The linguistic and human rights education of judges and public officials has 
begun but it is quite obvious that the final solution could be expected from the 
mass application of the new generation of law students. 
I would like to emphasize, however, that European integration is not 
incompatible with the preservation of the uniqueness of our legal culture. 
The integration has a double rationale. On the one hand, it must ensure the 
attainment of certain common goals; for this reason, it must develop the 
institutional guarantees of reaching similar results from similar springing. "As 
far as law is concerned, it means that, with respect to the basic goals to be 
realized by all means, we can and in some cases must 'unify' only those 
elements of our legal culture that has only a quasi instrumental signi-
ficance."27 
So, when we work upon making our legal culture "euro-conform", we must 
not forget about fostering our given culture! I believe it is not an exaggeration 
to claim that even Hungarian legal culture can contribute to the development 
of the legal system of the European Union. Hungarian authorities of legal 
policy could take an initiative about the reception of some of our legal 
conceptions to promote the development of some not well elaborated 
European legal institutions. One candidate could be our statute on ethnic 
minorities.28 
25
 See Kulcsár: op. cit. 147-148. Recent surveys on legal consciousness justify the same 
point. See Visegrády A. Schadt Gy.: Egyetemi hallgatók jogtudata. (The Legal Consciousness 
of Law Students, jogismerete). Magyar Jog. Vol. 47. (2000) 9. 
26
 Kecskés L. Szécsényi L.: Szemléletváltás az EK-magyar jogharmonizációban The 
Change of Perspective in the European Hannonization of Hungarian Law. Vol. 53. Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, ( 1998) 2. 60. 
2
' Varga Cs.: Európai integráció és a nemzeti jogi kultúrák egyedisége. (European 
Integration and the the Uniqueness of National Legal Cultures.) Jogtudományi Közlöny, Vol. 47. 
(1992) 10. 446. 
28
 Mihály Samu makes a similar point on this issue. See Samu M.: Az európai jog és az 
európai jogpolitika szükségessége. (European Law and the Necessity of a European Legal 
Policy), Magyar Jog, Vol. 44. (1997) 7. 
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5. Concluding remarks upon the perspectives the ins commune 
Europaeum 
The law of the EU is not the "European legal culture"29 but the product of the 
European legal cultures. The new "European legal culture" is in the making 
and manifested by e.g. the proliferation of technical norms and the growing 
unity and vertical plurality of the legal system.3" However, the future common 
law of Europe means much more than the growing harmony of different fields 
and norms of law. The "euro-centrism" of European law does not involve that 
it relies upon only the legal systems of the countries of Western Europe. It is 
also influenced by the legal institutions of e.g. the USA, Australia, New 
Zealand. One of the questions of the future is how can this complex but 
homogeneous legal order integrate the legal traditions of the countries of 
Eastern Europe.31 
The pledge of the future of the aquis communautaire is the extent of 
efficacy of its rules. 
It is a complex task to measure this efficacy that includes among others the 
inquiry into the following factors: 
the way the legislatures of the institutions of the community reflects the 
policy of the community; 
the application of the community law in the member states; 
the translation of the community directives into national laws; 
the effecti veness of secondary community legislature and national 
"naturalization" in respect to the systems of public administrative; 
the effectiveness of the community law in respect to the activity of 
economic and other organizations, or even private persons; 
the legal actions concerning the community law at national courts; 
the enforcement of the community law by national courts.32 
29
 See Gessner, V.: Wandel europäischer Rechtskulturen. In: Lebensverhältnisse und soziale 
Konflikte im neuen Europa. Hrsg.: B. Schäfer. Westdeutscher Verlag, Frankfurt, 1993. 5-18. 
30
 See Kulcsár: op. cit. 139. 
31
 Burrows N.: European Community: The Mega Mix. In: Studies in Legal Systems: Mixed 
and Mixing. Eds.: E. Ösücü E. Attwoll S. Coyle: Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague London-Boston, 1996. 312. 
32
 See Snyder, F.: The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions Processes, 
Tools and Techniques. Modern Law Review, Vol. 56. ( 1993 January) 25-27. On the notion of 
the efficacy of law, its factors and its measure, see Visegrády A.: A jog hatékonysága. (The 
Eff icacy of Law.) Unió Kiadó, Budapest, 1997. 
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One can see that the efficacy of European law is heavily dependant upon the 
national legal systems. 
As far as the perspectives of the approximation of the legal systems are 
concerned, I join the advocates of the convergence of continental and common 
law models. Both systems will be modified as judicial law becomes significant 
besides written law, and statutory law gains strength in relation to case law. 
Just like in the past, the European states will undoubtedly follow the same 
legal principles in the future. The root of the tree of European law is the 
Roman law, its bole is the ius commune, and its branches that grew in different 
directions will be grown in the same direction by the slowly evolving, unifying 
will of the European people.33 
33
 Schräge, E. I. H.: Utrumque lus. Über das römisch-kanonische ius commune als 
Grundlage europäischer Rechtseinheit in Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Revue Internationale des 
Droits de l'Antiquité, 3e Série, Tome XXXIX. (1992) 407. 
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"eEurope+ is expected to have a positive impact oil the 
adoption and effective implementation of the 'acquis com-
munautaire' in a number of areas. Moreover the undertaking 
of political commitments in the Candidate Countries similar to 
those of the EU is a concrete sign of the growing maturity of 
our relationship. " 
(Günther Verheugen, Brussels 16 June 2001) 
I. From Lisbon to Goteborg. Transition to a knowledge-based 
information society 
1.1. The main messages of the Lisbon EU Summit 
It is beyond doubt that one of the most prepared Summit in the last 10 years was 
the EU Summit held in Lisbon on 23-24 March 2000. Before this Summit the 
European Commission issued a Report on "eEurope an Information Society for all" 
in which paper the Commission made several proposals and developed important 
initiatives for the Lisbon Council Summit. 
What the Commission did then was that it prepared an inventory on what 
weaknesses the Union should face in the next decade as well as what challenges 
should be addressed by the EU in the foreseeable future in order that it could 
properly cope with the process of globalization in the XXI century.1 This is 
why 'employment, economic reform and social cohesion' was given the most 
important political priority in Lisbon in the context of 'developing a long-term 
strategy for the next decade'.2 
' See an excellent overview about the economic implications of the 'new economy' 
concept, wrote in Hungarian by Veress, J.: 'Új gazdaság-Internet gazdaság VeEurope-eMagyar-
ország-eSikerül?' ('New economy-Internet economy'/eEurope-eHungary-can it succeed?') , 
published as a supplement of the Európa 2002, IL/1 volume, Budapest 2001 Március, iii .-xxii. 
:
 In the Presidency conclusions the relevant heading is titled: "The new Challenge". And 
then it reads: "The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting the challenges 
of a knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people's lives and 
require a radical transformation of the European economy. The Union must shape these changes 
in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society and also with a view to the 
forthcoming enlargement. The rapid and accelerating pace of change means il is urgent for the 
Union to act now to harness the full benefits of the opportunities presented. Hence the need for 
the Union to set a clear strategic goal and agree a challenging programme for building knowledge 
infrastructures, enhancing innovation and economic reform, and modernising social welfare and 
education systems.", points 1 - 2 on page 1., SN 100/00. See: also the Commission Report on 
'eEurope-An information society for all', submitted to the Lisbon Summit (6978/00). From a 
THE NOTION OF eEUROPE WITHIN THE EU FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 221 
The Commission pointed out the following weaknesses at EU level: 
"More than 15 million Europeans are still out of work. The employment 
rate is too low and is characterised by insufficient participation in the labour 
market by women and older workers. Long-term structural unemployment and 
marked regional unemployment imbalances remain endemic in parts of the 
Union. The services sector is underdeveloped, particularly in the areas of 
telecommunications and the Internet. There is a widening skills gap, esepcially 
in information technology where increasing number of jobs remain unfilled. " 
(point 4 on page 4).3 
At Lisbon the European Council finally defined an ambitious strategy for 
change. A strategy to make the European Union by 2010 "the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth and better jobs and greater social cohesion".4 The Council 
also defined a "new open method of coordination at all levels, coupled with a 
stronger guiding and coordinating role of the European Council to ensure more 
coherent strategic direction and effective monitoring of progress. A meeting of 
the European Council to be held every Spring will define the relevant mandates and 
ensure that they are followed up. " (point 7. of the Presidency conclusions in 
Lisbon). This is an important institutional guarantee, and added value in practical 
terms built in the Lisbon Strategy itself.5 
The European Council also adopted a well-detailed programme in Lisbon at 
strategic level describing all the necessary implementing measures (more than 
historical point of view, see. e.g. Green Paper f rom the Commission on Commercial 
Communications in the Internal Market, "Making the most of the Internal Market". Strategic 
programme. Communication from the Commission to the Council 22. 12. 1993, COM( 1993) 632 
final or Europe's way to the Information Society. An action plan Communication from the 
Commission, 9.8.94, COM (1994) 347 final. 
3
 For more statistics with regard to the 'eEurope concept ' , see for example the speeches 
of Commissioner Erkki Liikanen before the Lisbon Summit like: (i) 'An Information Society 
for all', delivered by Liikanen in the 'Infoworld Conference-The liberalisation of the 
telecommunications sector in Greece' held in Athens on 21st January 2000, or (ii) Liikanen's 
speech delivered just before the Lisbon Summit on 9th March 2000 with the title: 'The 
Commission's top eEurope priorities for Lisbon'. 
4
 See in more detail: Communication from the Commission on 'Realising the E U ' s 
potential: consolidating and extending the Lisbon Strategy'. Contribution of the European 
Commission to the Spring European Council, Stockholm 23-24th March 2001., COM(2001) 79 
final. Volume I (Brussels, 7. 2. 2001 ) 2 et seq. 
5
 Reassured under the Feira Summit (Presidency conclusions, point 39), as well as under 
the Nice Summit by the French Presidency (Presidency conclusions, points 25., 34.). 
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60 measures, not only legal measures, but institution-building ones as well, see: 
Annex I). wich need to be made until end 2002 in order that the Lisbon Strategy 
could be successfully completed (under points 5-19 in the Presidency conclusions). 
From legal point of view the following fragement needs to be quoted: 
"The European Council calls in particular on:—the Council along with the 
European Parliament, where appropriate, to adopt as rapidly as possible during 
2000 pending legislation on the legal framework for electronic commerce,6 on 
copyright and related rights,1 on e-money, on the distance selling of financial 
services,8 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements, and the dual-use 
of export control regime, the Commission and the Council to consider how to 
promote consumer confidence in electronic commerce, in particular through 
alternative dispute resolution systems. " (point 11). 
6
 See: Directive 200/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. Similarly see: Directive 99/93/EC on 
electronic signature. A good summary of the implications of this Directive on the Internal Market 
is in the article of Emmanuel Crabit: La directive sur le commerce electronic. Le projet 
"Méditerraneé" in Revue du Droit de l'Union Européene 4/2000, 749-832. Further literature in 
the EU: Graham Pearce-Nicholas Platten: 'Promoting the Information Society: The EU 
Directive on Electronic Commerce ' , European Law Journal, Vol. 6 Issue 4. December 2000, 
363-379., or Roeder, E.: 'Services in the Information Society. A Commentary on the EC-
Directive on Electronic Commerce ' , EBLJ, Nov.-Dec. 1999, 472-M-81. From the Hungarian 
literature: Zsuffa, Á.: 'Gondolatok az e-kereskedelem (szabály)rendszeréről' ('Thoughts about 
the regulatory framework for e-commerce'), or Jambrik, G.: 'Contract formation via the 
Internet-legal problems and legislative questions' . Both articles were published in 'Europa 
2002', II. No. 2. (2001 June) Annex C. 
7
 Good summary can be found in Single Market News, No. 6-January 1997, article on 
'Copyright: Communication on a legislative framework for the Information Society' on page 
17 et seq. See also as background materials: Commission Green Paper on Combating 
counterfeiting and piracy in the Single Market, COM(98)569 final, or Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of Regions on Creating a Safer Information Society by improving the security 
of information infrastructures and combating-computer related crime, COM(2000)890 final, 
published in Brussels on 26. 01. 2001. For legal text see: Proposal for a directive on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society 
(SEC/2000/1734 final). 
8
 Not yet adopted even under the Swedish Presidency. See for more information: Proposal 
for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the distance marketing 
of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EE С and Directive 
97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, COM(1998)468 final, (OJ 385 of 11. 12. 1998, 10-17.), completed and 
modified by Opinion 1999/C 169/15 of the Economic and Social Committee (OJ С 169 of 16. 
06. 1999, 43^t8 . ) . Amended proposal see: (COM(1999) 385 of 23. 07. 1999). 
THE NOTION OF eEUROPE WITHIN THE EU FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 223 
Then " the Council and the European Parliament to conclude as early as 
possible in 2001 work on the legislative proposals announced by the Commission 
following its 1999 review of the telecommunications regulatory framework. The 
Member States and, where appropriate, the Community to ensure that frequency 
requirements for future mobile communications systems are met in a timely and 
efficient manner. Fully integrated and liberalised télécoms markets should be 
completed by the end of 2001." 
All these tasks show that the adopted Lisbon Strategy in March 2000 set out 
a really burdensome legislative programme for the Union to complete in order 
that the envisaged eEurope vision from a legal perspective could be put in 
practice by end 2002. 
1.2. The Santa Maria de F cira EU Summit. The eEurope Action Plan 2002 
The Freira Summit was a logical follow up of the Lisbon Summit, at which (he 
Heads of State and Governments dealt with the eEurope concept in more detail 
under the II Chapter of the Presidency conclusions, (points 19-39). 
The key-sentence that should be quoted is: "The European Council endorses 
the comprehensive eEurope 2002 Action Plan and requests the institutions, the 
Member Slates and all other actors to ensure its full and timely implementation by 
2002 and to prepare longer term perspectives for a knowledge-based economy 
encouraging info-conclusion and closing the numeracy gap. Ai a short term 
priority, the necessary steps should be taken to bring down the cost of 
accessing the Internet through the unbundling of the local loop. A report 
should be presented by the Commission to the European Council in Nice, and 
on a regular basis thereafter, on progress in achieving the Action Plan's 
objectives." (point 22). 
Following point 8. of the Lisbon Summit Conclusions, and this should be 
underlined, the Feira Summit finally adopted the Action Plan on eEurope 2002. 
This was a great achievement. 
1.3. Progress achieved during the French Presidency 
Not too much under the French Presidency can be reported in terms of the 
eEurope concept. This is primarily because during the French Presidency special 
attention was devoted to the successful completion of the institutional reforms 
of the EU which step was considered by the policy-makers in the EU as one of 
the most important preconditions for enlargement. (Adoption of the Nice Treaty 
in December 2000). For political reasons another priority was the adoption of 
the European Charter for Fundamental Rights. That is why the Presidency 
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Programme of France for the period of 1st July 2000 and 31st December 2000 
anticipated just little progress on the fulfilment of the Feira Action Plan on 
eEurope 2002. The main points were: 
quick adoption of the Directive on VAT '1 on electronic commerce (page 4, 
finally not completed), 
see: more than 12 measures, envisaged for adoption on pages 4 - 9 in the 
Presidency Programme (like for example: "In line with the conclusions of 
the Lisbon European Council, the French Presidency will work to secure 
political agreement on the proposal for a Directive on the distance selling 
of financial services... " (page 6) or "The French Presidency will hold dis-
cussions in the Telecommunications Council on the new regulatory regime 
for communications services (telecommunications and radio/TV) with the 
aim of reaching political agreement on at least some of the main Directives 
on the table.10 Following the communications adopted by the Commission, 
the focus will also be on Internet governance and the creation of a 'eu' 
domain name (dot EU)" (page 7) but with poor results." 
9
 See: Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 77/338/EEC as regards the value added 
taxes arrangements applicable to services supplied by electronic means, COM(2000) 349 final. 
As background material see: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on 'A strategy to improve the operation of the VAT system within the 
context of the Internal Market', COM(2000) 348 final. For the debate of the draft amending 
Directive on VAT see: Report on Proposed Directive COM(2000) 349 final, European 
Parliament session document, 28 November 2000 (Final A-5-0362/2000). 
10
 See as background material: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on 
'Fourth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package', 
COM(1998) 594 final. 
11
 Where considerable progress can be reported under the French Presidency is the area of 
'e-money' . See: Directive 2000/28/EC (OJ L 275, 27.10.2000, 37-38.) and Directive 
2000/46/EC (OJ L 275, 27. 10. 2000, 39—43) on e-money which legal measures provide that 
electronic money may be issued only by supervised institutions meeting certain legal and 
financial conditions, ensuring technical security. Similarly as an important step forward we 
should notice of the meeting of the Ministers of Civil Service in November 2000 in Strasbourg 
in which Council meeting a Resolution was adopted on e-government too. Other developments 
under the French Presidency were: the eEurope update in November 2000 concerning the Action 
Plan, see: COM (2000) 783 final and Towards the e-Conrmission-Action 7: Definition of a 
Strategy towards the e-Commission (Better use of ICT and Communications Networks), Note 
d'Orientation, version of 11/7/2000. 
THE NOTION OF eEUROPE WITHIN THE EU FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 225 
Nevertheless, it should be noted, that the French Presidency fulfilled its 
mission, from the viewpoint of the candidate countries, by the fact that the Nice 
Treaty was finally agreed and parafied by all Member States. 
1.4. The legislative implications at Community level of the adopted Lisbon 
Strategy12 
Following the Lisbon Summit, it turned out that the most important task for the 
Commission as well as for the forthcoming Presidencies before 2002 would be 
to establish the necessary regulatory frameworks for the proper implementation 
of the adopted Strategy and eEurope Action Plan. The Commission put therefore 
the question: 'what we need in order that the legislative foundations of our 
eEurope concept could be put in place ?' In its Action Plan adopted in June 
2000 the Commission answered in fact to this question as follows: we need (1) 
a supportive legal environment, (2) favourable tax measures, and (3) a positive 
social framework.13 This approach requires from a legal point of view a 'six-
pillars based regulatory framework', which the Union should efficiently 
implement in the next years to come. Namely: (i) the establishment of a new 
regulatory framework for electronic communication services, (ii) the rapid 
implementation by the Member States of the two new framework Directives (on 
e-commerce and on electronic signatures) including 'the country of origin 
approach' as far as the applicable law and 'forum-shopping' is concerned in e-
commerce, (iii) developing a cross-border on-line out of court dispute settlement 
mechanism plus preparing for a code of conduct for e-commerce players,14 (iv) 
12
 An excellent description on the relevant Community regulatory framework can be found 
in the Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on 'E-
contmerce and financial services' , Brussels, 07. 02. 2001, COM(2001) 66 final, in particular on 
pages 6 - 1 0 . As far as services in general are concerned, see: Communication f rom the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 'An Internal Market Strategy for 
Services', COM(2000) 888 final, in particular 13-14. Similarly see at regulatory framework 
level: Single Market News, No. 8—July 1997, article on 'Electronic Commerce: A framework 
for future action' on pages 23 at seq. Or as a broader-rather policy-based- presentation on the 
subject see: Green Paperon Commerce, in Bulletin of the EU, Supplement 2/97 (good summary 
is Annex С on the relevant acquis). 
11
 This means also a great challenge in terms of that eEurope should become implementable 
for all the EU citizens, including those suffering with disabilities. They should also have 
interactive access to all services of this new economy. 
14
 As for the implications of the eEurope concept vis-a-vis the consumers, this paper cannot 
address them in more detail, nevertheless as further literature see e.g.: Council Resolution 
1999/C23/01 of 19. 01. 1999. on the consumer dimension of the information society, OJ С 23 
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the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for digital television 
services with Internet capabilities, (v) the establishment of the security network 
of the eEurope concept from an IPRs point of view (e.g. unsolicited mails, 
viruses, or credit-card abuse etc.) as well as addressing its criminal law 
implications at EU level,15 in addition to this, this pillar covers also the data-
protection related issues of the new economy (vi) finally the establishment of 
an appropriate regulatory framework for (3G mobile) radio spectrum in the 
Community. 
We have to bear in mind all the above-referred regulatory pillars when 
addressing the legal issues of the process aiming at building up an EU 
completing a knowledge-based information society by 2010. 
2. The Swedish Presidency's contribution to the 'eEurope Action Plan' 
2.1. Preparing the Stockholm Summit 
Sweden took over the Presidency from France on 1st January 2001. As known 
this was for the first time that Sweden after her accession to the EU in 
1995 could hold the Presidency. That is why in the Semi-annual Presidency 
Programme, Sweden underlined the following: 
"On I January 2001, Sweden will for the first time assume the Presidency 
of the EU Council of Ministers. Sweden's foremost ambition is to serve the 
interests of the whole of the Union and its citizens, to ensure openness and 
continuity and to carry the issues on the EU's agenda forward. Three areas share 
top priority on the Goverment's agenda: Enlargement, Employment, Environ-
ment. These three Es will be distinguishing features of the Swedish Presidency." 
(page 2). 
One could say, that eEurope was not, therefore, addressed by the Swedish 
Presidency as one of the Presidency's priorities. But based on the concrete 
results of the last six months—we can contradict to such a presumption by 
of 28. 01. 1999, 1 - 3 . From the scientific literature: N. Reich: Consumer law and e-commerce, 
Competition and Consumer Law Journal, 2000, 180-200. 
15
 See e.g. the proposed Framework Council Decision on harmonisation of certain Member 
State criminal law provisions relating to fraud and counterfeiting involving all non-cash means 
of payment (including electronic payments ) so that they are recognised as criminal offences 
throughout the Union and punished with appropriate sanctions, COM( 1999) 438 final. Similarly 
see: 'Commission Communication on fraud prevention'. Written procedure (2001) 03. 
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arguing for that on the contrary, eEurope was in fact the fourth E in the 
completed priorities which brought also together with the political break-
through achieved with regard to the enlargement process a great success for 
the Presidency as we will see below. 
We can develop the following elements of the Presidency programme which 
may prove that further implementing the eEurope Action Plan 2002 was, 
indeed, a priority for Sweden: 
a) (on page 4 under the heading 'Full employment and high growth in a 
competitive Union') it is stipulated: "At its meeting in Lisbon in March 2000, 
the European Council established a new strategic goal for the Union: the 
creation within a decade of the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world with the potential for sustainable economic growth, more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion. It was established at the same time 
that full employment should be a goal of the Union's economic and social 
policy. These (the implementation J. Cz.) measures are to be followed up at 
annual spring summit meetings, the first of which is to take place in Stockholm 
in March 2001 during the Swedish Presidency. The Stockholm Summit must 
show both Europe's citizens and the world that the Union's objective defined 
at Lisbon is being taken seriously and that the work of modernising the 
European model continues" (page 5). 
b) (on page 7, ad. 'Education and research'), stipulated: "Increased broadly 
based investments in universal education and vocational training of high quality 
are preconditions for achieving the new strategic goals for the Union's work 
set out in the conclusions of the Lisbon Summit. The Report of the Education 
Council to the European Council in Stockholm should lay the foundation for 
a comprehensive strategy aimed at creating a learning Europe and raising the 
general level of knowledge in the Union. In this strategy, Sweden would 
particularly like to contribute to progress in equipping young people and adults 
to be able to utilise the potential of information and communication technology 
and in developing the different components of lifelong learning. Sweden 
intends to contribute to the succesful implementation of the action plan for e-
Learning. The importance of equality between men and women will also be 
emphasised in this context. Another objective is to complete the preparation of 
the Commission's proposal for a recommendation on mobility of students, 
researchers and teachers, and to follow up the action plan approved by the 
European Summit in Nice." 
c) (on page 9., ad. 'The internal market and consumer interests') stipulated: 
"Sweden intends to take various steps to promote an efficient internal market 
that operates in the interests of the consumers. The aim is that the internal 
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market should offer concrete advantages in the form of more safe products and 
services at competitive prices.The legal and economic interests of consumers 
will be promoted and protection against health hazards and hazardous products 
enhanced. In this way, consumers will acquire greater confidence in the Union 
and the internal market.... Sweden intends to devote attention to intellectual 
property law—e.g. copyright, trademarks, patents, particularly Community 
patents and design registration one of the internal market's most crucial areas. 
IPRs will be of growing importance for growth, not least against the backdrop 
of new technology. An important issue that Sweden intends to pursue during 
its Presidency is the formulation of clearer and simplier rules for the Internal 
Market. 
As the presiding country, Sweden will strive to ensure that the European 
Parliament and the Council can adopt the new package of legislation on public 
procurement not later than in June 2001."I6 
(on page 10) "Work is in progress to adjust the rules for VAT ... work on a 
Directive concerning value-added tax and e-commerce17 may be mentioned in 
particular" or "Great importance is also attached to the Commission's Green Paper 
on security of energy supply". 
d) (on page 11 ad. 'Telecommunications and IT') stipulated: "The signi-
ficance of telecommunications and IT for growth and employment is steadily 
increasing and special attention will be devoted to this area at the meeting of the 
European Council in Stockholm. Greater ability to exploit the new technology is 
crucial if we are to provide effective communications services for citizens, create 
new, and develop existing, businesses in goods and services, and promote 
innovation and research and development in Europe. Furthermore, the European 
telecommunications and IT industry needs to be able to assert itself in the face of 
tough global competition. In order to contribute to effective competition in the 
telecommunications sector, work will focus on the formulation of Community 
legislation on electronic communication during the Swedish Presidency. Sweden 
will follow up the Commission's eEurope initiative and the Action Plan adopted at 
the European Council in Feira. At the Summit meeting in Stockholm, a first report 
will be discussed on the contribution of this action plan to the development of a 
16
 Unfortunately, the legislative package on publ ic procurement to my informa-
tion couldn't have been adopted by the time when the Göteborg Summit was held. See: the 
proposal for a Direct ive on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public supply 
contracts, public service contracts and public works contracts, COM(2000)0275 final. 
1
 The draft amending Directive on VAT (within the framework of e-Europe notion) 
couldn't have been adopted either by the end of the Swedish Presidency. 
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knowledge-based information society and the priorities that should be established 
for its continued implementation. The Presidency will energetically strive to 
ensure that the new information society and all the new technology are available 
to all and that the new information technology is fully utilised in all sectors of 
society." 
e) (on page 16 'A Union close to its citizens') stipulated: "Regarding 
cooperation in the area of civil law, Sweden is particularly interested in making 
progress in issues that are crucial to the ordinary citizen. The realisation of the 
internal market presupposes that the rights of people and businesses have legal 
force accross national borders. Measures to simplify and speed up execution of 
judgements in other Member States are important in this context. Cooperation 
between cowls of law in the Union when evidence is to be taken in another Member 
State will also be improved. Another high priority issue is the establishment of 
networks which, inter alia, will give citizens easy access to information about 
the court procedure in Member States and concerning the material rules that 
apply, for example in connection with purchasing products or leasing a holiday 
home (vide: so-called EEJ-NET 'clearing houses'—J. Cz.)"18 
f) (on page 22 ad. 'An open, modern and effective Union/Transparency') 
stipulated: "Sweden attaches great importance to ensuring that the relevant legal 
instrument that is to be adopted not later than May 2001 leads to improved 
access to documents kept at EU institutions". 
All the above shows that while Enlargement (number 1 priority) was about 
1,5 page in the Presidency's Programme, the eEurope-related issues covered 
more than 4 pages, and set out very concrete actions/tasks to be made or to be 
carried out. Consequently I believe that eEurope was really a priority for 
Sweden, which Member State is anyhow one of the most advanced frontrunners 
of the eEurope idea. 
18
 In this field, Sweden has achieved a great deal in the last six months, because all the 
earmarked legal acts and other measures have been enacted: (1) further steps on implementing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of 
judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, OJ L 160 (30. 06. 2000) 37., 
(2) similarly further steps in implementing Council Resolution of 25 May 2000 on a Community-
wide network of national bodies for the extra-judicial settlements of consumer disputes, OJ С 
155 (06. 06. 2000), I, (3) adoption of Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the 
principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes, 
OJ L 109 (19. 04. 2001 ) 56. (which is in fact a revision of the similar Commission soft-law 
measure adopted still in 1998), (4) adoption of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and 
commercial matters, OJ L 012 (16.01.2001) 1. 
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2.2. Commission Communication 'eEurope 2002' Impact and priorities' 
This Paper is an excellent summary of the state of play where the EU stands at 
completing the eEurope Action Plan (See: Annex I).19 
It can be submitted that while the Goteborg Summit was deemed/planned 
by the Presidency to be an 'Enlargement-focused Summit', it is also clear 
that the extraordinary Summit, held in Stockholm20 was according to the 
Presidency schedule devoted to the progress-reporting on what has been 
achieved from the Lisbon Strategy, and how to further proceed with its imple-
mentation!? 
The Commission Communication on eEurope 2002/Impact and Priorities, 
adopted in Stockholm, is a very important summary document on what has been 
done so far as well as on how to go on. In this respect, the following points 
should be stressed: 
good progress on e-government (adoption of a Work Programme on e-
government /establishing electronic market places fore-procurements in the 
public sector/ see: on page 15, or adoption of a list of possible public 
services at net, see: point 3.6. and Annex I on page 19) 
good progress on institution-building (IB) actions (chapter 2) 
clear-cut programming for the future (chapter 5) 
specific chapter about how to involve the Candidate Countries (chapter 4) 
decided that eEurope should reach the EC financial scheme as well so that it 
could be gradually in an efficient way reflected in the implementation of the 
structural policies till 2006 (pages 11-13). 
19
 The annexed tables are taken f rom the 'Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on Realising the E U ' s potential: Consolidating and 
extending the Lisbon Strategy/Contribution of the European Commission to the Spring European 
Council Summit to be held in Stockholm on 23-24 March 2001, COM(2001 ) 79 final, 30-33 
(see also: pages 18-20). This was an important supplement to the 'Impact and priorities eEurope 
2002 ' Communication paper. A Third Paper, which was submitted to the Stockholm Summit, 
is a Commission Staff Working Paper on the 'First Report on progress towards the European 
Research and Innovation Area', which Report reflected also on the implementation of 
'Commission Communication on Innovation in a knowledge-driven economy' , COM(2000) 
567, 20. 9. 2000. 
20
 See: in more detail : Presidency conclusions of the Stockholm Summit , Chapters VI. 
VIII . 
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2.3 Progress achieved in establishing the earmarked regulatory frameworks 
Under the Swedish Presidency, as explored above, good progress has been made 
in terms of successfully completing eEurope Action Plan. Nevertheless some 
delays/problems should be also mentioned in order that a correct picture could be 
put in place in this respect. The Swedish Presidency couldn't reach progress in the 
following areas: 
the earmarked regulatory framework for radio spectrum not established, 
the télécoms package not adopted (although the deadline is end 2001 ), 
the new regulatory framework for public procurements in the classical sectors 
not adopted despite the fact that foreseen under the Swedish Presidency, 
the amending Directive on VAT (in the context of the e-commerce including 
the use of electronic invoicing for VAT purposes) not adopted (although the 
final deadline again is end 2001), 
the Directive on distance marketing of financial services not adopted, 
the proposed Directive on copyrights and neighbouring rights in the 
information society not adopted, 
an 'eu.'Internet domain name is not yet available. 
We hope that under the Belgian Presidency further progress can be reached in 
the above fields too. 
2.4. Goteborg Summit, Involvement of the Candidate Countries 
At the Goteborg Summit, the Swedish Presidency completely fulfilled the tasks, 
defined in the Commission Communication on 'eEurope 2002/Impact and 
Priorities' under the point 4. (eEurope+ an initiative by and for the Candidiate 
Countries).21 In the Presidency conclusions, the following reads: "Taking into 
account of their particular situations, candidate countries are invited to 
translate the Union's economic, social and environmental objectives into their 
national policies. The intention of candidate countries to adopt eEurope+ini-
tiative is a successful example. Starting from Spring 2003, the Commission will 
begin covering the candidate countries and their national policies in its annual 
synthesis report" (point 11.). This conclusion is a very good message for the 
candidate countries, because this means that they will be actively involved in the 
policy cooperation of the eEurope concept since 2003 as if they were already 
Member States. The Goteborg Summit also adopted the 'Common Action Plan 
on eEurope 2003' which sets clearly out those tasks (including the corresponding 
21
 See: COM(2001) 140 final on pages 17-18. 
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deadlines as well) which the candidate countries must consider before accession 
and shall complete in order that they could be also ready by the time of accession 
from this point of view. 
The above e-Europe Action Plan for the Candidate Countries aims to help in 
accelerating reform and modernisation of the economies in the acceeding Central 
and Eastern European Countries (hereinafter: CEECs), encourage capacity and 
institution-building, improve overall competitiveness, and allow the CEECs to 
leverage their strengths to the advantage of their citizens. In particular, e-Europe+ 
recognises that there is a basic need to ensure that all citizens are offered the 
possibility of access to affordable communications services in order to avoid a 
digital divide the Western part and Central-Eastern part of Europe in longer terms. 
The Action Plan is based on four objectives: 
accelerate the putting into place of the basic building blocks of the Infor-
mation Society, 
a cheaper, faster, secure Internet, 
investing in people and skills, 
stimulate the use of Internet. 
Tha Action Plan consists of 27 pages, it embodies more than 100 concrete 
actions the Candidate Countries should carry out before 2003 (with clear-cut 
deadlines and fund-raising-schedule) plus we can find therein a well-designed 
monitoring regime. 
This Action Plan is really a good paper for the CEECs to fit their on-going 
economic transformation which is far away not yet completed into the process 
of globalisation and in terms of how actively becoming a Member State of a 
knowledge-based information society—like the EU envisaged to be by 2010. 
3. Challenges for the Candidates Countries after the Swedish Presidency 
3.1. The notion of an 'information society' in Central and Eastern Europe 
It should be stressed that the Central and Eastern European Countries they are all 
in practical terms now in transition. This is the process what we call 'economic 
transformation' in the post-communist rgeion in Europe. In other words what we 
at present all are living in it is a transition process from a state-ownership-based 
central planning (command) economy into a functioning market economy in which 
the private ownership must be dominant. Beyond doubt this is a historical process 
which—as generally believed—far away not yet finished. The new challenges 
brought into this historical transition process by the forthcoming EU accession and 
within this accession process by the new notion of 'eEurope' (new economy) is 
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really a 'great endeavour' the transition CEECs will have to cope with in the next 
decade to come. The gap, however, is still too big, for this reason see a comparative 
analysis, published recently in Uniting Europe (Attached as Annex II). 
3.2. A new dimension of the 'constantly evolving acquis" 
As well-known from the scientific literature, the accession acquis of the EU 
which the CEECs should take on by the time of accession the latest is a given 
acquis (a 'lex date'22 using the ancient Roman law term). Even this acquis is 
one being 'constantly evolving'. A good proof for this characteristic is the 
recently-occured EC acquis following the Lisbon Strategy on 'building up a 
knowledge-based Information Society' or enacted so far in terms of the evolving 
new 'eEurope concept' within the EU. Undoubtedly this new acquis is an 
additional burden put/imposed on the Candidates "uniletarelly" by the EU (since 
the Europe Agreements obviously didn't even mention this), which burden and 
this is also clear- will be further developing. 
Since March 2000 (or if one wishes since April 1998 when the accession 
negotiations with the CEECs started) more than 20 new secondary legal 
measures have been adopted (or being currently under discussion) within the 
EU. This leads me to suggest that a post-screening meeting would be advisable 
to be held in the near future with the Candidates despite the fact that the 
relevant negotiating chapters have been provisionally closed with all of them. 
A good summary of the situation was given in Gothenburg in June 2001 by 
the European Council in the Action Plan of eEurope 2003 for the Candidate 
Countries: 
"While not interfering with the negotiation process, eEurope+ is expected 
to have a positive impact on the adoption and effective implementation (by the 
Candidates J. Cz.) of the 'acquis communautaire' in telecommunications, 
electronic commerce, areas of financial services and transport services, and 
several other areas of economic activity".23 
Let's hope in this. 
22
 See in more detai: Czuczai, J.: Some thoughts about Hungary's process of accession to 
the EU" in: Magyar Jog, July 1999, .390-397., or Czuczai, J.: 'Von der Rechtsstellung eines 
assoziierten Staates zum Status eines Mitgliedskandidaten im Ausschnitt des Prozesses der 
Rechtsangleichung' in: Magyar Jog, September 2000, 513-523., in particular on page 517. 
23
 See: Press Release issued on 16 June 2001 (http://www.europa.ei.int/comm/gothenburg 
council/eeurope2 en.htm website) on 'Heads of Government of EU Candidate Countries agree 
on common action to address the challenges of the Digital Economy, page 2. 
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3.3. Challenges and difficulties for the CEECs 
On this occasion, I would like to highlight only two main challenges (or 
difficulties) the Candidate Countries should confront with in the next years to 
come: 
(i) the first problem is with the new legal terminology, the 'eEurope acquis' 
has thus far developed (or will further bring in the EC legal phraseology). 
This legal terminology is brand-new because it doesn't comply with the 
legal and linguistic traditions of the Candidates, and I am convinced that 
the interpretation of the adopted national transposition measures in the 
CEECs will be not easy in the future. 
(ii) another problem relates to the codification on e-commerce etc. and the 
necessary codificatory techniques. Difficult issue is where and how to 
regulate the law on IT technology or e-commerce etc? In the Civil Codes, 
or in the Commercial Codes, where available, or in the Consumer 
Protection Codes, where available?24 By one framework law with several 
lower-level implementing measures, or in one very detailed Act? What 
about the role of the standards (EN, CEN, ETSI as well as the domestic 
ones?) in this law-making domain? It is almost unavoidable that the 
transposing national regulatory framework be fragmented, undesirably 
comprehensive and over-structured, whereby making the practical imple-
mentation (the application and the interpretation of the relevant laws) thus 
sometimes very difficult. That is why I think that the concerned judges, 
law-enforcement agents, prosecutors, attorneys, notaries should be trained 
in this new branch of law as early as possible. Special vocabularies/glossa-
ries and law-dictionaries are also needed to be developed in my opinion. 
3.4. Legal implications from a Hungarian perspective 
Hungary was among the first Candidate Countries, which reacted very promptly 
on the new challenges brought by the fact that the Action Plan eEurope 2002 
was adopted in June 2000 at the Feira EU Summit.25 
24
 See: Vékás, L.: 'The problems of preparing a new Civil Code in Hungary' in Annales 2000 
October of the Hungarian Law Society, Budapest, 173-208, in particular on pages 181. et seq. 
25
 See as further literature in Hungarian: (1) Újváriné Antal E.: "Az elektronikus aláírás és 
a hitelesítés-szolgáltatással összefüggő felelősségi szabályok" (The electronic signature and the 
rules on responsibility for accreditation-related service). In: Jogtudományi Közlöny, 2001 április, 
Budapest, 179-192., and Csenlerics Á.: "Az elektronikus aláírás, elektronikus irat szabályozásá-
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The Hungarian Government reached operative decisions after the EU Lisbon 
Summit like for example: 
setting up a special Government Commissioner post within the Prime 
Minister Office,26 
setting up a special (standing) Parliamentary Committee on Information 
Society, 
adopting a "Strategy for National Information Society", with an allocation 
of 40 Billion HUF in the Act 011 Two-years Central Budget for implemen-
tation,27 
adoption of an intensive legislative programme in relation to building up an 
information society in Hungary,28 
nak kérdései" (The electronic signature, the questions about regulating on the electronic 
documents). In: Napi Jogász. Budapest 2001/2. 17-18, or special supplement of HVG (Weekly 
World Economy) on 'Business at Net ' , issue of 2001, published on the 3rd of March, 65-90 . as 
well as the article on electronic signature, written by Imre Tevan, in the same issue of HVG on 
117-120. 
26
 See: 1045/2000 (V. 31.) Korm.h. informatikai kormánybiztos kinevezéséről, illetve 
1050/2000 (VI. 23.), and Korm.h. az államigazgatási informatika koordinációjának továbbfej-
lesztéséről szóló 1066/1999 (IV. 11.) Korm. határozat módosításáról, and 1051/2000 (VI. 28) 
Korm.h. a kormányzati munkamegosztás megváltozásával összefüggő egyes feladatok ellátásá-
ról. (Government Resolution No. 1045/2000 (V. 31) on the appointment of a Government 
Commissioner for Informatics and the Government Resolution No. 1050/2000 (VI. 23) on the 
amendment to the Government Resolution No. 1066/1999 (IV. 11 ) on further developing the 
coordination on informatics in terms of public administration, plus Government Resolution No. 
1051/2000 (VI. 28) on certain tasks relating to the changes in the division of government 
responsibilities.) Similarly see: "Elektronikus közbeszerzés/Digitális tender: Az informatikai 
kormánybiztos (Sik Zoltán) első terve a közbeszerzés minden láncszemének elektronizálása." 
(Public procurements by electronic means/Digital tendering: the first plan of the Government 
Commissioner for Informatics, Mr. Zoltán Sik, about digitalizing all chains of the public 
procurement process.) Figyelő, issue of 2000 jűnius 29—július 5, page 25. 
27
 See: Teván, I.: "Informatikai fejlesztési program / Civilek a pályán" (Development 
programme for informatics / ordinary people on the track), HVG (Weekly World Economy), issue 
of 26. 05. 2001, 120-121. As far as the most recent statistics in Hungary are concerned in terms 
of the eEurope concept see: "IDC-felmérés a visegrádi országok internetpiacáról — hozzáférésben 
már az é len já runk" (IDC survey on the Internet-related market-segmentation in the so-called 
Visegrád countries regarding access, we are already at the frontline). Világgazdaság, july 12 
2001. page 7, or Geese, M. Szabó, В.: "Ezerféle ügyintézés a világhálón" (Wide-ranging 
administration of matters on the world-net). Népszabadság, july 24 2001, 17. 
28
 See: in: Európa 2002, Vol. 2001. issue No. 2, Annex B, pages 1 -XXXIL in particular on 
page XXII. 
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after the Czech Republic, Hungary is the second Candidate where national 
transposition measure was enacted on electronic signature (Act No. XXXV. 
of 2001 on electronic signature),29 
adoption of the Act No. XL on Telecommunication ('A Hírközlésről').30 
But, there are also deficiencies/problems, which need to be overcome in the 
near future, like for example: 
delay in the implementation of the Government Resolution relating to the 
establishment of the central government IT system which can make the 
public procurements institutionally possible through electronic means by the 
1st February 2002 the latest,31 
the Hungarian National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) 
doesn't really reflect on the eEurope Action Plan 2002, in fact there is only 
one page addressing this topic,32 
delay in legal approximation like for example amendment to the Act No. 
XC of 1995 on public procurements, amendment to the 1992 Data Protec-
tion Act,33 or in the field of the consumer protection, delays in amending 
29
 For further literature see: 1075/2000 (IX. 13.) Korm.h. az elektronikus aláírásról szóló 
törvény szabályozási alapelveiről és az ezzel kapcsolatban szükséges intézkedésekről (Govern-
ment Resolution No. 1075/2000 (IX. 13.) on the legislative principles of the bill on electronic 
signature and the other necessary measures related ), also Jambrik G.: "Mérföldkő, de nem 
varázsszer: E-aláírás-aláírás-e?", and "Elekronikus aláírás Szignált törvény" (Cornerstone, but 
not black magic: e-signature, is it really a signature?'. (Electronic signature-signed Act), Figyelő, 
2001, issue of június 7-13, 43^15. 
30
 It should be noted that according to Article 107 of the recently adopted Act more than 50 
implementing Decrees will have to be adopted till 23rd December 2001 when the whole Act will 
enter into force (Article 103( 1 )). I doubt whether such a dömping law-making could succeed by 
the given deadline. Similar problem can be identified with the new Act on electronic signature 
(Article 27, more than 10 implementing Decrees should be adopted by September 2001 when 
the new Act will enter into force). 
31
 See: Article in Hungarian in: Világgazdaság of 21. 02. 2001 on "Kérdéses az elektronikus 
közbeszerzés startja Több hónapos késésben a programme" (The beginning of public procurements 
by electronic means is questionable. The programme is delayed with many months..., on page 8. 
32
 The revised Government Resolution No.: 2184/1999 (VII. 23.) on the NPAA, in particular 
Vol. I. 18. 
33
 See: "Digitális bukta/Internetce'gek nehéz helyzetben-Kalauz az Internethez" (Digital cake 
/ Net-companies are in difficult position Guidance to the Internet), special Supplement to the 
June 2001 issue of HVG (Weekly World Economy), 4-8., in particular the interview with 
Majtényi, L. former Ombudsman for Data Protection in Hungary on page 5. See also: Directive 
95/46/EC (OJ L 281. 23. 11. 1995, 31-50.) and Directive 97/66/EC (OJ L 24, 30. 01. 1998, 
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the 1997 Framework Act on Consumers'Rights, or the 1993 Act on Product 
Liability, or the 1959 Act on the Civil Code etc. (not talking about the still 
prevailing tasks relating to e.g. the full transposition of the new injunctions' 
Directive34 for the protection of consumers'interests, or of the new 
Directive35 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees, or of the whole e-commerce Directive from a consumers' point 
of view, or of the Directives on e-money etc.), 
Concerning protection of consumers' rights, I should underline in more 
general terms that I don't think that in Hungary 'the consumers' would be 
really placed in the centre of the law-making processes, which is a huge 
problem in my view (e.g. reconciliatory committees are very poor, NGOs are 
under-financed, court proceedings are time-consuming and not efficient 
etc.).36 I am convinced that this should change otherwise the necessary trust 
on the consumers'side in the service-providers and in general in the 'new 
economy'will be aborted (not in place), which trust is a pre-condition of the 
success of our 'eEurope' project. 
similarly no significant progress in amending the laws on taxation (e.g. 
VAT) with regard to implementing the eEurope Action Plan in Hungary, 
there are still regulatory loopholes in Hungary for example in the field of 
financial services where further law-making is needed (see: distance marketing 
or electronic payments etc.), 
Hungary should also make further efforts to prepare for the proper implemen-
tation of EEJ-NET (European Extrajudicial Network for Alternative out-of-
court dispute settlements) as well as for FIN-NET.' 
1-8.)—the Data Protection Directives deal with the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and the right to privacy in the context of electronic commerce. The 
full transposition of these Directives requires in Hungary for the amendment to the 1992 Data 
Protection Act (adoption of this amending law was originally scheduled by the Government by 
end 2001. This modification, however, requires for 2/3 majority in the Parliament. No draft bill 
made yet public!?). 
34
 See: Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19. 05. 1998 
on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, OJ L 166, 11. 06. 1998, 83-87. 
35
 See: Directive 1999/44/Ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 
on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ L 171, 07. 07. 
1999, 12-15. 
36
 See: the last Regular Report 2000 of the European Commission on Hungary's progress 
towards accession, COM( 2000)705 final, 67-68. 
37
 See: also Council Resolution of 19 January 1999 on the consumer dimension of the 
information society, OJ С 023 (28. 91. 1999.), 0001-0003. From the scientific literature, see: for 
example Reich, N.: "Consumer Law and e-conunerce", CCU, 2000, 185-200. Here I also have 
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4. Conclusions 
1 think that the following conclusions can be drawn up: 
following the adoption by the Gothenburg Council Summit of the "Common 
Action Plan on 'eEurope+2003-A cooperative effort to implement the 
information society in Europe " which programming paper was prepared by the 
Candidate Countries with the assistance of the European Commission, now the 
main challenge/task for the candidate countries is to get this Action Plan 
properly and as soon as possible converted/transferred into their own domestic 
legislative schedule as well as IB-programming system (icluding certainly the 
relevant financial implications); 
in my view, it will be essential that in the Candidate Countries before 
accession the "protection of comsumers" rights be given a political priority.38 
This will claim/require from the Candidates for a remarkable change in way of 
thinking (how they approach the consumers' affairs). Without this the imple-
mentation of the Common Action Plan on eEurope +2003", it appears to me, 
cannot be successful; 
final conclusion or rather suggestion can be that I think that in the imple-
mentation of the Community legislative programme on eEurope2003, the 
Candidate Countries should be involved already in the formulation process 
of the proposed secondary legal measures (maybe in the status of an 
"observer"), since following Gothenburg, building up an "eEurope" is now 
a common great challenge, and in fact a joint project for a "Re-united 
Europe". 
to note that in my view the Hungarian Code on Civil proceedings (Act No. Ill of 1952) should 
be amended too, and still before accession. This is because the current procedural rules are still 
not 'consumers'-focused' in ihe public administrative litigations, they still in fact protect the 
interests of the economic operators, especially by virtue of putting the 'burden of proof' on the 
shoulders of the poor consumers who are anyway out of possession. This approach must change. 
Í think that the economic operator who is in stronger position in almost all aspects-should prove 
that it did its best to obey with the relevant laws protecting the interests of the consumers. 
Like recently in Slovenia, where in 2000 the Slovenian Parliament discussed and adopted 
a 'Two-years Policy Programming Paperon Consumer Protection', submitted by the Slovenian 
Government. When the Hungarian Parliament discussed such a programme? 
THE NOTION OF eEUROPE WITHIN THE EU FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 239 
ANNEX I. 
LISBON COMMISSION ADOPTED LEGISLATION BENCHMARKING A N D 
CONCLUSIONS LEGISLATIVE A N D OTHER INITIATIVES 
POLICY PROPOSALS 
AN • eEurope Action Plan / e-Commerce Directive / European Extra Judicial 
INFORMATION (EEJ) Network created in 
SOCIETY FOR • eEurope 2002 Update April 2000 
ALL (Nice) (Report) 
• Telecoms Package / Directive on supervision of У Econfidence Web Site 
(7 measures) electronic money institutions launched by the 
Commission, 
(http://econfidence.jrc.it) 
• Creation of.eu Internet / Regulation on local loop У Commission awarded 
domain name unbundling funding for the Géant 
(Regulation) network ( 10 fold upgrading 
in speed of research 
networks by end 2001 
/ Amendment of VAT rules / Dual Use Regulation (eases У eEurope Scoreboard (Feb. 
for e-commerce electronic export of high tecnology 2001) 
invoicing (2 Directives) products) 
• eLeaming Intiative / Brussels Regulation (Rules 
(Action Plan) for jurisdication and 
recognition of judgements) 
• Communication on 
organisation and 
management of the Internet 
CREATE A • Community Patent У Benchmarking research 
EUROPEAN AREA (Regulation) policy 
OF RESEARCH 
AND • Community Design 
INNOVATION (Regulation) 
• Communication on the 
European Research Area 
and future orientations for 
research (2002-2006) 
• Staff paper on science. 
society and the citizen 
CREATING A • Communication on / Multiannual Programme У Small Business Charter 
FRIENDLY Enterprise Policy for enterprise (endorsed at Feira) 
ENVIROMENT (2001-2006) 
FOR STARTING 
UP AND • Competitiveness Report У Benchmarking Enterprise 
DEVELOPING 2000 policy: first results f rom 
INNOVATIVE Scoreboard 
BUSINNESSES 
ESPECIALLY • Communication on inno- У Innovation Scoreboard 
SMES vation in a knowledge-
based economy 
/ Communication on У Launching of new Best 
financial instruments procedure 
supporting SMEs 
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ISBON COMMISSION ADOPTED LEGISLATION BENCHMARKING A N D 
CONCLUSIONS LEGISLATIVE A N D OTHER INITIATIVES 
POLICY PROPOSALS 
ECONOMIC У Public Procurement / European Company Statue У Single Market Scoreboard 
REFORMS FOR Package (Adoption following further 





У Proposal on modernisation / Commission Regulation on У Report High Level Group on 
of the rules implementing state aid f o r SMEs Single European Sky 
Articles 81 and 82 
(Regulation) 
У Proposal on a fur ther stage / Commission Regulation on 
of postal liberalisation state aid for training 
(Directive) 
У Regulation on public / Commission framework for 
service obligations in state aid for environment 
passenger transport 
У Regulation on the creation / Commission framework for 
of a European Air Safety state aid for employment 
Authority 
/ Cardiff Report 
У Communication on 
general interest services: 
(Updating 1996 
Communication) 
У Communication on an 
internal market strategy for 
services 
У Communication on 
progress on building the 
internal market for 
electricity 
У White paper on a revised 
strategy for the common 
transport policy 
EFFICIENT A N D / 3rd Progress Report on the У Creation of Wise men 
INTEGRATED Financial Sendees Action (Lamfalusssy) group (July 
FINANCIAL Plan 2000) Interim Report (Nov 
MARKETS 2000)—Final Report (Feb 2001 ) 
У Communications on the У Implementation on 1997 
modernisation of the Code of Conduct on harmful 
Investment Services tax treatment 
Directive 






ADOPTED LEGISLATION BENCHMARKING AND 
OTHER INITIATIVES 
У Mid-term report on the 
implementation of the 
Risk Capital Action Plan 
У Communication on 
accounting strategy 
У Proposal for a directive 










У Communication on the 
contribution of public 
finances to growth and 
employment, the quality 
and sustainablity of public 
finances 











mobility for students, 
trainees and teachers 
/ Communication on e-
Leaming 
У Memorandum on 
education and lifelong 
learning 
/ Mobility Action Plan for 




У Towards a new social 
policy aganda 
(Communication) 
/ European Social Agenda 
and related scoreboard 
(European Council Nice) 
MORE AND BETTER 





/ Employment Guidelines 
2001 
/ First stage of consultation 





У Communication on safe 
and sustainable pensions 
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LISBON COMMISSION ADOPTED LEGISLATION BENCHMARKING AND 
CONCLUSIONS LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER INITIATIVES 
POLICY PROPOSALS 
PROMOTING / Communication on an 
У Equal opportunities action / Agreement on appropriate 
SOCIAL INCLUSION equal opportunities programme ( 2001 -2005 ) objectives to combat 
f ramework strategy (2001- exclusion (Nice) 
2005) 
/ Proposal for a Community 
У Antidiscrimination Action 
action programme on Programme (2001-2005) 
exclusion 
У Directive on equal 
treatment irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin 
У Directive on a general 
framework for equal 
treatment and employment 
MOBILISING THE 
У MEDIA PLUS programme / EIB Innovation 2000 
NECESSARY (2001-2005) Initiative 
MEANS 
У eCONTENT programme / Funding under RTD 
(2001-2005) programme, European 
Social Fluid, Structural 
/ Funds 
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ANNEX II. 
EUROSTAT REPORT ON INFORMATION S O C I E T Y 
IN T H E C A N D I D A T E C O U N T R I E S 
Brussels, (Uniting Europe) The number of personal computers (PCs) and Internet hosts per 
100 inhabitants in the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) is still 
relatively low compared with the EU, according to a report by Eurostat , the EU statistical 
office. 
In 1999 it was only about 'A of the EU average. 
However the CEECs record a strong growth of the number of PCs (+19% in 1999) and 
the Internet hosts (+34% in 1999). The number of mobile phone subscriptions is also 
growing strongly (+85% in 1999). 
Differences between the candidate countries are considerable: while the density of PCs 
in Slovenia and of Internet hosts in Estonia is close to the EU average, it stands at only 
about 1/10 of the EU average in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Information Society 1999/2000 
in million CEECs EU-15 USA World 
Number of PCs (Dec. 1999) 7 93 141 387 
per 100 inhabitants 6% 25% 52% 6% 
Internet hosts (Oct. 2000) 0.8 15,4 67.4% 6% 
per 100 inhabitants 0.8% 4.1% 24.2% 99.2 
Internet users (Nov. 2000) 8 88 144 360 
per 100 inhabitants 7% 23% 52% 6% 
Mobile phones (Dec. 1999) 11 147 86 481 
— per 100 inhabitants 10.7% 39.1% 31.7% 8% 
Source: Eurostat (ITU. Netsizer. NUA). 
'Information Society Statistics: Data for Central European Candidate Countries.' Eurostat, 
Statistics in focus, industry, trade and services. Theme 4-6/2001 -0-21. 
For further information: http://www.europa.eu.int/conn/eurostat/. 
This report is also available from the Office of Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2 rue Mercier. L-2985 Luxembourg Tel. +352.2929.41.118, Fax: 
+352.2929.42.709. http://eur-op.eu.int/fr/general/s-ad.htn. E-mail: info.info@cec.eu.int. 
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KATALIN PARTI 
Domestic Violence in Hungary, 
Concerning the Public Opinion, the Researches and the Data 
Available * 
I. The Public Opinion 
There are no more serious public talks on domestic violence than those are 
published in weekly magazines for women. People usually don't go deeper in 
this field since this issue is a taboo, they like the police—cannot exactly 
determine the phenomenon. It isn't defined where to split the private sphere 
and the right of the state to interfere. While there is an urgent movement all 
over the world to raise consciousness about gender-based violence as the most 
obvious form of discrimination against women, in a post-communist society 
such as Hungary there appears to be a contrary tendency: a withdrawal of the 
state from the areas of "private" violence.1 
The question of what grade of violence must be tolerated by women in 
order to maintain peace in the family is one of the untouched taboos, and so 
this is the least mentioned media issue. 
Creating the peace of the family is said to be the most important obligation 
of women in the recent public society. If a woman happens to seek divorce that 
prooves her total incapability for her simple role. Getting surrendered is the 
victim's shame. 
In the field of violence domestic type is the mostly uncultivated: in the 
1970-1980s the fact of domestic violence itself was denied. Though in 1997 
rape committed by the spouse was introduced into the criminal code, 45% of the 
surveyed don't know if it was a crime. On the other hand many consider that the 
Katalin Parti, Junior Research Fellow, National Institute of Criminology, Budapest, H-1026 
Budapest, Maros u. 6/a., Hungary. 
E-mail: partikat@niatavnet.hu 
The lecture was presented at the Workshop of Domestic Violence on 12lh October 2001, Paris. 
' This part follows the words of Krisztina Morvai's paper "Why Doesn't She Just Leave? 
Research Policy Recommendations for the Prevention and Response to Domestic Violence in 
Hungary", SOCO Project Paper No. 101 Vienna 2001. 2. 
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crime of spouse-committed rape is another weapon in women's hand against 
their husbands to have the children after the divorce as well. 
The abused wife is not very rarely said to provocate the assault herself, 
moreover, it sounds from some of the reasons of judgements. The public 
opinion blames the offended party not to leave their abuser. If the woman 
remains beside her abuser instead of abandoning him from her free will they 
take it as a legal ground of abusing. Unfortunately there isn't only the wide 
public considers it so, but the relatives and the family of the abused also. 
In a traditional patriarchal society that is for example in Hungary—up-
growing generation has socialized for a special behaviour: for hundreds of 
years it was a strict obligation for women to satisfy their husbands' (even 
sexual) demands. This view still keeps alive in the handicapped rural regions. 
Those who haven't been suffered for family abuse tend to keep away them-
selves by speeches like "this couldn't happen to a (so-called) neat woman ". 
This "someone-to-blame mechanism" is typically owned by today's Hungarian 
society. 
According to Olga Tóth's survey,2 though 37% of the interwieved consider 
that the abuser and the abused party knows each other most of the time, there 
are only a few who consider domestic violence a "real" crime. The public 
policy takes it more serious sin if someone drank drive than if someone beats 
his wife sometimes. Child-beating is considered almost the least serious sin: 
they take beating a very useful method to keep a child under discipline. Just a 
few (17%) refuse child-beating unambigously. 
As there is no exact state in Criminal Code for domestic violence we can point 
out that domestic violence is still considered a private problem in Hungary. 
II. The Statistics 
» 
The Supreme Prosecution and Ministry of Justice publish statistical issue on the 
offended party and on their relation to the offenders every year. According to 
this, relatives had an outstanding role in crimes in 1999: in the case of 
homicide 23,2%, in the case of rape 16,8%. Cathegory of close acquintance is 
relatively high (24,25%) in the case of aggravated battery, while that is much 
lower (9,7%) in the case of crimes against property. 
2
 Tóth, О.: Erőszak a csatádban (Violence in the Family). TÁRKI Socio-political Issues, 
1999. 
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The Department of Children and Juvenile Protection, Prosecution of the 
Capital looked all the juvenile offended cases started in 2000, and as a part of 
it, they studied the frequency of domestic violence as an affecting matter of 
crimes committed by youngsters. They also studied how often the Public 
Guardianship Authority had to be/was involved, and also when they weren't 
involved, though they should have been (if they could prevent crimes caused 
by domestic violence). 
According to the statistics, traditionally and significally women act much 
less as a perpetrator or an offended party. In Hungary women's role in 
committing crimes permanently remains under 14%. (Though among the 
violent crimes against person there's just a few committed by women, we must 
admit that some of these crimes are homicides committed within the family and 
motivated by a sudden anger, predicted by violence against wives.) Though 
women's rate is low on the perpetrators' side, that is higher on the side of the 
offended party, particularly measuring the latency that might be rather high in 
this field of crimes. To go further: there is higher victimization of women in 
some of the crimes but, taking all the crimes men's victimisation is higher. 
According to the estimated data. VA of the homicides and VI of the batteries are 
committed within the family all over the word, plus, most of the victims are 
women. The Supreme Prosecution measured that there is a high rate of female 
victims of violent crimes against life and limbs victimized within the family 
(22% of the female offended party of homicide and 17% of the female offended 
party of felonies of aggravated battery are victimized by their husbands/part-
ners). Most of the victims are female not only in violent crimes against person 
but also in robberies, thefts and frauds. 
While the interest in the field of domestic violence has increased in the last 
two years, thanks to the few surveys, will be mentioned in the following 
chapter, that might be the reason of the lack of specific statistics available. 
III. The Researches Available 
III. I. The methodology used by Krisztina Morvái in her 1998 research3 on 
domestic violence was to examine all criminal court decision finalized in the year 
1995 which dealt with criminal responsibility for homicide. Having identified the 
5
 Morvái, К.: Terror a családban (Tenor in the Family). Kossuth. Budapest, 1998. (This 
book publishes the consequents and quotes in-deepth interviews based on the data of the research 
mentioned in subtitle No.l.) 
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sex of the perpetrator and the victim, plus the relationship between them (e.g. 
stranger, friend, spouse, former spouse), she identified the proportion of 
"domestic" homicide cases. She looked only those homicide cases, where there 
is basically no latency, as opposed to non-lethal forms of violence. She could 
proove that the frequency of domestic abuse in Hungary is not less than in 
"Western" societies. The most important conclusions of her research are: 
The proportion of women among homicide victims is 40%. The fact that 
almost as many women as men are killed in violent crimes is surprising and 
alarming, given that the media as well as crime prevention policy, textbooks for 
law students and academic literature tend to present and target "violent crime" 
as a fundamentally male issue. 
While the proportion of male victims in relation of male perpetrators is 
68% (the number of male victims is 68% of the male perpetrators), the same 
proportion is 400% in the case of women (the number of female victims is 
400% in the case of female perpetrators). It follows that violence against person 
is predominantly male in origin and disproportionately female as regards its 
victims. Consequently violence cannot he effectively approached as a "gender 
neutral phenomenon". 
More than half of all homicide victims lost their lives in "family 
violence", meaning that the offender and the victim were relatives or were 
living in an intimate relationship without any formal family links (106 of the 
victims: 54%). It follows that violence in the family must be taken very 
seriously by the authorities and by society as a whole. 
After the group of male neighbours friends and acquintances (mainly 
drinking partners) the second largest group of homicide victims is wives and 
female partners. On the basis of the number of offenders, the single largest 
group is that of spouses and partners. 
Almost every third homicide victim was married or lived in domestic 
partnership with the offender. 
More than half of all female homicide victims were killed hy their 
husband/partner. This means that an adult woman is more likely to be killed by 
her husband/partner than by any other perpetrator. In other words, a woman has 
one and a half times more "chance" to be killed by her husband/partner than 
by anybody else. 
The probability of a woman being killed by a husband or a male partner 
is eight times greater than that of being killed by a stranger. Consequently the 
media and crime prevention emphasize on "stranger danger" simply doesn't 
reflect reality. 
Almost once a week a women in Hungary is killed by her husband or 
partner (48 cases in the examined year). This means that approximately 2600 
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women have been killed (tipically beaten to death) by their husbands/partners 
since the II. World War. 
The number of men killed by their wives or female partners is 14, while 
the number of female victims killed by their husbands/partners is 48. The 
"anecdotal evidence" indicating that domestic homicide is not gender-related 
and occurs equally in both sexes does not, at least in the case of Hungary, 
reflect relaity. 
Of all male homicide victims, 12% were killed by their wives or female 
partrners, typically in the joint family home. The ratio is 60% for female 
homicide victims killed by their husbands or male partners typically in the joint 
family home or in the woman's new home following divorce or separation. 
- In 77% of cases of women killed by their husbands/spouses the court 
found that the victim had been previously battered (physically assaulted) by the 
perpetrator. There is a very close correlation between "wife battery" (domestic 
abuse of women) and homicide against women. 
— Surprisingly the presence of wife battering was similarly frequent in the history 
of relationship in cases of women who killed their husbands/partners: 79%. 
57% of all the homicides by men against their spouses/partners were 
committed without any weapon. These victims were basically beaten to death 
by the perpetrator (using his bare hands, fists and feet).4 
III.2. Olga Tóth arranged a socio-political type survey in 1999, embracing 1010 
questionnaries.5 However 37% of the interrogated persons assume that the 
assaulter and the assaulted know each other, rather less consider these acts as 
real crimes, as real punishable crimes. This means that they consider ill-
treatment in family as a tolerable movement. In the same time those who 
consider the phenomenon a tolerable act mostly haven't finished even the 
primary school (81%). This means that in this social level every 5th women 
claim wife-abuse is tolerable. In sum, the younger and the more qualificated a 
person is, he/she claims wife-abuse the less tolerable. As it is already 
mentioned in Chapter I. there's just a few (17%) who consider child-beating a 
tolerable method of enforcing the child to behave him-/herself. Tóth points out 
that 30% of those women who were beaten as a child were sexually abused either 
(this rate is 7% in the group of unbeaten). Those who are the two opposite poles 
of employment hierarchy (leaders, skilled workers versus trained, physical 
workers) are the most endangered. 
4
 Formerly quoted papers of Morvái К.: Why Doesn't She Just Leave? Op. cit. 2. 
5
 Tóth: op. cit. 
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Those who divorced are 4 times more "experienced" domestic violence by 
their partners. This number draws one's attention that in the background of 
divorces and decreasing of marriages we can find physical assault and sexual 
slavery. If the assaulted revealed her (physical or mental) pain the audience was 
her relative or friend, but only 13% of the assaulted preferred charge. 
The survey proved that because it is a social taboo only 45% of the adult 
women considered domestic (sexual) violence a punishable act. As a result of 
it, only every 3rd act were reported to the police. Even less became a "case" 
(criminal file). Those who haven't made charge reasoned it with the followings: 
they were afraid of the further results (revenge) (20%), they hoped that 
everything would turn right (16%), they didn't want to separate their children 
from his father (14%), they thought there would be nobody to help ( 14%), or 
they felt ashamed of the phenomenon (9%). More than half (55%) of the cases 
where the police were involved the authority (police officer) seemed helpful, 
in 45% that seemed refusing. The police could offer specialized support 
organisation providing individual help (NGOs, self-government, children, 
women, and victim supporter organisations etc.) only in 31% of the reported 
cases. This rate is rather low why it takes only 5% of all the wife-beating cases. 
III.3. In the year of 2000 the National Institute of Criminology arranged a 
monitoring-type survey on the perpetrators of violent crimes against person 
committed by women (who are sentenced now) against their husbands/part-
ners.16 We studied if there is any relating point between former victimisation 
by the husband/partner and latter becoming a perpetrator of violent crime 
against the husband/partner. It is significant, that 34 of the crimes against life, 
limbs and health was committed against relatives (9/10 of it was committed 
against spouse/partner), and only 14 was against stranger. This is quite different 
from the statistics of the whole country, which shows that 23% of homicide and 
attempted homicide was against relatives, and 21% of them was against 
spouse/partner. This outstanding difference could be explained with the random 
selected little sample of the interviewed persons, as well as that we interviewed 
only those who were under inprisonment in 2000. Moreover, it might shows that 
6
 The survey is titled Female Inmates. Research and total workout by Lenke Feher and 
Katalin Parti. The research embraced the 3 prisons for women of the country, we took 
interviews and in-depth interviews with 10% of the female inmates and with all the warders 
and leaders. Our aim were to measure the special needs of sentenced women, how they can 
bear confinement, which are the similarities and the differences between the behaviour of the 
female and the male inmates, etc. 
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those who commit or attempt homicide against their partners due likely to be 
sentenced to inprisonment, whether the homicide was from self defence whether 
it was intended, whether it was preceded by wife-abuse for decades. This number 
lets us assume that the court more likely to examine the crime as one single act 
than a reason-result flow, in its context. 
The study observed the former alcoholic and psychical/physical terror by the 
latter offended party as an indicator of a violent crime against him. Almost the half 
of the perpetrators of crimes against life, limbs and health admitted that they were 
stressed, 1/3 of them admitted to have been alcoholic when committed the crime. 
1/3 of the victims were under the influence of alcohol, and 1/3 were alcoholic 
when assaulted. More than 1/3 of the offenders (the interviewed female inmates) 
were not only humiliated but also psychically and physically abused by their 
partners/husbands, in 42% through the former few decades (!). Only 15% of 
the interrogated inmates claimed strictly that they weren't abused at all. So we 
can point out that violent crime within the family is mostly committed by 
those who were humiliated and abused for years/decades by their partners, and 
this kind of behaviour of the abuser is indicated by drinking alcohol or the 
alcoholic of him. 
III.4. Over the first half of this year there was an observing survey at the NIC 
on the topic of domestic violence. The survey was examining how to cooperate 
the NGOs and the authorities such as police, prosecution and the court in 
handling domestic violence and in preventing violent crimes within the family. 
We studied papers at the Department of Children and Juvenile Protection, 
Prosecution of the Capital, and interviewed policemen, prosecutors, NGO 
leaders, social workers, children, women and victim supporting organisation 
workers, employees of the public guardianship authority. The survey showed 
out that there is a rather low level cooperation which is not enough to be really 
effective in preventing violence in the family, and so preventing abused 
children/youngsters to become criminals. 
IV. What is Missing 
There are no specific statistics on domestic violence provided by the 
police as domestic violence has not been introduced into the code yet. 
— The level of connection and flowing of information between the authorities 
(self-government, public guardianship authority, police, prosecution and court) 
and NGOs is rather low. 
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There are no special shelters for battered women in Hungary. For those 
who escape violence with their children there are mother-homes and they still 
can be accomodated in homeless shelters, but just temporarily (two months in 
average) and non the less, they have to pay for the accomodation. But for those 
who escape without children homeless shelters are the only choice. In addition, 
there are no skilled workers in shelters to protect victims from the husband/former 
husband/partner's agressive manner they often act in (separation abuse). Social 
workers very rarely have the special knowledge how to lead/support victims to 
construct their private life. 
— There is no equal, strict rules in police departments for handling domestic 
violence how to act when there is a wife/child battery reported: they don't 
know when they have the right to intervene, to take the assaulter in custody, 
etc. Moreover, they considers domestic violence as a private affair, that should 
be influenced by the authority only when "there is bleeding". By this they 
mean if there are life-threatening, open injuries caused some kind of weapon 
or instrument such as knife. Though, several researches prooved that most of 
the women who die as a result of domestic abuse are "simply" beaten to death. 
V. One Step Forward 
There is a recommendation to record the statement of domestic violence and 
stalking in Criminal Code and/or Code of Offences, as well as in police rules. 
This recommendation is still Ministry-level discursion. Due to the lack of 
restraining/protecting orders at this stage, the arrest of the perpetrator, in cases 
which are sufficiently supported by evidence, is the only way to protect the 
victim. Responding to that, one part of the recommendation is addressed to the 
National Police Chief Constable and to the Home Office Minister to issue a 
circular on rules of conduct which are obligatory for each and every police 
force, with the active involvement of women's NGOs. A tougher arrest police 
were recommended at least as a temporary measure until the instruments of 
restraining orders/protecting orders are introduced into the legal system. 
Moreover they also recommended that, even before the necessary of other legal 
and political changes, all emergency calls for invention in domestic violence 
must be registered, the measures taken by the police must be documented and 
a list of available sources including hotlines and emergency accomodation 
facilities must be handed over to the women who report domestic violence. Another 
of the recommendations was to immediately introduce the practice of notifying 
the victims about the release of the arrested suspect, as a crucial element in the 
protection of victims. The recommendation is also the introduction of a new 
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criminal offence into the Criminal Code or/and the Code of Offences which 
would focus on the actual characteristics of domestic violence. Obviously the 
charge on domestic violence would carry a tougher sentence than separate, ad 
hoc battering incidents. Court must take domestic violence in its complexity, 
without taking it out of its context. Because violence in the family usually does 
not end with ending the relationship itself, stalking as an apparing form of abuse 
after the separation (divorce or escape from home) "stalking" itself also should 
be criminalized.7 
There is a poster campaign on domestic voilence starting 17th October 2001 
invented, supported and totally worked out by NANE,8 a famous Hungarian 
women supporter NGO. There are posters pasted up over the territory of Budapest 
railway stations. The campaign due to last for 5 months, until next March. The 
posters are pasted on well-known, spectacular places (e.g. on the platform) 
where travellers can easily notice the attentions that are addressed not only to 
abused persons but also their relatives as well as those who are aware of the 
assaults arised in other families. The organizers' aim is to call up the attention 
for domestic violence as an existing, widespread, real problem in Hungary and 
moreover that ill-treatment in family is not a common method of "training" for 
the right behaviour but an unrighteous, punishable act (a forceful method of 
ruling) instead. 
VI. Summary 
Domestic violence is still a private problem in Hungary. People cannot define 
and as a result of it they cannot validate what takes ill-treatment in the family. 
This kind of haisy consideration of violence and sexuality could be cleared 
mostly by the media. Press should sold the controversions of what is reality and 
what is believed. If the statistics of domestic violence were known by the 
public women might be less charged with "seeking divorce after every tiny 
affairs". 
There are no established and formal (written) guidelines and rules of 
conduct or protocol for the police on what to do in cases of domestic 
7
 This chapter follows the words of Morvai's K. former quoted papers Why Doesn't She Just 
Leave? Op. cit. 11-12. 
8
 NANE: (Nők a Nőkért Együtt az Erőszak Ellen) Non-Governmental Organisation named 
Women for Women Together Against Violence. 
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violence.9 There is not even an expression like "domestic violence" or "crime 
committed within the family", but there is "family scandal" (appearing abbreviation 
"FS" in the minutes) instead, suggesting that there are two physically equal 
parties within the family who agrue. It assumes that woman has a leader role 
in starting domestic violence: she provocated violence against herself by 
making her husband angry. 
That calls media to introduce the phenomenon of domestic violence into the 
public opinion in its severe reality, not as a scandal instead. 
9
 See Hoyle (1998) on the role of the police in responding to domestic violence. 
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SZABOLCS KOPPÁNYI * 
Highlights of the New Telecommunications Regulatory Framework 
in Hungary 
The new Communications Act (Act 40 of 2001) was adopted by the Hungarian 
Parliament on June 2001. Some provisions of the Act are already in effect, but 
most provisions will become effective on December 23, 2001. Its aim is to open 
up the telecommunications market by the end of this year. The act, in accordance 
with current EU directives and regulations, provides the framework for the 
liberalized telecommunications market in Hungary for the next decade. It regu-
lates telecommunications services, frequency management, cable services and 
postal services in one unified act, and it also authorizes the relevant ministries to 
enact further detailed rules with respect to approximately 20 regulatory issues. 
Infrastructure-based competition 
The act generally favours infrastructure-based competition rather than service-
based competition, with an aim to accelerate network development in Hungary. 
However, recognizing that new entrants may not have the necessary resources 
to develop their own networks, the act prescribes the right of interconnection 
as a general rule and also as a special obligation for service providers that own 
or control a network. 
Licensing regime 
A new (EU-compatible) licensing regime has been introduced, the most 
important provision of which is that it removes almost all administrative 
barriers for entering the market. New service providers need only notify the 
relevant authority that they intend to commence provision of communications 
services and are permitted to start providing the service after 30 days from the 
date of such notification. Licences will only be required for construction of 
Szabolcs Koppányi, LL.M. 
E-mail: koppanyi@freemail.hu 
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telecommunications infrastructure and for utilization of scarce resources (ie, 
frequencies and identifiers). 
Regulation of significant market power 
One major objective of the new legislation is to regulate the activities of dominant 
communications operators, so as to prevent abuse of market dominance and create 
a level playing field for new entrants (including existing alternative service 
providers). The provisions regarding market power are not contained in a single 
section, but appear throughout the Act in conjunction with other provisions. 
However, the core provisions on market power are grouped in a specific section 
entitled "Rules applicable to identification of service providers with significant 
market power". "Significant market power" is regarded as a characteristic of those 
who control the market, and constitutes the only definition of "market 
dominance" in the Act. The definition corresponds with the criteria in the EU 
telecommunications framework directives, in particular open network pro-
visioning directives such as Directive 98/10/EC (ie, in practice, a 25% share of 
the relevant market). The new regulation follows the EU concept of asymmetric 
regulation by applying different rules for new entrants to the market and for the 
ex-monopolists. The act uses the concept of significant market power (SMP) in 
accordance with current EU legislation. 
Service providers that enjoy SMP will be obliged to: 
- cooperate with other players in the market so as to provide access to their 
networks; 
interconnect their networks with those of other service providers; 
prepare a reference interconnection offer; 
The SMP providers must grant access to the local loop to all parties, including 
their own affiliated companies, in a non-discriminatory way, that is they must apply 
the same technical, legal and economic terms and conditions to all parties; 
— In addition, SMP providers are subject to a universal service obligation. 
A special body of the Communications Authority, the Communications Arbitration 
Committee identifies service providers with significant market power in a 
formal decision. Service providers which have a market share of at least 25% 
in respect of a particular service in the geographic area where the service is 
provided are identified by the regulator as service providers with significant 
market power. The Communications Arbitration Committee may apply different 
criteria for the identification of service providers with significant market power 
in certain cases. The national carrier (MATAV) and all the local telephone 
operators (the "LTOs") are, by virtue of the Act, identified as service providers 
with significant market power. 
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The Act states that universal service providers will be selected by means of 
public tenders or auctions, but does not lay down any special rules regarding the 
provision of universal services by service providers with significant market power 
(in events where such service providers are obliged to provide universal services 
due to the failure of a public tender). However, it is likely that universal services 
will initially be provided by service providers that currently operate under a 
concession and are therefore subject to universal service obligations. (Under the 
existing regulatory regime, public voice telephony service providers operate on 
the basis of concessions, while many other communications services, such as 
those to closed user groups, are provided on the basis of licences). 
Potential problems of designating significant market power 
Although the Act distinguishes between service providers with significant 
market power and other service providers, and imposes specific obligations on 
operators deemed to have significant market power, it draws no distinction 
between the duties of new entrants to the market and incumbent operators. This 
approach will not necessarily provide protection against abusive market 
practices by incumbent operators, for the following reasons: 
At the start of the liberalization process, it will probably be necessary to 
impose special obligations on incumbent operators, particularly with regard to 
universal service, interconnection and the like. However, even if new entrants 
to the market succeed in winning a significant market share relatively quickly, 
they may have difficulty in achieving sufficient critical mass and profitability 
to build up their infrastructure in order to compete with the incumbent service 
providers if they are subject to equally stringent obligations. It would probably 
be wiser to begin by imposing special duties on incumbent operators, under a 
more stringent but narrower umbrella regulation. 
Some experts consider that the significant market power test is not an 
appropriate method of controlling the market. They view it as a rigid approach 
which leaves the telecommunications authorities too much discretion and has 
proved to be ineffective in practice. These arguments were the main reasons why 
the European Commission has shifted to a new and more flexible definition of 
'significant market power", which is closer to the concept of a dominant 
position in competition law. However, Hungary has apparently decided to 
follow the commission's former, more rigid approach. 
Moreover, the European Union's former regulatory measures based on sig-
nificant market power were not applied in isolation, but were often used in 
parallel with the general competition rules regarding a dominant position. The 
exact relationship between the new Communications Act and the existing Compe-
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tition Act with respect to the applicability of competition rules has not yet been 
clearly determined, and further clarification will be needed by virtue of 
jurisdiction of the Competition Office. However, the Act seems to rule out the 
possibility of applying traditional competition rules to the telecommunications 
industry in Hungary. According to the draft, the relevant authority will be the 
Competition Office, and not the Communications Authority, in cases involving 
competition issues (eg, exercise of abusive market practices by telecommuni-
cations service providers). However, the Competition Office will have to apply 
the specific provisions of the Act, and not the general rules of the Competition 
Act, in such cases. 
Rules for LTOs 
Under the Act, local telecommunications operators (LTOs) are subject to special 
rules. In Hungary, under the former concession regime, local telephony was 
provided by various operators in so-called "primer districts" (ie, regions of 
Hungary), where the LTOs enjoyed monopolist rights. However, the LTOs were 
not allowed to enter into the market of national and international voice telephony 
(due to MATAV's monopoly with respect to national and international voice 
telephony services). As a result, the local loop is currently characterized by a 
number of LTOs in the primer districts (MATAV, in addition to its role as the 
national and international voice service provider, has been the local telephone 
operator in several primer districts as well.). The act states that the LTOs will be 
required to convey any local loop, in whole or in part, for each service provider 
so requesting. However, the LTOs are not required to open the local loop to 
service providers that have significant market power and enjoy considerable 
advantages compared to the l.TOs on a national level, or if the conveyance is 
technically not feasible (ie, if there is a risk that the integrity of the network 
cannot be maintained). Although this regulation is intended to avoid 'cherry 
picking' by telecommunications service providers, it is unclear how it will be 
applied in practice. 
Access to the local loop 
The Act provides for, among other things, a general framework for local loop 
unbundling. The detailed rules regarding unbundling and the agreements 
related thereto were regulated in the Government Decree 175/2001. (IX. 26.) 
("Decree"). 
According to the new Act and the Decree, telephone service providers with 
significant market power ("SMP providers") are required to grant full or partial 
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access to their local loops upon request of other service providers if the other 
service provider attaches the bond with the consumer intending to use its services. 
In case of a full access, the incumbent SMP cannot provide services to the 
subscribers. In case of a partial access, the incumbent SMP may continue to 
provide services pursuant to its existing subscriber contracts and the new service 
provider may provide additional subscriber services, by utilizing the transmission 
capacity available on the loop of the incumbent SMP. 
Reference offer 
The SMP providers are required to file a reference offer with the Communica-
tions Arbitration Committee for approval and publication 80 days prior to the 
expiry of their exclusive right for the provision of telephone services as granted 
by their respective concession contracts. The content of the reference offer is 
regulated generally by the Act and the specific rules are to be found in the 
Decree. According to the Decree, the Reference Interconnection Offer must 
contain among others the duration of co-location, which must be at least one 
year, the detailed rules of the process of conclusion, modification and the 
expiration of the contract, the quality requirements and the price calculation 
method diverging from the provisions of the Communications Act, which diver-
gence is possible only after two years of the unbundling. The calculation of the 
price of the unbundling must be transparent and nondiscriminatory, and must be in 
observation of the LRIC (Long Run Incremented Costs) pricing scheme, the reaso-
nable coverage of general costs and the reasonable profit of the invested capital. 
If the reference offer cannot be approved, the Communications Arbitration 
Committee must provide the service provider with the specific reasons and 
request the service provider to file a new reference offer. If the new reference 
offer is not filed within 30 days of receiving the request the Communications 
Arbitration Committee may impose a fine on the service provider amounting 
to 0.1% of the service provider's gross turnover but not exceeding HUF 25 
million (approx. USD 87,000). The Communications Arbitration Committee 
will determine the terms and conditions of the reference offer if the second 
reference offer filed by the service provider is still not in compliance with the 
provisions of the Act and other relevant regulations. 
Exceptions 
If more than one service providers request access to the local loop, the SMP 
provider owning the local loop is entitled to accept, in a transparent procedure, 
the most favorable offer. 
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The SMP provider is not obliged to grant access to its local loop if it is 
technically not feasible or the other service provider requesting the access also has 
significant market power and "is in a significantly better position in terms of 
assets, finances and revenues and its influence on the development of the 
international communications market than the owner of the local loop or the other 
eligible parties". This latter provision is intended to allow the LTOs to refuse 
MATAV's request for access to their local loops. However, this provision will 
probably generate serious debate as it can be argued that MATAV is not in "a 
significantly better position" in relation to Vivendi, the second largest LTO in 
Hungary. On the other hand, one also can argue that Vivendi is in "a significantly 
better position" in relation to the other LTOs. 
The new regulation of unbundling is partly in line with the relevant laws of 
the EC. Hungary received derogation concerning number portability until January 
1, 2003. 
Price regulation 
With respect to price regulation, the Act follows the principle that no price 
regulation is needed as long as there is effective competition in the market. 
Therefore, under the Act, only universal services and SMP providers are subject 
to price regulation. The price regulation is based on the long-run incremental 
costs model price cap regulation, and is cost based (ie, the service providers are 
required to calculate their prices in a cost-oriented way). The provision of dial-up 
internet access services will also be subject to price regulation. 
Regulatory authority 
The Hungarian Communications Authority (H1F) has been designated as the 
entity responsible for market regulation. The Communication Arbitration 
Committee, as a part of HIF, is responsible for various tasks, including identifying 
service providers with SMP, mediating between telecommunications operators 
and deciding legal disputes regarding cooperation of telecommunications 
operators. In matters involving competition law issues, the Competition Office 
remains the exclusive regulatory body. 
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Democracy and Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
the Peace Treaty of Dayton 
Reflections in the Wake of a Conference 
On 30 March 2001 Budapest was host to an international conference held under 
the joint auspices of the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences and Friedrich Ebert Foundation. The conference addressed the above 
topic under the presidency of Ambassador Dr. István Horváth. It concerned itself 
with the Bosnian war still in the focus of world attention as well as with the 
Dayton Agreement closing that war. Although since the events of six years ago 
a new bloody conflict has taken place in the territory of former Yugoslavia, the 
situation in Macedonia has become uncertain again and the issues that arose in the 
course of the Bosnian settlement have remained ones of current concern. Some 
of the papers read at the conference sought to explore general interrelationships, 
while others focussed on the characteristics of certain legal institutions called 
upon to ensure the assertion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
participants received up-to-date information on the present status of the settlement 
from the speakers at the conference, who hold important posts in the state life of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among them, the paper of Viktor Masenkó-Mavi, a 
senior research fellow at Institute of Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences and a member of the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, conveyed a picture of the path which had led to the present-day 
situation, of the Yugoslav process of disintegration. Manfred Nowak, a professor 
of the Verwaltungshochshule in Vienna and also a member of the Human Rights 
Chamber, provided an exposition of the role played by the international 
community in the settlement of the conflict. The conference, which attracted a 
high interest, was attended by Ambassador Madame Amira Kapetanovic, who had 
herself participated in the peace negotiations, and she outlined the 
Government's efforts to stabilize the situation. Mr Frank Orton, formerly 
Sweden's ombudsman for against ethnic discrimination and currently federal 
Tímea Frank, Junior Research Fellow, Institute for Legal Studies, Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Budapest, H-1014 Budapest, Országház u. 30., Hungary. 
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human rights ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina involved in the Bosnia 
settlement, called attention to the specific features of this legal institution 
Srpska Republika. Professor Madame Snezana Savic, President of the 
Constitutional Court, explained the major provisions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovia's Constitution designed to ensure observance of human rights and 
funamental freedoms. Justice Minister Biljana Marie of Serbia drew attention to 
the specific state structrue, and Peter Neussel as legal adviser to the 
Representative described the past activity of that office. 
It is important to stress that, in contrast to the former Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav process of disintegration and the rise of new states 
did not run its course in a peaceful way, but was accompanied by a bloody armed 
conflict that shocked all Europe and was the gravest the continent had seen since 
World War Two. The figures speak for themselves: over 200.000 people lost their 
lives in the fightings, 20.000 persons are declared still missing, and 2 to 2.5 
million people were displaced during the bloody conflict of three and a half years. 
Ethnic cleansings took place across Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 
1995, adding up in fact to the first genocide committed since the holocaust. The 
reasons are to seek in the extraordinary heterogeneity of the Balkans, with 
different republics and nations at different levels of economic development, 
with different religious and cultural backgrounds, and with different historical 
traditions determing their identities as well. Bosnia and Herzegovina deserves 
special mention in this respect as it forms by itself a "mini-Yugoslavia", 
consisting of Muslims (43,7%), Croatians (17,3%) and Serbs (31,4%), none of 
whom are in absolute majority. 
It was obviously necessary to settle such an explosive situation of grave 
proportions as soon as possible, and the efforts to be made in that direction were 
clearly voiced on the European continent particularly affected as it was. The 
initial goal was to localize the war, but that course of policy did not produce but 
few results for years. From January 1993 the UN and EU peacemarkers Cyrus 
Vance and Lord Owen were pressing for adoption of a peace plan which was to 
divide the country's territory into ten, basically autonomous parts. Although the 
plan won US support, the belligerents disagreed with it. In May 1993 there were 
established six UN security zones to provide protection for Muslims fleeing from 
the Serb aggression. Those efforts reached an impasse, howewer. The concert of 
thes West European great powers was unable to find definite and coherent 
solutions for the management of the crisis, albeit the OSCE undoubtedly took on 
a significant role in reaching a democratic settlement. It was in that phase that 
the United States entered the swirl of events, and, with the parties compelled to 
sit down to the conference table, a cease-fire of 60 days was agreed upon in 
October 1995 and Serbs in Bosnia recognized sovereignty of the Croatian-
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Muslim federation. The Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia held 
talks on the postwar constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading 
in November 1995 to the signing of the Peace Treaty of Dayton as an instrument 
of historic significance. 
This agreement is an extremely complex legal instrument, with 10 articles, 
11 annexes and 102 maps, which is called upon to ensure a democratic and 
peaceful solution of the situation. The content of traditional peace treaties is 
limited to cease-fire, arms reduction and demarcation of frontiers. The Dayton 
Agreement goes much further by closing the war, guaranteeing international 
recognition for Bosnia and Herzegovina, containing the constitution of the new 
state, and envisaging a settlement to be achieved at long term. The agreement is, 
in essence, a delicate balance of compromises, compared to which an even more 
efficient one might be conceived of in theory, but in practice it can be considered 
to reflect a state of equilibrium under the conditios previling. 
The new state created by the Agreement is a special hybrid entity, a multi-
national "quasi federeation", virtually a binational "state" within the state. One 
is the Muslim-Croatian federation of May 1994 occupying 51% of the territory 
at present, while the other is the Srpska Republika of Serb dominance. The inter-
national status of the new federal state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is equally 
peculiar in that it represents a sui generis type of international administration 
without precedent, the leading role being played by the High Representative, also 
called the "beneficent dictator", who, contrary to public opinion, is acting on 
behalf of the international community as a whole rather than of the United 
Nations. The establishment of this institution is provided for by the section of the 
Dayton Agreement concerning the enforcement of its civil aspects. Under Art. 
5, the High Representative is the ultimate and supreme interpreter of the Peace 
Treaty of Dayton and exercises control over the process of implementing the 
peaceful settlement. In performing this function he coordinates the activities of 
the civil organizatoins and authorities, submits periodic reports on his activity to 
the United Nations, the European Union and all other governments and 
organizations concerned. Once an institution with a small staff, the High 
Representative's office has grown into a 671-strong body. At present, its work 
is concentrated on three priority areas: buliding a democratic state organizatoin 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, carrying out economic reforms, and promoting the 
return of refugees. A most important benchmark event of the peace process was 
the Bonn Conference of 1997 as Art. IX of its Final document empowers the 
High Representative to relieve of office any person who violates the provisoins 
of the Dayton Agreement in performing an official function and to adopt 
binding decisions in any matters calling for a decision which the Bosnian 
authorities fail to take. Such legislative decisions of binding force have been 
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adopted in the fields of property law, the legal reform, the media, and the 
protection of minorties. 
For all these aspects, Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be said to be a 
"protectorate", for it is not under the administration of any particular state, but 
represents a case in which supervision over the settlement is exercised by the 
international commmunity as a whole. (This is also supported by the fact the 
foreign experts participating in the working of state organs act independently 
rather in representation of their own governments.) 
The primary goal sought in the course of the settlement was to ensure the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Formulated as funda-
mental values in the very preamble to the Constitution are the obligation to 
respect human freedom, dignity and equality as well as the democratic method 
of governance, without which one cannot speak at all of a state organization 
under the rule of law. Special emphasis should be laid on Art. 2 (2) of the 
Constitution providing that the rights and freedoms as set forth in the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
well as in the Additional Protocols thereto are to directly apply in the territory 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they enjoy priority over all other laws and 
regulations, including the Constitution itself, namely they are accorded ipso 
iure supremacy. This settlement is significant and interesting for the added 
reason that Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a member of the Council of Europe, 
but participates in its activity in observer status. Another point of interest is that 
the framework agreement of Dayton makes it mandatory for the internal law to 
incorporate the application of those human rights conventions to which Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is not a party. This, in point of fact, seems to reinforce the 
universal character of human rights. 
The Constitution itself provides on the establishment of institutions called 
upon to guarantee attainment of the goals formulated in the preamble. The 
Constitutional Court is a body of 9 judges, 4 of them to be appointed by the 
federal House of Representatives and 2 to be elected by the National Assembly 
of the Serb Republic. The remaining 3 members, to be exclusively of foreign 
nationality, are appointed by the President of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Any court may request the Constitutional Court to eshablish whether a law 
or regulation on the validity of which its judgement depends is in conformity with 
the Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protocols 
thereto. The institution of Ombudsman similarly exhibits peculiar traits as it did 
not come about as the result of development but was introduced artificially. 
Moreover, this organ as a general institution of legal protection had to be created 
in a society to which the concept of ombudsman had been completely unknown. 
Its most conspicuous feature is its extraordinary complexity as the federal 
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Constitution provided for the establishment of other entities, i.e. its structural 
arrangement was not made by fields of competence (e.g. ombudsman for 
protection of data, parliamentars ombudsman for civic rights), but was based on 
the territorial pronciple. In February 2000 the law on the Ombudsman for Human 
Rights was also passed by the Serb Republic. The function of the ombudsman for 
human rights is to protect human rights, fundamental freedoms, and human 
dignity as enunciated in the federal Constitutional and in the documents referred 
on its annexes as well as in the fundamental law of the entities, with paricular 
emphasis on redress of grievances arising from violations of human rights. 
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LUCAS, A. LUCAS, H. J.: Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique ( A 
Treatise on Literary and Artistic Property). 2nd edition, Litec, Paris, 2001. 
French literature and art has influenced deeply the culture of mankind in the 
past centuries. For that reason, it is not surprising that French literary property 
law (and its literature) also had a significant impact on the development of 
literary property law in several countries. It has been four decades since 
Világhy contended about intellectual property law that "it was the French 
natural law movement that broke through the feudal forms of regulating 
intellectual property law (based on privileges)..., the first consistent 
(bourgeois) way of regulating intellectual property rights was provided by two 
statutes by the revolutionary legislature in France: the Patent Act of 1791 and 
the Literary Property Act of 1794." (More exactly, it was the French act on the 
utilization rights and copyrights of playwrights in 1793.) The French legislator 
has developed constantly the literary property law ever since, recently with 
statutes in 1957 and 1985, and with the Intellectual Property Code of 1992. 
As an indication of the fecundity of the literature upon the French literary 
property law, it is well enough to note that in the last decade of the 20th 
century nine comprehensive monographs were published on the subject. The 
one written by the Lucas brothers is the most prominent of them. Its new 
edition (published in the first months of the new century) is not only an 
honourable and comprehensive piece of work but an enjoyable piece of reading 
as well. The civil law chapters were written by A. Lucas (professor at the Uni-
versity of Nantes), while the chapters on international matters by H. J. Lucas 
(professor at the University of Poitiers). 
In the introductory parts (as it could be expected from a French jurist), 
André Lucas seeks an answer to one of the basic theoretical questions of 
literary property law: how to decide between monism (the unity of droit moral) 
and dualism (separate regulations for personality and property rights) (section 
29). Following Desbois, the author argues for the theory of modified dualism 
saying: "the moral and property rights of the authors are separable for reasons 
both from rationality (raison) and the observation of facts (observation des 
faits)." He believes that this solution is the dogmatically tenable one if we put 
literary property law to the test in 2000. It should be noted, however, that this 
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is the dominant view in French jurisprudence, and it must be taken as a sign of 
modesty (or precaution) that the jurist leaves open the possibility that possible 
new revelations might force him or the later generations to abandon it. 
In the discussion of protected works, we encounter one of the basic criteria 
of literary property rights: "authenticity" (ss. 77-99). It is quite surprising to 
me that the French statute remains silent on this issue, leading the judiciary to 
the conclusion that it is to be treated very carefully. In this respect, theory had 
to take the "pioneer" role, and it was (once again) Desbois who explicated the 
criterion of authenticity some fifty years ago. Of course, the "authenticity 
criterion" has become widely accepted since then. 
The criterion is a rather subjective one, contrary to the objective novelty 
criterion required with respect to industrial property. The Supreme Court 
(Court de cassation) explicitly laid down in a verdict of 1994 that only 
authenticity and not novelty can be required from literary or artistic works, as 
novelty is irrelevant in literary property law. The extent of authenticity is also 
irrelevant: minimal authenticity is well enough. It could be exemplified by the 
statute itself that provides protection to translation, adaptation, revision, 
collection of works as well. 
The evidence of authenticity is required case by case, but only if it is 
doubted by the opposing party in the judicial process. The courts are not bound 
by the standpoints of the several literary property associations. Typically, the 
question of authenticity is raised regarding "plastic" or "spacial" works. In 
those cases, it is usually enough to prove that the piece of work in question is 
more than the result of mere mechanic reproduction. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court expects the lower courts to analyze the features that they consider in 
settling the issues of authenticity. The author of the monograph contends that 
the English practice based on the principle "what is worth copying is prima 
facie worth protecting" is incompatible with the concept behind the French 
regulations. However, he regrets that (in this respect) French judicial practice 
is often influenced deeply by contingent circumstances and certain interest 
groups, instead of an objective approach. 
According to the French law (that is based upon a concept of personality 
rights), the right to authorship is conferred upon those whose personality is 
expressed in the given work (ss. 142-143). It should be noted, however, that 
some regard this concept as "romantic" in an era when multimedia corporations 
produce works on an industrial scale. The traditional concept of authorship is 
also contested by those who refer to the consumer who can become an author 
himself by way of manipulating the work available to him (utilisateur-mani-
pulateur). But their arguments are not convincing: despite the unpredictable 
development of the informatic environment, the concept of authorship remains 
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unaffected, as it was convincingly explicated in the Green Book of the EC 
Committee on Literary Property and Related Rights. 
It is remarkable that the authors wrote whole chapters on the literary 
property rights of spouses (ss. 146-154), on the literary property rights of 
natural persons and employed authors (ss. 155-167) (also discussing the legal 
status of the authors of computer works—s. 158), and on the several forms of 
multiple authorship (ss. 169-234). 
With respect to property rights, the copyright and the right to performance 
are presented in a synthetic way. According to André Lucas, before the 
emergence of utilization hy means of the Internet, the problems of utilization 
(ss. 241-245) were raised only in cases of marginal significance (like plastic 
works made of snow or gas). Publication on the Internet requires "fixation 
points" (that transmit the information) both on the parts of the users and the 
service providers. For this reason, the definition of utilization (sale or other 
transfer of ownership of the original or the copy of the work) ignited a heated 
debate that the Diplomatic Conference (on certain copyright and neighboring 
rights questions) of 1996 in Geneva could not settle: the parties could not reach 
an agreement even about the draft of a common declaration. 
The right to public performance (ss. 262-274) is given a rather abstract 
definition in the statute: it mentions public performance "by any means" which 
might include satellite broadcasting or coded broadcasting as well. However, 
in French judicial practice the material loaded onto a server is not to be taken 
as publicized. (Contrary to the opinion of the Belgian courts that take loading 
onto a server as analogous to the public performance of a musical composition 
on a concert.) 
In the discussion of the right to public performance, we find some state-
ments of principle that could he applied to other forms of intellectual property 
and are true of several other legal systems. Let me mention only two examples: 
the extent of protection is necessarily dependant upon the extent of the 
authenticity of the work (s. 282); 
in judging imitations the similarities and not the differences are decisive. 
Droit moral is a pivotal institution in French law. Moreover, it is a "shining 
page" ("Ruhmesblatt" as the German jurist, Ulmer called it) in the Bern Con-
vention. In this respect, French law is quite different to the American law (and 
the English law before 1988) that does not contain it (which raised problems 
in the negotiations about international agreements). 
It should be noted that the moral rights of authors are still unregulated in 
the European Union, as the subject stretches beyond the competence of 
common institutions. As to its characteristic features, droit moral is personal, 
inalienable, imprescriptible. The criteria of the moral rights of authors were 
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developed by the French judicial practice step by step, in an empirical way, and 
in connection with famous cases. That development provided the basis for the 
theories. The elements of droit moral are the right to publicization, the right to 
mark the author's name, the right to the respect of authorship. These elements 
are not to be taken as absolute: judicial practice may put restraints upon them 
case by case. 
As to the utilization of literary property rights, it is a new development 
(compared to the way it was even a few decades ago) that the author can 
distribute his or her works by way of the Internet or by turning to organizations 
for the common administration of rights. Besides, the traditional institutions for 
utilization (publishers, producers, media corporations) are also available. These 
traditional institutions usually support the utilization with substantial invest-
ments. One of the outstanding (and often contested) novelties of the Literary 
Property Act of 1985 is the way it regulates the utilization of works created for 
the purpose of advertising (ss. 657-687). In this respect, the problem lies in the 
fact that the advertising agency (as a third party) steps into the originally 
bipolar relationship of the author and the user. There are other cases that raise 
the problem of collisions between literary property law and trade mark pro-
tection (or even competition law the reviewer). The "slogan" created by the 
author, as a consequence of its utilization in commercials, becomes associated 
with the product or the service in the eyes of the members of the public. The 
party who ordered the commercial has a justified claim for the right to mark his 
name and the right of disposition over the slogan, while the author can claim 
the property rights as well. Actually, it is a case of the well known collision of 
interests between the investor and the author, further complicated by the triple 
pole character of the legal relationship (by the claims of the advertising 
agency). 
The rest of the first part centres around the discussion of the relating 
(neighboring) rights the protection of the rights of the producers of sound 
recordings, television corporations, databases. Finally, we find a summary the 
general rules of the protection of the related rights (ss. 818-900). 
In the second part of the book, Henri-Jacques Lucas deals with the issues 
of international literary property law. Following the traditions the French 
literature on private international law (arguably dating back to Roman law), he 
begins the discussion with giving an account of the legal status of foreigners. 
In the judicial practice, the VERDI verdict was the first landmark in which the 
Supreme Court dismissed the action of the famous Italian composer who 
claimed the prohibition of the performance of his operas in France. It was a 
long process of development, before the Supreme Court (more than a hundred 
years later), in the RIDEAU DE FER (Iron curtain) verdict of 1959, granted the 
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legal protection to the Russian composers of the music of a movie picture. The 
verdict, reflecting the current French approach, is mentioned again and again 
in several respects in the analysis (s. 908, 932). 
The statute that incorporated the "period of protection" Directive of the EU 
into French law (enacted on the 27th of March in 1997) also contains a clause 
that is discriminative to foreign authors (who are not citizens of members of any 
of the member states of the EU). For these authors, the longer period of 
protection can be granted only if it corresponds to the period of protection 
provided by the laws of the author's home country. In the analysis, this regu-
lation is taken as a partial return to the judicial practice before the RIDEAU DE 
FER verdict. 
As to the traditional private international law (the norms of collision), the 
guiding principles are once again to be found in the RIDEAU DE FER verdict. 
In judging the infringement of rights in France in connection with works 
created by foreign authors in foreign countries, French law is to be applied 
(which is—as Debois pointed it ou t - the lex fori and the lex loci delicti at the 
same time). The analysis leads here to the explicit conclusion that most of the 
literary property rights disputes are settled without reference to the norms of 
collision laid down in private international law (s. 933). It is interesting that 
even in countries of high legal culture, both the authors of civil law and the 
judges are rather reluctant to apply the norms private international law. The 
statement formulated by the German Nussbaum many years ago and being cited 
ever since ("Heimwertsstreben des Richters"), seems to be true of the French 
jurisprudence as well. 
The primacy of the French law is explicitly declared by the statute itself (L. 
122-2) with respect to satellite broadcasting if the source of broadcasting is 
on French territory. It is true, however, as H. J. Lucas rightly points it out, that 
this solution is not to be taken as "new". Its only benefit is that it sets up a 
clear norm of collision. Later, the author reaches the conclusion that the same 
norm applies to cases in which broadcasting takes place on demand, on 
account, or under the control of a company dealing with audio-visual activities 
and having its main seat in France (ss. 934-945). 
The analysis of lex mediatica is an interesting part of the book (ss. 
1009-1012). The issue, as far as I know, was first explicated by H. J. Lucas, 
and is further developed in this book. By lex mediatica he means the problems 
of protection of literary property rights in connection with works broadcast by 
means of satellites. The issue has become even more significant recently owing 
to the new possibilities of transmission by way of international computer 
networks. Lucas points to a parallel between this issue and the lex mercatoria 
(well known in international trade); the latter is also based upon custom. He 
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mentions as relevant aspects of the problem: (a) the responsibility for literary 
property rights in association with satellite broadcasting (as regulated in the 
French statute: L. 122-2/3); (b) the extension of responsibility to those operating 
cabel netwoks (that would allow for wider options of law enforcement of the 
author's rights); (c) the efforts to settle the problems of literary property rights by 
way of contracts concerning satellite broadcasting. However, the impact of lex 
mediatica (pretty much like the impact of lex mercatoria) makes its way in the 
world only on a voluntary basis or in arbitration procedures. As soon as the 
dispute is brought before regular courts, lex mediatica becomes irrelevant (ss. 
1009-1012). 
The analysis of the Bern Convention (ss. 1035-1125) and the international 
treaties derived (derivées) from it is quite remarkable. The latter include the 
Universal Copyright Convention (in French terminology: the Geneva Con-
vention), the International Rome Convention on the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, the WIPO (World 
Intellectual Property Organization) administered treaties (not in force yet -ss. 
1124-1126). Lucas justifies his decision to regard these conventions as 
"derivatives" by referring to the fact that the Bern Agreement for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works provided the basis for international literary 
property law. It vas the model for the derived conventions: they all rely upon 
it to a certain extent. (Although, according to the official terminology, they are 
"separate" conventions.) 
For the contemporary Hungarian reader, the discussion of the literary 
property law of the EU is of utmost practical importance. Although the relevant 
Directives of the EU Council are listed in section 113 in the Act LXXVI of 
1999, and discussed in a nutshell in the preamble to the bill, the average reader 
knows not much about the practice of literary property law in the EU. 
I regard it as a merit of the monograph that the topic is approached from the 
aspect of European law—and not literary property law. The issues are divided 
into three categories: 
the prohibition of discrimination based upon citizenship; 
— the free trade of goods and services; 
the freedom of competition. 
As to the prohibition of discrimination based on citizenship, Lucas mentions 
the decision concerning the Phil Collins case, in which the European Court had 
to consider section 125 in the German Literary Property Act of 1965. It 
discriminated foreign artists by not allowing them to prevent the trade of sound 
recordings in Germany if their permission is not given (while the right to such 
an action was granted to German performers). 
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With respect to the free trade of goods and services, the European Court had 
to answer the question of exhaustion of rights in the Deutsche Grammophon 
case. The decision was quite similar to verdicts in patent and trademark 
(Centrafarm) cases. The institution of exhaustion of rights became part of the 
European law (based on the practice of the European Court). It is manifested 
in the EU Council Directive of 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs and the Council Directive of 1996 on the Legal Protection of 
Databases. 
Among the forms of infringement of the freedom of competition, the abuse 
of superior strength seems to be by the most typical one. It is exemplified by 
the Magill case (also known in Hungary). In this case, the European Court 
contended that persons gaining rights from companies broadcasting radio and 
television programs enjoy de facto monopolistic position, and the defendant 
who gained such rights takes advantage of this situation. The facts were quite 
similar in the Tiercé Ladbroke case, in which the defendant denied the trans-
mission right of a horse-race to the Belgian Television. 
The examples from the practice of the European Court elucidate that in 
cases where substantial financial interests are at stake in a literary property 
rights dispute, the parties and the national courts exhaust all possibilities of 
legal interpretation. 
The work I reviewed is an interesting piece of reading owing to its logical 
and methodical way of explication and its critical attitude. Compared to the 
commentaries, it is quite refreshing. The reviewer was glad to see that, besides 
the frequently cited German, English, American and other foreign authors, he 
could find the name of the Hungarian Boytha several times. 
Alexander Vida 
CSABA VARGA: A jog társadalomelmélete felé [Towards a Social Science 
Theory of Law], {Jogfilozófiák [Philosophiae Iuris]} Osiris, Budapest, 1999, 
xi + 326 p. 
The title of the work itself is reminiscent of the socialist period, casting a light 
behind the false scenes of its prevailing ideology and the author's attempts at 
challenging it. For at the time when official Marxism had praised the perfection 
of the demands of theoricity and sociability in the researches in law, the author 
started publishing papers taking cognizance of such demands as failed promises 
exclusively, by proposing his papers to be taken as expectations heralding that 
the theoretical reformulation they undertook could result in a genuinely 
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academic advance, a pattern of future scholarly thought. At the same time, the 
title also indicates a claim of politics being elevated into a co-ordinate and 
complementary status to logic in law. For the socialist ideology was purist and 
non-compromising notwithstanding. For instance, when communist dictatorship 
had come to abuse and practically negate by the eventual annihilation of the 
law, the official administrators of "socialist legality" had felt as their obligation 
to cry out for its freeing from disturbing and undue interferences already when 
scholarship came close to observing anything more in the applied law than the 
mechanical outcome of an untouchedly sterile logic, working on nothing but 
the merely enacted laws. 
As to the scholarly development, the author's attempt at ontologically 
reconstructing the laws construction and functioning upon the bases patterned 
by George Lukács' late posthumous Towards the Ontology of Social Being 
aimed already in the early 70's at reconsidering the legal-theoretical problems 
of Marxism through a new terminology, introduced within the framework of a 
reformated philosophical background and methodology. Its further aim was to 
re-formulate former theoretical dilemmas within its own new scheme, on the 
one hand, by integrating into its proper system having in view their reconside-
ration and re-interpretation, instead of mere criticism or negation all those 
issues, theories and conceptualisations, that had been originated in the western 
hemisphera in our contemporary world, on the other. The individual papers 
collected in the present volume are conceived to have been instrumental to such 
a theoretical renewal, transforming its general philosophical and socio-scientific 
claims into concrete issues in concrete terms mostly in form of case-studies. By 
doing so, social science theory of law is taken as an ideal goal and, at the same 
time, as a touchstone of how and why to overcome by transcending Marxism. 
Accordingly, the characterisation of the social nature of law in one of the 
papers proves the misery of legal culture under socialism, as contrasted to 
overall legal security in the past. Or, drawing parallels between linguistic 
mediation and legal one in another paper points to the continued and ever 
growing self-emptying of socialist law. Also the destiny of the pair of categories 
of the economic basis and the ideological and institutional superstructure is 
shown within the much revealing framework of the gradual degeneration and 
self-sterilising rigidification of Marxism. 
The volume itself is a collection of papers re-edited in an enlarged, revised 
and corrected form originally published by the author in the period spanning 
from the beginning of his academic carreer in the mid-60's through two 
decades on. 
Its preface is followed by topics on (and individual papers dedicated to) 
Marxism and law (on the definition of law in the socialist theory of law in 
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general and in the 60's in particular, as well as on law taken as a mere 
superstructure), Legal formalism and its theory (on validity and efficacity of 
law as viewed front Lukács's ontological viewpoint), Law-making (on creation 
of law, as well as on codification and its limits), Motives of the rationalisation 
of law (on rationality and codification of law, as well as on rational Utopias in 
legal development), Law-application (on politics as a component to be 
controlled and channelled by logic, as well as on judicial activity and its logic 
viewed from the perspective of internal contradictions between ideals, reality, 
and future perspectives), Legal system and legal policy (on law as a system, as 
well as on the want of an autonomous legal policy), Law and morality (on law 
and its internal morality, as well as on law, society, language and values), 
Towards a social science theory of law (on theses about legal theorising upon 
the basis of Lukács's Ontology, as well as on macrosociological theories of law 
arriving from the lawyer's world concept to a social science theory of law), 
and, finally, Perspective (on the question whether is—or is not law in 
transition?). The volume ends by indexes according to subjects, normative staff 
used, and names. 
N. N. 
C S A B A V A R G A : A jog mint folyamat [Law as Process]. [Osiris könyvtár: Jog 
[Osiris Library: Law]} Osiris, Budapest, 1999, 430 p. 
Today it is a common understanding that our respective view of law is fitting 
within the framework of modern social scientific thought, albeit a long period 
of gestation preceded the time in Europe when its primitive idea was actually 
received. For legal scholarship had its turn to run the same path which for the 
science-philosophical and science-methodological reformulation of scholarship 
itself had been run, first, by natural sciences, and, secondly, by all the humanities. 
Covering the path said was by far not free from tensions and contradictions. For 
it had to touch upon foundational issues, and its stake was at the same time the 
scientific value of legal scholarship, on the one hand, and the chances to preserve 
the specificities and the particular autonomy of thinking in law and on law, on the 
other. Moreover, the new start after World War II has had to experience and 
overcome counter-running tendencies as well, mostly as a morally justified answer 
by the jusnaturalist reaction to the self-surrender of the legal profession and the 
almost completed internal emptying of law during the national-socialist regime. 
Recently, the decisive turn was signalled by the introduction of linguistico-
philosophical analysis and ontological approach in legal thinking. The law's 
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new concept is rather sensitive to the communicational foundations of our 
social practice, including the formative role played by the recurrently repeated 
and ceaseless series of our acts of (re)conventionalisation. It offers also a 
theory ready to reflect the ontological significance of linguistic games, that is, 
in law, first of all, of the deontology of the legal profession (i.e., "juristische 
Weltanschauung", the lawyers' world concept, which had once provoked 
Engels to exert nothing but exclusively ideological—or, to be sure, purely 
epistemological—criticism, with no regard to any guidance it might exert in 
actual practice). 
The final stage of the theoretical development formulated in the present 
book is an autopoietical understanding of law which, instead of interpreting the 
original methodological insight of autopoiesis in a systemic way in order to 
draw some internal dividing lines of any societal structure (as Luhmann and 
Teubner did), attempts at regarding our social world (made up by our daily 
conceptualisations and linguistic games) as a process in which ontological and 
epistemological approaches are unified in one view, that is, taken as a self-
structuring process in which also the differing methodological levels and 
professional ideologies of, e.g., problem-solving and justification in law, 
moreover, even the primitive ambivalence of all means of legal technique, can 
equally be explained. For the author's conception, this is the point where on 
the one hand and as a source of inspiration the recognition of the importance 
of historical human practice serving as a criterion (in the Marxist tradition in 
general and in the ontology of law as formulated by the author upon the basis 
of George Lukács's late posthumous social ontology in particular) and—on the 
other hand and as a pressing claim the contemporary methodological change-
over (in the English-American and Western European tradition, including, 
among others, speech-act theory, post-Wittgensteinian linguistico-philosophical 
analysis and cognitive sciences as well) can meet. 
The volume is a collection of papers—thoroughly revised and updated—pub-
lished originally by the author during the last two decades. Its preface is 
followed by topics on (and individual papers dedicated to) Theoretical legacy 
(on the development of philosophying about law in Central and Eastern Europe, 
as well as on the legal theory of Marxism), Modern formal law (on the culture 
of modern formal law with its challanges and limitations, as well as on 
Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law yesterday, today and tomorrow), Existence and 
validity of law (on the ontology of law, as well as on validity, on the law's 
ontological validity, and on ex post facto regulation as well), Law and history 
(on law and history, as well as on law as history), Anthropological foundations 
(on the path to have taken from legal customs to legal folkways, as well as on 
the question of anthropological jurisprudence based upon the study of Leopold 
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Pospísil and his comparative legal development), Legal techniques (on legal 
technique in general, as well as on presumption and fiction as means of legal 
technicalities in particular), Law-application (on Kelsen's theory of law-
application with its development, ambiguities and open questions, as well as 
on the components of judicial process, and also on law and logic viewed in a 
societal contexture mediated through legal reasoning), and, finally, Perspective 
(on the law's borders upon the basis of Antony Allott's study on the limitations 
of any effective legal action, as well as on European integration and the 
uniqueness of national legal development). The volume is closed by indexes of 
subjects, normative materials, as well as of names. 
N. N. 
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The Hungarian's science of international law and thus the Hungarian juris-
prudence in general suffered a grave loss: on April 13th 2001, Károly Nagy, 
Doctor of the Academy and Professor at the University of Szeged, Faculty of 
Law, Department of International Law passed away. 
His course of life led from Mezőberény through Gyula to Szeged where he 
stated his carreer at the Department of International Law- the headed by László 
Buza in 1957 and where he carried on his valuable educational and research 
activities for 44 continuous years. 
He advanced step by step in the hierarchy of university faculty: heading the 
Department of International Law from 1969 as an associate professor and as 
Professor between 1982 and 1996. his lectures introduced thousands of law 
students to the realm of positive international law and he examined their 
proficiency according to the high standards set by himself. He strived to 
promote a better understanding of international law among students by 
participating in the creation of various textbooks as co-author, writing several 
chapters, In 1995, he published a textbook on the history of international law 
[Nagy Károly: A nemzetközi jog, valamint Magyarország külkapcsolatainak 
története (A History of International Law and the External Relations of 
Hungary); Antológia Kiadó és Nyomda, Lakitelek, 1995.; 208 p.] followed by 
a comprehensive textbook on international law appearing in 1999 and providing 
ever since the best source of data and information available in Hungarian 
[Nagy Károly: Nemzetközi jog (International Law); Piiski Kiadó, Budapest, 
1999.; 68/0 p.] 
His scholarly activities featured numerous problems of international law: 5 
monographies, 28 major studies and dozens of other publications indicate that 
the law of international treaties, the relationship between international and 
national law, the institution of recognition, the protection of the environment 
by international law, the status of minorities in international and constitutional 
law all alike arose his interest as a jurist. But his most significant contribution 
to the science of international law is certainly related to the questions of state 
responsibility. Besides several studies concerning the topic mentioned above 
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he published an entire »tonography analysing the subject of international 
responsibility in its complexity [Nagy Károly: Az állam felelőssége a nemzet-
közi jog megsértése miatt (State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts); Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1991.; 243 р.]. His achievements in this 
field were acknowledged worldwide not only by academic circles: the 
propositions developed by Károly Nagy were cited on several ossasions during 
the ongoing codification process in the International Law Commission of the 
United Nations. 
Being a worthy successor of László Buda, his teaching and scientific 
methods are characterized by a positivist approach. The views expressed in his 
university lectures and in his writings were always based on positive law 
regardless of their compatibility with the actual political expectations. He 
handed down this attitude to his university colleagues and to his former 
students practising international law, as well. One should also mention that he 
was on friendly termes with practically each member of the small community 
of international lawyers in Hungary and this friendship was not confined to 
professional matters. 
He wanted to continue to teach and write until many years to come but 
these plans were shattered by the serious illness he had. The manuscript of his 
last study was already completed but he couldn't five to see it published. His 
professional heritage, his personality will not be forgotten but remembered and 
preserved in our hearts. 
László Bodnár 
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